Uzbekistan Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Census

Opinion: Uzbekistan Census – When the Village Reappears in the City

Uzbekistan's first census in 37 years did more than revise the country's population upward. It changed the map of where pressure is accumulating. The preliminary results put the population at 39,047,321 – 810,617 above the official estimate. That alone resets a planning baseline. Schools, clinics, housing, labor forecasts, and regional budgets all depend on knowing how many people a state is governing. The deeper story lies in the distribution. The largest correction was in Tashkent Region. Its population had been estimated at roughly 3.2 million. The census put it at nearly 3.8 million, moving it from seventh to third among Uzbekistan's regions. Five regions, Namangan, Jizzakh, Kashkadarya, Surkhandarya, and Bukhara, came in below estimate. This suggests that demographic pressure is more concentrated in and around Tashkent than the planning baseline assumed. The central question is now absorption: whether the state can integrate people whom a narrowing rural economy, growing water stress, tighter access to Russia's labor market, and rising expectations are all pushing toward its cities. The Arithmetic of Absorption More than 600,000 young people enter Uzbekistan's job market each year. The administration has said that by 2030, the annual figure will reach one million. Official unemployment fell to 4.9% in the third quarter of 2025, but 760,000 people were nevertheless registered as job seekers. Moreover the International Labour Organization estimates that informal employment accounts for about 40% of the workforce. Those figures complicate the headline rate. Much of the intake is still not finding stable, formal, better-paid work. This is the arithmetic driving everything else. The gap between the number entering the labor market and the number the formal economy can absorb has not disappeared, rather it has relocated. Some of this pressure has moved abroad, while the rest remains in villages as underemployment or has shifted to regional towns. But the census shows that much of it is shifting toward Tashkent and the region around it, where jobs, construction sites, universities, and expectations are concentrated. This does not mean every young person is leaving the countryside, or that rural life is collapsing. Uzbekistan's village economy remains large and socially central. Yet it can no longer absorb pressure as it once did, while older outlets are narrowing. How Water Multiplies the Pressure Water stress is one force among several. People leave when rural livelihoods become less secure, farm income less reliable, and the city starts to look like the only route into cash, education, and mobility. The rural economy was already changing before the latest water shocks. Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries accounted for 17.3% of GDP in 2025, down from 18.5% a year earlier. That is not necessarily a sign of failure. It is part of economic transformation. The problem begins when the transition outpaces the state's capacity to absorb people who lose their foothold in the old economy. Water rarely drives rural migration by itself. It erodes the remaining foothold of those still holding on. In vulnerable agricultural regions, especially along the Amu Darya, shortages sharpen an already...

