Our People > Stephen M. Bland

Stephen M. Bland

Managing Editor and Head of Investigations

Stephen M. Bland is a journalist, author, editor, commentator, and researcher specializing in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Prior to joining The Times of Central Asia, he worked for NGOs, think tanks, as the Central Asia expert on a forthcoming documentary series, for the BBC, The Diplomat, EurasiaNet, and numerous other publications.

His award-winning book on Central Asia was published in 2016, and he is currently putting the finishing touches to a book about the Caucasus.

Articles

Energy Security

Kazakhstan Targets 2027 Exit From Routine Russian Electricity Imports

Kazakhstan wants to stop buying electricity from Russia by 2027. The challenge is whether it can do so while keeping homes warm, mines running, and fast-growing regions supplied when demand peaks. The target is a test of whether the country can close a power deficit caused by years of underinvestment, rising demand, aging thermal plants, and uneven regional supply. The goal was restated this month by Deputy Energy Minister Sungat Yessimkhanov, who said Kazakhstan expects to reduce its electricity shortfall this year and bring it down to zero in 2027. The pledge builds on earlier government comments that Kazakhstan would cut imports as new domestic capacity comes online. In February 2025, Yessimkhanov told Kazinform that Kazakhstan planned to reduce electricity imports from Russia and could stop buying foreign electricity once planned capacity was commissioned in 2027. The gap is small on paper, but it carries political weight. Kazakhstan may be energy-rich, but its electricity system has been running short. The country produces coal, oil, gas, uranium, and growing volumes of renewable power, yet it still relies on imports from Russia to cover gaps between generation and consumption. In 2025, Kazakhstan generated 123.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity and consumed 124.6 billion kilowatt-hours, according to a January government meeting on new capacity. Installed capacity rose from 25.3 gigawatts to 26.7 gigawatts, but demand still exceeded domestic generation. Data from KEGOC, Kazakhstan’s national grid operator, shows how narrow the margin has become. In 2025, the gap between production and consumption was 1.4956 billion kilowatt-hours. KEGOC said the shortfall was covered by supplies from the Russian energy system. Kazakhstan received 4.6388 billion kilowatt-hours from Russia and sent 2.1595 billion kilowatt-hours back. That left a net power flow from Russia of 2.4793 billion kilowatt-hours, down from 3.4111 billion kilowatt-hours in 2024. The planned 2027 shift does not mean Kazakhstan will disconnect from Russia’s grid. The objective also fits a wider pattern in Astana’s energy policy: not breaking with Russia, but reducing the number of areas in which Russia is the default route, supplier, or emergency backstop. In oil and trade, Astana has been trying to expand alternatives to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium route through Russia, including through the Middle Corridor. In electricity, the logic is narrower but similar. Ending Russian power imports would not make Kazakhstan energy-independent, but it would turn one more Russian-linked dependency from a structural need into a contingency option. Kazakh energy analyst Zhakyp Khairushev made this distinction in comments to LS, stating that Kazakhstan has a real chance to reach annual self-balance in 2027, but a stable surplus will be harder. The key issue is not only installed capacity, but available capacity during peak hours, winter demand spikes, and repair periods. A megawatt of wind or solar power does not play the same role as a megawatt of coal, gas, or flexible generation during a cold evening. Kazakhstan’s deficit is not only about total output; it is also about where electricity is produced, when it is available, and whether the grid...

16 hours ago

Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be tracking the culmination of Bishkek's power struggle as charges are formally brought against Tashiyev, alongside a fresh wave of EU sanctions that look designed to make an example of one Central Asian state. We'll also break down the shutdown of a key Kazakh pipeline carrying oil to Europe, Russia's increasingly blunt statements on foreign military deployments across the region, Ashgabat's crackdown on Starlink connections in Turkmenistan, and the EU's push to turn Central Asia into a transit point for Afghans being deported back to Afghanistan. We'll also cover the spread of a new strain of foot-and-mouth disease tearing through the region. And for our main story, we turn to the mounting ecological crisis in the Caspian Sea, where falling water levels and worsening environmental pressures are becoming impossible for the region to ignore. On the show this week: Vadim Ni, co-founder of the Save the Caspian Sea movement.

