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Diplomacy

Turkmenistan Highlights International Outreach at Cabinet Meeting

A recent Cabinet meeting in Turkmenistan highlighted contacts with many countries and international organizations, reinforcing a perception that the tightly managed nation is taking more steps, however limited, to engage the world. Appearing via video link, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov presided over the May 1 meeting of ministers who covered economic growth, oil and natural gas production, scientific research, and other national priorities in a review of the year so far. But international outreach was a big part of the high-level discussion in an energy-rich Central Asian country often defined as opaque and restrictive. An account of the meeting by the Turkmenistan State News Agency (TDH) ticked off statistics: 220 delegations visited Turkmenistan this year, 400 delegations from Turkmenistan visited other countries, 711 negotiations and other meetings occurred in the country with foreign states and international agencies, and 57 more international documents were added to Turkmenistan’s legal code. “The development of diplomatic relations through foreign embassies is one of the important directions of the foreign policy work of neutral Turkmenistan,” said the report, referring to the country’s policy of non-alignment and not getting involved in the internal affairs of other countries. “Work on promoting relations with the countries of the Middle East is also ongoing,” it said. Iraq opened its embassy in Ashgabat in March, 17 years after Turkmenistan and Iraq established diplomatic relations in 2009. On May 4, Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan’s foreign minister, spoke by telephone with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi about regional security, Caspian issues, and other matters, according to the Turkmen Foreign Ministry. The ministry’s statement did not mention the Iran conflict or uncertainty surrounding the ceasefire with the United States. Turkmenistan’s international campaign is consistent with a pattern seen across Central Asia, where governments have sought to diversify their trade and diplomatic ties while maintaining close relations with the region’s major powers, Russia and China. Turkmenistan, however, still exports most of its natural gas to China, its largest trading partner. At the same time, Turkmenistan is intensifying efforts to integrate into the global trading system, with officials reaffirming plans to move towards membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is the last post-Soviet republic to start WTO accession talks. Turkmenistan’s leaders are also working on their international profiles. Berdimuhamedov attended an ecological summit of regional leaders in Kazakhstan last month. His father and predecessor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, traveled to the U.S. in February, China in March, and Austria in April. This month, he is due to travel to the Russian city of Kazan. Although government transparency is limited in Turkmenistan, father and son appear to run the country through a power-sharing arrangement. Outsiders are getting more glimpses of Turkmenistan. The capital, Ashgabat, hosted an international tourism conference in April. This month, the Reuters news agency reported on a trip there after being given what it said was “rare access” to travel in the country. It remains unclear, however, whether any efforts to engage with the outside world will materially change daily life in Turkmenistan, where people...

5 days ago

Regional Ecological Summit

Opinion: The Regional Ecological Summit and the Making of a Central Asian Voice

On 22–24 April, Astana hosted the Regional Ecological Summit—a gathering of governments, international organizations, financial institutions, and civil society that marked a new level of ambition in Central Asia’s environmental diplomacy. Fifty-eight sessions were held across three days at a moment when Central Asia’s ecological agenda is becoming inseparable from its political and economic future. The opening ceremony was attended by the presidents of all five Central Asian states. The summit adopted the Astana Declaration on Ecological Solidarity in Central Asia and brought renewed attention to the need to reform the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). Taken together, these developments signal more than procedural diplomacy. They point to growing political momentum. The region has never lacked shared history or channels of communication. Russian remains a practical language of intergovernmental exchange, and borders, economies, rivers, energy systems, and labor markets have tied these countries together long before contemporary climate diplomacy gave this interdependence a new vocabulary. For decades, much external analysis of Central Asia expected this interdependence to produce confrontation, particularly around water and energy. Those risks remain real. Yet the Astana summit showed a more complex trajectory. Climate change, biodiversity loss, water insecurity, land degradation, and food security are not separate national problems neatly contained within borders. Addressing them is becoming one of the fields through which regional coherence is being built. The significance of the Summit lies less in ceremonial language than in the consolidation of multiple ecological agendas into a visible diplomatic architecture. Through its panels and high-level discussions, the Summit placed Central Asia’s natural heritage not at the margins of development but at its center. Ecosystems, rivers, glaciers, mountains, and landscapes are not only environmental assets. They are conditions for prosperity, stability, and resilience. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of IFAS reopened the question of whether the Fund, long criticized for its limitations, can be reworked rather than left as a symbol of failed regional environmental governance. Kazakhstan’s proposal for an International Water Organization should be read in the same frame: it is not merely a technical proposal about water governance but an attempt to move a Central Asian concern into the language of global institutional reform. Kyrgyzstan’s mountain agenda and Tajikistan’s glacier diplomacy also belong to this broader pattern. They are not just isolated national branding exercises. Together with Uzbekistan’s increasingly active regional posture, they form a wider mosaic: each country brings a distinct ecological priority, but these priorities are becoming legible as parts of one regional perspective, and its voice carries more weight when presented as such. This is particularly important in the current geopolitical moment. As larger powers turn inward, compete over corridors, or speak about Central Asia through the old grammar of influence, the region is attempting to define itself not as terrain for another “Great Game" but as a pole of its own. This does not mean distance from external partners. On the contrary, the United Nations was a strategic partner of the Summit, and many formats involved major international organizations, European...