Labor Migration

Opinion: Russia’s Migration Crackdown Tests Central Asia’s Labor Alternatives

Russia is no longer the unquestioned labor destination it once was for Central Asian workers. That shift is real, but it is easy to overstate. The Times of Central Asia recently reported that labor migration from the region is becoming more diverse. Workers are looking not only to Russia, but also to South Korea, the Gulf states, the United Kingdom, Poland, Belarus, and other destinations. The old Russia-centered model is weakening, even if it has not collapsed. The question is scale. It now intersects with two other filters: legal status and banking access. Alternative labor markets can absorb some Central Asian workers, but they cannot yet replace the Russian labor outlet. Russia did not function as an ordinary destination. For years, it acted as the region's largest external labor valve: geographically close, linguistically familiar, legally accessible for some, and large enough to absorb millions of workers across construction, services, logistics, agriculture, and municipal labor. South Korea, the UK, Poland, and the Gulf can offer higher wages and more formal recruitment channels. They can also reduce overdependence on Moscow. But they are more selective, more bureaucratic, and much smaller in immediate absorption capacity. That leaves a more important question: can new destinations expand fast enough to offset a narrowing Russian market? For now, the answer is probably no. Diversification Is Real, but Not Replacement The difference between diversification and replacement is crucial. A worker from Kyrgyzstan leaving for seasonal work in the UK, or a worker from Uzbekistan entering an organized recruitment program in South Korea, represents a genuine shift. These routes can be safer, better paid, and less exposed to the social hostility now facing many Central Asian migrants in Russia. But they cannot absorb workers on the same scale. Russia's labor market absorbed Central Asian workers in very large numbers because it had a combination few other destinations can match: proximity, low entry costs, dense migrant networks, Russian-language familiarity, and long-standing informal labor channels. Even as those channels become more restrictive, they remain embedded in household economies across the region. This is why diversification should be read as a partial adaptation, not a full exit. For governments in Tashkent, Bishkek, and Dushanbe, the search for new labor markets is necessary. It reduces exposure to Russian policy shocks. It gives workers more choices. It also helps governments negotiate better legal recruitment schemes. Yet the structural problem remains. If Russia closes the door faster than alternatives can open, pressure does not disappear. It returns home through unemployment, lower remittances, and frustrated expectations. The EAEU Line Russia's migration crackdown does not affect Central Asia evenly. The most important dividing line is not geography. It is legal status. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which allows the free movement of labor among member states. In practical terms, citizens of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have a different legal status in Russia than citizens of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. They do not face the same work-permit and labor-patent system. That does not...

Foreign Investment

Opinion: Why Deals Go Quiet – Contracts, Trust, and Business Development in Central Asia

The meeting had gone well. The counterpart had nodded at the right moments, asked sensible questions, and shaken hands warmly at the door. There had been no objection, no pushback, no obvious red flag. Then nothing happened. No follow-up call. No revised term sheet. No polite email explaining what had changed. Just silence, stretching from weeks into months, until the deal that had seemed close was quietly, undeniably dead. Foreign executives who have spent time in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, or elsewhere in Central Asia may recognize this pattern. It is often filed away as bad luck, an unresponsive partner, or a market that “just isn’t ready.” Sometimes those explanations are partly true. But in many cases, something more basic is at work: the parties are operating with different assumptions about trust, commitment, communication, and timing. There is a way to put this more precisely. In many Western commercial settings, the contract gives the commercial relationship its legal form: it records binding obligations, allocates risk, and defines what each side can enforce. In Kazakhstan, and in many business settings across Central Asia, the broader business relationship often remains the framework within which the contract is negotiated, performed, and sustained. Neither approach is irrational. The trouble begins when either side assumes its own is simply how serious business works everywhere. The issue is not that contracts are meaningless or unenforceable. It is that many deals do not close. They stall because the relationship, the people who actually back the deal, or trust around the transaction was never strong enough to carry it forward. In many Western commercial settings, the contract is treated as the main container of trust. Negotiation builds toward a signature, and the signature defines what each party now owes the other. After that point, performance is supported by process: lawyers, clauses, deadlines, courts, regulators, and dispute mechanisms. The relationship matters, but it is often understood as something that produces the contract. In Kazakhstan and across much of Central Asia, business development can work differently. The relationship often remains the container in which an agreement sits. A memorandum of understanding (MOU), for example, may be seen less as the end of the conversation than as one stage in a longer process of confidence-building. A foreign negotiator may believe the signature closes the matter. A local counterpart may believe it has only moved the relationship into a new phase. Neither approach is irrational. Both are ways of managing uncertainty. The difficulty begins when either side assumes its own approach is simply how serious business works everywhere. This is one of the details foreign investors often miss: failure rarely announces itself. There is no confrontation, no dramatic breakdown, no final meeting in which the deal is formally pronounced dead. It shows up instead as an absence. A phone that stops ringing. A term sheet that does not move. A relationship that goes quiet without explanation. A Western team may read silence as the absence of a problem. No news is good news. In...

