Diplomacy - The Times Of Central Asia

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Diplomacy United States

Kazakhstan Reshapes Its U.S. Partnership

On June 12, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Kazakhstan's Deputy Prime Minister–Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu in Washington. According to the State Department readout, the American side reiterated its commitment to Kazakhstan’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity while the two diplomats discussed the expansion of “opportunities for bilateral trade and investment” and the importance of “trusted infrastructure and a favorable regulatory landscape for U.S. companies in Kazakhstan.” Other policy issue-areas targeted for cooperation included the expansion of security cooperation, promotion of regional integration (through the C5+1 diplomatic platform), and exploration of commercial opportunities “particularly in the technology and critical minerals sectors.” The bilateral meeting is an expression of deeper structural adaptation within a rapidly transforming international system. While U.S.-Kazakhstan relations were once characterized by only episodic contact and simple tactical cooperation, they have recently been reconstituted into a stable and operationally integrated bilateral relationship with system-wide relevance. Trade between the United States and Kazakhstan reached $4.1 billion in 2023, a 30 percent increase from the year prior, with projections for 2025 surpassing $4.5 billion by mid-year. Long anchored in oil exports and machinery imports, the bilateral trade structure is now undergoing strategic deepening. Kazakhstan’s 12 percent share of global uranium reserves, alongside its emerging lithium sector and other rare earth elements, makes one of the most alluring partners in U.S. efforts to restructure supply chains and reduce overdependence on China, owing to its export reliability, geographic position between major powers, and regulatory openness to Western investment. Kazakhstan, for its part, is demonstrating a granular grasp of what structural integration into global supply networks requires. Domestic reforms have included the modernization of investment regimes and coordinated institutional adjustments across ministries and frameworks such as the Astana International Financial Centre. Nonetheless, uneven rail capacity, limited downstream processing, and gaps in customs harmonization still pose material constraints to full Western alignment. The C5+1 framework, launched in 2015 and revitalized since 2021, has matured into a semi-institutionalized platform for intra-regional coordination. Thanks partly to Kazakhstan's initiatives, it now offers both practical counterweights to Russian influence and Chinese economic presence, including infrastructure collaboration and trade diversification, as well as symbolic ones like diplomatic visibility and regional leadership signaling. More than a diplomatic forum, it reflects a broader regional strategy in which Central Asian states, led by Astana, seek to institutionalize a distinct strategic space through multilateral formats. This architecture enables selective cooperation on infrastructure, trade, and regulatory standards while preserving flexibility amid the competing pressures of a multipolar order. Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu has been instrumental in this conceptual and operational shift. After serving as Chief of Staff to the President from 2022 to 2023, he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister–Minister of Foreign Affairs in April 2023. His career trajectory—including postings at Kazakhstan’s UN Mission in Geneva (overlapping with Tokayev's tenure as Director General of the UN Office in Geneva) and his leadership in Asia-Africa diplomatic affairs—reflects an evolving strategic mindset. Nurtleu has emerged not merely as a representative of state policy but...

Citizen Rights Bilateral Cooperation Diplomacy

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan Hold Talks on Consular Cooperation and Citizen Rights

Officials from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan met in Dushanbe on May 27 to discuss consular cooperation and the protection of citizen rights, according to the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The consultations brought together delegations from both countries’ foreign ministries. The Tajik delegation was led by Bahodur Safarzoda, Head of the Main Consular Department, while the Kyrgyz side was headed by Seitek Zhumakadyr uulu, Director of the Consular Service Department. Discussions focused on improving bilateral cooperation, including measures to protect the rights of citizens living or traveling in each other’s countries, streamlining border-crossing procedures, and enhancing the efficiency of consular services. The meeting was part of broader efforts to strengthen trust and cooperation between the two neighboring countries. In March, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon signed a landmark agreement in Bishkek to resolve the long-standing dispute over the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Under the terms of that agreement, both national parliaments must ratify the deal before it becomes official. If approved, the final step will be the formal exchange of ratification documents, expected to occur on March 31 during a summit in the Fergana Valley. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev is also expected to attend. Only after this exchange will the physical demarcation of the border begin.

Afghanistan Diplomacy Taliban International Diplomacy Geopolitics Regional Security

Recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Between Law, Diplomacy, and Pragmatism

