Belt and Road Initiative - The Times Of Central Asia

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China

Kazakhstan Turns to China and Hong Kong for Deals, Yuan Debt, and Market Access

Kazakhstan has opened a new phase in its economic ties with China, with a large package of Hong Kong and mainland Chinese agreements arriving alongside Kazakhstan’s first sovereign borrowing in China’s domestic bond market. The two steps show Astana is moving beyond trade growth into finance, listings, yuan debt, and China-linked capital for infrastructure and industry. On June 2, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin met a delegation of about 70 business representatives from Hong Kong and mainland China. Kazakhstan’s government said the group included 40 Hong Kong companies and 30 mainland Chinese companies working in finance, logistics, technology, energy, industry, and professional services. The visit produced four intergovernmental memoranda and 42 commercial agreements. Together, they covered aviation, finance, trade, innovation, technology, the digital economy, and green development. Hong Kong’s government gave a separate count, saying its business delegation had so far concluded 43 memoranda and agreements in Kazakhstan. The same statement said Hong Kong and Kazakhstan would move ahead with exploratory talks on a comprehensive double-taxation agreement and an investment promotion and protection agreement. A Hong Kong airline plans to launch direct flights to Almaty in the first quarter of 2027, which would add a practical link to the new finance and trade agenda. Officials discussed bond issuance, yuan funding, listings by Kazakh companies in Hong Kong, joint investment funds, and large investment projects. Baiterek National Managing Holding signed cooperation documents with Bank of China (Hong Kong), Invest Hong Kong, and Standard Chartered Hong Kong. Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, which operates the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, also signed two memoranda in Kazakhstan, including one with the Astana International Exchange. The two exchanges plan to work on cross-border listings of shares and debt securities. The agreements came days after Kazakhstan completed its debut sovereign panda bond, a renminbi-denominated instrument sold in mainland China by a foreign issuer. The Finance Ministry raised 3.4 billion yuan (about $500 million) through three-year sovereign bonds. The bonds carried a 1.9% yield, and demand exceeded supply by two times. The issue was listed on the Beijing Financial Assets Exchange and the Astana International Exchange. The sovereign issue followed earlier yuan deals by state-linked Kazakh issuers. Development Bank of Kazakhstan placed 2 billion yuan in three-year yuan-denominated Eurobonds in September 2025, the first such issue in Central Asia. KazMunayGas raised 1.25 billion yuan in October through a five-year offshore yuan-denominated bond. Samruk-Kazyna, Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund, closed the order book for 3 billion yuan in debut panda bonds in April 2026. Together with the sovereign bond, those issues total 9.65 billion yuan. The figures cover more than central-government borrowing. The National Bank of Kazakhstan defines external debt as liabilities of residents to non-residents. It includes debt obligations of both the public and private sectors. A country breakdown drawn from National Bank data shows Kazakhstan’s external debt to Chinese creditors rose to $12.87 billion at the start of 2026, up from $9.29 billion at the end of 2024. The new panda...

Why the Caspian Is Becoming Eurasia’s New Energy Crossroads

Russia’s war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East are accelerating the emergence of a new Eurasian energy architecture, with the Caspian region increasingly at its center. In international politics, moments when several global crises simultaneously create opportunities for new centers of influence are rare. Today, a vast area stretching from Central Asia to the South Caucasus is experiencing just such a moment. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped Europe’s approach to energy security. Tensions in the Middle East have also raised questions about the reliability of traditional energy supply routes. Meanwhile, the global energy transition is driving demand for both clean-energy sources and alternative transport corridors. Against this backdrop, the Caspian region is no longer viewed as a peripheral economic space. It is increasingly emerging as a critical hub in Eurasia’s evolving energy system. Baku Energy Week 2026 shows how far this shift has come, highlighting Azerbaijan’s transformation from a traditional oil and gas producer into a strategic connector linking Central Asia, Türkiye, Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. One of the forum’s most significant political signals came in the form of a message from U.S. President Donald Trump to participants. His remarks went beyond a routine diplomatic greeting and reflected a broader shift toward a more pragmatic view of global energy policy. Trump described the United States as a strong supporter of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas industry and said the U.S.-Azerbaijan energy partnership would become more important in the years ahead. For much of the past decade, Western energy strategies appeared increasingly focused on rapid decarbonization and climate objectives. However, rising energy prices, Europe’s energy crisis, and growing global electricity demand have prompted policymakers to reassess those priorities. Trump openly reaffirmed support for the oil and gas sector and emphasized that the United States remains a long-standing energy partner of Azerbaijan. More importantly, Washington appears to recognize Baku’s strategic role in global energy security. The Trump administration increasingly views energy security as an element of geopolitical competition and is prepared to support projects that diversify supplies of hydrocarbons and critical raw materials. Speaking at the opening of Baku Energy Week, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said Trump’s policies had helped return energy policy to “normality.” Aliyev also noted that the oil and gas industry had faced sustained pressure from advocates of a rapid energy transition. It was therefore no coincidence that Azerbaijan signed a series of agreements during the forum with major American companies, including Chevron, JPMorgan, Oracle, and Comstock Resources. Particularly noteworthy was a cooperation agreement covering critical minerals and rare earth elements. For Washington, access to these resources is increasingly a matter not only of energy policy but also of technological and national security amid intensifying competition with China. In effect, Washington is beginning to view Azerbaijan as an important platform in a changing Eurasian energy map. While Washington is signaling renewed political backing, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains one of the principal architects of the region’s practical integration. Over the past...

