• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 44

Opinion: The U.S. Dollar Loses Its Luster as the Uzbek Som Shines

From May 20, 2025, to June 19, 2025, the U.S. dollar declined from 12,885 Uzbek som to 12,625 som, reaching its lowest level since early December 2023. This trend is anticipated to persist. Over the past 30 days, the dollar has depreciated by 2.08% against the som. The Central Bank of Uzbekistan adheres to a flexible exchange rate mechanism, commonly referred to as a floating exchange rate. This approach allows the value of the Uzbek som to be primarily influenced by market forces of supply and demand, rather than being fixed or pegged to another currency. In the context of Uzbekistan, the Central Bank defines the market-determined exchange rate, permitting the som to fluctuate freely based on the interactions between buyers and sellers in the foreign exchange market. In 2017, Uzbekistan transitioned to a flexible exchange rate regime, aligning the som with market conditions and narrowing the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates. This move is expected to enhance export competitiveness, as noted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). While the market predominantly determines the exchange rate, the Central Bank reserves the right to intervene in the foreign exchange market to mitigate excessive fluctuations or address significant imbalances. However, it does not maintain a fixed exchange rate. The primary objective of the Central Bank is to uphold price stability, ensuring low and stable inflation. The flexible exchange rate regime empowers the Central Bank to utilize interest rates as a tool to influence inflation and manage the overall economy. Since 2020, the Central Bank of Uzbekistan has been implementing an inflation targeting framework that guides its monetary policy decisions, including those related to the exchange rate. Uzbekistan has recently achieved a remarkable milestone, with its international reserves soaring to an unprecedented $49.6 billion, primarily driven by a substantial increase in gold prices. This significant figure, recorded at the end of last week, represents the highest level of international reserves since the Central Bank of Uzbekistan began tracking this data in 2013. Uzbekistan has been on a remarkable journey of financial growth, marked by a sustained increase in its reserves over the past five months. Since the beginning of the year, the country's reserves have increased by an impressive $8.48 billion, reaching a new historic high of $49.66 billion. In May alone, the reserves saw a substantial boost of $410.2 million, translating to a 0.8% increase compared to April. This consistent upward momentum not only highlights the resilience of Uzbekistan's economy but also demonstrates its ability to adapt and thrive in a dynamic global landscape. Central to this financial ascent has been the role of gold, which has enjoyed significant demand due to its elevated prices in international markets. Over the last month, gold prices surged by 3.27%, rising from $3,280 to $3,390.07 per ounce. When examining the broader trends, it is evident that gold has significantly appreciated, with a striking 25.5% increase since the start of this year and an even more impressive 41.3% surge over...

Opinion: From Xi’an to Astana – Elevating China–Central Asia Cooperation to a New Height

As summer awakens the vibrant landscapes of Kazakhstan, with lilac blossoms aglow and the Ishim River meandering through the capital, Astana is once again at the center of regional diplomacy. From June 16 to 18, Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit Kazakhstan to attend the Second China–Central Asia Summit — an event of both symbolic weight and strategic substance. This year’s summit marks more than a diplomatic gathering — it signifies the maturing of a young but increasingly impactful multilateral framework born from centuries-old ties. From the ancient Silk Road to today’s modern infrastructure corridors, the five Central Asian nations and China are deepening a relationship rooted in trust, driven by mutual benefit, and destined to shape the region’s collective future. Ancient Friendship, Strategic Renewal More than 2,100 years ago, Chinese envoy Zhang Qian opened the first pathway to Central Asia, laying the groundwork for millennia of exchange. In 2013, standing in Kazakhstan, President Xi unveiled the Silk Road Economic Belt, the founding vision of what would become the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), reviving the spirit of the ancient Silk Road for a new era. Since then, cooperation between China and Central Asia has grown from historical affinity into a full-spectrum partnership. Over the past decade, this partnership has reached “three completions”: the full establishment of comprehensive strategic partnerships between China and all five Central Asian countries, full coverage of BRI cooperation documents, and full alignment with the concept of a shared future for humanity. These milestones demonstrate not just diplomatic intent but a shared strategic outlook that has withstood global uncertainties. As Xi noted, the decision to deepen China–Central Asia cooperation is not a product of convenience, but a generational choice made by leaders with long-term vision, responding to the will of their peoples and the imperatives of regional stability. Tangible Results: A Shared Path to Modernization Since the launch of the China–Central Asia mechanism in 2020, progress has accelerated. The elevation of this platform to the leaders’ level in 2023 during the Xi’an Summit underscored its growing relevance. From the Xi’an Declaration to the establishment of a permanent secretariat, institutional foundations are now firmly in place. More importantly, the mechanism is delivering real results. Trade between China and the five Central Asian states reached a record $94.8 billion in 2024, a $5.4 billion increase from the previous year. New cooperation structures in transport, agriculture, customs, and emergency management are enabling efficient multilateral coordination. A flagship example is the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, now under active construction, marking a milestone in physical connectivity. This long-anticipated project, personally championed by the three heads of state, will reshape regional logistics and unlock new trade routes across Eurasia. Beyond rail, a web of cooperation is forming: the high-functioning Khorgos Gateway and the newly launched Kazakhstan Xi’an Terminal, increased Caspian Sea corridor traffic, and regularized freight trains between China and Central Asia. These are not mere infrastructure projects — they are lifelines of mutual development. Kazakhstan, in particular, is actively reinforcing its role as...

