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Eurasian Economic Union

At EAEU Forum, Kyrgyzstan Calls for Integration in Trade, Logistics, and Migration

At the 4th Eurasian Economic Forum in Minsk, marking the 10th anniversary of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Kyrgyzstan highlighted ongoing internal barriers that continue to hinder its development. Chief among them are trade delays, logistical bottlenecks, and persistent challenges in labor migration. Deputy Minister of Economy Sultan Akhmatov reaffirmed Kyrgyzstan’s commitment to Eurasian integration and strengthening economic ties with other EAEU member states. According to the ministry’s press office, Akhmatov emphasized the need for deeper investment cooperation and expressed confidence that enhanced integration would bolster regional stability and mutual economic growth. He also advocated for expanded academic exchanges, the development of digital and vocational education, and the creation of joint research platforms across the EAEU. Yet, alongside these ambitions, Akhmatov pointed to systemic obstacles. He urged the removal of trade and customs barriers that burden importers and exporters at border checkpoints. He also emphasized the importance of mutual recognition of quality certifications and ensuring labor mobility within the Union. Labor Migration: An Economic Lifeline Labor migration remains a crucial pillar of Kyrgyzstan’s economy. In 2024, remittances from Kyrgyz migrants, most of whom live and work in Russia, reached $3 billion, equivalent to 24% of national GDP. This figure nearly matches the country’s total exports of $3.8 billion during the same period. However, the number of Kyrgyz labor migrants in Russia has been steadily declining. First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Amangeldiev attributed this trend to both domestic economic improvements and new restrictions introduced by Russian authorities, including changes to migration law. As of 2024, foreign workers in Russia are required to sign one-year contracts with employers, a condition that has created legal uncertainty and discouraged long-term employment. “I Left Moscow Because the Rules Changed” Aziret Abdiev, a Kyrgyz welder who worked in Moscow for nearly a decade, shared his reasons for leaving: “I didn’t leave because I disliked the work. I spoke fluent Russian, had a steady job, and was valued for my skills. But over the past year, the pressure increased, inspections, bureaucracy, hostility. It became clear I couldn’t continue. Now I’ve applied for a Schengen visa and will be heading to Lithuania to work in a metal factory.” Expert Opinion: Migration as a Core Integration Priority Kyrgyz experts argue that labor migration is central to the country’s national interest. Raising the issue at the Minsk forum, they contend, was both pragmatic and necessary. “For Kyrgyzstan, labor migration is more than an economic category. It is a matter of social stability, foreign currency inflows, and the future of entire generations,” political analyst Bakyt Baketaev told The Times of Central Asia. According to official statistics, up to one million Kyrgyz citizens work abroad, primarily in EAEU member states. This makes mutual recognition of qualifications, access to social protections and healthcare, and the safeguarding of migrant rights critical priorities for Kyrgyz policymakers. Baketaev believes progress is possible, if Kyrgyzstan acts consistently and professionally while building coalitions within the EAEU. He notes that other member states face similar challenges: “There is room...

Foreign Affairs

Former Kyrgyz Prime Minister Proposes Special Status for Citizens in Russia

At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF-2025), Temir Sariyev, head of the Kyrgyz Chamber of Commerce and Industry and former prime minister, proposed granting Kyrgyz citizens a special status in Russia. The statement sparked mixed reactions in both Moscow and Bishkek. Speaking at the Kyrgyzstan-Russia business dialogue, Sariyev, who was involved in Kyrgyzstan’s accession negotiations to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), highlighted Bishkek’s consistent political and economic support for Moscow. He drew on historical ties, citing Kyrgyz support during the Great Patriotic War. “If we recall the Great Patriotic War, it was the 28 Panfilov Guardsmen who defended Moscow. It was a turning point. When the special military operation began, the first to extend a helping hand, without fear, was the Kyrgyz Republic,” Sariyev said, referring to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He proposed exploring the possibility of granting Kyrgyz migrants in Russia a special status, citing longstanding bilateral ties. However, the initiative met resistance in the Russian State Duma. Konstantin Zatulin, First Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, dismissed the proposal, noting that Kyrgyz citizens already enjoy considerable privileges under the EAEU framework, such as visa-free entry, the right to work without a permit, and exemption from patent requirements. “What additional special status could we be talking about? It is impractical. Kyrgyzstan is already in a more advantageous position than other Central Asian countries that are not members of the Union,” Zatulin said. Pushback also came from within Kyrgyzstan. Deputy Prime Minister Edil Baisalov criticized both Sariyev's proposal and the broader outcomes of Kyrgyzstan's EAEU membership. In a post on X, Baisalov wrote: “Of course, our people have a special status, but not because of their participation in the 1941-1945 war. Special status should come from real membership in the EAEU, which hastily accepted us without sufficient guarantees. In reality, there is neither equal access to the labor market nor full access to our goods.” He urged Kyrgyz authorities not to appeal to “pity” or “sympathy,” but instead to demand the full implementation of EAEU commitments. As of now, Sariyev’s proposal has not been officially introduced. Analysts suggest that amid Russia’s sensitive migration and geopolitical climate, the initiative is unlikely to gain traction in the near term.