4 days ago

Victory day

No Tanks on Red Square as Moscow’s Victory Day Pull Fades in Central Asia

Russia’s Victory Day parade on May 9 is set to be more restrained this year, with tanks, armored vehicles, and missile systems absent from Red Square for the first time in nearly two decades. The Russian Defense Ministry cited the “current operational situation,” while the Kremlin blamed what it called Ukrainian “terrorist activity.” Russia also reported drone attacks aimed at Moscow in the days before the ceremony, and security around President Vladimir Putin has been tightened. The reduced scale of the parade carries a resonance beyond Russia. Victory Day remains one of the most emotionally charged dates in the post-Soviet calendar, including in Central Asia, where families still remember relatives who fought, died, or labored during World War II. But across the region, the holiday has increasingly been placed inside national calendars rather than left as part of Russia’s political script. The contrast with last year is sharp. In 2025, Moscow marked the 80th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat with its largest Victory Day parade since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Chinese troops marched on Red Square, Xi Jinping sat beside Putin, and foreign leaders attended from across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet space. Tanks, rocket launchers, missile systems, drones, and other military hardware rolled through the square. This year’s guest list is more limited. The Kremlin’s initial list of foreign delegations included leaders and senior figures from Belarus, Laos, Malaysia, Slovakia, the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska. Attendance has also been hard to read. Earlier reports said Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov were expected in Moscow, while the Kremlin’s initial published list of foreign guests did not include any Central Asian presidents. On May 8, however, Kazakh and Uzbek media reported that Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev were traveling to Moscow for Victory Day events. The late confirmations complicate the picture, but they do not restore the full regional show of unity seen in the last two years, when all five Central Asian presidents were present at the Moscow parade. It does suggest, however, that Moscow’s political ownership of the date is less automatic than it once was. Victory Day, which commemorates the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in what Russia calls the Great Patriotic War, has long been one of the main rituals of modern Russian power. It draws large television audiences, fills public space with military symbolism, and presents the Kremlin as the guardian of a sacred national memory. The holiday speaks of sacrifice and family loss, but also of nationalism and state control over history. Putin has used that language repeatedly. On May 9, 2024, after appearing on Red Square in snowfall, he said Russia was going through a “difficult, milestone period,” and warned: “We will not allow anyone to threaten us. Our strategic forces are always in combat readiness.” In 2025, he used the 80th anniversary parade to link Soviet wartime memory to Russia’s current war, saying...

5 days ago

Energy Security

Uzbekistan’s Gas Output Falls by 15% as Imports Rise

Uzbekistan’s natural gas production fell by 15% in the first quarter of 2026, adding pressure to an energy system already strained by rising demand, aging infrastructure, and lower hydrocarbon output. The country produced 9.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas in January-March, down from 11.3 billion in the same period last year. The figures are based on data from Uzbekistan’s National Statistics Committee, which also listed declines in oil, coal, and gas condensate production. Oil output fell to 157,300 tons in the first quarter, compared with 160,800 tons in the same period last year. Coal production declined from 1.2 million tons to 1.1 million tons, while gas condensate output fell even more sharply, dropping from 296,600 tons to 242,300 tons. Motor gasoline production rose to 313,200 tons, while diesel output increased to 280,900 tons. The latest data reflect a longer shift in Uzbekistan’s energy balance. Uzbekistan was long a net gas exporter, supported by large Soviet-era fields, a broad domestic gas network, and access to the Central Asia-China pipeline system. That position has weakened as older fields have declined and domestic use has grown. Uzbekistan now has to cover demand from households, power plants, industry, and transport while trying to modernize the sector. That task is getting harder. The country’s permanent population reached 38.2 million people as of January 1, 2026, according to official statistics, leading to more strain on the grid. Imports have risen sharply to meet these needs. Uzbekistan spent $360.5 million on natural gas imports in the first quarter of 2026, a 2.2-fold increase from the same period last year. Meanwhile, gas export revenues fell to $36.7 million, down from $94.3 million a year earlier. That shift has regional weight. Uzbekistan imports gas from Russia and Turkmenistan. Russian gas reaches Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan, using a Soviet-era pipeline route that once moved gas in the opposite direction. Uzbekistan began receiving Russian gas in 2023, as Moscow sought new markets after losing much of its European gas business. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Russian gas exports to Uzbekistan rose by about 30% in 2025, reaching more than 7 billion cubic meters through the Central Asia-Center pipeline system. Tashkent and Moscow have since discussed larger energy supplies. In April, Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin agreed to increase deliveries of Russian oil and gas to Uzbekistan. The talks also covered wider cooperation in energy, industry, transport, and agriculture. More imports can help Uzbekistan avoid shortages, especially in winter, while supporting power generation and reducing pressure on households. But they also bring new costs, with higher imports weighing on the trade balance and increasing reliance on outside suppliers. That is a sensitive issue for a country trying to expand its domestic industry and keep energy prices stable. The government is trying to slow the production decline. Uzbekneftegaz has said that exploration work added 2 billion cubic meters of gas reserves and 40,000 tons of liquid hydrocarbon reserves in the first quarter. The company...

