• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
14 November 2025

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 83

How to Harness Momentum Along the Middle Corridor: Interoperability on the New Silk Road

When most people think of the “Silk Road,” they picture a single camel train inching across a tan horizon, blue-white porcelain strapped beside bolts of silk. That fairytale, however romantic, was never true. Medieval Eurasia operated on multiple, overlapping, and improvised routes, often seasonal. And frankly, for a Westerner at the far end, it scarcely mattered how the goods got there, only that they did. Then, oceanic shortcuts and the Americas rewired global trade; two world wars shattered old geographies, and the Iron Curtain sealed Central Asia into a blank space on Western mental maps. Now, the region is reopening on its own terms, and supply chains are being redrawn in real time. Suddenly, the term “Middle Corridor” has become trendy. The Caspian Policy Center held its 3rd Trans-Caspian Connectivity Conference in London in July this year, focusing on the theme “Harnessing the Momentum, Building on the Synergies.” The title itself implies a recognition of some “momentum” and some “synergies.” A couple of months after the London conference, I spoke by phone with David Moran, a former UK ambassador with extensive experience in the region, to ask him about what he thinks of the whole “New Silk Road” idea. His point is refreshingly unsentimental: stop imagining a line and start thinking of it as a web of interconnected channels. In practice, that means folding energy, digital, finance, and steel into a single operating picture so capital shows up on better terms; widening the frame from C5+1 to a Central Asia–South Caucasus–Turkey logic that actually matches how goods and electrons move; and fixing bottlenecks that are more about governance than concrete. We talked about quiet levers: insurance that prices climate risk properly, a digital spine that makes rail and the Caspian behave like one network, and the long-cycle drivers that turn logistics into strategy. Compound those gains, and pretty soon you’ve built something you no longer have to call “alternative.”  “Alternative” lets officials kick decisions into next year; “strategy” forces sequencing, standards in definitions, and capital discipline today. It also resets expectations: this is not a clever detour around trouble, it is the backbone of a regional growth story that European lenders might just actually know how to price. Seen that way, the geography snaps into focus. On the Caspian, Aktau and Kuryk on one shore and Baku on the other form the hinge, while the BTK railway and Kazakhstan’s Altynkol–Zhetygen pull weight inland. Atyrau is the western Kazakh air node that connects workers, parts and schedules to the Caucasus, the Gulf, and Europe. Thread through the rest: Black Sea power interconnect ideas, subsea data routes, the hydrocarbon pipes already in place. Put it together and you have a web with redundancy, optionality, and recognisable standards built in. If there’s one real shift, it’s moving from projects to an operating plan. Moran puts it cleanly: “Go for a fully integrated regional connectivity strategy -- energy, digital, finance, infrastructure -- rather than working through sectoral initiatives separately.” Integration isn’t a slogan; it’s how you...

How Armenia–Azerbaijan Peace Lowers Corridor Risk for Central Asia

The framework announced on 8 August 2025 in Washington for Armenia–Azerbaijan peace and development resets the security–economics equation in the South Caucasus and holds deep implications for Central Asia. At its core is the mutual recognition of territorial integrity, renunciation of force, and a transit arrangement under Armenian jurisdiction linking mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan across the Syunik province. For Central Asia, the immediate significance is the de-risking of the westbound Caspian–Caucasus–Anatolia artery centered on Azerbaijan’s Alat Port and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) rail route. As reported by Azerbaijan Railways, BTK’s operating capacity was lifted to 5 million tons/year (t/y) in May 2024 and has a path for expanding to 17 million tons in later phases. Alat currently lists 13 berths and dedicated ferry roll-on/roll-off (“ro-ro”) facilities. A dependable Armenian-jurisdiction link would create a second, legally unambiguous passage across the South Caucasus. Single-route dependence through Georgia would be reduced, as would the variance of end-to-end journey times. That reliability directly benefits Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, whose westbound flows move by rail-ferry from Aktau/Kuryk to Alat and from Turkmenbashi to Alat before continuing overland toward Türkiye. Peace Reframes the Middle Corridor These developments also strengthen the business case for incremental investments in ports, ferries, rail paths, and energy interconnectors tied to the Middle Corridor, including swap-based energy routing already practiced between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. At Alat, confirmed as the hinge of the Middle Corridor, political risk converts into bankable time, which prices into contracts, which later in turn finances small but decisive capacity steps; bankable time begets bankable trade. Conflict risk in the South Caucasus has been a priced variable since 2020. A durable peace narrows that risk band and yields three operational effects with country-specific salience. First, marine war-risk and cargo premiums in nearby high-risk theaters such as the Gulf, typically ranging from 0.2–0.3% of hull value, rose to 0.5% during recent tensions. This figure offers a benchmark for how underwriters re-price routes as perceived closure risk changes. Second, forwarders can trim buffer time, improving asset utilization for rail paths and ro-ro (roll on, roll off) rotations pairing the Caspian ports (Alat, Aktau/Kuryk, Turkmenbashi). Third, carriers gain confidence to publish regular rotations and pre-position equipment; the Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping Company notes 1–2-day intervals in favorable conditions and shows multiple departures on a given day (e.g., August 15 listed Alat–Kuryk, Alat–Turkmenbashi, etc.). Lower variance is not cosmetic; it is collateral for contracts. Banks recognize collateral. Insurers do, too. When variability falls, rate discovery improves; as a result, multi-month slots or rail-path agreements become financeable. This is precisely the mechanism exporters from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan need to secure predictable capacity into Azerbaijan and onward to Türkiye. Reliability also changes routing choices. At Alat, rail-ferry cargo arriving from Aktau/Kuryk or Turkmenbashi can be planned to run either via Georgia or via Syunik toward Kars, whichever route minimizes dwell time and schedule variance for the onward leg. Even where pure distance savings are modest, gains in reliability reduce movements of empty containers. They also...

