Uzbekistan Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Geopolitics

Opinion: The U.S. Still Doesn’t Know Where Central Asia Belongs

Washington cannot decide where Central Asia belongs. Is it part of Europe? Asia? The Middle East? The confusion is on full display in how the House of Representatives has reassigned the region across subcommittees in rapid succession. In the 116th Congress, which convened in 2019, Central Asia fell under the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment. Two years later, in the 117th Congress, it was moved to the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation. That arrangement barely settled before the 118th Congress shifted it again—this time to the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Now, in the 119th Congress, it has been relocated to the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia. On the banks of the Potomac, Central Asia has taken on a nomadic life of its own—constantly on the move, never quite settling in one place. At the State Department, Central Asia is grouped under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs alongside Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. At the Pentagon, by contrast, the Middle East team oversees relations with Central Asia, alongside countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. These mismatches are not just clumsy; they are strategically dangerous. By misplacing Central Asia, Washington is misreading the geography of China’s rise. It is time for Washington to stop the bureaucratic musical chairs and place Central Asia within a coherent grand strategy. Far from being an afterthought, the region is one of the most consequential pieces of the geopolitical puzzle facing the United States: how to respond to China’s strategy. This is because Central Asia sits at the heart of China’s decades-long effort to move its critical lifelines away from the Indo-Pacific and onto the Eurasian landmass. Over the past 15 years, China has quietly reoriented its energy routes, reducing reliance on maritime pathways vulnerable to U.S. naval dominance—particularly chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—and expanded overland imports across Eurasia. Today, China imports significant volumes of natural gas via pipelines from Turkmenistan and Russia, as well as crude oil from Kazakhstan. These continental routes are largely insulated from maritime interdiction, giving Beijing strategic resilience. Central Asia should be understood through this lens. For China, the region is not peripheral—it is essential. The pipelines, railways and trade corridors that underpin China’s resilience all pass through Xinjiang and Central Asia. In this sense, Central Asia is not merely adjacent to China; it is embedded in China’s vision of the future. This is why Washington’s practice of grouping Central Asia with South Asia misses the mark. The two regions operate under fundamentally different strategic logics. South Asia is centered on the Indian subcontinent, shaped by maritime dynamics and the India‑Pakistan rivalry. Central Asia, by contrast, is a continental crossroads—defined by overland connectivity, energy flows and great‑power competition across Eurasia. India, meanwhile, is geographically constrained—lacking direct land access to Central Asia due to territory administered by Pakistan and separated from China by the Himalayas—leaving it...

Middle Corridor

Opinion: A New Southern Gate – How the EU-Armenia Summit Unlocks a Critical Branch for the Middle Corridor

