• KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760

Viewing results 13 - 18 of 97

Opinion: Can the Aral Sea Be Saved? Central Asia’s Water Cooperation Test

For most people, the Aral Sea is known through climate documentaries and satellite images as shorthand for ecological disaster. Once the world’s fourth-largest lake, it withered after Soviet planners diverted its two lifelines, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, to turn Central Asia into a cotton empire. Over almost five decades, as much as three-quarters of the water in these river systems has leaked into desert soils rather than reaching the sea. NASA satellite data show that the blue inland ocean has been replaced by dusty basins. We all know that story. But the more urgent question is different: can the Aral Sea still be “saved” in any meaningful sense, in a century of climate stress and water shortages? Is it still capable of being restored to health? The honest answer is yes, but only if Central Asian states and their international partners stop treating it as a frozen symbol of Soviet failure and begin governing the entire basin as a shared, climate-vulnerable commons. Anything less is nostalgia with good drone footage. From Lake to Warning Signal The Aral Sea once covered about 68,000 square kilometers and supported fishing communities along what is now the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border. Before the large-scale Soviet irrigation projects of the 1960s, its level depended mainly on inflow from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, with smaller contributions from precipitation and groundwater. In the arid climate of the basin, the sea’s stability depended on a fragile balance between river inflow and water loss through evaporation. That balance began to collapse after Soviet planners expanded irrigation for cotton and rice, diverting water from rivers that had fed the sea for centuries. Evaporation continued while river inflow fell, and the sea shrank rapidly. By the early 2000s, time-lapse images published by NASA’s Earth Observatory showed large areas of deep blue water turning into exposed seabed and dust plains within a generation. The consequences went far beyond a retreating shoreline. As the water receded, the exposed seabed became the Aralkum Desert, a source of toxic dust contaminated with salt as well as fertilizer and pesticide residues. Winds carry that dust across farms and towns, degrading soil and crops while exposing residents to serious health risks. The IFAS Agency in Uzbekistan, a working body of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, coordinates projects and programs in the Aral Sea basin. The collapse of fisheries also devastated local livelihoods and food supplies. Researchers have linked the wider Aral Sea crisis to higher rates of respiratory disease and anemia. Some studies have also reported elevated cancer risks. The loss of such a large body of water has changed the local climate. Without the sea’s moderating effect, summers have become hotter and drier, while winters have become colder. These pressures are now compounded by climate change and the retreat of glaciers in the upstream mountains that feed Central Asia’s river systems. The Aral Sea is therefore more than an environmental tragedy. It is a warning of what can happen when political...

Opinion: Middle Powers and the “Voice of the Region” – Is Central Asia Becoming a Coordinated Actor?

Against the backdrop of growing global fragmentation and the weakening of universal international institutions, the role of so-called middle powers is increasing. These are states able to influence regional agendas without possessing great-power status. In this changing system, Central Asia is gradually moving beyond its long-standing image as a geopolitical periphery and is beginning to act more like a region with shared interests. For decades, the region was viewed mainly as a space where the interests of external powers, including Russia, China, the U.S., and others, intersected. Today, that paradigm is beginning to shift. Central Asia is showing greater signs of agency through what may be described as a cluster effect: individually, the countries have limited influence, but collectively they form an important transit hub between Europe and Asia, a growing market, a significant resource base, and a strategic security zone. This creates the conditions for a more coordinated regional position, even if a single regional voice is still emerging rather than fully formed. C5+Azerbaijan as a Foundation for Regional Architecture The institutional foundation of this process is the Central Asian leaders' consultative format, which is now expanding through Azerbaijan's participation. That is turning what was once a C5 dialogue into a looser C5+Azerbaijan, or C6, framework focused on transport, energy, and practical cooperation. Within this framework, the countries of the region are learning to act in a more coordinated manner without supranational pressure. In practice, this process is developing through three main areas. The first is transport and logistics. Azerbaijan's participation has strengthened efforts to make the Middle Corridor more coherent, though the route still faces bottlenecks in capacity, customs coordination, and Caspian crossings. Through tariff coordination, simplified border procedures, and investment in port and rail infrastructure, Central Asia and the Caucasus are increasingly functioning as parts of a single transport artery. That gives the region a faster option for cargo between China and Europe, even if it remains far smaller than traditional maritime routes. Shipping goods via the Suez Canal or the northern route can take between 35 and 45 days, whereas the Middle Corridor can reduce transit times to around 13-21 days under favorable conditions. According to forecasts cited by BCG, shipping volumes along the route could increase three- to fourfold during the current decade. Beyond logistics, the project is creating a new economic framework for the region. Its status as a crossroads is attracting investment in transport hubs and manufacturing facilities along the route, with the potential to turn transit corridors into zones of economic growth. This gives participating countries not only transit revenue but a stronger basis for long-term strategic resilience. The second major area is energy integration, where historical disputes over water and fuel resources are increasingly being supplemented by models of joint development. The Kambarata HPP-1 hydropower project in Kyrgyzstan, being developed with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, has created an important precedent for shared management of water and energy interests. The project is expected to support cleaner electricity generation while helping stabilize irrigation flows...