Organization of Turkic States

Turkey’s Turkic Gambit: Balancing Influence in Post-Soviet States

Despite its superpower ambitions, which have diminished somewhat since February 24, 2022, Moscow views Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence with increasing concern. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which includes several Central Asian republics, is perceived by the Kremlin as a rival to its regional blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, for Central Asian nations, the OTS is not a political or military alliance but rather a framework for economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The extent of Turkey’s influence remains limited within these parameters. A Historical Perspective Russia continues to interpret geopolitical dynamics through the lens of century-old concepts, particularly Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism, both of which emerged as nationalist movements against the Russian and Ottoman empires. Pan-Turkism gained traction in the Ottoman Empire but lost momentum following its adoption and subsequent rejection by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideology was later revived during the Cold War, when Turkey’s NATO membership positioned it as a force for destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkic regions within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Despite Turkish efforts, Pan-Turkic sentiment found limited success, influencing only Azerbaijan, which aligned closely with Turkey after losing the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan formalized this relationship in the early 1990s with the doctrine of “Two Countries, One Nation.” Baku only began to see concrete benefits from its alliance with Ankara after winning the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The Organization of Turkic States: Reality vs. Rhetoric Although the first summit of Turkic states was held in 1992, the OTS’s precursor, the Turkic Council, was only founded in 2009. The agreement, signed in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, initially included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining in 2018, and officially became a member in 2019, whilst Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2022), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2023) hold observer state status. Turkmenistan has frequently been rumored to be considering full membership. Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia have often clashed with the ambitions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan delayed its membership in the Turkic Council until 2019 due to strained relations with Ankara which dated back to the mid-1990s. Turkey, the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics, expected to leverage its Cold War victory over the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region. While Kazakhstan initially welcomed Turkish economic expansion and Pan-Turkic rhetoric, it became increasingly skeptical in the 2000s. Uzbekistan, however, was cautious from the outset and largely resisted Turkish influence. Kazakhstan’s shift in perspective coincided with Ankara’s increased push for deeper Turkic integration. Turkish-backed initiatives in Kazakhstan revealed clear expectations that Ankara would lead such a union, prompting Astana to resist. Kazakhstan, which balances ties with the West, China, and Russia, rejected the notion of falling under Turkish leadership. The Kazakh government neutralized Pan-Turkic voices by integrating key advocates into political positions, redirecting their efforts toward promoting Kazakh nationalism instead. Turkey’s Role in the...

Finance

Single Securities Market to Be Launched in the EAEU

Last week, the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council convened in Almaty, where the heads of government from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states agreed to standardize securities trading across their stock exchanges. The agreement is expected to further integrate the financial markets of the five member countries, according to Myktybek Abirov, vice president of the Kyrgyz Stock Exchange. “The main purpose of the agreement is to harmonize the rules and standards of securities circulation within the common economic space, which will facilitate financial market integration, improve investor access, and enhance liquidity,” the Kyrgyz Ministry of Economy and Commerce stated. “The adoption of such rules will create new opportunities for businesses and investors, expanding their reach and strengthening economic ties between EAEU countries.” Abirov told The Times of Central Asia that the agreement will allow both private and state-owned companies to list their securities on stock exchanges across EAEU member states. “This is a welcome development, as it gives our issuers access to other stock markets,” Abirov said. “They will be able to place their securities in Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia, while investors will gain broader access to financial instruments, enabling them to diversify risks.” According to Abirov, efforts to establish a unified securities market within the EAEU have been ongoing for a decade. The newly reached agreement includes the mutual recognition of financial brokers across member states’ stock exchanges. “Each EAEU country currently has slightly different listing requirements. Now, the Eurasian Economic Commission has set unified standards that companies must meet,” he explained. “Securities that comply with these standards will be tradable on financial markets without additional procedures.” Private financial sector representatives have expressed unanimous support for the initiative, emphasizing that greater integration will be beneficial - provided that administrative and regulatory procedures are sufficiently streamlined. The key challenge now is ensuring effective implementation, they noted. Officials at the Kyrgyz Stock Exchange hope that the first such trades will take place this year. Meanwhile, the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KASE) has confirmed its readiness to list foreign securities under the new framework.

