Our People > Stephen M. Bland

Stephen M. Bland

Managing Editor and Head of Investigations

Stephen M. Bland is a journalist, author, editor, commentator, and researcher specializing in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Prior to joining The Times of Central Asia, he worked for NGOs, think tanks, as the Central Asia expert on a forthcoming documentary series, for the BBC, The Diplomat, EurasiaNet, and numerous other publications.

His award-winning book on Central Asia was published in 2016, and he is currently putting the finishing touches to a book about the Caucasus.

Articles

Earthquake

Earthquake Shakes Bishkek; No Major Damage Reported

A magnitude-4.3 earthquake struck near Besh-Kungey, about 19 km southeast of Bishkek, on September 12, 2025, at around 2:00 PM local time. The quake was very shallow - just 1 km deep - making its tremors strongly felt across the city. Local media outlet AKIpress described the quake as “strong,” with residents reporting shaking windows, rattled dishes, and minor panic, though no serious damage or injuries have been confirmed. The tremor’s intensity surprised many, given its moderate magnitude. No statement has yet been issued by the Kyrgyz Seismological Service confirming the depth or epicenter of the quake. Seismo.kg lists the event among recent felt tremors, but details remain scant. While the earthquake was clearly perceptible, especially in Bishkek, there are so far no reports of serious damage, injury, or casualties. Local authorities are monitoring the situation. Given Kyrgyzstan’s high seismic risk and known vulnerability in older or poorly constructed buildings, experts caution that even moderate quakes could carry elevated risk for such structures. This event underscores the seismic risk facing areas along fault lines in Central Asia. Though moderate in scale, it serves as a reminder of the importance of earthquake preparedness and resilient infrastructure in seismic zones.

6 months ago

Business Climate

Kazakhstan Factories Under Strain as Costs Bite, Economy Shows Mixed Signals

Kazakhstan’s manufacturing sector slipped further in August, with the latest Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) falling to 47.9. That was down from 49.9 in July and 49.7 in June, keeping the index below the neutral 50 mark for a third straight month. It also marked the sharpest deterioration in manufacturing activity since March 2022, according to S&P Global and Freedom Holding Corp. From Highs to Lows The striking downturn comes on the heels of a banner year. In December 2024, the PMI reached a record 53.9, capping 11 straight months of expansion. Buoyed by post-pandemic recovery and government support, manufacturing output grew by 6.8% in 2024, the fastest pace since 2011, helping push GDP growth to 5%. But momentum cooled as 2025 began. The PMI slipped to 51.5 in January, reflecting slower expansion after the year-end surge. By June and July, it hovered just under 50, signaling stagnation. Seasonal shutdowns for repairs in August contributed to weaker output, but analysts say the slide points to deeper structural pressures. [caption id="attachment_36026" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Kazakhstan’s PMI peaked at 53.9 in December 2024 but slid steadily through 2025, falling into contraction territory below 50 by mid-year and hitting 47.9 in August — the sharpest deterioration since March 2022.[/caption] Orders Dry Up, Costs Rise The August report revealed broad-based weaknesses. New orders fell for the first time in 19 months, ending a growth streak that began in early 2024. The decline reflected lower demand from both domestic and export markets. With fewer orders, factories scaled back staffing and cut input purchases. At the same time, costs surged. A weak tenge and fuel inflation made imports more expensive, while logistics delays lengthened supplier delivery times. These pressures forced firms to raise output prices at a faster pace, risking competitiveness. “August saw another sharp decline in business activity in Kazakhstan’s manufacturing sector,” said Yerlan Abdikarimov of Freedom Finance Global, which partners with S&P on the survey. He cited weak demand, volatile commodity markets, rising costs, and currency and tax pressures. Taxes have indeed become a burden. A new code passed in mid-2025 raised the extraction royalties on metals, hitting downstream metallurgy. Inflation stood at 12.2% in August 2025, with the National Bank keeping its policy rate high at 16.5% in a bid to tame prices. That leaves financing costly for businesses, resulting in squeezed margins and thinning confidence. The August survey showed business confidence at its lowest since 2021. While firms still expect growth over the next year, their optimism is increasingly cautious. Industry Responses and Government Initiatives Some executives see hope in the government’s industrial policy. A $400 million cotton-to-textile cluster is under construction with Chinese partners in Turkestan, aiming to process domestic cotton into textiles at scale. Officials say the project, due to start production by late 2025, will create thousands of jobs and expand exports. Light industries, such as textiles and apparel, posted strong growth in the first half of 2025, with clothing up about 5.6% and textiles 5.7% according to official data. Chemicals...

