Belt and Road Initiative - The Times Of Central Asia

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Railways

Central Asia’s Rail Corridors: U.S. and Chinese Partnerships in Perspective

Kazakhstan’s railways are modernizing with a U.S. supplier, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are advancing a new trans‑mountain link with China. On September 22, 2025, Wabtec and KTZ announced a multi‑year locomotive and services package worth about $4.2 billion, described by the company as its “largest” agreement. In parallel, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan formalized a joint company to build the long-planned CKU railway, with China holding a 51% stake. Central Asia’s rail networks are thus being reshaped by two major partnerships - one with the United States and one with China. Rather than a zero-sum rivalry, these projects show how regional governments are pursuing different infrastructure strategies to expand connectivity. Kazakhstan and Wabtec: Modernizing an Existing Network In September 2025, Kazakhstan’s railway operator KTZ signed a $4.2 billion agreement with U.S.-based Wabtec for 300 Evolution Series ES44ACi locomotives. The diesel-electric engines are tailored for Kazakhstan’s 1,520 mm gauge network and harsh climate, replacing aging Soviet-era stock. Wabtec finalized full ownership of the Astana locomotive plant in late 2023; production and services for 1,520-mm stock are now fully under Wabtec’s Kazakhstan subsidiary. Local manufacturing and long-term service contracts are expected to expand domestic engineering capacity. The locomotives’ digital diagnostic systems should improve fuel efficiency and maintenance intervals. According to the official Wabtec press release, the agreement “strengthens KTZ’s role as a critical and reliable hub for the Middle Corridor,” while KTZ CEO Talgat Aldybergenov said it “confirms our commitment to advanced technologies in the transport sector”. Rail accounts for about 64% of Kazakhstan’s freight turnover (2024), so locomotive performance directly affects Middle Corridor throughput. Financing details have not been disclosed, but the purchase appears to be domestically funded through KTZ and state support. For Astana, the order fits its multi-vector foreign-policy approach: Kazakhstan continues its partnerships with France’s Alstom, China’s CRRC, and Russia, maintaining balance across suppliers. While the locomotives are diesel, Kazakhstan is also electrifying key lines with European partners. Diesels provide an immediate boost without new catenary investment, and Wabtec claims lower emissions than previous models. Over time, expanded electrification could complement this upgrade. Overall, the Wabtec partnership represents incremental modernization. This is an interoperability-based approach that strengthens existing routes rather than building new corridors from scratch. [caption id="attachment_37655" align="aligncenter" width="950"] Image: trains.com - One of Kazakhstan’s modern Evolution Series diesel locomotives (model TE33A) produced through a partnership with U.S. firm Wabtec. Kazakhstan’s railways carry about 64% of the country’s freight, making such upgrades crucial for trade connectivity.[/caption] The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) Railway: Building a New Corridor After nearly three decades of discussion, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan launched construction of the CKU railway in late 2024. The 523 km line will run from Kashgar (Xinjiang) through the Kyrgyz mountain ranges to Andijan, Uzbekistan. It will provide a second direct China–Central Asia connection, bypassing reliance on Kazakhstan’s network. The CKU is designed with dual gauges: standard (1,435 mm) in China and broad (1,520 mm) in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, with a dry-port transshipment hub in Makmal, Kyrgyzstan. This compromise allows integration with existing Central...

Foreign Investment

Climbing the Value Chain: Uzbekistan’s Textile Transformation Through Chinese Investment