After the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, the question of recognizing the new Afghan regime became one of the key issues in regional and global politics. Although no country has granted de jure recognition to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), international engagement with the de facto authorities is becoming increasingly institutionalized. This article attempts to systematize and provisionally classify countries based on their stance toward the IEA. This is not a formal legal typology but rather an analytical tool meant to identify "stable patterns of behavior" in the context of interactions with the de facto authorities in Kabul. This approach does not aim for exhaustive academic precision but provides a basis for further discussion and analysis. To begin, we must clarify some basic principles, first and foremost, the institution of recognition. In international legal doctrine, the recognition of a new state or government is a unilateral act by a state and does not require the approval of international organizations. The UN, including the Security Council, does not formally conduct acts of recognition, but its approval is required for admitting authorities to the UN General Assembly, which constitutes formal recognition of international legitimacy and a willingness by the global community to work with them. The key mechanism here is the UN Credentials Committee. This is a special committee of the UN General Assembly consisting of nine member states, which change on a rotating basis. It annually reviews the lists of delegations accredited to participate in UN General Assembly sessions. Between 2021 and 2024, the committee decided to reject the recognition of seats for the Taliban government. In effect, this constitutes a denial of international recognition at the UN level. While the decision of the Credentials Committee has no formal legal significance as an act of recognition or non-recognition, politically it sends a strong signal to other states: the UN still does not regard the IEA as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. In other words, the Credentials Committee acts as a kind of beacon: until it is "lit," a wave of de jure recognition from other states is highly unlikely. Many countries, especially those following a policy of collective decision-making, will take their cue from the UN. For now, the signal remains unchanged: the international community maintains a cautious distance from legitimizing the Taliban regime. As is well known, there are two types of recognition: de jure recognition, which is complete and official and involves the establishment of diplomatic relations, and de facto recognition, which is limited and does not imply full legitimization of the regime. Removing the Taliban from national terrorist lists (as Kazakhstan and Russia have done) does not constitute legal recognition, even though some may portray it as such. The UN itself uses the term "de facto authorities" to describe the Taliban. At the same time, the UN Security Council sanctions regime on Afghanistan (under Resolution 2255) provides for the application of sanctions on an individual basis, without qualifying the regime as a terrorist regime. The...

Women's rights Education Security Regional Security Afghanistan Diplomacy

Opinion: Balancing Rights and Realities – Engaging Afghanistan for Change

The attention of the international community has once again turned to human rights in Afghanistan following the latest report by Richard Bennett, the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan. In his report, Bennett recommended that member states consider the concept of gender apartheid and support its codification, noting that Afghan women regard this term as the most accurate description of their situation. This initiative emerged in response to the tightening restrictions on women and girls imposed by the Taliban. The renewed focus on gender issues is not exactly what Central Asian countries expect in the context of Afghan settlement. For them, it is far more important to address pressing issues of security, economic cooperation, and control of migration flows, which directly affect regional stability. Therefore, Central Asian states prefer to concentrate on practical steps and avoid over-politicizing issues that could complicate dialogue with the Taliban and exacerbate the situation in neighboring Afghanistan. Today, women’s rights have become a cornerstone in the international community’s attempts to establish dialogue with the Taliban. The rights of women in Afghanistan have been a journey, with different periods bringing different challenges. Back in the 1920s, Amanullah Khan was a real game-changer, giving Afghan women the official equal status they deserved. But then things changed a bit during King Zahir Shah's reign (1933–1973) when education became a priority, and girls started going to school. By 1973, a heartening number of 150,000 girls were proudly enrolled in schools across the country. And let's not forget the momentous step of Kabul University opening its doors to women in 1947. Since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, women’s rights in Afghanistan have been significantly curtailed. Women are banned from attending educational institutions, working in most sectors, traveling without a male escort, and participating in public life. These measures have already received widespread international condemnation — rightfully so — but the official recognition of "gender apartheid" as a crime against humanity could give this issue a new legal status and increase pressure on the Islamic Emirate. The question is: How productive is this approach? The politicization of Afghan settlement, especially through the lens of women’s rights, may only worsen the situation. Making gender issues a precondition for dialogue severely limits the space for negotiations with the Taliban regime. In the United Nations itself, the Taliban are considered the "de facto authorities" of Afghanistan, and dialogue with them takes place at various bilateral and multilateral levels. In this context, strict demands on women’s rights could delay or even halt the process of engagement. This is because the Taliban perceives such conditions as interference in their internal affairs and cultural norms. Dialogue at an Impasse: Is an Inclusive Government Being Set Aside? The international community — primarily its Western segment — and the Islamic Emirate have taken extremely rigid positions. For international actors, women’s and girls’ rights have become the top priority, while the issue of forming an inclusive government in Afghanistan has receded into the background....

