• KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
18 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 119

Opinion: What is on the agenda for Central Asia at COP31?

The 2026 United Nations Climate Change Conference, better known as COP31, is taking place in Antalya, Türkiye, from November 9 to 20. Delegations from almost 200 countries will participate in the event, including all the Central Asian republics, but Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan will play an outsize role in coordinating their messaging and ensuring the regional environmental agenda gets the time it needs in the spotlight. The buzzword for the C5 in Türkiye is “cooperation.” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources will host a meeting for Central Asia’s five environmental ministers at its national pavilion to discuss regional cooperation and joint climate initiatives. Uzbekistan is committed to contributing to common positions on glacier retreat, water security, adaptation needs, and equitable access to climate finance through the multilateral Mountain Group and the Group of Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs). Turkmenistan will continue pushing for the formation of the Ashgabat Climate Dialogue as a new multilateral platform for promoting climate change initiatives. In line with its Mountain Agenda, the Kyrgyz Republic will be lobbying for support to establish the Global Mountain Resilience Center in Bishkek. Mobilizing affordable climate finance is critical for all the republics. According to the Climate Policy Initiative, global climate finance reached $2 trillion in 2024, against estimated annual mitigation finance needs of $7.8 trillion through 2030. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Aziz Abdukhakimov, Presidential Adviser on Environmental Issues and Chair of the National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change of the Republic of Uzbekistan, stated: “Access to adequate, predictable and affordable climate finance remains essential for developing countries to achieve their climate goals. For Uzbekistan, the implementation of our national climate commitments is estimated to require approximately $33.7 billion for mitigation and $15.7 billion for adaptation by 2030.” Closing, or at least narrowing, that gap requires building support among international financial institutions, multilateral development banks, development partners, and private investors. The GEF Council, meeting in Samarkand ahead of the Eighth GEF Assembly, endorsed a $3.9 billion replenishment package (GEF-9), demonstrating donor interest and tangible commitment to climate projects, including for a restoration project in the Chu and Talas river basins shared by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and for a risk mitigation facility to attract private investment into Uzbekistan’s renewable energy sector. But there is hope that commitments at COP31 will go further. In September 2026, during Climate Week NYC, President-Designate Murat Kurum announced that Uzbekistan would be one of the first five pilot countries to receive support under the Climate Implementation Bridge (BRIDGE), the flagship initiative of COP31. This represents an important opportunity to translate national climate priorities into investment-ready projects and facilitate access to international financing. In his interview, Abdukhakimov stated that Uzbekistan’s focus will be “mobilizing investment in renewable energy, energy efficiency, climate-resilient infrastructure, sustainable water management, agriculture and ecosystem restoration.” At the same time, Kazakhstan will be presenting its plans to establish a national climate investment platform, plus a framework partnership program for developing the circular economy across Central Asia. Tajikistan will be...