Opinion: China–Central Asia Partnership – Seeking Opportunity in a World of Uncertainty

Leaders from China and the five Central Asian countries will gather in Astana on Monday, two years after their inaugural summit in the Chinese city of Xi’an. However, as Chinese President Xi Jinping has often noted, “Our world is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century." The geopolitical landscape is markedly different from that of their first meeting, with both China and the Central Asian nations now facing a world of increasing uncertainty. In April, foreign ministers from China and the Central Asian countries convened in Almaty, Kazakhstan, where Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed concern over the rising tide of protectionism and unilateralism. He criticized the United States for launching a tariff war against more than 180 countries, saying it undermines international trade and destabilizes the global economy. Wang reaffirmed China’s commitment to openness. “China will consistently promote a high degree of openness, share opportunities with the world, and take responsibility for upholding international norms,” he said. Wang’s remarks were echoed by the Central Asian representatives, who voiced strong support for China’s vision of building a “community with a shared future” and pledged to deepen cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, said that China and Central Asian nations have set clear guidelines for collaboration in trade, energy, transport and logistics, education, and science. The ties between China and Central Asia stretch back to the ancient Silk Road camel caravans that carried not only goods but also cultures. At the first China-Central Asia summit in Xi’an, Chinese President Xi said: “Back in 2013, I put forward the initiative of jointly building a Silk Road Economic Belt during my first visit to Central Asia as Chinese president.” Like an echo of millennia past, the ancient Silk Road now finds its modern expression through connectivity and cooperation. In May, the first tourist train linking the Chinese city of Xi’an and Almaty, the largest city in Kazakhstan, made its inaugural journey. Also in May, Kyrgyzstan’s State Civil Aviation Agency reached an agreement with Chinese aviation authorities to open a new air route to the Chinese city of Kashgar. As part of the Air Silk Road initiative, this will become the second direct air link between Central Asia and Western China. [caption id="attachment_32911" align="aligncenter" width="1179"] The first tourist train between Xi'an and Almaty; image: CGTN[/caption] This is in addition to a key milestone in the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway project. In April, construction began on a 12-kilometer tunnel in Kyrgyzstan’s Jalal-Abad region. At the groundbreaking ceremony, Kyrgyz Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, Bakyt Torobayev, stated: “This project is not only of infrastructural importance. It paves the way for improved quality of life, economic growth, and stronger ties between regions and peoples.” [caption id="attachment_32913" align="aligncenter" width="1179"] China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway; image: CGTN[/caption] Beyond infrastructure, Kyrgyzstan is working to integrate with China’s banking payment system. A significant step was taken during a recent meeting in Beijing, where the finance ministers of both countries agreed to establish financial infrastructure for cross-border settlements...

