• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10663 0.38%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10663 0.38%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10663 0.38%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10663 0.38%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10663 0.38%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10663 0.38%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10663 0.38%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10663 0.38%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 117

Opinion: As Water Runs Short, Uzbekistan Faces New Migration Pressure

In the 21st century, Uzbekistan is no longer just confronting an ecological crisis - it is on the verge of socio-political transformations driven by water. As agricultural lands are being degraded and river flows are decreasing, the country is now facing what experts describe as a “slow-onset disaster”: internal climate migration. The roots of this crisis go back to the tragedy of the Aral Sea, once the world’s fourth-largest lake, which has shrunk to roughly 10% of its original area since the 1960s largely due to Soviet-era irrigation projects. The human toll has been enormous: not only is agriculture in decline, but the lives of the people living in the Aral Sea region have been profoundly altered. Each year, storms lift an estimated 15 million to 75 million tons of sand, dust, and salt from the dried Aral seabed, spreading it across Uzbekistan and the wider region. Now, another challenge is looming - the water supply. In 2018, 79,942 internally displaced people were reported in Uzbekistan. The dwindling water supply and the threat to agro-ecosystems are creating a new generation of climate migrants. The number of climate-related displacements is expected to reach 200,000 in the coming years. The Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, Uzbekistan’s hydrological lifelines, are under growing strain from climate change, inefficient irrigation, and transboundary water-distribution pressures. Experts warn that the country's water deficit could reach 7 billion cubic meters by 2030, and 15 billion cubic meters by 2050. The World Bank predicts that Uzbekistan's economy could shrink by 10% by 2050 if no meaningful action is taken to adapt to climate change. Now, another new factor threatens to accelerate this trend. The Taliban government in Afghanistan is building the Qosh Tepa Canal, a 285-kilometer irrigation project that will divert water from the Amu Darya River. According to Rieks Bosch, an international expert on natural resources and economics, the canal will divert 20% of the Amu Darya's water, which will exacerbate water shortages in some parts of Uzbekistan and negatively affect agriculture. "In any case, Uzbekistan will definitely suffer," he said.  Analyses show that up to 250,000 people could lose their jobs in agriculture as a result of water shortages. The most vulnerable regions - Bukhara, Khorezm, Karakalpakstan, Surkhandarya, and Kashkadarya - are located mainly in rural areas and depend on agriculture and livestock. With almost half of Uzbekistan’s population living outside urban centers, the loss of agricultural viability is not just an economic problem; it is the disruption of a way of life. “Water scarcity, air pollution, biodiversity loss, and a sharp decline in agricultural productivity are constantly increasing,” President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said at COP 28, acknowledging that these problems are “reaching their “critical peak.” Yet policy responses are still lagging behind the pace of environmental change. Uzbekistan’s climate migration problem cannot be solved by managing water resources alone. This requires a new strategic framework – a “Water-Migration-Security” strategy that combines regional cooperation, innovative water-saving technologies in agriculture, and proactive adaptation measures for the communities most at...

Insider’s View: Tashkent’s Water Diplomacy – From National Reforms to Regional Synergy in Central Asia

On April 22, a summit of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), one of the region's prominent organizations, takes place in Astana. The meeting of the Heads of the Founding States is especially significant because it marks the transition of the Fund's chairmanship to Uzbekistan for the 2027-2029 period. This will be our country's third mandate, following leadership terms in 1997-1999 and 2013-2016. Tashkent was at the forefront of the creation of IFAS. Yet returning to this leadership role after a decade comes in a fundamentally transformed regional landscape. Today, Uzbekistan brings not only substantial experience but also a broad portfolio of initiatives that have received international recognition. The Transformation of Uzbekistan's Water Sector for Sustainable Development Facing intensifying climate pressures alongside strong economic and demographic growth, Uzbekistan has made the restructuring of water resource management a core priority of state policy. The scale of the challenge is clear in the data. Over the last 15 years, per capita water availability in the republic has fallen by more than half, from 3,000 to 1,400 cubic meters per year. According to the Ministry of Water Resources, the annual volume of water resources has dropped to 51-53 billion cubic meters, a 21% decline from 1991 levels of 64 billion cubic meters. A major challenge remains the country's high dependence on external sources, as approximately 80% of surface water, or 41 billion cubic meters, originates outside the country. While the water shortage did not exceed 3 billion cubic meters prior to 2015, expert forecasts indicate that the deficit could reach 7 billion cubic meters by 2030 and 15 billion cubic meters by 2050. Recognizing the scale of these risks, Uzbekistan, under the leadership of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, is pursuing broad technological modernization of the water sector. In less than a decade, the area using water-saving technologies has grown from 28,000 hectares to more than 2.6 million hectares, now covering more than 60% of all irrigated land. At the same time, large-scale work continues across the country on canal concreting and the reconstruction of flume networks. By 2030, these systemic measures are projected to yield annual savings of up to 15 billion cubic meters of water. At the same time, the sector is undergoing digitalization. Currently, 11 information platforms are being deployed to manage the water cadastre, monitor pumping stations, and track land reclamation status. Over the past four years, the management of 100 major water facilities has been fully automated, the Smart Water system has been introduced at 13,000 water intake points, and more than 1,700 pumping stations have been equipped with real-time online monitoring devices. At the same time, the national economic model is also adapting. According to the Center for Economic Research and Reforms, the share of agriculture in GDP has declined from 32% in 2017 to 19% by 2024. Notably, against this backdrop, total agricultural production has increased by 17%. This divergence points to a transition toward more efficient resource use and higher productivity. Regional Synergy and Water...