Too Young to Be Responsible: When Children Raise Children in Uzbekistan

“The household chores are now on my shoulders.” The words come from a girl quoted in a UNICEF study of children affected by labor migration in Uzbekistan. Her grandmother died when she was in seventh grade. By the time she spoke to UNICEF, her grandfather had also died the previous year. She described cleaning, cooking, washing clothes, and looking after her brother, a household’s work done by one child. Her account raises a question that is rarely asked when an older sibling is praised for being helpful: who is looking after the child who is doing the looking after? In Uzbekistan, caring for younger brothers and sisters is often understood as oilaga yordam, helping the family. An older sister watches a baby while her mother cooks. A brother takes a little sibling outside. These arrangements can express affection and solidarity, and build independence, patience, and practical skills. But there is a difference between helping and becoming indispensable. What happens when caring for a younger sibling is no longer an occasional contribution, but the thing that decides how an older child spends their afternoons and how much freedom they have? Different Families, Different Boundaries In MEN AYOLMAN, a private Facebook community for Uzbek women, mothers were asked whether they let their children play outside without an adult, and whether they knew families where young children looked after even younger ones. The replies showed sharply different ideas of independence, safety and responsibility. One mother let her 12-year-old and 2-year-old go outside together. The older child looks after the younger, but with precautions: the courtyard is enclosed, there are security cameras and a guard, and she watches from the window. She reminds the older child not to lose sight of the little one. In her view, children can play together if they are independent enough and the place is safe. Another mother tried letting her six-year-old daughter go out with her four-year-old brother near their home. It did not work. The boy kept making demands, upsetting his sister and calling for his mother, who watched anxiously from the window and finally went outside herself. For her, it showed how hard it is to expect a young child to manage another child. A different mother said that some families in her neighborhood send small children outside with older siblings, but objected because the older ones are children themselves. “You can’t entrust a child to another child.” These comments concern outdoor supervision and are not a representative survey of sibling care in Uzbekistan. They show conflicting expectations: children should grow independent and responsible while being protected from burdens they may not be ready for. These accounts focus largely on the younger child’s safety. The older child’s well-being receives less attention. When Children Become Unusually Serious Mutabar Ruzikulova, a kindergarten teacher in Uzbekistan, has watched how responsibility for younger siblings can shape children’s behavior. In an interview for this article, she described children who seemed to become unusually serious or independent after taking charge of someone...

Opinion: China’s Regional Strategy Meets Central Asia’s National Bargains

The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway spent decades on the drawing board. Disagreements over its route and financing held it up long after the three governments endorsed the project. In 2024, a Kyrgyz parliamentarian asked railway officials a simple question: “Where will we find $1 billion?” A financing agreement signed in Bishkek on December 16, 2025, cleared a major obstacle. The railway is estimated to cost $4.7 billion. Chinese banks will lend about $2.3 billion to the joint project company over 35 years. China holds 51% of the company, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. The partners will provide the remaining funding as equity. In June 2026, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament approved in the first reading a separate $304.5 million loan from China’s Export-Import Bank to help fund its own contribution. That loan has a 25-year term. The joint company’s debt and Kyrgyzstan’s borrowing for its stake are different obligations, but both affect how much value the country will need to earn from the line. Kyrgyzstan wants business around the railway, including terminals and freight services; Uzbekistan gains a direct rail link toward China, while Beijing gains another route west. The governments agreed to build the line, but tariffs and terminal operations will help decide how the returns are shared. The same division between shared goals and separate deals runs through China’s C+C5 relationship with the five Central Asian states. At the second China-Central Asia summit in Astana in June 2025, the six countries signed a treaty on eternal good-neighborliness. The Chinese Foreign Ministry also published a list of 55 cooperation documents. The first 14 cover the regional China-Central Asia framework. The other 41 involve Chinese institutions and counterparts in individual Central Asian countries, including local authorities and companies. The count reflects how the agreements are organized rather than their financial weight. The regional documents cover road permits, customs procedures and green minerals. The country-specific agreements extend into particular industries and investment relationships. Customs cooperation shows how regional talks can lead to bilateral action. At a meeting on May 21–22, 2025, customs chiefs from China and Central Asia agreed to joint border inspections. The next day, Chinese and Kazakh officials conducted an inspection of Nur Zholy-Khorgos. They agreed to accept more trucks from Kazakhstan and recognize each other’s X-ray inspection images to reduce repeat checks. Kazakhstan’s customs authority explicitly linked the inspection to the regional meeting. The agreement illustrates how governments can address a shared concern through negotiations at an individual crossing. The Astana investment agreements reflected different national priorities. Kazakhstan pursued investment protection and applications for China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, while Kyrgyzstan signed documents on an AI application center and processing industries. These were country-specific arrangements within the wider regional framework. The railway illustrates why some projects require only a few governments to agree. After recurring disagreements over its route and funding, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan reached a financing settlement in 2025. They did not need all five Central Asian governments to negotiate a single position. Kazakhstan already has direct rail links...