6 days ago

TCA Interviews

UNEP Interview: From Space, Central Asia’s Methane Challenge Comes Into Focus

Satellites are changing the way the world sees methane. What was once an invisible leak from a well, flare, pipeline, landfill, or coal mine can now be detected from space, traced to a specific site, and sent to governments and companies for action. A new analysis by the United Nations Environment Programme’s International Methane Emissions Observatory puts that system to the test. Its Methane Alert and Response System, known as MARS, uses 35 satellite instruments to identify major human-caused methane “super-emitters” and notify those responsible. UNEP says the system has already enabled 41 mitigation cases in 11 countries, covering sources estimated to have released 1.2 million tonnes of methane. For Central Asia, the findings are especially relevant. UNEP’s new data includes a rolling list of the world’s 50 largest satellite-detected methane sources, covering oil and gas, coal, and waste, and shows where rapid action may be possible. Several of those sources are linked to Turkmenistan’s oil and gas sector, placing the region firmly inside a global debate over methane transparency, climate responsibility, and whether satellite alerts can lead to action on the ground. Of the 50 sources featured in the latest UNEP/IMEO snapshot, China has the largest number, while Turkmenistan stands out sharply for Central Asia, with the second-largest individual source and four of the top ten. Methane is shorter-lived than carbon dioxide, but far more powerful in the near term. That makes cutting large leaks one of the fastest ways to slow global warming. The harder question, as UNEP’s latest data makes clear, is no longer only where the leaks are, but who responds when they are found. On April 30, UNEP/IMEO presented the new MARS findings, highlighting the growing role of satellite-based monitoring in identifying major methane sources and pressing governments and companies to act. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Meghan Demeter, MARS Programme Manager, International Methane Emissions Observatory, UNEP. TCA: What does the new MARS data reveal about Central Asia specifically that may surprise readers? Demeter: The latest MARS data products depict the region as one with growing engagement and significant mitigation potential. Responses to MARS notifications are increasing, supported in particular by designated national focal points who play a key role in coordinating follow-up with operators. Based on the published 2025 data alone, the response rate across Central Asia currently stands at 22%. Managing a high volume of alerts requires more effort to achieve very high response rates compared to countries that receive only a handful of notifications. Encouragingly, the region has already recorded nearly 20 mitigation cases, underscoring the strong potential for emissions reductions when large methane sources are identified and addressed. TCA: Why does Central Asia matter in the global methane debate, even if it is not the world’s largest methane-emitting region? Demeter: Across Central Asia, looking at the 2025 data alone, UNEP’s International Methane Emissions Observatory, through the Methane Alert and Response System (MARS), detected and notified 298 emission sources from the oil and gas sector. While satellites detect only a fraction of global methane emissions, satellites are highly effective at identifying so-called “super-emitters,” methane emission events so large they can be detected from space. These represent opportunities where action can deliver the greatest and fastest climate wins, while also catalyzing broader change. Regarding the “top 50” list of emission events, 11 of these sources are located in Central Asia, all from...

