Belt and Road Initiative - The Times Of Central Asia

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Energy Security

Russian Fuel Shortages Revive Tajikistan’s Search for Oil and Gas

On July 10, Tajikistan’s Energy Minister Daler Juma said the country had enough fuel to last two more months. This situation is due to Tajikistan’s dependence on Russian petroleum products, which are in short supply in Russia itself because of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries. Located in the southeast corner of Central Asia and ringed by mountains on three sides, Tajikistan has few options to replace those Russian supplies, so the Tajik authorities are preparing to try again to find domestic hydrocarbon supplies. Looking to Strike Oil at Home Estimates of the share of Tajikistan’s petroleum imports supplied by Russia range from 70% to 80%. Tajikistan’s head of civil aviation, Habibullo Nazarzoda, said on July 9 that his country is facing shortages of airplane fuel and is in talks with Turkmenistan. Russia has a prohibition on exporting aviation kerosene that runs from June 1 to November 30. Tajikistan does have hydropower and coal, but neither one of those helps with shortages at petrol stations, and much of the internal transport of people and goods in mountainous Tajikistan is done via the road network. So, Tajikistan is again looking at the potential to develop domestic hydrocarbon fields, this time with the help solely of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). On July 7, the head of the Tajik government’s Geological Department, Ilhom Oymuhammadzoda, said CNPC was already carrying out exploration at several potential hydrocarbon deposits in Tajikistan. “I think [CNPC] will present a progress report on the seismic survey operations by the end of the year,” Oymuhammadzoda told a press conference in Dushanbe. He named the Tajik Depression, in southwestern Tajikistan, and the Ferghana Basin, in northwestern Tajikistan, as two of the more promising sites. However, Oymuhammadzoda indicated that work in northern Tajikistan could require drilling down to a depth of 7,000 meters. Tajikistan’s Search for Oil and Gas Past studies of Tajikistan’s potential oil and gas fields point especially to the southwest of the country as a logical place to seek these hydrocarbons. Southwest Tajikistan is adjacent to gas and oil fields in southern Uzbekistan that have been producing for decades, to fields in northern Afghanistan, where exploration has confirmed commercial flows, and not too far east from the giant gas fields in Turkmenistan. Looking at a map, it seems logical that southwest Tajikistan is part of this same hydrocarbon structure. In 2008, Canadian company Tethys started exploring the Bokhtar area about 100 kilometers south of Dushanbe. Tethys found both oil and gas in the area. In 2012, the Canadian company estimated the area’s gross prospective resources at 8.5 billion barrels of oil and condensate and 3.22 trillion cubic metres of gas. For a small country like Tajikistan, it was potentially enormous, although these resources remained unconfirmed and commercially unproven. However, getting to that oil and gas required drilling wells that were 3,500 meters or deeper, which greatly added to production costs. In 2013, Gazprom International drilled a well at the Sarykamysh field in southwest Tajikistan that was...