Opinion: Strengthening the Silk Bonds — India’s Renewed Push Towards Central Asia

The velvet-draped tables of New Delhi’s 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue convened under the stewardship of External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar on June 6, 2025, radiated congeniality, with history and strategy converging. This high-level engagement, attended by foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, marked more than a diplomatic ritual — it signaled India's deepening resolve to recalibrate its strategic posture in a region too long shaped by other powers. Yet beneath pledges of shared civilizational futures and energy corridors, an uncomfortable truth lingered as India remains a guest, not a player, in Central Asia’s great power theatre. Further, India’s internal socio-political landscape presents notable challenges that inadvertently shape its foreign policy credibility, particularly in the eyes of Central Asian nations. Persistent communal tensions — most visibly manifested in the Hindu-Muslim divide, the controversial demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992, and the politically charged construction of the Ram Mandir — have deepened perceptions of religious polarization. Such domestic developments, while largely internal, resonate beyond India’s borders, especially in the Muslim-majority Central Asian republics, raising concerns about inclusivity and pluralism in India’s governance model. Simultaneously, India’s strained relations with key neighbors — Pakistan, and China, and increasingly volatile dynamics with Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka — have reinforced a regional image of discord and inconsistency. These internal and regional complexities contribute to a trust deficit, making Central Asian countries cautious in placing long-term strategic confidence in India. For New Delhi to emerge as a dependable partner in the region, addressing internal fissures and presenting a coherent, inclusive national vision is as vital as economic or diplomatic outreach. Central Asia sits at the center of ancient trade routes and modern geopolitical competition. For India, its importance is twofold: the region is a bridge to Eurasia and a repository of energy resources critical to India’s growing economy. But India’s historical connectivity to Central Asia — through the Silk Road, shared cultural legacies, and spiritual exchanges — has, for decades, been overshadowed by geographic and political barriers, notably the lack of direct overland access due to Pakistan. Recognizing these constraints, the dialogue showcased a strategic pivot. India reaffirmed its commitment to enhancing regional connectivity through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chabahar Port in Iran. While geopolitical instability in Iran and Afghanistan poses challenges, India's emphasis on multimodal routes demonstrates pragmatic flexibility. In an era defined by supply chain resilience and multipolar geopolitics, connectivity is no longer just an infrastructure question — it is a currency of influence. The dialogue also addressed the evolving regional security architecture. India’s proposal for counter-terrorism cooperation, capacity building, and intelligence sharing was timely and necessary. However, the dialogue echoed with familiar refrains, viz. civilizational bonds, shared destiny, and multipolar cooperation. Yet beneath the diplomatic choreography lies a haunting question. Can India transcend its historical role as Central Asia’s cultural cousin to become its strategic confidant? History whispers caution. The Burden of History: From Silk Roads to Shadow Roads For centuries, the Silk Road...

Opinion: What Uzbekistan’s FIFA World Cup Breakthrough Tells Us About State-Building

When Uzbekistan's goalkeeper Utkir Yusupov made those crucial saves against the UAE last night, securing his country's first-ever FIFA World Cup qualification, he was putting the finishing touches to a decade-long story about how nations build capacity, and what happens when they finally get it right. Uzbekistan's journey to the 2026 World Cup is not just a sports story. Go deeper, and you'll find something more interesting: a case study in institutional development. The Numbers Don't Lie Consider what Uzbekistan has pulled off in recent years. At Rio 2016, the country won 13 Olympic medals, placing 21st globally. In Tokyo, they obtained three gold medals despite disruptions caused by the pandemic. Uzbekistan achieved its best-ever performance at the Paris Olympics, securing 13 medals (8 gold, 2 silver, and 3 bronze), placing them 13th overall in the medal standings, first among post-Soviet states, and fourth among Asian nations overall. But the real story is the systematic nature of their success. Seven of those 13 Rio medals came in boxing alone, with three golds. At the 2023 World Boxing Championships in Tashkent, Uzbek fighters received five gold medals, the tournament's best overall performance. Boxers also dominated the Paris Olympics, bringing five gold medals to the national team’s account. Uzbekistan’s youth football teams have been even more dominant: AFC U-23 champions in 2018, U-20 Asian Cup winners in 2023, and U-17 continental champions twice since 2012. This is not random. Big tournaments reward institutional capacity, not just individual talent. Success on this scale requires functional sports federations, coherent youth development systems, and the kind of long-term planning that only works when bureaucracies can actually implement policies rather than just announce them. Small Economy, Outsized Results What makes Uzbekistan's breakthrough particularly striking is the economic context. Uzbekistan is not Germany or Japan leveraging massive GDP advantages. Uzbekistan's sports budget doubled to roughly $230 million by 2025, serious money for the country, but pocket change compared to what traditional powers spend. Yet they're outperforming nations with far deeper pockets. Their junior teams dominate youth football rankings. Their boxers routinely defeat athletes from wealthier countries. That efficiency ratio, results per dollar invested, suggests something important is happening at the governance level. The government has built over a hundred new sports facilities while doubling coaches' salaries. President Mirziyoyev's Presidential Olympics program scouts talent across all regions, attracting the best prospects to national training centers. Athletes now receive meaningful incentives: houses, cars, and scholarships. This is a systematic investment with clear metrics and accountability. The Quiet Politics of Athletic Success Sports remain one of the few arenas where state effectiveness can reveal itself without the outsized intrusion of politics. You can't fake your way to consistent Olympic medals or sustained success in FIFA youth competitions. These achievements require multiple sectors - education, healthcare, and urban planning - to function in coordination. Uzbekistan's sporting surge coincides with broader signs of improved state capacity under Mirziyoyev's administration. The infrastructure investments are real. The youth development programs are producing measurable results....