1 week ago

Gulnara Karimova

Swiss Court Suspends Karimova Case as Asset Questions Remain

A Swiss court has suspended part of a money laundering case involving Gulnara Karimova after she failed to appear at trial. Judges at the Federal Criminal Court in Bellinzona said they had taken all possible steps to secure Karimova’s participation in the proceedings. This included a visit to Uzbekistan in August 2024, when court representatives met with the country’s Supreme Court to discuss options for her involvement. However, those efforts did not succeed, and in January 2026, Uzbekistan’s authorities formally declined the request. As a result, the court ruled that proceedings against Karimova could not continue in her absence. The same decision was applied to her co-defendant, described by prosecutors as a close associate. In this case, judges identified a separate legal obstacle preventing the trial from moving forward. Karimova’s lawyer, Grégoire Mangeat, described the dismissal more strongly, telling Reuters that the decision “amounts to an acquittal under Swiss law.” The court’s reasoning, however, was procedural: judges found a lasting obstacle to continuing the case because Karimova cannot attend, and no judgment is likely before the statute of limitations expires. According to the court, the co-defendant—an Uzbek national believed to be living in exile in Russia—cannot travel to Switzerland due to outstanding international arrest warrants. While it would theoretically be possible for him to travel from Russia, the absence of direct flights between the two countries since 2022 and the risk of detention in a third country make his participation unlikely. Judges also noted that the statute of limitations for the charges against him is set to expire in June 2027, making it effectively impossible for him to attend court before that deadline. This was described as a “permanent obstacle” to continuing proceedings against him. Despite these developments, the overall case remains open. The court confirmed that the main proceedings will continue against a former asset manager at Lombard Odier, as well as against the bank itself. Judges said there were no barriers to continuing this part of the trial and moved forward with preliminary hearings. The case, which has been under investigation for more than a decade, centers on allegations of money laundering and financial misconduct linked to a broader corruption network. While parts of the proceedings have now been suspended, key questions remain unresolved. Among them is the issue of assets allegedly connected to Karimova. The court stated that the possible confiscation of these funds will still be examined as part of the ongoing trial. The unresolved asset question is tied to a fall that has stretched across more than a decade. Once a high-profile public figure, Karimova built a vast business empire, pursued a career in fashion, and even dabbled in pop music under the name “Googoosha.” A former UN envoy and self-styled “Princess of Uzbekistan,” Karimova projected an image of glamour and influence that later collapsed under the weight of corruption cases in Uzbekistan and abroad. A leaked U.S. diplomatic cable offered a much darker portrait, describing her as “a robber baron” and “the single most...

2 weeks ago

U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations

Rubio Meeting Highlights Kazakhstan’s Growing U.S. Agenda

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s April 15 meeting with senior Kazakh officials in Washington gave fresh visibility to a relationship that both sides increasingly frame in economic as well as diplomatic terms. At a time when Washington is trying to give its Central Asia policy more practical shape, Kazakhstan is a key U.S. partner in the region. Rubio met President Tokayev’s Special Representative for Negotiations with the United States, Erzhan Kazykhan, and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy, Serik Zhumangarin. The talks covered ways to expand economic ties between the United States and Kazakhstan, as well as Kazakhstan’s role in peacemaking and regional initiatives. Rubio also welcomed Kazakhstan’s participation in the C5+1 platform and reaffirmed U.S. support for the country’s “sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.” In a post on X, Rubio said the talks focused on strengthening commercial ties and advancing regional cooperation. That language put trade, investment, and regional economic coordination at the center of the meeting. Launched in 2015, the C5+1 began as a diplomatic framework linking the United States and the five Central Asian states. It later broadened into a more structured platform, with working groups on trade, energy, and the environment, and with growing emphasis on logistics, diversification, supply chains, and investment. The rise of the B5+1 reinforced that shift by giving business a more formal place in the relationship. By late 2025, the format placed more emphasis on deliverables, including infrastructure, funding mechanisms, and cooperation on mineral processing and research. That shift has also been visible in Kazakhstan’s own dealings with Washington. During President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to the United States in November 2025, the Kazakh delegation signed 29 bilateral agreements worth about $17 billion, including a memorandum on critical minerals cooperation and major commercial deals in aviation, agriculture, and mining. The same visit underlined how closely economic diplomacy and strategic supply concerns are now tied together. Kazakhstan has attracted roughly $100 billion in cumulative U.S. investment since independence, and critical minerals have moved closer to the center of the relationship as Washington looks for secure supply chains beyond China and Russia. Kazakhstan has attracted over $151 billion in net foreign direct investment since independence. Rubio’s talks with Zhumangarin and Kazykhan came after months of stronger U.S.-Kazakhstan economic contact. Kazakhstan has a larger economic profile than any other Central Asian state, and its role in energy, critical minerals, investment, and transit gives it a prominent place in Washington’s regional thinking. That makes Astana a natural focus for any U.S. push to deepen commercial ties in Central Asia. The sovereignty language in the U.S. readout was also not incidental. For Kazakhstan, public backing from Washington on sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity carries political weight in a region where questions of borders, pressure, and strategic dependence remain sensitive. Astana’s multi-vector foreign policy is built on preserving room for maneuver among larger powers. High-level engagement in Washington supports that strategy and signals that closer U.S. ties can sit alongside Kazakhstan’s broader balancing act. The Washington...