Tajik-Afghan Border

Chinese Workers Return to Tajik Highway Under Guard After Afghan Border Attacks

Chinese engineers and workers have returned to a highway site in eastern Tajikistan under armed protection. Their return restarts work on a road toward China that stopped after two attacks from Afghanistan killed five Chinese nationals in November. Tajikistan's Transport Ministry said Chinese specialists came back in April to the Kalai-Khumb to Vanj section of the Dushanbe-Kulma highway in Gorno-Badakhshan. They are advising local crews, pouring concrete, fitting tunnel lighting and completing other works. Ozodi said its correspondent saw Tajik special forces guarding Chinese workers in Darvaz in late May, but security officers did not allow photos or video. The return keeps the China-funded Dushanbe-Kulma corridor moving. The road links Dushanbe with the Kulma Pass on the Chinese frontier through the Pamir. The Kalai-Khumb-Vanj works sit close to the Pyanj River, where attacks from the Afghan side are impacting the cost of Chinese projects. Construction on the Kalai-Khumb-Vanj section began on Sept. 20, 2022, with the contract running until September 20, 2026. The contractor is China Road and Bridge Corporation. China is funding the work with a $230 million grant. Once complete, the road section should shrink from 109 kilometers to 92.3 kilometers. It includes two tunnels, five anti-avalanche corridors and 14 bridges. The route crosses Darvaz, one of Tajikistan's hardest mountain road sections. The Transport Ministry has described it as a route that had gone for years without major repairs. The work is meant to allow year-round movement and lower fuel and travel costs. By January, crews had finished 12 of the 14 bridges. Two bridges, avalanche corridors and tunnel systems remained under construction. Work stopped after the November 30 attack in Shodak, a village in Darvaz district. Tajikistan's Border Troops said an armed group came from Ruzvayak in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province and attacked CRBC employees. Two Chinese citizens were killed and two were wounded. Dushanbe called the attackers members of an armed terrorist group, but did not publicly name the organization. Four days earlier, another attack hit Shamsiddin Shohin district in Khatlon, also from Afghan territory. The Chinese embassy said three Chinese citizens were killed and one Chinese citizen was wounded. TCA previously reported that Tajikistan described the strike as using an unmanned aerial vehicle carrying explosives. China reacted with a rare public warning. On December 1, the Chinese embassy urged Chinese companies and personnel to evacuate the Tajik-Afghan border area. Its latest June 9 public warning still told Chinese citizens not to work or travel in Tajikistan's southern border areas, citing a complex security situation and extreme weather. Afghanistan's Taliban government promised cooperation after the killings. Reuters quoted Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi as saying, "The Islamic Emirate is fully prepared to strengthen border security, conduct joint investigations, and engage in any form of coordination… joint measures against malicious elements are a pressing necessity." Taliban officials later said suspects had been detained in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province. The Tajik authorities say the border is stable and under control, while continuing to announce smuggling cases and armed incidents....

China

Kazakhstan Turns to China and Hong Kong for Deals, Yuan Debt, and Market Access

Kazakhstan has opened a new phase in its economic ties with China, with a large package of Hong Kong and mainland Chinese agreements arriving alongside Kazakhstan’s first sovereign borrowing in China’s domestic bond market. The two steps show Astana is moving beyond trade growth into finance, listings, yuan debt, and China-linked capital for infrastructure and industry. On June 2, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin met a delegation of about 70 business representatives from Hong Kong and mainland China. Kazakhstan’s government said the group included 40 Hong Kong companies and 30 mainland Chinese companies working in finance, logistics, technology, energy, industry, and professional services. The visit produced four intergovernmental memoranda and 42 commercial agreements. Together, they covered aviation, finance, trade, innovation, technology, the digital economy, and green development. Hong Kong’s government gave a separate count, saying its business delegation had so far concluded 43 memoranda and agreements in Kazakhstan. The same statement said Hong Kong and Kazakhstan would move ahead with exploratory talks on a comprehensive double-taxation agreement and an investment promotion and protection agreement. A Hong Kong airline plans to launch direct flights to Almaty in the first quarter of 2027, which would add a practical link to the new finance and trade agenda. Officials discussed bond issuance, yuan funding, listings by Kazakh companies in Hong Kong, joint investment funds, and large investment projects. Baiterek National Managing Holding signed cooperation documents with Bank of China (Hong Kong), Invest Hong Kong, and Standard Chartered Hong Kong. Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, which operates the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, also signed two memoranda in Kazakhstan, including one with the Astana International Exchange. The two exchanges plan to work on cross-border listings of shares and debt securities. The agreements came days after Kazakhstan completed its debut sovereign panda bond, a renminbi-denominated instrument sold in mainland China by a foreign issuer. The Finance Ministry raised 3.4 billion yuan (about $500 million) through three-year sovereign bonds. The bonds carried a 1.9% yield, and demand exceeded supply by two times. The issue was listed on the Beijing Financial Assets Exchange and the Astana International Exchange. The sovereign issue followed earlier yuan deals by state-linked Kazakh issuers. Development Bank of Kazakhstan placed 2 billion yuan in three-year yuan-denominated Eurobonds in September 2025, the first such issue in Central Asia. KazMunayGas raised 1.25 billion yuan in October through a five-year offshore yuan-denominated bond. Samruk-Kazyna, Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund, closed the order book for 3 billion yuan in debut panda bonds in April 2026. Together with the sovereign bond, those issues total 9.65 billion yuan. The figures cover more than central-government borrowing. The National Bank of Kazakhstan defines external debt as liabilities of residents to non-residents. It includes debt obligations of both the public and private sectors. A country breakdown drawn from National Bank data shows Kazakhstan’s external debt to Chinese creditors rose to $12.87 billion at the start of 2026, up from $9.29 billion at the end of 2024. The new panda...

