Uzbekistan Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Central Asia - Iran Relations

Opinion: Why Central Asia Cannot Afford to Abandon the Iranian Route

Kazakhstan had barely secured a foothold in Iran’s largest commercial port when renewed military escalation made the southern route risky again. The problem for Central Asia is that Iran is more than a trading partner. For a region without direct access to the open sea, it provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. The agreement allocates two years for construction and the following 25 for operation. Astana expects the terminal to provide more direct access to markets in the Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. The project almost immediately found itself in a different reality. In July, U.S. strikes hit Iranian railway and coastal infrastructure. The Aq Taqeh Khan bridge on a rail route connecting Iran with Turkmenistan and, further north, with Kazakhstan, was damaged. There was no confirmed halt to Central Asian freight traffic, but military risk was no longer an abstract concern for carriers. That risk has now been compounded by a new U.S. sanctions campaign. On August 24, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent launched what Washington calls Operation Economic Outcast, combining direct sanctions with pressure on Iran’s foreign economic partners. The United States said it would set timelines for other countries to shut down economic activity with Iran, while the scope of secondary sanctions was expanded to cover five areas: digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping. Nearly 60 Iran-linked individuals, entities, and vessels were also sanctioned. The United States has not publicly identified which countries could face penalties first. War and sanctions can make the Iranian route more expensive, slower, and more dangerous. They cannot change geography. Iran gives Central Asia overland access to ports on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. From Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, cargo can move onward toward India, the Gulf states, and East Africa. Iran also provides a western overland route toward Turkey. This is one of the fundamental differences between the Iranian route and the Middle Corridor, which crosses the Caspian Sea before continuing through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The Middle Corridor requires cargo to move between rail and maritime transport. Iran offers the possibility of a continuous overland chain while also providing access to ports connected to the Indian Ocean. For Kazakhstan, the southern route is already more than a plan. Trade with Iran increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor reached 3.5 million tons, while rail traffic between Kazakhstan and Iran increased by 69%. It is this expanding transport network that is now exposed to greater military and sanctions risks. There is another factor. A free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, entered into force on May 15, 2025. It significantly reduced tariff barriers to trade in goods between the two sides. Uzbekistan offers...

Opinion

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan Show What Diplomacy Can Deliver as Vast Rail Project with China Advances

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev met on July 30 on the shores of Kyrgyzstan’s Lake Issyk-Kul, in Cholpon Ata, to sign the Treaty on Allied Relations. It was much more than business as usual. In their press conference, the leaders largely set aside the diplomatic boilerplate and expressions of mutual approbation that usually attend such summits. Instead, the meeting focused on putting a decisive end to mutual Kyrgyz-Uzbek grievances and rivalry, opting for dialogue over confrontation, stability over tension, and partnership over the quest for primacy in their bilateral relationship. Without ceding any of their sovereignty, they stressed that teamwork and shared responsibility—not the pursuit of great-power patronage or one-upmanship—are the surest way to advance common interests. Japarov, like Mirziyoyev, made clear that strategic-level collaboration always trumps short-term transactional gains. One of the biggest takeaways from the Japarov–Mirziyoyev summit was the confident demeanor and optimism with which they spoke about the future of Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations. Veering from his scripted notes and speaking in Russian to the press, Mirziyoyev said: “What an atmosphere we have today [here in Kyrgyzstan]. Look at what we're doing today— we're making history. This alliance — all of this will remain in history forever and ever.” Friendship, mutual respect, and hard work will produce “dynamic development” and “steady economic growth,” leading to “the well-being of peoples.” Business Development and Ahead of Schedule Once dismissed as an engineer's pipedream or a financier's nightmare, Japarov and Mirziyoyev said they’re staying the course on building strategic connectivity, energy, and water infrastructure, singling out the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the Kambarata-1 Hydropower Plant (HPP), projects that some considered unrealistic. The leaders made it plain that this railway will deliver huge benefits. As Mirziyoyev put it: "We will work together non-stop to develop trade and logistics infrastructure along this railway route." Beyond offering transit times faster than the northern routes, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway will boost tourism and bring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan hundreds of millions of dollars in transit revenue. Most importantly, it will unlock untapped economic resources, fueling new jobs, businesses, and logistics hubs along the corridor. After the Japarov-Mirziyoyev meetings, The Times of Central Asia spoke with Akramjon Nematov, First Deputy Director of Uzbekistan's Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies. Having been on site, he noted that the numbers and progress on the ground speak louder than any words or communiqués: "Construction is active at 83 of 107 planned sites on the Kyrgyz line, with over 10,000 workers and 7,000 units of heavy machinery deployed. Crews are drilling 26 tunnels through the Tian Shan, with over 13.5 kilometers of the main tunnel already cut, while 38 of 50 bridges are underway. The pace is staggering. I've watched this railway move Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations from friction to cooperation – and I measure progress not in words, but in cubic meters of earth moved." China has committed to supplying most of the capital and engineering capacity. The project carries a total capitalization of roughly $4.7 billion, structured as a $2.3...

