Belt and Road Initiative - The Times Of Central Asia

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Geopolitics

Opinion: The U.S. Still Doesn’t Know Where Central Asia Belongs

Washington cannot decide where Central Asia belongs. Is it part of Europe? Asia? The Middle East? The confusion is on full display in how the House of Representatives has reassigned the region across subcommittees in rapid succession. In the 116th Congress, which convened in 2019, Central Asia fell under the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment. Two years later, in the 117th Congress, it was moved to the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation. That arrangement barely settled before the 118th Congress shifted it again—this time to the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Now, in the 119th Congress, it has been relocated to the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia. On the banks of the Potomac, Central Asia has taken on a nomadic life of its own—constantly on the move, never quite settling in one place. At the State Department, Central Asia is grouped under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs alongside Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. At the Pentagon, by contrast, the Middle East team oversees relations with Central Asia, alongside countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. These mismatches are not just clumsy; they are strategically dangerous. By misplacing Central Asia, Washington is misreading the geography of China’s rise. It is time for Washington to stop the bureaucratic musical chairs and place Central Asia within a coherent grand strategy. Far from being an afterthought, the region is one of the most consequential pieces of the geopolitical puzzle facing the United States: how to respond to China’s strategy. This is because Central Asia sits at the heart of China’s decades-long effort to move its critical lifelines away from the Indo-Pacific and onto the Eurasian landmass. Over the past 15 years, China has quietly reoriented its energy routes, reducing reliance on maritime pathways vulnerable to U.S. naval dominance—particularly chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—and expanded overland imports across Eurasia. Today, China imports significant volumes of natural gas via pipelines from Turkmenistan and Russia, as well as crude oil from Kazakhstan. These continental routes are largely insulated from maritime interdiction, giving Beijing strategic resilience. Central Asia should be understood through this lens. For China, the region is not peripheral—it is essential. The pipelines, railways and trade corridors that underpin China’s resilience all pass through Xinjiang and Central Asia. In this sense, Central Asia is not merely adjacent to China; it is embedded in China’s vision of the future. This is why Washington’s practice of grouping Central Asia with South Asia misses the mark. The two regions operate under fundamentally different strategic logics. South Asia is centered on the Indian subcontinent, shaped by maritime dynamics and the India‑Pakistan rivalry. Central Asia, by contrast, is a continental crossroads—defined by overland connectivity, energy flows and great‑power competition across Eurasia. India, meanwhile, is geographically constrained—lacking direct land access to Central Asia due to territory administered by Pakistan and separated from China by the Himalayas—leaving it...

China

Opinion: Expect China to take its 2+2 diplomacy to Central Asia

China does not do military alliances. Its declared posture is one of non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs. Yet Beijing has long understood that commercial ties alone cannot anchor strategic relationships; only security partnerships can. China’s recent experiments with 2+2 security dialogues – bringing together foreign and defense ministers – signal that it is seeking to move beyond an economics-first approach. The most likely next candidates for this format are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all of which share borders with China. For Central Asian governments, a 2+2 with China may hold appeal, particularly as they seek to manage instability spilling over from Afghanistan at a time when Russia’s security role is being strained by its war in Ukraine. After years of hoping that engagement could stabilize Afghanistan, Central Asian states have largely shifted to a policy of containment – seeking to insulate themselves from cross-border militant threats, narcotics flows and refugee movements rather than attempting to reshape Afghanistan’s internal trajectory. For Beijing, the objective would be to consolidate partnerships across the Eurasian heartland – an outcome Washington would prefer to counter. China shares Central Asia’s risk-management approach toward Afghanistan. Like its neighbors, Beijing has little appetite for deep involvement inside the country itself, focusing instead on preventing instability from spilling northward toward Xinjiang or disrupting Belt and Road corridors that run through the region. A 2+2 format offers China a way to institutionalize security coordination without violating its long-standing aversion to formal alliances. Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Defense Minister Dong Jun traveled to Phnom Penh to hold China’s first-ever 2+2 dialogue with Cambodia. Wang told reporters that China is willing to develop the mechanism into a “strategic platform” for enhancing political and defense security cooperation. He described it as a key instrument for cementing mutual assistance and solidarity, and for advancing the construction of a China-Cambodia “community with a shared future.” Wang also said China was prepared to work with Cambodia to build an “Asian security model” based on shared security and on seeking common ground while reserving differences. China’s deepening security engagement with Cambodia comes as the Southeast Asian nation remains locked in a border dispute with Thailand. Although Wang’s itinerary took him next to Bangkok, Beijing chose to hold a 2+2 only with Cambodia – notably the non-U.S. ally in this pairing. China is new to the 2+2 format. Last April, Beijing hosted its first ever 2+2 with a foreign country – with Indonesia. The trajectory suggests further 2+2 engagements ahead, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – the three Central Asian states that border China. In several aspects, Central Asia may be a more conducive environment for this diplomacy than Southeast Asia: there are no maritime disputes, and the countries are not embedded in U.S. alliance structures. Instead, there is a convergence around defensive security priorities – particularly border control and crisis management linked to Afghanistan – making the 2+2 format a natural fit. China under President Xi Jinping has always had an eye...