4 weeks ago

Official Visit

Astana–Israel Talks Span Technology, Trade, and Holocaust Remembrance

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar in Astana on January 27, marking the first official visit by an Israeli foreign minister to Kazakhstan in almost 16 years, and underscoring Astana’s stated interest in deepening economic and technological cooperation with Israel as it continues to recalibrate its foreign policy. According to the Kazakh presidential administration, the talks focused on expanding bilateral relations across trade, investment, science, and technology, with both sides emphasizing practical areas of cooperation. The visit came as Kazakhstan seeks to diversify its economy beyond hydrocarbons and strengthen partnerships with countries at the forefront of applied innovation. Tokayev said the visit demonstrated Israel’s commitment to strengthening comprehensive cooperation with Kazakhstan, while discussions highlighted concrete sectors for collaboration, including artificial intelligence, agrotechnology, water resource management, and digital governance. These areas align closely with Kazakhstan’s national development priorities, particularly its focus on digital transformation, public-sector reform, and productivity-driven growth. Economic cooperation featured prominently throughout the visit. A Kazakh-Israeli business forum was held alongside the high-level talks, aimed at translating diplomatic engagement into commercial outcomes. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry said the forum is expected to support new investment partnerships and initiate joint projects in high-value sectors, with a focus on technology transfer and localized projects. Kazakh officials said bilateral trade reached $162.4 million between January and November 2025, with exports totaling $92.1 million and imports $70.3 million. While modest in absolute terms, the figures were cited as evidence of untapped potential, particularly in non-resource sectors where Israeli companies have global expertise. As part of the discussions, Kazakhstan invited Israeli firms to participate in national digital transformation initiatives, including projects related to e-government, data-driven public services, and digital infrastructure. Officials cited Kazakhstan’s recent progress in digital governance and public-sector innovation as a foundation for expanded cooperation. Kazakhstan and Israel established diplomatic relations in 1992, shortly after Kazakhstan gained independence. Israel opened its embassy in Almaty in 1996, while Kazakhstan inaugurated its embassy in Tel Aviv in 2000, laying the groundwork for steady but largely low-profile bilateral ties. Political relations have traditionally been pragmatic, with cooperation focused on trade, agriculture, healthcare, and education rather than formal alliances. Bilateral trade has remained modest, reflecting limited commercial engagement beyond specific sectors such as agrotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and water management. In recent years, Astana has shown growing interest in Israel’s applied innovation ecosystem, particularly in areas aligned with Kazakhstan’s domestic reform agenda, including digital governance, artificial intelligence, and public-sector modernization. Israeli firms have previously participated in pilot projects and advisory initiatives in Kazakhstan, though large-scale joint ventures have been limited. Kazakhstan has also positioned itself as a neutral diplomatic actor in the Middle East, maintaining relations with Israel while emphasizing interfaith dialogue and mediation. Beyond economic ties, the talks also addressed regional and international issues, including developments in the Middle East and Kazakhstan’s diplomatic positioning in support of the objectives underpinning the Abraham Accords framework. Sa’ar welcomed Kazakhstan’s engagement, describing it as a constructive contribution to dialogue and cooperation between Israel and Muslim-majority countries. Sa’ar...

3 months ago

U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations

Uzbekistan Deepens U.S. Partnership Through New Investment Council and National AI Strategy