Opinion: Supply Chains of Power: How Critical Minerals Are Shaping China–U.S. Competition in Central Asia

Central Asia is no longer a distant frontier for global geopolitics. It is developing into a central arena of competition for critical minerals, supply chains, and industrial power, where minerals are no longer simple commodities but have instead become key components of contemporary statecraft. In essence, this transformation highlights a recognition in Washington and other capitals that critical mineral supply chains are fundamental to next-generation energy systems, the development of artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic defense capabilities. Even as the global economy is multipolar, critical mineral supply chains remain highly concentrated and dominated by China. Control of rare earths is increasingly geopolitical, with clear economic, political, and security consequences. The significance of that imbalance is now shaping U.S. foreign policy, Central Asia’s development strategies, and the future of global economics. China’s Strategy: Control the Chain, Not Just the Mine Though many years in the making, China’s critical minerals strategy is still often misunderstood as focused primarily on resource access. However, Beijing’s efforts are far broader and more effective. Not only securing raw materials, the Chinese leadership has also worked to control the entire supply chain—from extraction to processing, refining, and manufacturing. China’s long-term focus and investments began in the 1980s with efforts that culminated in the Made in China 2025 plan for national and overseas manufacturing. In 2023 alone, Chinese firms invested more than $120 billion in overseas mining and processing, targeting key elements used in energy supply chains. Beijing also fed its industrial base by providing over $220 billion for the production of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable infrastructure. As a result, China now controls approximately 60% of lithium processing, more than 70% of cobalt refining, and over 90% of battery material manufacturing. Strategically, China controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining and associated technologies. Early investments in supplies enabled Beijing to subsequently concentrate funds into refining capacity to feed its industrial sector. This integrated approach has shifted the power dynamic for global supply chains tied to the critical minerals economy. As evidenced by Beijing’s near monopoly on processing, market control is not just associated with geological supplies but with processing capacity. China’s willingness to weaponize access not only to rare earths but also to processing technology demonstrates Beijing’s market muscle. This distinction is critical. Rare earth elements are not inherently scarce, but they are rarely found in concentrated deposits, making them difficult to extract and refine. Over decades, Beijing developed unique refining capabilities and subsidized an industrial base that disincentivized competition and encouraged processing to shift to China. The Vicious Circle Prohibitive investment costs, long development timelines, and market volatility have discouraged Western investment in alternative supply chains. Each stage (mining, processing, refining, manufacturing) is interdependent: miners won’t invest without buyers and offtake agreements, processors and refiners need secure financing and stable mineral supply, and manufacturers need steady inputs. Such interdependence creates an investment standoff and heightens perceptions of risk. By integrating all stages, Beijing exerts influence across global markets, from pricing to production. This has conditioned global markets...