6 months ago

Trump Administration

Trump Reengages Central Asia Amid Tariffs and Rising Competition

In a bid that signals renewed U.S. interest in Central Asia, U.S. President Donald Trump on September 7, 2025, held what he described as a “great conversation” with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Earlier in the week, Trump also spoke over the phone with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, with both sides highlighting plans to expand their strategic partnership. Commentators have noted that Trump’s rhetoric and transactional approach to foreign policy in his second term create both challenges and opportunities for sustained U.S. engagement in the region. “Great Conversation” With Tokayev As he departed the White House for the U.S. Open men’s final, President Trump told reporters, “We had a great conversation,” though he offered no further details on the substance of the discussion. On Kazakhstan’s side, President Tokayev had reached out in July, expressing his openness to constructive trade talks following Trump’s imposition of 25% U.S. tariffs on Kazakh goods. In that July letter, Tokayev committed to “developing fair, predictable, and mutually beneficial trade relations.” He also emphasized his readiness for “constructive dialogue aimed at finding a rational solution.” The exchange reflects the broader importance of the U.S.–Kazakhstan relationship, which extends far beyond tariffs. Since 2017, the two nations have maintained an “enhanced strategic partnership,” covering trade, security, and energy cooperation. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer and a leading supplier to U.S. nuclear power plants, while American firms such as Chevron and ExxonMobil are deeply invested in the country’s vast oil fields. Strategically located between Russia, China, and Europe, Kazakhstan offers Washington a critical partner in promoting regional stability and developing alternative trade corridors traditionally reliant on Russian land. By engaging closely with Astana, the U.S. strengthens its foothold in Central Asia while securing vital resources and supporting Kazakhstan’s multi-vector diplomacy. Strategic Outreach to Uzbekistan Earlier the same week, Trump and Uzbekistan’s Mirziyoyev agreed to broaden their strategic partnership across economic, security, and cultural domains, the Uzbekistan press office reported. According to the office, Trump praised Uzbekistan’s “irreversible reforms” aimed at modernizing its economy and improving living standards, while Mirziyoyev lauded what he termed the “impressive results of the domestic and foreign policy” of the U.S. administration. This extension of engagement to Tashkent comes against a backdrop of longstanding U.S. involvement in Uzbekistan, including trade under bilateral agreements since the mid-1990s and cooperation on border control and counter-terrorism programs. In late 2024, shortly before Trump’s second term began, Washington reaffirmed its support for Uzbekistan’s bid to join the World Trade Organization, with U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai announcing the completion of bilateral market-access negotiations. That same year, U.S. officials also underscored opportunities in critical minerals cooperation with Tashkent through the C5+1 diplomatic framework. Beyond trade and security, Uzbekistan is strategically important as Central Asia’s most populous nation and a key transit hub between China, Russia, and South Asia. Closer U.S.–Uzbek ties complement Washington’s regional engagement with Kazakhstan, creating overlapping partnerships that strengthen American influence, promote economic diversification, and reinforce stability across Central Asia. Why Now? Geopolitics, Tariffs, and Regional...