Women's History

Opinion: A Century Apart, Two Official Visions of Uzbek Womanhood

A century ago, in 1926, the Russian-language Uzbek newspaper Pravda Vostoka published an appeal to the “working women of the Soviet East” written by Clara Zetkin – a Marxist and a women’s rights advocate from Germany. In its appeal for women’s unveiling, it asked where the mullahs had been while women suffered through the “dark past” and promised that Soviet law now shone “bright rays” over a liberated and free Soviet present. It closed not with a tribute to women, but with a slogan: “Forward to socialism! Always ready to fight for world revolution!” There was a significant problem with this text. Literacy among Uzbek women was extremely low, particularly in rural areas, and those who could read generally read Uzbek rather than Russian. Historian Marianne Kamp documents this gap in her book The New Woman in Uzbekistan. The article calling women to political consciousness was, therefore, not directly accessible to the overwhelming majority of its stated audience. That gap is not just a flaw in the propaganda or evidence of its exaggerated reach. Rather, it explains how the propaganda worked. A Russian newspaper speaking to Uzbek women who largely could not read it depended on party cadres, activists, public readings, meetings, and other literate intermediaries who could disseminate the message in Uzbek. It did not address an existing constituency so much as construct one – handing local organisers a model of the politically awakened Soviet woman they were expected to promote in villages where practically no woman could have read the article herself. [caption id="attachment_54189" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Uzbek women in the old city of Tashkent before going out into the street on International Women’s Day, March 8, 1924. Photo: Public domain.[/caption] The “working women of the Soviet East” were therefore both an audience and an emerging political category. That category served a larger claim the Soviet state was making about Central Asia: that the region was “backward” and required revolutionary socialist transformation. In Soviet rhetoric, as in some earlier Russian imperial writing, the condition of women became one of the principal measures by which a society’s level of development was judged. A society’s position on the imagined path from feudalism to modernity could be read from whether its women were veiled or unveiled, secluded or employed, illiterate or educated. Transforming women’s appearance and public role offered the state an especially visible means of demonstrating that Central Asia was leaving its supposedly backward past behind. This does not mean that Soviet female emancipation was merely an empty disguise for imperial domination. Many contemporary works by historians such as Adrienne Edgar, Marianne Kamp, and Shoshana Keller showcase the genuine changes produced by Soviet literacy campaigns, education, employment, family law, and women’s political participation. Soviet gender policy did not simply reproduce the restrained paternalism of the tsarist administration. It attempted, and in many ways succeeded, at a much more radical transformation in the realm of gender politics. What it does complicate is who was doing the defining. It is tempting to read...