For the first time in its history, the European Union held a full summit with Armenia. The meeting, which took place in Yerevan on 4–5 May 2026, was not merely a diplomatic milestone for Armenia. It also sent a signal to governments thousands of kilometers away in Central Asia that the trade route linking Asia to Europe through the South Caucasus is becoming more real, and more politically backed, than ever before. The centerpiece of the summit saw the signing of a “Connectivity Partnership” between Brussels and Yerevan. The European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, described Armenia as "uniquely positioned" to connect Europe with the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Under the EU's Global Gateway program, investments in Armenia are expected to reach €2.5 billion. A further €3 billion is earmarked specifically for the Middle Corridor – the trade route that runs from China across Central Asia, over the Caspian Sea, through the South Caucasus, and into Europe. “We will support your integration into key transport networks like the Trans-Caspian Corridor. It is a route that is also of strategic importance for Europe, given the growing flows of trade between our two regions,” von der Leyen stated. A Route That Is Already Moving Fast The Middle Corridor, formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), has grown at a pace that few predicted. Cargo volumes rose 70 percent in the first nine months of 2024 alone, reaching 3.4 million tons. By the end of that year, the total had climbed to 4.1 million tons – up from just 350,000 tons in 2021. The World Bank projects that the route could handle up to 11 million tonnes a year by 2030. It's important to maintain some perspective. These numbers are small fry when compared to the billions of tons of trade that moves between Europe and Asia by sea. However, the Middle Corridor does offer important diversification, particularly given the spillover effects of wars in the Middle East and piracy in the Red Sea. [caption id="attachment_48602" align="aligncenter" width="1274"] Image: Trans Caspian International Transport Route and it’s southern part, China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway project. Source: middlecorridor.com[/caption] Where Uzbekistan Stands For Uzbekistan, the Middle Corridor is both an opportunity and a work in progress. In January 2025, President Mirziyoyev signed a decree to upgrade road and rail connectivity, and in September 2024, Tashkent co-founded the Eurasian Transport Route Association alongside Austria, Azerbaijan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkey. In December 2024, Uzbekistan sent its first block train all the way to Brazil – through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and the Georgian port of Poti – proving the route is operationally viable. But costs remain a challenge. Shipping a 40-foot container via the Middle Corridor currently costs between $3,500 and $4,500, compared to $2,800–$3,200 on the Northern Corridor through Russia. Europe, meanwhile, accounts for only around 3 percent of Uzbekistan's exports and 13 percent of its imports — a share that Tashkent wants to grow significantly. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway — a $8 billion, 573-kilometre project whose...

Afghanistan

Opinion: Hormuz Crisis Pushes Afghanistan Aid Routes Toward Central Asia

The crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is usually viewed through the lens of energy security or military escalation. But it also has another, less visible, humanitarian dimension. A recent article in The Guardian, “Calls for humanitarian corridor through Strait of Hormuz as Iran war hits vital aid,” points to a critical shift: because of the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, along with instability around Hormuz, traditional humanitarian supply routes are beginning to break down. For Afghanistan, this is no longer a theoretical concern but an operational reality. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), cited by The Guardian, the cost of delivering food to Afghanistan has tripled. Cargo that previously moved by sea through Hormuz and onward to Pakistani ports must now travel overland across multiple countries, adding weeks to delivery times. The consequences are felt most acutely by vulnerable populations, particularly children. Predictability is one of the core requirements of any humanitarian system, and that predictability is now disappearing. Some shipments are stranded in regional hubs. Routes are constantly changing. Fuel costs continue to rise. Even modest increases in oil prices significantly raise operational expenses for humanitarian agencies. For Afghanistan, the implications are severe. The country has been in a prolonged food crisis for several years, with millions dependent on external aid. Delays of even one or two weeks can directly affect malnutrition and mortality rates. According to United Nations estimates, around 3.7 million Afghan children are currently suffering from wasting, nearly one million of them from severe wasting, a condition associated with sharply elevated mortality risks. UNICEF estimates that in 2026 alone, 1.304 million children aged 6-59 months will require treatment for acute malnutrition, including severe cases and other high-risk groups. Another 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are also suffering from acute malnutrition. Under these conditions, even temporary disruptions in aid deliveries become a direct threat to human life. The situation is being compounded by several overlapping factors. First, instability around the Strait of Hormuz has made maritime routes both more expensive and riskier. Second, the Pakistani corridor, previously the main overland route, has become unreliable, as repeated border closures and restrictions have tied humanitarian deliveries to the fluctuating political and security relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Third, Iran has imposed restrictions on food exports and has itself become part of the conflict zone, undermining its role as both a supplier and transit route for Afghanistan. Together, these developments are creating what can be described as a “triple crisis” for humanitarian logistics into Afghanistan. The previous aid delivery system is effectively ceasing to function. In response, the WFP is restructuring its logistics network. One solution has been increased use of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor: Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Although this route is longer and more expensive, it offers predictability and an alternative to disrupted maritime pathways. The key issue is no longer which route is cheapest, but which is reliable. This shift places Central Asia increasingly at the center of...