Opinion: Trump Has Golden Opportunity to Launch C6+1 on Sidelines of UN

Representatives of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan — along with Azerbaijan, are expected in New York for the United Nations General Assembly in September. Historically, meetings between the Central Asian states and the United States – the C5+1 – have taken place on the sidelines of the United Nations. It is the most natural and logistically efficient venue for President Donald Trump to re-engage with the C5 partners he hosted at the White House last November. As of now, only foreign ministers are expected to attend the UNGA. But this could change if Trump extends an invitation to the leaders, according to a Central Asian diplomatic source. This time, however, he has the opportunity to add Azerbaijan, transforming the format into a C6+1. Baku has already been invited to participate as a full member in Central Asian gatherings, and Washington should build on that momentum. Azerbaijan is uniquely positioned: close to both Israel and Turkey – two of America’s most important regional partners – it sits astride one of the most important connectivity corridors linking Europe and Asia. Its inclusion would turn the C5+1 into a genuinely trans‑Caspian framework that reflects the emerging realities of Eurasian integration. The move would also link two major diplomatic achievements of Trump’s second term: the launch of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a 43-km strategic transit corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia, and Trump’s elevation of the C5+1 to a White House-level summit. While TRIPP was discussed at the C5+1 meeting in November, bringing Azerbaijan into the next gathering would allow the administration to present itself as the architect of a new Eurasian trade and energy map. Strategically, a C6+1 format carries significant implications for great-power competition with China. This is because Central Asia is so crucial to Beijing’s grand strategy. In its recently adopted 15th five-year plan, neighborhood diplomacy is listed as the top priority — ahead of relations with major powers or developing countries. Beijing seeks to build a “community with a shared future” with 17 neighboring states, including all five in Central Asia, to “create a favorable external environment” for national rejuvenation, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated. For China, Central Asia is a vital “hinterland” for energy and resource security, and a buffer against maritime disruptions. The United States does not need to dominate the Eurasian Heartland or force Central Asian states to choose between Washington and Beijing. It simply needs to ensure that any Chinese westward access runs through a vast landmass of countries that maintain constructive relations with the United States. A C6+1 format helps shape that environment without confrontation. A stable Middle Corridor – the energy and trade route running through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan to Turkey and the Mediterranean – also benefits America's energy-hungry allies in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea. Both increasingly look to Kazakhstan as an alternative oil supplier as they...

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments. When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable. The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed. Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability. However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game. History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained. There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you. This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly. This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia. First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection. Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central...

Opinion: Uzbekistan’s Strategic Reorientation in an Evolving International System

Almost as if responding to the pressures of a transforming international environment, the early twenty-first century has witnessed the emergence of Uzbekistan as a state seeking to redefine its strategic identity after decades of caution and relative isolation. When Shavkat Mirziyoyev assumed the presidency of Uzbekistan in 2016, he inherited a state possessing considerable demographic weight, a pivotal geographic position, and untapped economic potential, yet constrained by regional mistrust and international isolation. His policy has combined internal reform with a multi-vector diplomacy grounded in pragmatic calculations of national interest rather than ideological aspirations. At the global level, Mirziyoyev has pursued a diplomacy of equilibrium. Rather than aligning unequivocally with any major power, Uzbekistan engaged simultaneously with Russia, China, the United States, and Europe, seeking economic modernization and strategic autonomy in equal measure. This multivectorism is tantamount to a classical calculation: that for a state situated at the crossroads of great-power interests, independence is preserved not by isolation but by balanced engagement. In that sense, Uzbekistan’s involvement in the Board of Peace established by U.S. President Donald Trump highlights Tashkent’s readiness to engage in emerging diplomatic frameworks beyond traditional multilateral institutions. In his address during the first summit of the Board of Peace on February 19, Mirziyoyev stressed that “...Uzbekistan has supported the peacebuilding initiative of establishing the Board of Peace, and firmly declared its commitment to take a practical part in its successful implementation.” He added, “...Uzbekistan is ready to make a tangible contribution to the construction of residential buildings, kindergartens, schools, and hospitals.” Uzbekistan is driven by several motivations in joining the new organization beyond its multi-vector diplomacy. First and foremost, Tashkent seeks to elevate U.S.–Uzbekistan relations to the level of a strategic partnership grounded in economic cooperation and selective collaboration on global security and peace initiatives. In addition, Uzbekistan’s seat at the organization means its contribution to solving global crises, not just regional issues, which enhances its image as a ‘middle power’ in the foreseeable future. Secondly, this organization is aimed at maintaining international peace and stability through economic development. In this regard, it creates an opportunity for Uzbek construction and engineering firms to gain access to Middle Eastern markets and form partnerships with major global contractors by being involved in construction, engineering, and infrastructure development. This experience earns credibility for future projects. It should be noted that significant supply chains are needed for reconstruction, which presents Uzbekistan with opportunities to participate through its transport companies, air cargo services, transit routes, and railway logistics. Also, it is perfectly aligned with Uzbekistan’s vision of presenting itself as a regional connectivity hub. From a political perspective, supporting U.S.-led initiatives can secure potential diplomatic backing from international financial institutions and open avenues for partnerships across multiple sectors, particularly in technology. It sends a strong signal to Western investors that Uzbekistan is a reliable and responsible partner, which would potentially lead to increasing foreign direct investment. Political backing should be added to this list as the U.S. would assist Central Asia, including...