Geopolitics

Opinion: The U.S. Still Doesn’t Know Where Central Asia Belongs

Washington cannot decide where Central Asia belongs. Is it part of Europe? Asia? The Middle East? The confusion is on full display in how the House of Representatives has reassigned the region across subcommittees in rapid succession. In the 116th Congress, which convened in 2019, Central Asia fell under the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment. Two years later, in the 117th Congress, it was moved to the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation. That arrangement barely settled before the 118th Congress shifted it again—this time to the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Now, in the 119th Congress, it has been relocated to the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia. On the banks of the Potomac, Central Asia has taken on a nomadic life of its own—constantly on the move, never quite settling in one place. At the State Department, Central Asia is grouped under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs alongside Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. At the Pentagon, by contrast, the Middle East team oversees relations with Central Asia, alongside countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. These mismatches are not just clumsy; they are strategically dangerous. By misplacing Central Asia, Washington is misreading the geography of China’s rise. It is time for Washington to stop the bureaucratic musical chairs and place Central Asia within a coherent grand strategy. Far from being an afterthought, the region is one of the most consequential pieces of the geopolitical puzzle facing the United States: how to respond to China’s strategy. This is because Central Asia sits at the heart of China’s decades-long effort to move its critical lifelines away from the Indo-Pacific and onto the Eurasian landmass. Over the past 15 years, China has quietly reoriented its energy routes, reducing reliance on maritime pathways vulnerable to U.S. naval dominance—particularly chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—and expanded overland imports across Eurasia. Today, China imports significant volumes of natural gas via pipelines from Turkmenistan and Russia, as well as crude oil from Kazakhstan. These continental routes are largely insulated from maritime interdiction, giving Beijing strategic resilience. Central Asia should be understood through this lens. For China, the region is not peripheral—it is essential. The pipelines, railways and trade corridors that underpin China’s resilience all pass through Xinjiang and Central Asia. In this sense, Central Asia is not merely adjacent to China; it is embedded in China’s vision of the future. This is why Washington’s practice of grouping Central Asia with South Asia misses the mark. The two regions operate under fundamentally different strategic logics. South Asia is centered on the Indian subcontinent, shaped by maritime dynamics and the India‑Pakistan rivalry. Central Asia, by contrast, is a continental crossroads—defined by overland connectivity, energy flows and great‑power competition across Eurasia. India, meanwhile, is geographically constrained—lacking direct land access to Central Asia due to territory administered by Pakistan and separated from China by the Himalayas—leaving it...

Opinion: Expect China to take its 2+2 diplomacy to Central Asia

China does not do military alliances. Its declared posture is one of non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs. Yet Beijing has long understood that commercial ties alone cannot anchor strategic relationships; only security partnerships can. China’s recent experiments with 2+2 security dialogues – bringing together foreign and defense ministers – signal that it is seeking to move beyond an economics-first approach. The most likely next candidates for this format are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all of which share borders with China. For Central Asian governments, a 2+2 with China may hold appeal, particularly as they seek to manage instability spilling over from Afghanistan at a time when Russia’s security role is being strained by its war in Ukraine. After years of hoping that engagement could stabilize Afghanistan, Central Asian states have largely shifted to a policy of containment – seeking to insulate themselves from cross-border militant threats, narcotics flows and refugee movements rather than attempting to reshape Afghanistan’s internal trajectory. For Beijing, the objective would be to consolidate partnerships across the Eurasian heartland – an outcome Washington would prefer to counter. China shares Central Asia’s risk-management approach toward Afghanistan. Like its neighbors, Beijing has little appetite for deep involvement inside the country itself, focusing instead on preventing instability from spilling northward toward Xinjiang or disrupting Belt and Road corridors that run through the region. A 2+2 format offers China a way to institutionalize security coordination without violating its long-standing aversion to formal alliances. Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Defense Minister Dong Jun traveled to Phnom Penh to hold China’s first-ever 2+2 dialogue with Cambodia. Wang told reporters that China is willing to develop the mechanism into a “strategic platform” for enhancing political and defense security cooperation. He described it as a key instrument for cementing mutual assistance and solidarity, and for advancing the construction of a China-Cambodia “community with a shared future.” Wang also said China was prepared to work with Cambodia to build an “Asian security model” based on shared security and on seeking common ground while reserving differences. China’s deepening security engagement with Cambodia comes as the Southeast Asian nation remains locked in a border dispute with Thailand. Although Wang’s itinerary took him next to Bangkok, Beijing chose to hold a 2+2 only with Cambodia – notably the non-U.S. ally in this pairing. China is new to the 2+2 format. Last April, Beijing hosted its first ever 2+2 with a foreign country – with Indonesia. The trajectory suggests further 2+2 engagements ahead, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – the three Central Asian states that border China. In several aspects, Central Asia may be a more conducive environment for this diplomacy than Southeast Asia: there are no maritime disputes, and the countries are not embedded in U.S. alliance structures. Instead, there is a convergence around defensive security priorities – particularly border control and crisis management linked to Afghanistan – making the 2+2 format a natural fit. China under President Xi Jinping has always had an eye...