6 months ago

gasoline

Russia’s Gasoline Export Ban: Limited Shock, Broader Lessons for Central Asia

Russia’s decision to prolong restrictions on gasoline exports has raised concerns in energy markets, but for Central Asia, the immediate fallout appears limited. The true significance lies in what the move reveals about structural dependencies, the role of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the region’s long-term push to diversify energy supplies. Moscow Extends Ban On September 2, Russian officials confirmed that the government may prolong its gasoline export ban for oil producers into October, extending measures first introduced in late summer. Deputy head of the Federal Antimonopoly Service, Vitaly Korolev, told state media that the authorities were weighing a one-month extension beyond the current deadline of September 30. As reported by Reuters, the aim is to stabilize domestic fuel supplies following refinery outages and a seasonal spike in demand. Ukrainian drone strikes have also damaged key refineries, reducing Russia’s production capacity by an estimated 10–17%. The ban affects a relatively small share of Russia’s overall fuel output but highlights the state’s readiness to intervene in energy markets. Previous restrictions in 2023 and 2024 temporarily halted shipments to stabilize domestic prices. The latest decision reflects similar concerns: tightening inventories, growing demand from the agricultural sector, and pressure to prevent inflation ahead of winter. While Moscow insists the measure is temporary, traders and governments across post-Soviet space are watching closely. Russia remains one of the world’s largest fuel exporters, and even marginal policy changes can cause significant ripples. Fuel Security in Central Asia For Central Asia, the impact of the ban will be blunted by exemptions. As members of the EAEU, both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continue to import Russian gasoline without interruption. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy issued a statement stressing that the country is self-sufficient, pointing to its refineries in Pavlodar, Shymkent, and Atyrau. “For countries that have signed the relevant intergovernmental agreement… these restrictions do not apply,” Minister of Energy, Yerlan Akkenzhenov, stated. Kyrgyzstan is highly dependent on Russian imports. However, according to Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy, the 1.6 million tons of fuel the country consumes annually, 93% of which is imported from Russia under intergovernmental agreements, will remain unaffected by the export ban. Since mid-summer, gasoline and diesel prices have climbed, driven by rising global oil benchmarks and repair work at several Russian refineries. Talks are already in progress to set revised supply volumes for 2026. Non-EAEU states face a different challenge. Uzbekistan sources fuel through state-brokered contracts with Russian companies, ensuring stability for now, but smaller private importers outside of these deals have reported difficulties accessing volumes. Late last year, the Chairman of Uzbekistan’s Central Bank warned that the country’s growing reliance on Russian fuel imports could increase vulnerability to supply shocks, which may translate into limited competition and rising prices. Tajikistan remains heavily dependent on Russian fuel through bilateral import agreements, and its virtually non-existent refining capacity makes it highly susceptible to external price fluctuations, a vulnerability underscored by seasonal diesel shortages and repeated spikes in domestic fuel prices. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, continues subsidizing its energy sector heavily:...

7 months ago

Rare Earth Elements

Kazakhstan’s Rare Earth Exports Under Political Spotlight as Strategic Role Grows

Kazakhstan’s rare earth metal exports are once again under scrutiny. On September 3, the leader of the Ak Zhol party in Kazakhstan’s parliament, Azat Peruashev, renewed his call for tighter control over rare earth exports. Peruashev formally urged the Minister of Industry and Construction, Ersaiyn Nagaspayev, to investigate and improve oversight after concerns that state control over ore shipments is increasingly being delegated to private labs without adequate verification. Peruashev’s statement raised the alarm about the possible undervaluation of exports and the concealment of valuable trace metals, a practice that could deprive the state of critical revenues at a time of growing global demand for rare earth elements. “According to the law on precious metals and stones, the state authority is responsible for control over the import and export of ores and concentrates. But based on the official response from the Ministry of Industry, it appears that state control has effectively been delegated to laboratories hired by the subsoil users themselves. The government agency does not verify the accuracy of its data and limits itself to just receiving the documents,” Peruashev said. The appeal marks the latest development in a controversy that first surfaced earlier this year. On March 7, The Times of Central Asia reported that Peruashev had submitted a formal parliamentary inquiry to Kazakhstan’s Anti-Corruption Service and the Ministry of Industry. That inquiry cited allegations from a former Kazakhmys lab assistant who claimed ore and concentrate exports were leaving the country without undergoing proper chemical analysis. According to the complaint, this practice allowed exporters to underreport the presence of rare earth and precious metals, artificially lowering shipment valuations to the benefit of powerful business interests. Kazakhmys rejected suggestions of intentional wrongdoing, stressing that any rare metals recovered during processing were incidental and directed to the state enterprise Zhezkazganredmet. The company added that it welcomed greater state scrutiny and dialogue. Peruashev’s renewed demand, however, indicates that concerns remain unresolved, particularly around whether the government has sufficient oversight to prevent leakage or mismanagement in an industry viewed as of increasing strategic and economic importance. A Geological Windfall This renewed debate comes as Kazakhstan’s rare earth sector enjoys unprecedented global attention. In April, TCA reported the discovery of a massive new deposit in the Karagandy region, unofficially dubbed “Zhana Kazakhstan,” estimated at 20 million metric tons of ore containing neodymium, cerium, lanthanum, and yttrium. Officials said average concentrations reached 700 grams per ton, a figure that, if validated, would position Kazakhstan among the world’s top three in rare earth deposits. In total, the government has identified 38 new mineral deposits, including 3.7 million tons of copper and nickel and 19 tons of gold. These discoveries are part of an ambitious exploration program that aims to expand mapped geological territory to 2.2 million square kilometers by 2026. For policymakers, the figures highlight both an opportunity and a dilemma: how to harness world-class reserves without falling into the trap of export dependence. At Home and Abroad International interest in Kazakhstan’s deposits is on...

7 months ago