Opinion – The Quiet Competition: How the U.S. Is Losing Ground to China in Central Asia

Over the past decade, China has steadily expanded its presence in Central Asia, not through military force, but by building roads, trade corridors, and digital infrastructure. As the United States scaled back its regional footprint following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, Beijing moved quickly to fill the void. Today, China has positioned itself as the region's dominant external power, while the U.S. risks being left on the sidelines. At the heart of China’s strategy is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has provided over $1 trillion into infrastructure projects globally since its launch in 2013. This includes $704 billion in construction contracts and $470 billion in non-financial investments. In 2024 alone, BRI engagement reached $121.8 billion – $70.7 billion in construction and $51 billion in investments – and trade between China and the countries of Central Asia hit a record $95 billion, highlighting the depth of China's economic integration. This engagement has also created significant financial dependencies. Central Asian countries owe China roughly $15.7 billion, about 8% of the region's total external debt, and these loans are often opaque and carry terms that provide Beijing with outsized political leverage. Chinese firms are also laying fiber-optic networks and constructing electric vehicle corridors to link western China with its neighbors. In Tajikistan, for example, contractors are upgrading the Pamir Highway to support cross-border EV transport. Huawei and other Chinese tech giants are also expanding the region’s telecommunications infrastructure, raising serious concerns about surveillance, data sovereignty, and long-term digital dependency. China’s economic outreach is reinforced by high-level diplomacy. The China–Central Asia (C+C5) format has become the centerpiece of Beijing’s regional engagement. At the 2025 summit, leaders from across the region gathered to coordinate on connectivity, climate resilience, and trade facilitation. The regularity and substance of these summits stand in sharp contrast to the United States’ more sporadic diplomatic presence. The U.S. maintains the C5+1 platform and launched a promising Critical Minerals Dialogue in 2024. However, these initiatives have yet to match the scale or consistency of China's approach as U.S. infrastructure investment is limited, its commercial footprint is small, and diplomatic engagement is too infrequent to shift the region’s strategic trajectory. This matters. Central Asia is strategically located, resource-rich, and increasingly central to global supply chains and geopolitical competition. Kazakhstan alone supplies more than 40% of the world’s uranium. The region also serves as a testing ground for competing development models, and if the United States fails to become a more engaged and credible partner, China’s infrastructure-heavy, state-centric model may become the default. To remain competitive, Washington should recalibrate its approach in Central Asia. This includes pursuing bilateral deals that deliver real impact, such as deepening ties with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan through targeted investment packages, trade agreements, and joint-sector initiatives. It also means securing access to critical minerals by expanding private-sector investment in mining, processing, and transport infrastructure aligned with U.S. supply chain needs. Offering digital infrastructure alternatives is equally essential; the United States must support secure, interoperable, and transparent technology networks that...