China

Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s New Playbook in Central Asia

In the Kyzylorda Region, near the town of Shieli, the silos and conveyor belts of a Chinese-backed plant rise out of the fine brown dust that dominates the landscape. It is the kind of project the Belt and Road was supposed to deliver in Central Asia: heavy industry, fixed capital, and a visible mark on the landscape. But it is also a reminder that China’s role in the region has become narrower, more contested, and less sweeping than the old rhetoric suggested. In photographs, the Gezhouba Cement Plant looks like a self-contained industrial island on the steppe. For nearby villagers, it became something else: a source of jobs and local prestige for some, but also of years of complaints about dust clouds and whether the state was quicker to defend a flagship Chinese-backed project than the people living beside it. Projects like the plant in Shieli also help explain why views of China across Central Asia remain mixed. Beijing is seen as a source of trade, investment, and technology, but that promise is tempered in some places by concerns over transparency, environmental costs, and who really benefits when a project arrives. China has become Central Asia’s dominant trading partner, but investment has not kept pace with the surge in commerce. The gap says a lot about how Beijing now works in the region: with a sharper focus on sectors that matter to its long-term influence. In 2025, trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion, up 12% year on year. Chinese exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion, while imports from Central Asia reached $35.1 billion. Trade has grown fast enough to reshape the region’s external balance, but long-term investment has been far more selective. Over 2005–2025, the five Central Asian states accounted for about 3% of China’s global overseas investment and construction total. The picture changes once direct investment is separated from trade and construction contracts. China’s FDI stock in the five Central Asian states stood at about $36 billion by mid-2025. Roughly 90% was concentrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The structure of that capital has also changed. Extractive industries still accounted for 46% of the portfolio, but manufacturing and energy together made up more than one third, and greenfield projects rose from 43% to 60%. China has not poured money into Central Asia on the scale once implied by early Belt and Road rhetoric. Instead, it has invested in sectors that strengthen its industrial position. Kazakhstan remains at the center of this relationship. It is China’s biggest commercial partner in Central Asia, and the main destination for Chinese capital in the region. Kazakhstan-China trade reached $43.8 billion in 2024. The country’s portfolio of projects with Chinese participation includes 224 ventures worth about $66.4 billion. Some are still at the planning stage, but the range of projects is telling. Recent developments have included a hydrogen energy technology innovation center in Almaty and a large wind farm with electricity storage. Kazakhstan still sells...

Diplomatic Talks

Xi Jinping and Berdymuhamedov Sr. Discuss Expansion of China-Turkmenistan Partnership

Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks with Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov, Turkmenistan's former president and leader of its People's Council, during the latter’s official visit to China. The meeting took place on March 18 at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing, according to a statement from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Xi noted that China had recently completed its annual parliamentary meetings, commonly referred to as the “Two Sessions,” during which key socio-economic priorities were outlined. He said the country’s new development agenda would support modernization efforts and create additional opportunities for international cooperation. The Chinese president said that mutual political support remains central to the comprehensive strategic partnership between Beijing and Ashgabat. He reaffirmed China’s readiness to continue backing Turkmenistan on issues related to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and its internationally recognized policy of permanent neutrality. Xi and Berdymuhamedov discussed expanding cooperation in the energy sector, particularly natural gas supplies, as well as in trade, investment, transport connectivity, agriculture, artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and clean energy. Both leaders also highlighted the importance of aligning China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Turkmenistan’s plans to revitalize historic Silk Road trade routes. Humanitarian cooperation was another focus of the talks, including plans to develop educational and cultural exchanges and establish joint centers. The leaders also discussed coordination on regional security challenges, including efforts to counter terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Berdymuhamedov reaffirmed Turkmenistan’s commitment to the One China principle and expressed readiness to deepen bilateral cooperation in energy, infrastructure, and trade. He said closer ties with China were important for Turkmenistan’s long-term economic development and again noted Beijing’s support for the country’s neutrality policy. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also attended the meeting. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the visit followed Berdymuhamedov’s trip to the United States in mid-February, the details of which were not fully disclosed. Shortly after his return, Turkmenistan’s President, Gurbanguly's son Serdar Berdymuhamedov, dismissed the country’s ambassador to the U.S. and its permanent representative to the United Nations. No official explanation was provided for the personnel changes.