Caspian Region

Why the Caspian Is Becoming Eurasia’s New Energy Crossroads

Russia’s war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East are accelerating the emergence of a new Eurasian energy architecture, with the Caspian region increasingly at its center. In international politics, moments when several global crises simultaneously create opportunities for new centers of influence are rare. Today, a vast area stretching from Central Asia to the South Caucasus is experiencing just such a moment. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped Europe’s approach to energy security. Tensions in the Middle East have also raised questions about the reliability of traditional energy supply routes. Meanwhile, the global energy transition is driving demand for both clean-energy sources and alternative transport corridors. Against this backdrop, the Caspian region is no longer viewed as a peripheral economic space. It is increasingly emerging as a critical hub in Eurasia’s evolving energy system. Baku Energy Week 2026 shows how far this shift has come, highlighting Azerbaijan’s transformation from a traditional oil and gas producer into a strategic connector linking Central Asia, Türkiye, Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. One of the forum’s most significant political signals came in the form of a message from U.S. President Donald Trump to participants. His remarks went beyond a routine diplomatic greeting and reflected a broader shift toward a more pragmatic view of global energy policy. Trump described the United States as a strong supporter of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas industry and said the U.S.-Azerbaijan energy partnership would become more important in the years ahead. For much of the past decade, Western energy strategies appeared increasingly focused on rapid decarbonization and climate objectives. However, rising energy prices, Europe’s energy crisis, and growing global electricity demand have prompted policymakers to reassess those priorities. Trump openly reaffirmed support for the oil and gas sector and emphasized that the United States remains a long-standing energy partner of Azerbaijan. More importantly, Washington appears to recognize Baku’s strategic role in global energy security. The Trump administration increasingly views energy security as an element of geopolitical competition and is prepared to support projects that diversify supplies of hydrocarbons and critical raw materials. Speaking at the opening of Baku Energy Week, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said Trump’s policies had helped return energy policy to “normality.” Aliyev also noted that the oil and gas industry had faced sustained pressure from advocates of a rapid energy transition. It was therefore no coincidence that Azerbaijan signed a series of agreements during the forum with major American companies, including Chevron, JPMorgan, Oracle, and Comstock Resources. Particularly noteworthy was a cooperation agreement covering critical minerals and rare earth elements. For Washington, access to these resources is increasingly a matter not only of energy policy but also of technological and national security amid intensifying competition with China. In effect, Washington is beginning to view Azerbaijan as an important platform in a changing Eurasian energy map. While Washington is signaling renewed political backing, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains one of the principal architects of the region’s practical integration. Over the past...