As relations between China and Uzbekistan deepen, cooperation is no longer confined to the traditional pillars of energy and infrastructure. The partnership has begun to branch into new and diverse areas, adding layers of complexity and opportunity to their bilateral ties. Emerging sectors such as pharmaceuticals and waste-to-energy are gaining traction, signaling a shift toward a more multidimensional relationship. At the same time, the textile industry has become an increasingly important bridge between the two countries, offering fresh avenues for collaboration. Recent agreements highlight this momentum. In the upstream segment of Uzbekistan’s textile sector, China Hi-Tech Holding has committed to a major investment in synthetic fiber and viscose yarn production. This move is particularly significant for Uzbekistan, as it reduces reliance on cotton and secures inputs essential for modern mixed-fabric production. Midstream, cooperation is expanding as well. An agreement between Uzbekistan and China’s Fong Group to develop dyeing and finishing facilities for mixed fabrics underscores the practical steps being taken to create a more integrated textile supply chain. These developments also reflect a broader trend of growing Chinese interest in Uzbekistan’s domestic market and its strategic location at the crossroads of the Middle East and Europe. With its young population and export potential, Uzbekistan is increasingly attractive to Chinese textile companies. The Red Dragonfly Group’s plan to establish a manufacturing base in Uzbekistan by 2026 is a clear example of how Chinese firms see the country not only as a production hub but as a gateway to wider regional markets. One of the main reasons Uzbekistan is emerging as a crucial destination for Chinese companies is the shifting incentive structure that encourages the relocation of manufacturing capacity abroad. Rising labor costs in China, particularly in the labor-intensive textile sector, are placing companies under pressure amid fierce domestic competition. In contrast, Uzbekistan offers an appealing alternative where the average monthly wage for a skilled worker is around 200-400 dollars, and energy costs are just 0.04 dollars per kilowatt-hour. Together, these factors significantly lower production costs and make the country highly attractive for firms seeking to maintain competitiveness. Equally important are Uzbekistan’s proactive regulatory policies, which create a favorable business climate for foreign investors. The government has relied heavily on Special Economic Zones and Small Industrial Zones and offers tiered incentive packages that reward higher commitments. Investors contributing between 3 and 5 million dollars receive three years of income tax holidays, while investments of 5 to 15 million dollars are rewarded with a five-year exemption. Those exceeding 15 million dollars benefit from an unprecedented ten-year tax holiday. Moreover, starting in September 2025, the social tax rate for textile companies and clusters will be cut to 1% for three years. At the same time, imports of blended fabrics and raw materials for the leather and sericulture industries will be exempt from customs duties. These measures provide Chinese companies with tangible cost advantages that rival opportunities in Southeast Asia. Another powerful driver is geopolitics. Growing trade tensions between China and the West, particularly the...

SCO Summit

Central Asia Advances Agenda at Record-Breaking SCO Summit in Tianjin

At the opening ceremony of the SCO Summit in Tianjin on August 31, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi joined Central Asian leaders in a group photo. The Tianjin summit - China’s second time hosting the SCO and its “largest-ever” summit - was attended by all five Central Asian presidents alongside a host of key countries. In his welcome speech, Xi highlighted that the SCO now bears “greater responsibility” for safeguarding regional peace and stability, and said the summit was expected to produce a new 10-year development strategy. Xi proposed fast-tracking an SCO development bank, pledging 2 billion yuan ($280 million) in aid plus 10 billion yuan in loans to seed the fund. Xi also urged members to oppose a “Cold War mentality” and support an inclusive, multilateral trading system in a pointed rebuke to recent U.S. tariffs. Central Asian Leaders and Their Messages Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev opened the summit for his delegation, thanking Xi and praising China’s “consistent policy aimed at strengthening security, stability, economic cooperation, and cultural ties within the SCO framework.” In his address, Tokayev marked the symbolic 80th anniversaries of the end of World War II, noting the value of unity and solidarity which he said the SCO embodies. Tokayev reaffirmed Kazakhstan’s support for a multipolar world order, respect for sovereignty, and mutually beneficial trade and investment, and pledged to keep combating the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Beyond the opening remarks, Central Asian leaders used the summit to lay out their strategic priorities. Speaking at the heads-of-state meeting, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan called for further reform of SCO institutions and expansion of its dialogue partners. Mirziyoyev advocated for new cooperation mechanisms - a regional center for critical materials, a “Unified SCO Transport Space” linked to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, digital platforms, and green energy corridors - and proposed measures to boost intra-regional trade. Notably, Mirziyoyev urged the signing of an Agreement on Trade Facilitation, saying it “will give a boost to the growth of intra-regional trade within the SCO area.” In his closing remarks, he congratulated Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov on assuming the SCO chairmanship for 2026, setting up the next summit. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon did not address the leaders’ meeting, but in a pre-summit interview, he highlighted China’s role in the SCO, crediting China with significant investment in Tajik infrastructure and energy, and welcoming Beijing’s proposal to locate an SCO Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe. "We are confident that the center will make tangible contributions to strengthening regional cooperation and combating illicit drug trafficking," he stated. As a founding member, Rahmon stressed that the SCO’s top priority has long been Central Asian security and said that Tajikistan fully backs China’s Tianjin agenda, citing Beijing’s support for roads, tunnels, and power lines in Tajikistan. The incoming 2026 chair, Sadyr Japarov of Kyrgyzstan, met with Xi on August 31, reviewing plans to deepen all-around cooperation. Xi stated that China will fully support Kyrgyzstan in...