6 days ago

New Uzbekistan

Opinion: The Reform Paradox for Uzbekistan: Global Capital, Political Control

In mid-May, Uzbekistan is preparing to take a major step onto the global financial stage – one that reflects its broader, decade-long push to open its economy to international investors. The country's National Investment Fund (UzNIF), a $2.4 billion vehicle holding minority stakes in 13 strategic state-owned enterprises, is preparing to list 30% of its capital on the London and Tashkent stock exchanges — the first time such a state-backed investment vehicle is being listed on international equity markets. For President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the move signals that Uzbekistan wants to be seen as an investable, reforming, and globally connected state. But the planned listing also captures the central paradox of Uzbekistan's current trajectory: the country is opening economically while remaining politically closed. Foreign investors are being invited in. State assets are being partially exposed to market discipline. Capital markets are being developed. Yet the political system remains tightly managed, with limited opposition, weak institutional pluralism, and few independent channels for releasing social pressure. That is why Uzbekistan's stability should not be read only as a strength. It should also be read as a system test: can controlled modernization keep producing legitimacy without creating political mechanisms for absorbing the expectations it generates? Mirziyoyev as a Controlled Modernizer Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s political style is not that of a frontline strongman constantly mobilizing society against enemies. His approach is administrative, developmental, and transactional: reform from above, personnel control, investment attraction, infrastructure, market opening, and the redistribution of economic flows. In this sense, Mirziyoyev is best understood not as a liberal reformer in the Western sense, but as a controlled modernizer. The reform agenda is real. Uzbekistan has moved to attract foreign capital, open selected state assets, improve its business image, and position itself as a more predictable investment destination. The UzNIF listing fits this broader effort: it is designed to deepen capital markets, signal openness to international investors, and show that the state is willing to place parts of its economic architecture under market scrutiny. But the political architecture remains tightly managed. Freedom House continues to rate Uzbekistan as "Not Free" — 12 points out of 100 in its 2026 report — citing the concentration of power in the executive branch, the absence of a genuine parliamentary opposition, and severe restrictions on independent journalists and human rights defenders. This is the central tension: Uzbekistan is reforming economically, but not politically. [caption id="attachment_48249" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Tashkent has opened up to investment over the past decade. Image: Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] Growth as Legitimacy For now, the model works because growth provides legitimacy. The World Bank expects Uzbekistan's economy to grow by around 6.4% in 2026, following 7.7% growth in 2025 – supported by domestic demand, private consumption, and continued investment. Public debt remains comparatively moderate at around 28% of GDP, and the country benefits from the perception that it is one of the more dynamic economies in the region. This gives the ruling system room to maneuver. The reform narrative allows the leadership to present itself as forward-looking without opening the...