Water Security

Opinion: The Amu Darya Stress Test – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the Politics of Agricultural Adaptation

Central Asia’s water crisis is usually discussed as a problem of rivers, reservoirs, and diplomacy. But in 2026, the Amu Darya is also becoming something else: a test of state adaptation. The river basin entered the irrigation season under acute pressure. According to data cited by Kabar, the flow of the Amu Darya stood at only 66.8% of its normal level as of February 11, compared with 101.8% a year earlier. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the river’s flow could fall to around 65% of its historical norm, raising risks for food security and agriculture across downstream states. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal is advancing. The canal, one of the Taliban government’s most ambitious infrastructure projects, is designed to divert water from the Amu Darya to irrigate large areas of northern Afghanistan. Carnegie Politika has estimated that, once fully operational by 2028, it could take up to 10 cubic kilometers of water annually from the river. For Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the implications are direct. Both rely heavily on Amu Darya water. Both inherited agricultural systems shaped by Soviet-era irrigation, cotton production, and centralized planning, and both are now facing a combination of climate stress, upstream extraction, and aging water infrastructure. Yet their responses are increasingly different. The emerging contrast is not simply between two agricultural policies; it is between two institutional logics: adaptation and control. Uzbekistan’s Adjustment Strategy Uzbekistan is one of the most exposed countries in the region. Its population is large, its agriculture remains water-intensive, and some of its most vulnerable regions, including Khorezm and Karakalpakstan, sit near the lower reaches of the Amu Darya. For decades, the old model relied on large-scale irrigation, cotton, rice, and the assumption that water would continue to move through the regional system much as it had before. That assumption is now weakening. Tashkent’s response remains costly and far from complete. Uzbekistan still faces serious water losses, degraded land, salinization, and uneven implementation of reform. But the direction of travel is visible: the state is trying to reduce exposure by changing crops, infrastructure, and diplomatic behavior. Rice is one example. Traditional flooded rice cultivation is extremely water-intensive, and water shortages have already pushed some Uzbek rice farmers away from traditional Amu Darya regions toward areas with more stable access to water. Uzbekistan has also begun experimenting with less water-intensive methods. In Karakalpakstan, UNDP has supported the introduction of upland rice, which can reduce water consumption by up to 40% compared with traditional rice cultivation. Separately, Uzbekistan has announced plans to expand resource-efficient rice cultivation, including drip irrigation and drought-resilient rice varieties. The state is no longer treating the old water-intensive model as untouchable. In 2026, Uzbekistan allocated significant public financing for water-saving technologies. Government-linked reporting has described plans to expand drip irrigation, sprinkler systems, and laser land leveling across hundreds of thousands of hectares, with a broader target of expanding water-saving technologies to 3.5 million hectares by 2028. Laser leveling may sound technical, but its use reflects a shift from simply demanding more...

Termez Dialogue 2026

Opinion: Indian Ambassador Says Shared Spiritual Legacy Reflects Indo-Uzbek Solidarity