Middle Corridor

Insider’s View: Why Uzbekistan’s Caspian Push Might Be Beneficial for Georgia

Over the past year, Georgia has shifted its focus towards Central Asia, establishing strategic partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The country has long-term plans for the region in several development areas, including trade and transport logistics. However, the current phase of Georgian–Central Asian relations is not solely based on economic pragmatism. It should also be viewed as a means of preserving sovereignty in the face of global challenges that are catalyzing the old-world order to collapse. In this context, strategic connectivity can be defined as a vital component of small states’ long-term stability and security, placing it on a par with defense capabilities. By intensifying political and economic ties with Tbilisi, Tashkent is seeking to reinforce the Western orientation of its foreign policy. This is necessary to successfully balance between the major powers and minimize the risk of becoming overly dependent on neighboring Russia or China, for example. However, this move should not be perceived as a counter to the geopolitical ambitions of non-regional actors in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. It is devoid of political overtones and reflects the parties’ desire to strengthen their sovereignty based on shared economic interests and opportunities. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) is the key driver in this dynamic, and its significance extends far beyond transport connectivity. It is a mutually beneficial initiative whose ultimate goal is to ensure regional stability and sustainable economic growth. Thus, Uzbekistan gains an alternative route to the European Union market — the country’s third-largest trading partner — via the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi on the Black Sea coast. Meanwhile, the Trans-Caspian route provides Georgia with access to the rapidly growing markets of East and South Asia via Uzbekistan and neighboring countries. The new transit corridor concepts promoted by Uzbekistan in the context of the expanding Central Asian partnership deserve special attention. Tashkent and Tbilisi have enormous potential to develop transport cooperation by establishing intercontinental logistics chains: China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey/EU, and India–Pakistan–Afghanistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–EU. Both projects involve connecting the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway and the Trans-Afghan Railway Corridor (the Kabul Corridor), which are an absolute priority for Uzbekistan, with the Middle Corridor. This will significantly increase the republic’s exports of transport services by attracting additional transit flows from the South Caucasus, Turkey and Europe, while also expanding the freight base for the aforementioned railway corridors. The issue of jointly promoting new trade routes along the east-west and north-south axes (from Europe to China and India, respectively) through Uzbekistan requires ongoing expert discussion to amplify its relevance. To fully realize its own transit potential, it is insufficient for Uzbekistan to focus solely on the infrastructure development of the Middle Corridor. This is because, even after the launch of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, the country’s ability to attract additional transit cargo flows would remain very limited due to Kazakhstan’s dominance in rail transport between the EU, Central Asia, and China via the Caspian Sea. For Uzbekistan, it is far more important to extend the Middle Corridor to China and India. This would...

Opinion

Uzbekistan’s Heritage Did Not Stop With the Silk Road

When people think of Uzbekistan’s architectural heritage, the images are familiar: the turquoise domes of Samarkand, the madrasas of Bukhara, Khiva’s walled city, and the monuments of Shakhrisabz. But Uzbekistan’s history did not stop with the Silk Road. At its 48th session in July, UNESCO inscribed “Tashkent Modernist Architecture. Modernity and Tradition in Central Asia” on the World Heritage List. The new site brings together ten buildings and urban complexes constructed between the 1960s and the early 1990s, during the period in which Tashkent was dramatically rebuilt following the 1966 earthquake. The inscription deserves to be celebrated. More importantly, it expands the definition of what Uzbek heritage can be. [caption id="attachment_52926" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Kosmonavtlar Metro Station, Tashkent; photo: Mathieu Lemoine[/caption] These buildings do not belong to the world of caravanserais and Timurid courts. They represent another layer of the country’s history: the ambitious and highly creative transformation of Soviet-era Tashkent. For decades, Central Asian heritage has often been viewed through a chronological hierarchy. The older a monument, the easier it is to recognize as heritage. Timurid architecture is obviously precious. A concrete building from the 1970s can appear more expendable. Tashkent shows why that distinction is too simple. UNESCO notes that the architecture developed after the earthquake combined industrialized construction and seismic engineering with local climatic, cultural and material conditions. The result was not simply Soviet modernism transplanted to Central Asia, but a distinct architectural language adapted to Tashkent. This broader understanding of heritage comes at an important moment. Uzbekistan is modernizing rapidly. Its cities are growing, tourism is expanding, infrastructure is improving and redevelopment is transforming urban space. Much of this change is necessary and welcome. Historic neighborhoods cannot be expected to function as open-air museums. Residents need reliable drinking water, sewage systems, heating, electricity, internet access, waste collection, accessibility, safe streets and comfortable housing. A leaking pipe is not “authenticity.” The more difficult question is how modernization takes place. [caption id="attachment_52925" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Tashkent Modernist State Museum of History; photo: Mathieu Lemoine[/caption] Uzbekistan has already experienced how delicate that balance can be. In Shakhrisabz, large-scale redevelopment substantially altered the historic urban fabric. The historic center was placed on UNESCO’s List of World Heritage in Danger in 2016 and remains there today. The experience offers an important lesson: preserving monuments is not necessarily the same as preserving a city. A city can retain its most famous madrasa, mosque or mausoleum while losing part of its heritage if the streets, neighborhoods, businesses and communities surrounding them disappear. The pressure is not only architectural. As tourism grows and historic centers become more desirable, economic incentives change. Houses can become hotels and restaurants. Businesses serving residents can give way to businesses serving visitors. Traditional workshops can struggle with higher costs. Redevelopment can create pressure on residents to relocate. Bukhara illustrates why this is important. Its identity rests not only on monumental architecture but on a living economy of craftsmanship. Gold embroidery, ceramics, jewelry, woodwork and other trades remain sources of employment as well as cultural identity....