The View From Ankara – President Tokayev’s Working Visit to Turkey

The official visit of President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Turkey on July 29, 2025, carries a multidimensional and strategic significance that extends far beyond the boundaries of diplomatic protocol. This engagement stands out as part of an ongoing multidimensional process of transformation marked by deepening regional alliances in the fields of science, energy, and logistics. Invited by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Tokayev co-chaired the fifth meeting of the Turkey-Kazakhstan High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. As a result of this summit, 20 bilateral agreements were signed, encompassing new frameworks of regional integration, especially in the fields of mining, energy, transportation, and higher education. Energy Diplomacy and Resource Geopolitics One of the most striking dimensions of the visit was the negotiation of new cooperation mechanisms aimed at transporting Kazakh oil to global markets via Turkey. According to President Tokayev, currently 1.4 million tons of Kazakh oil are transported annually through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Under the newly signed memoranda of understanding, the parties aim to increase this volume. This development not only strengthens Turkey’s ambition to become a regional energy hub but also holds critical importance for Kazakhstan’s strategy to diversify export routes and secure access to safe ports. Furthermore, the expressed intent of Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) to operate in Kazakhstan signals that the collaboration may extend beyond transport into production processes as well. Kazakhstan's reserves of rare earth elements and strategic minerals are of considerable value to both European and Asian economies prioritizing green energy transitions. In this context, the agreements signed in the mining sector may herald a new phase — one that mandates not only commercial but also technological and scientific R&D collaborations. Strategic Dimensions of the Middle Corridor Another key agenda item during the visit was the development and activation of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly referred to as the ‘Middle Corridor.’ According to data shared by Tokayev, approximately 85% of road freight transported between China and Europe passes through Kazakhstan. This positions Kazakhstan as the backbone of the region’s logistics infrastructure. Turkey’s central role in the Middle Corridor makes it a decisive actor in the route’s integration with Europe. In this regard, Kazakhstan’s efforts to modernize its rail and road infrastructure, alongside its revival of maritime transport on the Caspian Sea, when combined with Turkey’s port capacity and transportation infrastructure, offer significant synergistic potential. These developments also underscore the strategic importance of the Zangezur Corridor and reinforce the value of uninterrupted transportation from China to Europe via Turkey, bypassing the Iranian route. Education and Academic Diplomacy The visit also drew attention for its scientific and cultural dimensions, in addition to its economic focus. Joint initiatives such as Gazi University’s planned establishment of a branch within the South Kazakhstan Pedagogical University can contribute to aligning the Turkish higher education model with Kazakhstan’s ongoing education reforms. Moreover, the Turkish Maarif Foundation’s new school initiatives in Kazakhstan signify a broadening and institutionalization of bilateral cooperation in education. These efforts may extend beyond student exchange programs to encompass joint research...