TASHKENT, June 10, 2026 - Indian Ambassador to Uzbekistan Smita Pant used her official remarks at the Termez Dialogue 2026 to argue that connectivity between Central and South Asia cannot be judged by infrastructure alone. Roads, railways, ports, energy links, financial channels, and digital systems are essential. But durable cooperation also depends on confidence, cultural memory, and a willingness to treat sovereignty as a condition for partnership rather than an obstacle to it. The second meeting of the Termez Dialogue was held under the theme “Peace, Connectivity, and Resilience: Shaping the Foundation for Shared Prosperity.” It was organized by the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, in partnership with CICA. The forum fits into a wider Uzbek diplomatic push to reconnect Central and South Asia through political dialogue, trade, transport, climate cooperation, and cultural exchange. Pant’s address stood out because it placed the human dimension of connectivity at the center of the discussion. The broader idea associated with the Termez platform was captured in the phrase: “Eurasia needs not lines of division, but spaces of trust.” For India and Uzbekistan, that argument has particular force. Their relationship is not only diplomatic. It rests on older movements of people, ideas, language, food, faith, scholarship, and trade. That history gives modern policy a deeper base. Central and South Asia are often discussed today through the language of corridors, transit costs, sanctions risk, and access to ports. Those questions are real. The International North-South Transport Corridor, Chabahar, air freight links, customs procedures, and digital payment systems all matter to India’s practical engagement with Central Asia. But the old routes that connected India, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and the wider Eurasian space carried more than goods. They also carried habits of coexistence. “Connectivity is not just material. It is not just about roads and rail. It is also cultural, spiritual, financial, and digital,” she said, reminding delegates that human relationships and shared values constitute the most resilient infrastructure of all. [caption id="attachment_50469" align="aligncenter" width="2508"] Indian Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Smita Pant. Photo: Embassy of India, Tashkent [/caption] This is not a decorative point. Central Asia’s geography makes connectivity a strategic necessity, but its history shows that routes endure only when they are trusted. The UN General Assembly resolution on strengthening connectivity between Central and South Asia gave international backing to this agenda in 2022. The harder question now is how to make that connectivity commercially viable, politically acceptable, and socially useful. Pant’s answer was to frame India’s approach around sustainability and sovereignty. “India's approach on connectivity is guided by a very simple mantra – it must be built on the bedrock of financial sustainability and local priorities and should not bypass ideas connected to national sovereignty and independence. India’s approach to connectivity dictates that relations must be transparent, fair and benefit the person on the ground,” she said. That line is important because connectivity projects can easily become abstract. Maps look clean from a...

Infrastructure Finance

Opinion: Central Asia’s Shift from Silk Road Romance to Infrastructure Finance – What the June Forums Are Building

In mid-June, Tashkent and Baku will host two major international finance gatherings within the same regional window: the fifth Tashkent International Investment Forum in Uzbekistan, and the Islamic Development Bank Group’s 2026 Annual Meetings in Azerbaijan. The overlap in timing is useful less as a calendar coincidence than as a signal of how infrastructure, finance, and regional integration are now being discussed together. In Tashkent, the fifth Tashkent International Investment Forum opens under the theme “Investment Resilience: New Frontiers, New Partnerships.” In Baku, the Islamic Development Bank Group will convene delegates from its 57 member countries under the theme “Regional Integration for Sustainable Prosperity.” Add the Astana International Financial Centre’s increasingly active forum calendar, a new cross-border Islamic finance alliance signed in May among regional industry associations, and a stream of connectivity and green investment pledges from recent regional summits, and the wider region looks increasingly focused on turning connectivity talk into investment structures. The more important question is not how much money is being discussed, but what kinds of projects are becoming investable. One answer keeps surfacing: a multi-thousand-kilometer trade route that carries goods from China across Kazakhstan, over the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, and onward through Georgia and Türkiye to Europe. The Middle Corridor, formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, runs through many of the investment pitches now being made across the region. The forums show how infrastructure, finance, and regional connectivity are increasingly being discussed together. The corridor is one of the clearest tests of whether that agenda can move from conference language into bankable projects. For most of the past century, the world categorized this region under two headings. One is heritage: the caravanserais and blue domes of the old Silk Road. The other is hydrocarbons: the oil and gas beneath the Caspian basin. Both cast the region as a place value came out of or once passed through. The corridor proposes something more ambitious: that value should pass through again, but this time on terms shaped by the region itself. The shift is from selling what lies underground to earning from where the region sits on the map. Freight volumes on the Middle Corridor have risen roughly fivefold over recent years, while transit times have been cut from about a month to roughly two weeks as border procedures and port operations improved. The World Bank’s benchmark study sets out the goal of tripling freight volumes and halving travel time by 2030, and regional projections now point to annual throughput of around ten million tons or more by the end of the decade. For landlocked economies long dependent on a single route to world markets, a second viable artery is less a convenience than a form of strategic insurance. But turning a route on a map into a working corridor requires serious capital. It requires expanded port capacity on the Caspian, additional vessels and ferries, rail upgrades, terminal infrastructure, and the less visible digital and customs systems that allow cargo to clear multiple borders...