Census

Opinion: Uzbekistan Census – When the Village Reappears in the City

Uzbekistan's first census in 37 years did more than revise the country's population upward. It changed the map of where pressure is accumulating. The preliminary results put the population at 39,047,321 – 810,617 above the official estimate. That alone resets a planning baseline. Schools, clinics, housing, labor forecasts, and regional budgets all depend on knowing how many people a state is governing. The deeper story lies in the distribution. The largest correction was in Tashkent Region. Its population had been estimated at roughly 3.2 million. The census put it at nearly 3.8 million, moving it from seventh to third among Uzbekistan's regions. Five regions, Namangan, Jizzakh, Kashkadarya, Surkhandarya, and Bukhara, came in below estimate. This suggests that demographic pressure is more concentrated in and around Tashkent than the planning baseline assumed. The central question is now absorption: whether the state can integrate people whom a narrowing rural economy, growing water stress, tighter access to Russia's labor market, and rising expectations are all pushing toward its cities. The Arithmetic of Absorption More than 600,000 young people enter Uzbekistan's job market each year. The administration has said that by 2030, the annual figure will reach one million. Official unemployment fell to 4.9% in the third quarter of 2025, but 760,000 people were nevertheless registered as job seekers. Moreover the International Labour Organization estimates that informal employment accounts for about 40% of the workforce. Those figures complicate the headline rate. Much of the intake is still not finding stable, formal, better-paid work. This is the arithmetic driving everything else. The gap between the number entering the labor market and the number the formal economy can absorb has not disappeared, rather it has relocated. Some of this pressure has moved abroad, while the rest remains in villages as underemployment or has shifted to regional towns. But the census shows that much of it is shifting toward Tashkent and the region around it, where jobs, construction sites, universities, and expectations are concentrated. This does not mean every young person is leaving the countryside, or that rural life is collapsing. Uzbekistan's village economy remains large and socially central. Yet it can no longer absorb pressure as it once did, while older outlets are narrowing. How Water Multiplies the Pressure Water stress is one force among several. People leave when rural livelihoods become less secure, farm income less reliable, and the city starts to look like the only route into cash, education, and mobility. The rural economy was already changing before the latest water shocks. Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries accounted for 17.3% of GDP in 2025, down from 18.5% a year earlier. That is not necessarily a sign of failure. It is part of economic transformation. The problem begins when the transition outpaces the state's capacity to absorb people who lose their foothold in the old economy. Water rarely drives rural migration by itself. It erodes the remaining foothold of those still holding on. In vulnerable agricultural regions, especially along the Amu Darya, shortages sharpen an already...