Opinion: The Remittance Economy’s Promise: How Migration Could Support Women Entrepreneurs in Uzbekistan

Migration has become a major socio-economic process, substantially affecting Uzbekistan’s economic development and quality of life. The primary destination countries for labor migrants from Uzbekistan have been Russia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, and Turkey, as well as certain European and Asian countries. Remittances from migrants have become a major source of foreign currency inflows and a key form of economic support for households. Over time, they have raised economic activity and contributed to greater currency stability. In 2025, remittance inflows to Uzbekistan rose 28% compared to 2024, reaching $18.9 billion. Despite the positive growth of Uzbekistan’s economy, the country still faces limited employment opportunities. Although the unemployment rate dropped to 4.9% in the third quarter of 2025, a noticeable improvement, around 760,000 people remained unemployed and were looking for work. In 2025, the official average monthly salary in Uzbekistan was  6,376,700 soums (about $530 at the year-end exchange rate). This remains relatively low, pushing many working-age people to seek work abroad. When people picture remittances flowing into Central Asia, they usually imagine one scenario: the father who has gone abroad, sending his family in Uzbekistan “survival money” for rent, groceries, and school fees. In some small districts of Uzbekistan, however, this picture is starting to look different. That same money can now also become a source of opportunity: a sewing machine, a voucher for educational courses, or a business plan with a woman’s name on it. A Policy Shift Begins While remittances have substantially improved the living standards of recipient households and have become a crucial source of foreign currency for Uzbekistan, their effect on women is more complex. For some families, money sent home from abroad has been considered “out of the system.” These funds regularly supported family budgets, but financial institutions did not always recognize them as income. Recipients could lack the documented income or credit history needed to qualify for a loan, even when their families had received remittances for many years. However, a pilot program launched in March 2026 by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the European Union in cooperation with Hamkorbank, one of Uzbekistan’s leading banks, aims to change the picture. According to IFAD, the program’s credit scoring model uses remittances to assess a borrower’s ability to repay a loan. This approach could be transformational for rural women who struggle to access credit directly. It could enable rural borrowers to access formal loans, invest in small businesses, and build a credit history. Alongside the financial support, 900 rural residents, at least 50% of whom will be women, will have access to business and financial literacy training. In addition, 100 participants will receive enterprise mentoring to help them run or scale up their businesses. Faces Behind the Numbers Women face many obstacles in accessing credit, finding employment, and launching a business. According to the World Bank, they own nearly a third of registered micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises in Uzbekistan but receive only about 14% of loans to those businesses. This may be due to limited collateral or...