China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway

China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Railway: What It Means for Central Asia

The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway (CKU railway), also known as the Kashgar–Andijan railway line, is more than an infrastructure project. It represents a geopolitical initiative that could significantly shape the future of Central Asia. In June 2024, Beijing, Bishkek, and Tashkent signed the intergovernmental agreement to move the project forward. The project’s financing—estimated at $4.7 billion—was finalized in December 2025, sparking optimism in all three nations about regional connectivity, trade, and economic growth. Once completed, the railway is expected to become a vital strategic asset in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). From China’s perspective, the CKU project is a strategic line that diversifies its trade channels and strengthens overland access to Central Asia and beyond. Construction was ceremonially launched on 27 December 2024 in Kyrgyzstan, with major works progressing through 2025, including key tunnel works. For Uzbekistan, the railway could serve as a key link for commerce and transit. Tashkent aims to integrate the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan line with existing international transport networks, including connections through Iran and Turkey. But how important is the project for Kyrgyzstan, through which, according to recent reporting, 304 km of the line will pass? According to Nurbek Satarov, Presidential Envoy in the Naryn Region, the project is vital for Kyrgyzstan’s most mountainous region, as roughly 90% of the route through the country will run through Naryn. As he told The Times of Central Asia, construction is in full swing, and the railway is expected to be completed between 2028 and 2030, despite the challenging terrain and technical difficulties. The project includes the construction of 50 bridges and 29 tunnels, underscoring the significant engineering complexities involved. But while regional and national authorities anticipate direct economic benefits from the project, critics argue that Kyrgyzstan may end up serving primarily as a transit country, with limited gains for the local economy. They also question the financial sustainability of the project, noting that it is backed by a long-term loan package of approximately $2.3 billion from Chinese banks. The financing, structured over 35 years and to be repaid by the joint venture company implementing the railway, increases Kyrgyzstan’s exposure to China-linked debt and has raised concerns about future repayment obligations. [caption id="attachment_44216" align="aligncenter" width="1536"] Site visit at the road construction project in the Naryn Oblast; image: TCA, Nikola Mikovic[/caption] However, Edil Baisalov, Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Prime Minister, claims that the CKU will have a positive impact on the country’s economic development. “This railroad will virtually transform Kyrgyzstan – and not just Kyrgyzstan, but the whole of Central Asia,” he told The Times of Central Asia. Baisalov believes that the CKU railway, once completed, will be part of a larger transcontinental railroad that will cut transit times by at least seven days compared to the northern routes of the Trans-Siberian Railway and maritime transport. The CKU line could indeed bypass the usual northern rail routes through Russia and Kazakhstan, taking a significant share of freight from those countries and reducing their transit revenue. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, hopes to see direct gains...

Foreign debt

Balancing Act: Kyrgyzstan’s Strategy to Manage Chinese Debt

In recent years, China’s economic engagement across Eurasia has become increasingly diverse and complex. What began with large-scale infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative has expanded into a wide range of sectors, including critical minerals, energy, pharmaceuticals, and textiles. Alongside these investments, China has also deepened its soft power presence through Luban Workshops, educational exchanges, and media cooperation with regional countries. While this growing influence strengthens China’s position as a major development partner, it has also raised public concern about debt dependency. Kyrgyzstan illustrates this issue more clearly than most. In 2022, more than 40% of the country’s official external debt was owed to China. This heavy reliance has sparked debate over whether the relationship creates long-term vulnerabilities that could limit economic independence and policy flexibility. The scale of the debt has generated several layers of concern within Kyrgyz society. Many worry that national resources are being redirected from essential public needs toward debt repayment. Others fear that financial obligations could eventually lead to asset-for-debt arrangements or serve as a tool of political influence. Kyrgyz governments have therefore explored various ways to ease their debt burden, but with limited success. Direct Negotiations with China and Innovative Approaches The first approach has been to negotiate directly with China for relief. However, these talks have mostly produced temporary payment deferrals rather than genuine debt reduction. In November 2020, China Eximbank agreed to postpone $35 million in loan repayments until the period between 2022 and 2024. The agreement remained purely commercial, requiring a 2% fee on the deferred amount and likely continued interest payments. This arrangement differs from the more concessional restructuring models often offered by multilateral lenders or Paris Club members, which are designed to restore debt sustainability and support economic reform. Chinese state lenders such as the Eximbank tend to approach debt through a commercial logic, emphasizing the protection of contracts and the profitability of Belt and Road projects. As a result, debt forgiveness is considered an unattractive option from the perspective of Chinese financial institutions. Kyrgyzstan has also experimented with more innovative ideas. The government proposed that creditors forgive part of its debt in exchange for investments in environmental and climate-related projects. These initiatives, often described as debt-for-nature swaps, would redirect funds from debt service toward renewable energy, reforestation, or carbon reduction programs. Although several European partners expressed interest, China declined to participate in 2024. China’s reluctance reveals an important feature of its lending philosophy. Despite its growing global presence, Chinese state banks continue to prioritize financial security and measurable returns over experimental or non-monetary arrangements. Even when Beijing publicly supports global climate cooperation, its institutions remain cautious about initiatives that fall outside traditional commercial frameworks. Kyrgyzstan’s New Debt Management Strategies Kyrgyzstan’s approach to managing its external debt is undergoing a gradual but meaningful transformation. The government has introduced new policies and sought diversified financial partnerships in an effort to strengthen fiscal stability and reduce dependency on any single creditor. One of the most significant steps has been...