Uzbekistan is advancing a broad effort to strengthen its relationship with the United States through new economic, diplomatic, and technological initiatives. A presidential decree establishing the Uzbekistan–U.S. Business and Investment Council, alongside a major artificial intelligence partnership with NVIDIA, underscores the country’s strategy to draw investment and accelerate digital development. A New Platform for Economic Engagement The creation of the Uzbekistan–U.S. Business and Investment Council follows President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s recent participation in the C5+1 Summit, where regional connectivity and U.S.–Central Asia cooperation were central topics. The council will be jointly led by the Head of the Presidential Administration and a representative appointed by the U.S. administration, giving both sides a formal mechanism to coordinate investment priorities and oversee major projects. Uzbekistan expects the platform to support initiatives involving institutions such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Asian Development Bank. Officials have framed the council as part of a longer-term effort to expand trade, encourage U.S. private-sector engagement, and diversify the country’s investment base. Expanding Diplomatic Reach The government is preparing to significantly widen its diplomatic network in the United States. A new Adviser-Envoy will be assigned to the embassy in Washington beginning in 2026 to coordinate investment initiatives linked to the council. Plans are also underway to open additional consulates in Philadelphia, Chicago, Orlando, and Seattle, reflecting both the size of the Uzbek diaspora and growing interest in regional outreach. Uzbekistan’s shift toward deeper engagement includes a visa-free regime for U.S. citizens starting January 1, 2026, which will allow 30-day stays and support increased travel for business and education. Updates on foreign policy and consular matters are regularly published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Expanding the National AI Ecosystem Alongside diplomatic and economic reforms, Uzbekistan is pursuing ambitious plans to grow its artificial intelligence capacity. During a recent visit to the United States, Digital Technologies Minister Sherzod Shermatov held discussions with leaders at NVIDIA on infrastructure development, AI governance, and workforce training. The ministry has positioned the partnership as a key step toward integrating international expertise into Uzbekistan’s digital transformation strategy. The cooperation includes the development of an AI Excellence Center powered by NVIDIA technology and supported by training programs from the company’s Deep Learning Institute. The center will provide training for educators and specialists, while universities begin preparing to introduce AI-focused academic programs and certification pathways. A Nationwide Investment in Digital Infrastructure Uzbekistan plans to deploy two national AI clusters by 2026 with a combined computing capacity of up to one megawatt. One cluster will support academic and research institutions, while the second will focus on public-sector systems and industrial projects, including automation, healthcare analytics, and digital government services. Funding is in place for NVIDIA-powered supercomputers that will be installed at leading universities, with procurement scheduled for late 2025. The government is also creating an Industrial AI Excellence Center backed by a $3 million investment. The facility is expected to begin operating in 2026 and will concentrate on...

6 months ago

Aral Sea

Kazakhstan Urges Regional Cooperation to Save the Aral Sea

Kazakhstan has intensified its efforts to restore its portion of the former Aral Sea, calling on neighboring Central Asian states to increase their participation in regional environmental cooperation. Once the world’s fourth-largest lake, the Aral Sea has become a symbol of ecological catastrophe. Experts warn that international efforts remain inadequate. How the Sea Died Straddling the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the Aral Sea began to shrink in the 1960s when large-scale irrigation projects diverted water from its two main tributaries, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, to support cotton production and agriculture. A growing regional population added further strain. By 1989, the sea had split into the Northern (Small) and Southern (Large) Aral Seas. In 2014, the eastern basin of the Southern Aral Sea dried up completely. Today, the Aralkum Desert occupies much of what was once open water. Kazakhstan has since focused on restoring the Northern Aral Sea. [caption id="attachment_37684" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] A ship stranded in the desert, Moynaq, Uzbekistan; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] The restoration of the Northern Aral Sea has already yielded visible environmental and social benefits. Rising water levels have lowered salinity, allowing several native fish species to return. Local fisheries, once thought lost, are now active again in communities such as Aralsk. According to the Ministry of Ecology, the annual fish catch in the North Aral has risen more than tenfold since the early 2000s, reviving local employment and boosting food security. Experts note that even small ecological gains have had a profound psychological impact on residents who once witnessed the sea’s disappearance. Call for Renewed Efforts On October 15, Kazakhstan called for expanded international cooperation to protect both the Aral and Caspian Seas. First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yerzhan Ashikbayev, speaking at the International Astana Think Tank Forum-2025, emphasized Kazakhstan’s contribution to the global climate agenda. He noted that a regional climate summit, set to be held in Astana in 2026, would provide a platform for coordinated strategies and joint decision-making among Central Asian nations. “Astana also calls for increased international participation in solving environmental problems and preserving the water resources of the Aral and Caspian Seas,” Ashikbayev said. Earlier, on October 10, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov met with senior officials from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan during the second meeting of the Board of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), chaired by Kazakhstan. The event highlighted the need for a united regional approach, noting that restoration of the Aral Sea can be achieved through collective action. Bektenov acknowledged the challenges of the recent growing season, but said regional cooperation had helped maintain a stable water regime in the basin. “Each country has its own national interests, and we are obliged to defend them and will always do so. But I am convinced that our common strategic, long-term priority is good neighborly relations. In solving everyday short-term tasks, we must not undermine long-term priorities. I think that we will take joint measures to ensure that issues are always...

7 months ago