Geopolitics

Opinion: The U.S. Still Doesn’t Know Where Central Asia Belongs

Washington cannot decide where Central Asia belongs. Is it part of Europe? Asia? The Middle East? The confusion is on full display in how the House of Representatives has reassigned the region across subcommittees in rapid succession. In the 116th Congress, which convened in 2019, Central Asia fell under the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment. Two years later, in the 117th Congress, it was moved to the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation. That arrangement barely settled before the 118th Congress shifted it again—this time to the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Now, in the 119th Congress, it has been relocated to the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia. On the banks of the Potomac, Central Asia has taken on a nomadic life of its own—constantly on the move, never quite settling in one place. At the State Department, Central Asia is grouped under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs alongside Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. At the Pentagon, by contrast, the Middle East team oversees relations with Central Asia, alongside countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. These mismatches are not just clumsy; they are strategically dangerous. By misplacing Central Asia, Washington is misreading the geography of China’s rise. It is time for Washington to stop the bureaucratic musical chairs and place Central Asia within a coherent grand strategy. Far from being an afterthought, the region is one of the most consequential pieces of the geopolitical puzzle facing the United States: how to respond to China’s strategy. This is because Central Asia sits at the heart of China’s decades-long effort to move its critical lifelines away from the Indo-Pacific and onto the Eurasian landmass. Over the past 15 years, China has quietly reoriented its energy routes, reducing reliance on maritime pathways vulnerable to U.S. naval dominance—particularly chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—and expanded overland imports across Eurasia. Today, China imports significant volumes of natural gas via pipelines from Turkmenistan and Russia, as well as crude oil from Kazakhstan. These continental routes are largely insulated from maritime interdiction, giving Beijing strategic resilience. Central Asia should be understood through this lens. For China, the region is not peripheral—it is essential. The pipelines, railways and trade corridors that underpin China’s resilience all pass through Xinjiang and Central Asia. In this sense, Central Asia is not merely adjacent to China; it is embedded in China’s vision of the future. This is why Washington’s practice of grouping Central Asia with South Asia misses the mark. The two regions operate under fundamentally different strategic logics. South Asia is centered on the Indian subcontinent, shaped by maritime dynamics and the India‑Pakistan rivalry. Central Asia, by contrast, is a continental crossroads—defined by overland connectivity, energy flows and great‑power competition across Eurasia. India, meanwhile, is geographically constrained—lacking direct land access to Central Asia due to territory administered by Pakistan and separated from China by the Himalayas—leaving it...

China

Opinion: Expect China to take its 2+2 diplomacy to Central Asia

China does not do military alliances. Its declared posture is one of non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs. Yet Beijing has long understood that commercial ties alone cannot anchor strategic relationships; only security partnerships can. China’s recent experiments with 2+2 security dialogues – bringing together foreign and defense ministers – signal that it is seeking to move beyond an economics-first approach. The most likely next candidates for this format are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all of which share borders with China. For Central Asian governments, a 2+2 with China may hold appeal, particularly as they seek to manage instability spilling over from Afghanistan at a time when Russia’s security role is being strained by its war in Ukraine. After years of hoping that engagement could stabilize Afghanistan, Central Asian states have largely shifted to a policy of containment – seeking to insulate themselves from cross-border militant threats, narcotics flows and refugee movements rather than attempting to reshape Afghanistan’s internal trajectory. For Beijing, the objective would be to consolidate partnerships across the Eurasian heartland – an outcome Washington would prefer to counter. China shares Central Asia’s risk-management approach toward Afghanistan. Like its neighbors, Beijing has little appetite for deep involvement inside the country itself, focusing instead on preventing instability from spilling northward toward Xinjiang or disrupting Belt and Road corridors that run through the region. A 2+2 format offers China a way to institutionalize security coordination without violating its long-standing aversion to formal alliances. Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Defense Minister Dong Jun traveled to Phnom Penh to hold China’s first-ever 2+2 dialogue with Cambodia. Wang told reporters that China is willing to develop the mechanism into a “strategic platform” for enhancing political and defense security cooperation. He described it as a key instrument for cementing mutual assistance and solidarity, and for advancing the construction of a China-Cambodia “community with a shared future.” Wang also said China was prepared to work with Cambodia to build an “Asian security model” based on shared security and on seeking common ground while reserving differences. China’s deepening security engagement with Cambodia comes as the Southeast Asian nation remains locked in a border dispute with Thailand. Although Wang’s itinerary took him next to Bangkok, Beijing chose to hold a 2+2 only with Cambodia – notably the non-U.S. ally in this pairing. China is new to the 2+2 format. Last April, Beijing hosted its first ever 2+2 with a foreign country – with Indonesia. The trajectory suggests further 2+2 engagements ahead, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – the three Central Asian states that border China. In several aspects, Central Asia may be a more conducive environment for this diplomacy than Southeast Asia: there are no maritime disputes, and the countries are not embedded in U.S. alliance structures. Instead, there is a convergence around defensive security priorities – particularly border control and crisis management linked to Afghanistan – making the 2+2 format a natural fit. China under President Xi Jinping has always had an eye...