Opinion: The U.S. Still Doesn’t Know Where Central Asia Belongs

Washington cannot decide where Central Asia belongs. Is it part of Europe? Asia? The Middle East? The confusion is on full display in how the House of Representatives has reassigned the region across subcommittees in rapid succession. In the 116th Congress, which convened in 2019, Central Asia fell under the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment. Two years later, in the 117th Congress, it was moved to the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation. That arrangement barely settled before the 118th Congress shifted it again—this time to the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Now, in the 119th Congress, it has been relocated to the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia. On the banks of the Potomac, Central Asia has taken on a nomadic life of its own—constantly on the move, never quite settling in one place. At the State Department, Central Asia is grouped under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs alongside Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. At the Pentagon, by contrast, the Middle East team oversees relations with Central Asia, alongside countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. These mismatches are not just clumsy; they are strategically dangerous. By misplacing Central Asia, Washington is misreading the geography of China’s rise. It is time for Washington to stop the bureaucratic musical chairs and place Central Asia within a coherent grand strategy. Far from being an afterthought, the region is one of the most consequential pieces of the geopolitical puzzle facing the United States: how to respond to China’s strategy. This is because Central Asia sits at the heart of China’s decades-long effort to move its critical lifelines away from the Indo-Pacific and onto the Eurasian landmass. Over the past 15 years, China has quietly reoriented its energy routes, reducing reliance on maritime pathways vulnerable to U.S. naval dominance—particularly chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—and expanded overland imports across Eurasia. Today, China imports significant volumes of natural gas via pipelines from Turkmenistan and Russia, as well as crude oil from Kazakhstan. These continental routes are largely insulated from maritime interdiction, giving Beijing strategic resilience. Central Asia should be understood through this lens. For China, the region is not peripheral—it is essential. The pipelines, railways and trade corridors that underpin China’s resilience all pass through Xinjiang and Central Asia. In this sense, Central Asia is not merely adjacent to China; it is embedded in China’s vision of the future. This is why Washington’s practice of grouping Central Asia with South Asia misses the mark. The two regions operate under fundamentally different strategic logics. South Asia is centered on the Indian subcontinent, shaped by maritime dynamics and the India‑Pakistan rivalry. Central Asia, by contrast, is a continental crossroads—defined by overland connectivity, energy flows and great‑power competition across Eurasia. India, meanwhile, is geographically constrained—lacking direct land access to Central Asia due to territory administered by Pakistan and separated from China by the Himalayas—leaving it...

Opinion: A New Southern Gate – How the EU-Armenia Summit Unlocks a Critical Branch for the Middle Corridor

For the first time in its history, the European Union held a full summit with Armenia. The meeting, which took place in Yerevan on 4–5 May 2026, was not merely a diplomatic milestone for Armenia. It also sent a signal to governments thousands of kilometers away in Central Asia that the trade route linking Asia to Europe through the South Caucasus is becoming more real, and more politically backed, than ever before. The centerpiece of the summit saw the signing of a “Connectivity Partnership” between Brussels and Yerevan. The European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, described Armenia as "uniquely positioned" to connect Europe with the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Under the EU's Global Gateway program, investments in Armenia are expected to reach €2.5 billion. A further €3 billion is earmarked specifically for the Middle Corridor – the trade route that runs from China across Central Asia, over the Caspian Sea, through the South Caucasus, and into Europe. “We will support your integration into key transport networks like the Trans-Caspian Corridor. It is a route that is also of strategic importance for Europe, given the growing flows of trade between our two regions,” von der Leyen stated. A Route That Is Already Moving Fast The Middle Corridor, formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), has grown at a pace that few predicted. Cargo volumes rose 70 percent in the first nine months of 2024 alone, reaching 3.4 million tons. By the end of that year, the total had climbed to 4.1 million tons – up from just 350,000 tons in 2021. The World Bank projects that the route could handle up to 11 million tonnes a year by 2030. It's important to maintain some perspective. These numbers are small fry when compared to the billions of tons of trade that moves between Europe and Asia by sea. However, the Middle Corridor does offer important diversification, particularly given the spillover effects of wars in the Middle East and piracy in the Red Sea. [caption id="attachment_48602" align="aligncenter" width="1274"] Image: Trans Caspian International Transport Route and it’s southern part, China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway project. Source: middlecorridor.com[/caption] Where Uzbekistan Stands For Uzbekistan, the Middle Corridor is both an opportunity and a work in progress. In January 2025, President Mirziyoyev signed a decree to upgrade road and rail connectivity, and in September 2024, Tashkent co-founded the Eurasian Transport Route Association alongside Austria, Azerbaijan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkey. In December 2024, Uzbekistan sent its first block train all the way to Brazil – through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and the Georgian port of Poti – proving the route is operationally viable. But costs remain a challenge. Shipping a 40-foot container via the Middle Corridor currently costs between $3,500 and $4,500, compared to $2,800–$3,200 on the Northern Corridor through Russia. Europe, meanwhile, accounts for only around 3 percent of Uzbekistan's exports and 13 percent of its imports — a share that Tashkent wants to grow significantly. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway — a $8 billion, 573-kilometre project whose...