Regional Ecological Summit

Opinion: The Regional Ecological Summit and the Making of a Central Asian Voice

On 22–24 April, Astana hosted the Regional Ecological Summit—a gathering of governments, international organizations, financial institutions, and civil society that marked a new level of ambition in Central Asia’s environmental diplomacy. Fifty-eight sessions were held across three days at a moment when Central Asia’s ecological agenda is becoming inseparable from its political and economic future. The opening ceremony was attended by the presidents of all five Central Asian states. The summit adopted the Astana Declaration on Ecological Solidarity in Central Asia and brought renewed attention to the need to reform the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). Taken together, these developments signal more than procedural diplomacy. They point to growing political momentum. The region has never lacked shared history or channels of communication. Russian remains a practical language of intergovernmental exchange, and borders, economies, rivers, energy systems, and labor markets have tied these countries together long before contemporary climate diplomacy gave this interdependence a new vocabulary. For decades, much external analysis of Central Asia expected this interdependence to produce confrontation, particularly around water and energy. Those risks remain real. Yet the Astana summit showed a more complex trajectory. Climate change, biodiversity loss, water insecurity, land degradation, and food security are not separate national problems neatly contained within borders. Addressing them is becoming one of the fields through which regional coherence is being built. The significance of the Summit lies less in ceremonial language than in the consolidation of multiple ecological agendas into a visible diplomatic architecture. Through its panels and high-level discussions, the Summit placed Central Asia’s natural heritage not at the margins of development but at its center. Ecosystems, rivers, glaciers, mountains, and landscapes are not only environmental assets. They are conditions for prosperity, stability, and resilience. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of IFAS reopened the question of whether the Fund, long criticized for its limitations, can be reworked rather than left as a symbol of failed regional environmental governance. Kazakhstan’s proposal for an International Water Organization should be read in the same frame: it is not merely a technical proposal about water governance but an attempt to move a Central Asian concern into the language of global institutional reform. Kyrgyzstan’s mountain agenda and Tajikistan’s glacier diplomacy also belong to this broader pattern. They are not just isolated national branding exercises. Together with Uzbekistan’s increasingly active regional posture, they form a wider mosaic: each country brings a distinct ecological priority, but these priorities are becoming legible as parts of one regional perspective, and its voice carries more weight when presented as such. This is particularly important in the current geopolitical moment. As larger powers turn inward, compete over corridors, or speak about Central Asia through the old grammar of influence, the region is attempting to define itself not as terrain for another “Great Game" but as a pole of its own. This does not mean distance from external partners. On the contrary, the United Nations was a strategic partner of the Summit, and many formats involved major international organizations, European...