Economic Cooperation

Iran Expands Economic Cooperation with EAEU and Kazakhstan

In recent years, Iran has strengthened its trade, economic, and transport ties with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), an economic bloc comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. In December 2024, Iran was granted observer status in the EAEU, joining Cuba and Uzbekistan as the bloc’s third observer state. This status allows Iran to attend EAEU meetings and access non-confidential documents but does not grant decision-making rights. A year earlier, in December 2023, the EAEU and Iran signed a full Free Trade Agreement (FTA), establishing duty-free trade for 90% of goods and covering more than 95% of mutual trade between the parties. According to official statistics, the EAEU plays a significant role in Iran's foreign trade. In 2023, the bloc accounted for 10.1% of Iran’s exports, making it Iran’s third-largest trading partner after China (30.4%) and Turkey (14.5%). [caption id="attachment_28237" align="aligncenter" width="800"] Image: Marko Bukorovic[/caption] Strengthening Ties with Kazakhstan Iran has also worked to deepen bilateral cooperation with EAEU members, particularly Kazakhstan. On January 30, Iranian First Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref visited Almaty to attend a meeting of EAEU prime ministers. He also held bilateral talks with Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov, focusing on expanding trade, economic, agricultural, transport, and logistics cooperation. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration, in the first eleven months of 2024, trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Iran reached $296 million, an 8.1% increase compared to the same period in 2023. Kazakhstan’s exports to Iran rose by 29.1% to $100.6 million. Bektenov described Iran as a friendly neighbor in the Caspian region and emphasized Kazakhstan’s interest in diversifying and increasing exports to Iran. The country has identified 60 types of goods worth over $132 million for potential export and is prepared to meet Iran’s demand for grain products, including wheat and barley. Expanding Transport and Logistics Cooperation Discussions also covered transport and logistics cooperation, with a focus on increasing cargo traffic along the North-South Corridor, which connects Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. Both sides expressed interest in expanding transit capacity and modernizing key port terminals in Kazakhstan (Aktau and Kuryk) and Iran (Anzali and Amirabad). The Iranian Vice President stressed the geographic and economic importance of the Iran-Kazakhstan partnership and reaffirmed both countries’ commitment to increasing bilateral trade to $3 billion annually.

Agriculture

Kazakhstan Restricts Potato Exports to Non-EAEU Countries Amid Price Surge

Rising potato prices in Kazakhstan have prompted the government to impose a six-month restriction on potato exports to non-Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) countries, according to Tengrinews. The decision is aimed at stabilizing domestic prices and preventing further spikes. Price Surge Linked to High Export Demand The price increase has been driven by strong demand from neighboring countries, particularly Uzbekistan, and rising export prices. In 2024, Kazakhstan’s potato exports increased by 1.5 times, from 411,000 metric tons to 605,000 tons, according to government data. Export-oriented producers significantly raised their prices, increasing them from 170 KZT ($0.32) to 270 KZT ($0.51) per kilogram. This spike in export demand has directly impacted the domestic market, with retail prices soaring in many regions. For example: In Aktobe, potatoes were sold for no more than 200 KZT per kilogram in early January but doubled within a week. In supermarkets, prices have climbed to 388 KZT ($0.73) per kilogram, with some areas seeing prices as high as 400 KZT ($0.75) per kilogram. Even lower-quality potatoes have become more expensive, as sellers report rising costs with every new shipment. Export Restrictions to Stabilize Prices To address these challenges, the government has restricted potato exports to non-EAEU countries for six months. Exports to EAEU member states will continue but under stricter oversight. As part of these measures, the issuance of phytosanitary certificates for exports has been entirely suspended as of January 16, 2025. Sufficient Reserves to Meet Domestic Needs Despite the export restrictions, the Ministry of Agriculture has assured citizens that domestic reserves are sufficient to meet demand until the early 2025 harvest. As of January 19, reserves (excluding stocks in trade networks) amount to over 850,000 tons. Key figures from 2024 and early 2025 include: Total potato harvest (2024): 2.9 million tons, including 300,000 tons from the early harvest. Imports (2024): 56,000 tons. Consumption (August–December 2024): 844,000 tons. Exports (2024): 620,000 tons. Forecasted consumption (January–April 2025): 675,000 tons. The government’s measures aim to ensure that prices stabilize while maintaining sufficient supplies for domestic consumers until the next harvest. Growth vs. Food Security Kazakhstan’s decision to restrict potato exports to non-EAEU countries highlights the delicate balance between export-driven agricultural growth and ensuring food security at home. While the restrictions are expected to ease price pressures domestically, they underscore the challenges of managing supply chains and export demand in a region with fluctuating agricultural dynamics.