Opinion: Hormuz Crisis Pushes Afghanistan Aid Routes Toward Central Asia

The crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is usually viewed through the lens of energy security or military escalation. But it also has another, less visible, humanitarian dimension. A recent article in The Guardian, “Calls for humanitarian corridor through Strait of Hormuz as Iran war hits vital aid,” points to a critical shift: because of the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, along with instability around Hormuz, traditional humanitarian supply routes are beginning to break down. For Afghanistan, this is no longer a theoretical concern but an operational reality. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), cited by The Guardian, the cost of delivering food to Afghanistan has tripled. Cargo that previously moved by sea through Hormuz and onward to Pakistani ports must now travel overland across multiple countries, adding weeks to delivery times. The consequences are felt most acutely by vulnerable populations, particularly children. Predictability is one of the core requirements of any humanitarian system, and that predictability is now disappearing. Some shipments are stranded in regional hubs. Routes are constantly changing. Fuel costs continue to rise. Even modest increases in oil prices significantly raise operational expenses for humanitarian agencies. For Afghanistan, the implications are severe. The country has been in a prolonged food crisis for several years, with millions dependent on external aid. Delays of even one or two weeks can directly affect malnutrition and mortality rates. According to United Nations estimates, around 3.7 million Afghan children are currently suffering from wasting, nearly one million of them from severe wasting, a condition associated with sharply elevated mortality risks. UNICEF estimates that in 2026 alone, 1.304 million children aged 6-59 months will require treatment for acute malnutrition, including severe cases and other high-risk groups. Another 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are also suffering from acute malnutrition. Under these conditions, even temporary disruptions in aid deliveries become a direct threat to human life. The situation is being compounded by several overlapping factors. First, instability around the Strait of Hormuz has made maritime routes both more expensive and riskier. Second, the Pakistani corridor, previously the main overland route, has become unreliable, as repeated border closures and restrictions have tied humanitarian deliveries to the fluctuating political and security relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Third, Iran has imposed restrictions on food exports and has itself become part of the conflict zone, undermining its role as both a supplier and transit route for Afghanistan. Together, these developments are creating what can be described as a “triple crisis” for humanitarian logistics into Afghanistan. The previous aid delivery system is effectively ceasing to function. In response, the WFP is restructuring its logistics network. One solution has been increased use of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor: Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Although this route is longer and more expensive, it offers predictability and an alternative to disrupted maritime pathways. The key issue is no longer which route is cheapest, but which is reliable. This shift places Central Asia increasingly at the center of...

Opinion: The Regional Ecological Summit and the Making of a Central Asian Voice

On 22–24 April, Astana hosted the Regional Ecological Summit—a gathering of governments, international organizations, financial institutions, and civil society that marked a new level of ambition in Central Asia’s environmental diplomacy. Fifty-eight sessions were held across three days at a moment when Central Asia’s ecological agenda is becoming inseparable from its political and economic future. The opening ceremony was attended by the presidents of all five Central Asian states. The summit adopted the Astana Declaration on Ecological Solidarity in Central Asia and brought renewed attention to the need to reform the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). Taken together, these developments signal more than procedural diplomacy. They point to growing political momentum. The region has never lacked shared history or channels of communication. Russian remains a practical language of intergovernmental exchange, and borders, economies, rivers, energy systems, and labor markets have tied these countries together long before contemporary climate diplomacy gave this interdependence a new vocabulary. For decades, much external analysis of Central Asia expected this interdependence to produce confrontation, particularly around water and energy. Those risks remain real. Yet the Astana summit showed a more complex trajectory. Climate change, biodiversity loss, water insecurity, land degradation, and food security are not separate national problems neatly contained within borders. Addressing them is becoming one of the fields through which regional coherence is being built. The significance of the Summit lies less in ceremonial language than in the consolidation of multiple ecological agendas into a visible diplomatic architecture. Through its panels and high-level discussions, the Summit placed Central Asia’s natural heritage not at the margins of development but at its center. Ecosystems, rivers, glaciers, mountains, and landscapes are not only environmental assets. They are conditions for prosperity, stability, and resilience. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of IFAS reopened the question of whether the Fund, long criticized for its limitations, can be reworked rather than left as a symbol of failed regional environmental governance. Kazakhstan’s proposal for an International Water Organization should be read in the same frame: it is not merely a technical proposal about water governance but an attempt to move a Central Asian concern into the language of global institutional reform. Kyrgyzstan’s mountain agenda and Tajikistan’s glacier diplomacy also belong to this broader pattern. They are not just isolated national branding exercises. Together with Uzbekistan’s increasingly active regional posture, they form a wider mosaic: each country brings a distinct ecological priority, but these priorities are becoming legible as parts of one regional perspective, and its voice carries more weight when presented as such. This is particularly important in the current geopolitical moment. As larger powers turn inward, compete over corridors, or speak about Central Asia through the old grammar of influence, the region is attempting to define itself not as terrain for another “Great Game" but as a pole of its own. This does not mean distance from external partners. On the contrary, the United Nations was a strategic partner of the Summit, and many formats involved major international organizations, European...