China

Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s New Playbook in Central Asia

In the Kyzylorda Region, near the town of Shieli, the silos and conveyor belts of a Chinese-backed plant rise out of the fine brown dust that dominates the landscape. It is the kind of project the Belt and Road was supposed to deliver in Central Asia: heavy industry, fixed capital, and a visible mark on the landscape. But it is also a reminder that China’s role in the region has become narrower, more contested, and less sweeping than the old rhetoric suggested. In photographs, the Gezhouba Cement Plant looks like a self-contained industrial island on the steppe. For nearby villagers, it became something else: a source of jobs and local prestige for some, but also of years of complaints about dust clouds and whether the state was quicker to defend a flagship Chinese-backed project than the people living beside it. Projects like the plant in Shieli also help explain why views of China across Central Asia remain mixed. Beijing is seen as a source of trade, investment, and technology, but that promise is tempered in some places by concerns over transparency, environmental costs, and who really benefits when a project arrives. China has become Central Asia’s dominant trading partner, but investment has not kept pace with the surge in commerce. The gap says a lot about how Beijing now works in the region: with a sharper focus on sectors that matter to its long-term influence. In 2025, trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion, up 12% year on year. Chinese exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion, while imports from Central Asia reached $35.1 billion. Trade has grown fast enough to reshape the region’s external balance, but long-term investment has been far more selective. Over 2005–2025, the five Central Asian states accounted for about 3% of China’s global overseas investment and construction total. The picture changes once direct investment is separated from trade and construction contracts. China’s FDI stock in the five Central Asian states stood at about $36 billion by mid-2025. Roughly 90% was concentrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The structure of that capital has also changed. Extractive industries still accounted for 46% of the portfolio, but manufacturing and energy together made up more than one third, and greenfield projects rose from 43% to 60%. China has not poured money into Central Asia on the scale once implied by early Belt and Road rhetoric. Instead, it has invested in sectors that strengthen its industrial position. Kazakhstan remains at the center of this relationship. It is China’s biggest commercial partner in Central Asia, and the main destination for Chinese capital in the region. Kazakhstan-China trade reached $43.8 billion in 2024. The country’s portfolio of projects with Chinese participation includes 224 ventures worth about $66.4 billion. Some are still at the planning stage, but the range of projects is telling. Recent developments have included a hydrogen energy technology innovation center in Almaty and a large wind farm with electricity storage. Kazakhstan still sells...

Diplomatic Talks

Xi Jinping and Berdymuhamedov Sr. Discuss Expansion of China-Turkmenistan Partnership

Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks with Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov, Turkmenistan's former president and leader of its People's Council, during the latter’s official visit to China. The meeting took place on March 18 at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing, according to a statement from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Xi noted that China had recently completed its annual parliamentary meetings, commonly referred to as the “Two Sessions,” during which key socio-economic priorities were outlined. He said the country’s new development agenda would support modernization efforts and create additional opportunities for international cooperation. The Chinese president said that mutual political support remains central to the comprehensive strategic partnership between Beijing and Ashgabat. He reaffirmed China’s readiness to continue backing Turkmenistan on issues related to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and its internationally recognized policy of permanent neutrality. Xi and Berdymuhamedov discussed expanding cooperation in the energy sector, particularly natural gas supplies, as well as in trade, investment, transport connectivity, agriculture, artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and clean energy. Both leaders also highlighted the importance of aligning China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Turkmenistan’s plans to revitalize historic Silk Road trade routes. Humanitarian cooperation was another focus of the talks, including plans to develop educational and cultural exchanges and establish joint centers. The leaders also discussed coordination on regional security challenges, including efforts to counter terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Berdymuhamedov reaffirmed Turkmenistan’s commitment to the One China principle and expressed readiness to deepen bilateral cooperation in energy, infrastructure, and trade. He said closer ties with China were important for Turkmenistan’s long-term economic development and again noted Beijing’s support for the country’s neutrality policy. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also attended the meeting. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the visit followed Berdymuhamedov’s trip to the United States in mid-February, the details of which were not fully disclosed. Shortly after his return, Turkmenistan’s President, Gurbanguly's son Serdar Berdymuhamedov, dismissed the country’s ambassador to the U.S. and its permanent representative to the United Nations. No official explanation was provided for the personnel changes.