6 days ago

Floods

Heavy Rain and Mudflows Kill Four in Tajikistan

Heavy rain and landslides have swept parts of Tajikistan in recent days, killing at least four people and damaging dozens of homes, as well as roads and farmland. In one incident, a boat carrying students capsized in a river but all the passengers were rescued. Three people were killed and three others were hospitalized in the southern city of Kulob after an overnight deluge, the press office of Tajikistan’s presidency said on Saturday. President Emomali Rahmon expressed condolences and instructed top officials to go to the scene of the disaster and help affected families. Intense rainfall continued over the weekend. One person died and two others were seriously injured in a lightning strike in Kaduchi village on Sunday afternoon, according to Tajikistan’s Committee for Emergency Situations and Civil Defense. The victims were taken to a hospital in the western city of Tursunzoda. Mudflows damaged homes, roads, and other infrastructure in several villages and settlements. Some canals filled with mud, stones, and gravel before overflowing into nearby streets. Emergency workers brought in heavy machinery and pumps to clear debris and water. The boat that capsized on Sunday afternoon was carrying seven secondary school students and their class teacher on the Syr Darya River, which runs through the northern city of Khujand. The group had arrived at a cultural and entertainment park for the excursion. Boatmen and other people rescued the students, according to an official account.

6 days ago

Critical Minerals

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Critical Minerals Promise Is Running Out of Time

Kazakhstan has long been defined by what lies beneath its soil. Oil, uranium, copper, zinc, lead, chromium, gold, and other minerals have shaped the country’s post-Soviet economy and supplied the budget, export revenues, and industrial base that supported three decades of state-building. That model is now entering a more complex phase. In the first quarter of 2026, Kazakhstan’s industrial output slipped as mining and quarrying fell by 11.4%, with crude oil production down 19.8%, natural gas output down 20%, and other mineral extraction down 15.1%, according to figures reported from the Bureau of National Statistics. The oil decline also reflected specific disruptions. Kazakhstan’s energy minister said oil and gas condensate production fell 20% year-on-year in the first quarter, while production at Tengiz had only recently resumed after an outage linked to a fire at a power unit. Reuters reported that the field’s restart was gradual. Those short-term shocks should not be confused with the whole story. They expose a deeper vulnerability: Kazakhstan has been highly successful at extracting known deposits, but far less successful at replacing them. The World Bank’s mining sector diagnostic put the problem plainly. Kazakhstan is underexplored, greenfield exploration has been almost non-existent for about 30 years, and much of the geological data inherited from the Soviet period is incomplete or outdated. This is not a story of geology alone. It is a story of institutions, incentives, and time. Deposits deplete whether governments plan for it or not. The difference between a mature resource economy and a vulnerable one is whether exploration, processing, regulation, and regional diversification keep pace with extraction. The Arithmetic of Depletion Kazakhstan still has one of the strongest mineral endowments in Eurasia. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has described rare and rare-earth metals as having “essentially become new oil,” and told the government to expand geological and geophysical exploration from 1.5 million square kilometers to at least 2.2 million by 2026, according to Akorda. OECD analysis published in 2026 underlines why the stakes are high. Kazakhstan’s metals mining sector accounted for 12.1% of GDP in 2024. The country is the world’s largest uranium producer, can currently export 21 of the 34 critical raw materials on the European Union’s official list, and has some of the world’s largest reserves of chromium, zinc, and lead. Yet reserve strength on paper does not remove the operational pressure at existing mines. In 2022, Kazakhstan’s prime minister warned that reserve growth for many minerals had not been compensated and that major metal deposits in eastern Kazakhstan, including Orlovskoye, Maleyevskoye, Tishinskoye, and Ridder-Sokolnoye, could be mined out within the next decade, according to the government’s own account of its 2023-2027 geology concept. Gold shows a similar tension between headline potential and mine-level pressure. Industry reporting has linked a fall in Kazakhstan’s 2025 mining output targets partly to changes at Vasilkovskoye, one of the country’s largest gold deposits, where operations are shifting from open-pit to underground mining as easily accessible ore becomes harder to extract. MINEX Forum reported that the transition reduced...

6 days ago