Kazakhstan and Turkey Reshape Their Eurasian Partnership

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Ankara consolidated bilateral ties, but it also marked a deeper strategic inflection. The visit marks a broader regional convergence between two major Eurasian actors as they coordinate a strategic regional architecture. Thus, Tokayev’s language emphasized an “expanded strategic partnership,” signaling a move beyond traditional trade or cultural diplomacy. Ankara, for its part, went well beyond symbolic gestures in its response, with binding institutional agreements and substantive infrastructural commitments. The timing of the visit underscores its significance against the current geopolitical backdrop, where Central Asia is once again the object of keen attention from external actors vying for footholds and influence. In this context, the Kazakhstan–Turkey axis appears not as a knee-jerk reaction to outside machinations but as a deliberate autonomous regional vector that enhances the agency of both countries. Strategic Depth of the Tokayev Visit Tokayev’s trip to Turkey represents an assertion of multidimensional regional agency: Kazakhstan’s long-standing multi-vector foreign policy was once a balancing act among great powers, but it has now entered a phase of selective consolidation. This bilateral intensification indexes a shift in the configuration of Eurasian geoeconomics, as strategic weight disperses across an increasingly differentiated agentic field. The Astana–Ankara alignment means that both countries can act with diminished external dependence, even as global architectures become more unstable and contested. Tokayev’s diplomacy suggests the emergence of an equilibrium strategy anchored in regional connectivity rather than bloc affiliation. Ankara’s perspective is equally structural. The shared vocabulary — “coordination,” “deepening,” “integration” — signals a logic of long-horizon strategic cooperation. Complementarities Across the Bilateral Core The current Kazakhstan–Turkey relationship exhibits a structurally complementary relationship rarely sustained at this depth between two regional powers so geographically distant from one another. On one side, Kazakhstan brings economic scale, resource depth, and transit centrality to the Middle Corridor. On the other, Turkey brings not only industrial experience and defense sector credibility but maritime access, NATO membership, and a flexible political reach into Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean basin. The evolution of mutual strategic trust based on converging structural interests binds these capacities of the two sides together. For Kazakhstan, Turkey provides logistical continuity and downstream industrial expansion; Ankara also diversifies Astana's international geoeconomic network. For Turkey, Kazakhstan provides resource access, eastward corridors, and meta-regional relevance beyond the Black Sea. These structural interests converge across multiple material economic sectors: energy, defense-industrial cooperation, agrotechnology, education, and digital logistics. Nor is this convergence driven solely by state policy: both countries’ private sectors increasingly perceive each other as entry points into economic systems adjacent to one another. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) as an Institutional Amplifier The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), now maturing into an institutionalized platform for regional legitimacy with a shared symbolic and infrastructural vocabulary, enables Kazakhstan–Turkey cooperation to transcend the limits of bilateralism while maintaining its coherence. Joint positions on transport, trade, education, and foreign policy are advanced and discussed within a common multilateral setting where proposals are negotiated horizontally with other Turkic states. Through...

After U.S. Strikes, Kazakhstan Warns of Deteriorating Security in Caspian Region

Kazakhstan said on Sunday that U.S. military strikes on Iran pose “serious consequences” for security in the Caspian region. “As a result of recent U.S. military actions against Iran, the international situation is rapidly deteriorating, posing serious consequences for the security of states in our region,” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said after the United States joined Israel’s war against Iran and attacked several Iranian nuclear sites. “Kazakhstan, as one of the Caspian region states, maintains cooperation with Iran in various spheres. We believe that all disputes, including those related to nuclear issues, must be resolved through negotiations based on the United Nations Charter,” the ministry said. “We urge all relevant states to accelerate the development of an agreement aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and providing security guarantees for states that comply with the non-proliferation regime under international oversight,” it said. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Russia border the Caspian Sea. The area is an important trade route.

What Does Raisi’s Death Mean for the Caspian Sea Region?

By Robert M. Cutler The death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter accident on May 19 will have significant effects on Iranian domestic politics and foreign policy. These include not only Iran's relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan directly, but also indirectly through the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR, also called the "Middle Corridor") and the International North–South Transit Corridor (INSTC). Despite conspiracy theories, the only reasonable alternative hypothesis to an accidental crash is that the pilot intentionally ran the helicopter into the mountain head-on at full speed. Both possibilities may be subsumed under the category "Act of God". Raisi was working to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and was seen as a potential - even likely - future Supreme Leader of Iran, succeeding the 85-year-old Ali Khamenei, who is in poor health. Now, however, it is not out of the question that his death leads to a reorientation of Tehran's foreign policy and a wave of radicalization. The outcome will depend upon the obscure machinations of the theocratic and security-service elite, for which the formal organizational and constitutional arrangements set the framework but do not determine the result. The Iranian president is not the most powerful individual in the country's political system, but he is still influential. Raisi had sought to improve ties with Azerbaijan, including water projects on the Aras River and discussions about transportation links. These initiatives may now face delays or even reversals. Yerevan's strategic significance for Tehran's relationship with Moscow and its broader regional ambitions will not diminish; indeed, their bilateral military-industrial cooperation has only grown since Russia's re-invigoration of its war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. At the same time, Tehran's relations with Baku are more complicated, for myriad present-day and historical reasons, not least but not only concerning the Azerbaijani minority in Iran.   The South Caucasus and Trans-Caspian Implications Armenia and Azerbaijan are nevertheless persevering in their bilaterally-based practical cooperation and peace negotiations, now proceeding without third-party mediation. The most recent high-level meeting in this process took place between their respective foreign ministers in Almaty on May 10–11. These significant discussions followed talks between them in Berlin in February of this year, and they took place in the context of ongoing efforts to delimit and demarcate the two countries' common border. Delimitation refers to drawing and describing lines on maps, whereas demarcation is the process of installing physical markers on the territory. Demarcation has already begun in the sensitive Tovuz region, and the Russian contingent assisting Armenian border guards under a bilateral agreement has already been withdrawn. In April, as a result of this process, Armenia returned four villages to Azerbaijan. Unresolved issues involve territorial claims against Azerbaijan in Armenia's constitution and the reopening of regional transit routes. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's initiative for the necessary constitutional reforms, along with his border-demarcation initiatives and continuing peace negotiations, have provoked anti-government protests in Armenia, fueled by the irredentist and xenophobic segments of the diaspora, which are the best established, most...