Delimitation Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Border Diplomacy

Kyrgyzstan Hails Border Deal with Tajikistan as Major Diplomatic Success

Kamchybek Tashiyev, head of Kyrgyzstan's State Committee for National Security (GKNB), addressed parliament for the first time regarding the Kyrgyz-Tajik border agreements. He clarified the terms of the final agreement and explained the territorial concessions Kyrgyzstan made to prevent future border conflicts. The document has sparked mixed reactions in Kyrgyz society, with some deputies expressing dissatisfaction with the delimitation results, while ordinary citizens hope for lasting peace between the two countries. Final Agreement Tashiyev stated that the border agreement was based on the 1991 accords, countering earlier Tajik proposals to rely on documents from 1924-27. Years of work by geographers enabled both sides to reach mutual compromises. The Kyrgyz-Tajik border spans 1,006 kilometers. By 2011, 520 kilometers had been delineated, while the remaining 486 kilometers were settled over the past three years. “We have prepared several documents for signing by the presidents of both countries, including an agreement on the state border, an agreement on water resources—a previous water dispute in 2022 led to armed conflict—as well as agreements on cross-border road use and new infrastructure projects,” Tashiyev said. Over the past three years, the two nations have held numerous bilateral meetings, resulting in the signing of 45 protocols. Tashiyev noted that the process could be finalized within a month, as the Kyrgyz parliament has already approved the agreement, leaving only the leaders' signatures. Parliamentary Debate “We are making history! We have responsibly completed border delimitation with Uzbekistan. We approved the agreements with Tajikistan without debate. The people appreciate this. But public opinion is divided—that is common. If 50-60% of citizens support it, stability will follow,” said MP Nadira Narmatova during the parliamentary session. However, some MPs opposed the government's decision. Sultanbai Aizhigitov, an MP from Batken Oblast, criticized the transfer of Dostuk village, where Kyrgyz authorities had previously built roads and reinforced the state border. He also disapproved of the shared water intake arrangement, arguing that the territory had always belonged to Kyrgyzstan. Voices from Border Villages In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Kanybek Myrzamuratov, a resident of Samarkandek village near the border, said most locals supported the government's decision. While some land was ceded, he emphasized that peace was the priority. “In some places, one street belongs to two countries—Tajiks on one side, Kyrgyz on the other. Disputes often started over minor issues but escalated into larger conflicts. At times, entire villages would mobilize against each other, leading to casualties,” he said. According to villagers, tensions with Tajikistan became serious in 1996, though minor disputes occurred even during Soviet times. The Soviet authorities, however, downplayed such incidents. Both sides engaged in stone-throwing, livestock theft, and occasional violence. Myrzamuratov noted that Kyrgyz authorities kept negotiations with Tajikistan confidential to prevent unrest among border residents. “In Dostuk, Leilek District, houses were burned down in last year’s clashes. Residents would not have accepted a transfer to Tajikistan. To prevent confusion and disputes, the authorities remained silent,” he said. He added that locals now look forward to reopening the...

Regional Security Regional Development Diplomacy Strategy Afghanistan

Afghanistan: Rentier State or Hostage to Foreign Aid?

The current geopolitical turbulence presents Afghanistan and the countries of Central Asia with serious challenges. After the Taliban's return to power in 2021, Afghanistan found itself in a state of deep economic crisis, and its continued stability once again depends on external assistance. However, with the shifting global order, traditional donors such as the U.S. and the European Union are scaling back their involvement in Afghan affairs, while new sources of support remain uncertain. This creates significant risks for the countries of the region, which must find ways to minimize the consequences of Afghanistan’s crisis and ensure their own security. Historical context: dependence through the ages Afghanistan has always been dependent on external sources of income. This historical context was explored by Ali Nuriyev (historian, blogger, and researcher of the Ottoman world) in his article for TRT, "Afghanistan: The Graveyard of Empires or a Rentier State?" “As flattering as it may be for Afghans to have a reputation as [a nation that has kept its independence despite incursions from Great Powers], everything comes at a price, including Afghanistan’s independence”. Nuriyev provides a detailed analysis showing that since the founding of modern Afghanistan in the 18th century by Ahmad Shah Durrani, the country has built its economy and politics on external sources of income. Durrani financed his campaigns through raids on India, while his successors received subsidies from the British in exchange for maintaining neutrality in the "Great Game" between the British Empire and Russia. Later, in the 20th century, Afghanistan skillfully played on the rivalry between the USSR and the U.S., securing billions of dollars for infrastructure, education, and military modernization. By the 1970s, two-thirds of the country's state budget came from foreign aid. Even after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan continued to rely on external support. The governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani survived primarily due to funding from the United States and its allies. Today, following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Afghanistan is once again searching for new sources of income. Sanctions and frozen assets have forced the Taliban to seek support from China, Russia, and other nations, further proving that the country’s reliance on foreign aid remains unchanged. This is the historical reality: Afghanistan is a state that, for centuries, has survived thanks to external resources. Its independence has always been closely tied to its ability to extract benefits from the geopolitical maneuvers of great powers. In the present day, this historical context can be interpreted in different ways. However, one fact remains clear, today’s geopolitical turbulence is already having a negative impact on Afghanistan. Afghanistan's adaptation As the global order shifts, the key players on the "Afghan track" are adjusting their strategies toward Afghanistan, exacerbating the country’s economic crisis. United States – For Afghanistan, the new realities in the U.S. mean reduced aid and frozen assets. The U.S., which had long been Afghanistan’s primary donor, is unlikely to increase financial support soon. Following...