Belt and Road Initiative

Kyrgyz PM Highlights Belt and Road as Strategic Priority

Kyrgyzstan regards China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a strategic pillar of bilateral cooperation aimed at modernizing infrastructure and attracting investment, Prime Minister Adylbek Kasymaliyev said during a panel session on BRI prospects at the 2025 Summer Davos in Tianjin on June 24. “In today’s geopolitical climate, marked by tension, uncertainty, and international fragmentation, the Belt and Road Initiative remains a vital platform for global cooperation,” Kasymaliyev stated. He emphasized that Kyrgyzstan was one of the first countries to support and actively participate in the initiative, which was launched 12 years ago and has since expanded to include numerous countries worldwide. Many of these nations, he noted, are already experiencing the tangible benefits of BRI-related cooperation. Five Pillars of Engagement Kasymaliyev outlined five strategic areas in which Kyrgyzstan is cooperating with China under the BRI framework: Transport Connectivity “Kyrgyzstan is ready to leverage its geographic location and transit potential to become a key logistics hub linking Asia and Europe,” he said. The construction of new transport corridors under the BRI is central to this vision, particularly in enhancing Eurasian connectivity. Trade and Economic Cooperation Kasymaliyev called for deeper trade and investment ties. He positioned Kyrgyzstan as a potential gateway for Chinese and other foreign investors to access markets in both the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the European Union. Financial Sector Development Highlighting ongoing reforms, he noted that Kyrgyzstan’s financial sector, including its capital market, is undergoing active development. Digitalization and Innovation Kyrgyzstan supports the development of the Digital Silk Road and is home to a high technology park offering favorable conditions for resident companies engaged in digital and tech innovation. Energy Cooperation Kasymaliyev pointed to ongoing and planned energy initiatives, including renewable energy projects, as a key area for future collaboration. “Kyrgyzstan remains committed to the principles of the Belt and Road Initiative, which is gaining even greater relevance in today’s complex global environment,” he concluded. High-Level Bilateral Dialogue Also on June 24, Kasymaliyev held talks with Chinese Premier Li Qiang. The Chinese premier reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to aligning its development strategy with Kyrgyzstan’s and urged continued progress on interconnection projects, most notably the long-discussed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway.