Opinion: C5+1 in Samarkand: What Uzbekistan Expects and What Washington Wants

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has arrived in Uzbekistan with a delegation representing more than 200 American companies. He is attending a C5+1 ministerial meeting with the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The agenda includes regional connectivity, energy security, trade, private investment, and economic modernization. The visit brings the format back to its birthplace. The first C5+1 ministerial meeting was held in Samarkand on November 1, 2015, with then-Secretary of State John Kerry. The November 6, 2025, summit in Washington gave the relationship a substantial commercial dimension. Uzbekistan and the United States announced economic agreements and trade contracts worth approximately $34.5 billion. President Donald Trump also said Uzbekistan intended to purchase and invest more than $100 billion in the United States over the following decade. Samarkand is now hosting a ministerial meeting accompanied by a large business delegation. The immediate question is how much of the previously announced portfolio has moved toward financing and implementation. In late September, Uzbekistan's Minister of Investment, Industry, and Trade, Laziz Kudratov, valued the project portfolio with the United States at $35 billion, with approximately $7 billion already completed. On that accounting, about $28 billion remains. In my assessment, the strongest overlap between American and Uzbek interests lies in processing critical minerals inside Uzbekistan, using American financing and technology to serve international supply chains. Washington wants alternative sources of strategic materials. Tashkent wants investment in industrial production rather than simply exporting raw materials. Their positions are less closely aligned on technology and relations with Iran. Uzbekistan seeks access to American artificial intelligence infrastructure while maintaining cooperation with China. It also regards Iran as an important transit partner. Washington's approach to sensitive technologies and sanctions could complicate both ambitions. Another Uzbek priority is ending the application of the Jackson–Vanik Amendment to Uzbekistan, a U.S. trade-law provision dating from 1974 that continues to affect the legal framework for bilateral commerce. Rubio can support its repeal, but Congress must make the decision. Investment Deals The C5+1 format has become more commercially focused. At the Washington summit, the U.S. Department of Commerce organized a dedicated venue for business agreements and announced more than $25 billion in commercial deals involving the five Central Asian countries. Since the Washington summit, Uzbekistan has developed additional channels for economic cooperation with the United States. A bilateral Business and Investment Council has brought together officials and business representatives. Cooperation has also expanded into critical minerals, energy, infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing. In June 2026, Uzbekistan's Ministry of Investment, Industry, and Trade, its Fund for Reconstruction and Development, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) announced a joint investment platform. Uzbekistan has also adopted a critical minerals development program for 2026–2030, covering 120 projects valued at $4.2 billion. The first stage includes 12 projects worth $166 million, with plans to produce high-purity selenium, tellurium, and rhenium. These plans reflect Tashkent's industrial priorities. Uzbekistan wants foreign partners to help build processing facilities and...

Opinion: China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway: Turning Transit Into Local Benefits

At the eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan on October 8, 2026, Azerbaijan joined the forum as a full member after three years of participation as a guest of honor. President Ilham Aliyev stated that “Transport is one of the primary areas of cooperation between Central Asia and Azerbaijan”. Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for comprehensive infrastructure along the routes, with logistics hubs and service centers supporting production facilities and industrial zones to generate economic activity around the transport corridors. Construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is among Uzbekistan’s transport priorities and is important for Kyrgyzstan, making this “integrated transport corridor development” approach particularly relevant. Construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway (also known as the Kashgar-Torugart-Makmal-Jalal-Abad-Andijan railway) has been underway since December 2024. Public discussion of the project focuses mainly on shorter routes linking China and Central Asia with the Middle East and Europe, and on the line’s design carrying capacity. However, growth in transit traffic does not in itself guarantee economic benefits for the Naryn and Jalal-Abad regions of Kyrgyzstan or the Andijan region of Uzbekistan. Local economic impact depends on whether freight services and tariff policy allow small shippers to use the railway’s stations. Border delays can limit those benefits, as can a lack of storage and processing infrastructure nearby. What the Project Involves The intergovernmental agreement on the implementation of the project was signed by China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan on June 6, 2024. The joint project company was registered in July 2024, the investment agreement was signed on December 20, 2024, and construction officially began on December 27, 2024, in Jalal-Abad. According to the Ministry of Transport of Uzbekistan, the total length of the line is 532.53 km; 20 stations are planned, including two border stations, one transshipment station, four intermediate stations, and 13 passing loops. The Makmal transshipment station will be the transfer point between China’s 1,435 mm track gauge and the 1,520 mm gauge used in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. From Torugart to Makmal, the 165.5 km section will use the Chinese gauge. The 146.26 km section from Makmal to Jalal-Abad will use the wider gauge, connecting to the existing network toward Andijan. At Makmal, containers will be sorted and transferred between trains. Wagons can instead have their wheel assemblies changed to run on the other gauge. Freight trains will be assembled or split up at the station, which will also have facilities to weigh wagons and cargo. The parties estimate the cost of the project at USD 4.7 billion. Under the loan agreement signed on December 16, 2025, about USD 2.3 billion is provided by a syndicate of Chinese banks as a 35-year loan to the project company. Another USD 2.3 billion or so forms the project company’s charter capital. China holds 51% of the shares, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. As of October 2026, construction is underway along the entire length of the route. In September 2026, the project company reported the completion of the first tunnel...