New Uzbekistan

Opinion: The Reform Paradox for Uzbekistan: Global Capital, Political Control

In mid-May, Uzbekistan is preparing to take a major step onto the global financial stage – one that reflects its broader, decade-long push to open its economy to international investors. The country's National Investment Fund (UzNIF), a $2.4 billion vehicle holding minority stakes in 13 strategic state-owned enterprises, is preparing to list 30% of its capital on the London and Tashkent stock exchanges — the first time such a state-backed investment vehicle is being listed on international equity markets. For President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the move signals that Uzbekistan wants to be seen as an investable, reforming, and globally connected state. But the planned listing also captures the central paradox of Uzbekistan's current trajectory: the country is opening economically while remaining politically closed. Foreign investors are being invited in. State assets are being partially exposed to market discipline. Capital markets are being developed. Yet the political system remains tightly managed, with limited opposition, weak institutional pluralism, and few independent channels for releasing social pressure. That is why Uzbekistan's stability should not be read only as a strength. It should also be read as a system test: can controlled modernization keep producing legitimacy without creating political mechanisms for absorbing the expectations it generates? Mirziyoyev as a Controlled Modernizer Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s political style is not that of a frontline strongman constantly mobilizing society against enemies. His approach is administrative, developmental, and transactional: reform from above, personnel control, investment attraction, infrastructure, market opening, and the redistribution of economic flows. In this sense, Mirziyoyev is best understood not as a liberal reformer in the Western sense, but as a controlled modernizer. The reform agenda is real. Uzbekistan has moved to attract foreign capital, open selected state assets, improve its business image, and position itself as a more predictable investment destination. The UzNIF listing fits this broader effort: it is designed to deepen capital markets, signal openness to international investors, and show that the state is willing to place parts of its economic architecture under market scrutiny. But the political architecture remains tightly managed. Freedom House continues to rate Uzbekistan as "Not Free" — 12 points out of 100 in its 2026 report — citing the concentration of power in the executive branch, the absence of a genuine parliamentary opposition, and severe restrictions on independent journalists and human rights defenders. This is the central tension: Uzbekistan is reforming economically, but not politically. [caption id="attachment_48249" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Tashkent has opened up to investment over the past decade. Image: Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] Growth as Legitimacy For now, the model works because growth provides legitimacy. The World Bank expects Uzbekistan's economy to grow by around 6.4% in 2026, following 7.7% growth in 2025 – supported by domestic demand, private consumption, and continued investment. Public debt remains comparatively moderate at around 28% of GDP, and the country benefits from the perception that it is one of the more dynamic economies in the region. This gives the ruling system room to maneuver. The reform narrative allows the leadership to present itself as forward-looking without opening the...

Education

Opinion: Uzbekistan’s Growth Story Has a Skills Problem

Uzbekistan has become one of Central Asia's strongest growth stories. GDP expanded by 6.5% in 2024, and the Asian Development Bank projects growth of 6.7% in 2026 and 6.8% in 2027. Industry, services, and foreign investment are all expanding. The World Bank says real GDP growth averaged around 6% a year between 2017 and 2025. Beneath that momentum, however, a quieter problem is taking shape. Uzbekistan may not yet be training enough workers for the economy it is trying to build. The issue is not a shortage of capital; it is a shortage of market-ready skills. The country has moved from an isolated, heavily state-controlled economy toward a more open and reform-driven model in less than a decade. But if education, vocational training, and private-sector demand do not align faster, Uzbekistan risks turning one of the region's strongest demographic advantages into a labor-market strain. A Dividend That Could Become a Deficit Uzbekistan is a young country in every sense. About 700,000 young people enter the job market each year, while the working-age population is expected to keep expanding for decades. In development economics, this kind of demographic concentration is often described as a dividend: a period when a large share of the population is of working age, productive, and capable of driving growth. The risk is that the dividend does not materialize automatically. It depends on whether young people can move into productive, formal, and better-paid work. If the workforce entering the economy is not equipped with the skills employers need, the same demographic pressure can feed into informality, underemployment, migration, and social strain. The official unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in the third quarter of 2025. That is a meaningful improvement. But around 760,000 people remained registered as job seekers, and the International Labour Organization has estimated informal employment at about 40% of the workforce. Remittances also remain a structural pillar of household income: according to Central Bank data cited by local media, inflows reached $18.9 billion in 2025, up from $14.8 billion in 2024. This is not the picture of a country that has already solved its human-capital challenge. It is the picture of a country racing against time. The Mismatch at the Heart of the Problem The core challenge is not a shortage of graduates. Higher education has expanded dramatically. According to Uzbekistan's National Statistics Committee, coverage among 18- to 23-year-olds reached 47.7% at the start of the 2024/2025 academic year, up from 8.3% in 2017. The number of higher education institutions has also grown rapidly. By conventional access metrics, this is an extraordinary achievement. But enrollment alone is not the measure that matters. Employers need workers who can solve practical problems, operate modern equipment, manage digital systems, and adapt quickly to changing production and service needs. Too many students are still moving through programs shaped by an older economic model: credential-heavy, theoretically oriented, and weakly connected to the needs of a modern labor market in IT, manufacturing, logistics, energy, tourism, and services. The student-financing system has...