Regional Influence

Iran–Israel War Highlights Central Asia as Zone of Strategic Stability

The explosive conflict between Iran and Israel, including coordinated U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, has drawn global attention to the Persian Gulf and Levant. The escalatory spectacle, however, has blinded most observers to a quieter structural shift. This is the rising indispensability of Central Asia, including its linkages with the South Caucasus. Unaligned in rhetoric and untouched by spillover, Central Asia's very stability quietly threw into relief its increasing centrality to Eurasian energy and logistics calculations. As maritime chokepoints came into question and ideological rhetoric became more inflamed, Central Asia offers a reminder that the most valuable nodes in a network are the ones that continue operating silently and without disruption. Neither Israel nor Iran has real operational depth in Central Asia, and this has made a difference. Unlike Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen — where proxy networks or ideological leverage allowed Tehran to externalize confrontation — no such mechanisms exist east of the Caspian Sea. Iran’s efforts in Tajikistan, grounded in shared linguistic heritage and periodic religious diplomacy, today remain cultural and informational rather than sectarian and clientelist. The influence of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Central Asia is minimal; Israeli presence, while diplomatically steady in places like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, is neither controversial nor militarized. There are no significant arms flows or dual-use infrastructure for either side to use. As a result, Central Asia has remained untouched by the conflict. Although the Iran–Israel conflict is relatively geographically localized, it has shed light on global systems far beyond the immediate zone of combat. Although not so far from the missile trajectories and nuclear facilities, Central Asia and the South Caucasus are remarkably insulated from their effects. Rather than becoming another theater of contestation, they have demonstrated their value as stabilizing elements at a time of heightened geostrategic volatility. It is no longer optional to take into account the Central Asian space, which geoeconomically includes Azerbaijan, now a permanent fixture at the region's summits. As the war now produces a phase of reactive adaptation in international geoeconomics and diplomacy, the region has become a control parameter of the international system rather than a fluctuating variable dependent upon it. The Iran–Israel conflict has drawn new attention to the vulnerability of maritime energy corridors, especially the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes. While contingency planning has focused on naval logistics and airpower deterrents in the Gulf, the Eurasian interior has remained materially unaffected, reflecting its structural indispensability. Central Asia and the South Caucasus, particularly Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, offer existing and potential overland alternatives that bypass maritime chokepoints entirely. Kazakhstan’s oil continues to flow via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline to the Black Sea, while Azerbaijan’s infrastructure, anchored by the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) corridor, links Caspian energy to Mediterranean terminals. These routes are not replacements for Persian Gulf volumes, but, as redundancies, they acquire significance as stabilizing arteries as well as increased relevance in moments of system stress. The war has thus sharpened a fact...

Central Asia-China Summit

Opinion: Xi Jinping Heads to Astana – What’s at Stake in the Central Asia-China Summit?

On June 16-17, President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China will visit Kazakhstan. The second Central Asia-China summit is scheduled for June 17 in Astana. Leading up to the event, a series of forums, meetings, and conferences have been unfolding across Central Asia and China, drawing experts, journalists, diplomats, and energy-sector representatives. These activities suggest that the upcoming summit is poised to overshadow its predecessor. While U.S. analysts continue debating the viability of their own C5+1 framework for engaging with Central Asia, and the European Union advanced its outreach with the inaugural EU-Central Asia summit, China has relied on a well-worn path. The thousand-year legacy of the Middle Kingdom is filled with moments when it had to engage with the complex mosaic of Central Asia, once a turbulent region of khanates, emirates, and nomadic tribes. Despite the chaos, China succeeded in carving out a secure overland corridor, the Great Silk Road, which threaded through what are now the independent Central Asian republics, linking them like beads in a continental necklace. Then, as now, China is seeking stability in the region, not just for political influence but to safeguard its global supply chains. Beijing’s modern initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative and its broader “community of shared future” concept, aim to establish global “islands of comfort” conducive to Chinese interests. At the heart of this strategy lies a deeply embedded worldview: that China represents civilization itself. The Chinese learned long ago to deal with their neighbors not with violence, but through economic incentives, a method which is proving just as effective today. This layer of understanding is notably absent in many Western and post-Soviet analyses of China’s actions in Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and beyond. The reasons for this are twofold. First, Chinese officials are careful never to state views about cultural hierarchies explicitly; doing so would risk alienating partners. This reticence is a feature of traditional Eastern diplomacy. Second, Beijing has cultivated its own expert ecosystem within the post-Soviet sphere. In response to a wave of Sinophobia that swept through Central Asia a decade ago, China now primarily engages with favorable media outlets and Sinologists, many of whom are nurtured through carefully managed media tours. One such tour, organized by People’s Daily, is currently underway ahead of the Astana summit. As a result, the discourse surrounding the summit is shaped less by hard policy proposals than by diplomatic pageantry, with everything presented in the best possible light. At the recent 5th Forum of Think Tanks, “Central Asia-China: New Horizons for Regional Partnership,” Kazakhstan's State Councilor Yerlan Karin likened China and Central Asia to “the two lungs of Asia,” emphasizing the symbolic depth of their growing relationship. The 6th Central Asia-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, chaired by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and held in Almaty in April, likewise offered little in terms of concrete summit outcomes. According to a general statement from Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry, topics included political dialogue, trade, connectivity, sustainable development, and security cooperation,...