• KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
23 October 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 50

AIIB Signs $1.1 Million in Grant Agreements for Caspian Green Energy Projects

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Azerbaijan have signed two grant agreements totaling $1.1 million. The funds will support preparations for a submarine electricity cable between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, as well as preliminary planning for offshore wind infrastructure in the Caspian Sea. Most of the funding, $1 million, is earmarked for the first phase of a feasibility study for the Caspian Green Energy Corridor. The grants are being administered by AIIB through the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance. The project envisages laying an approximately 400-kilometer submarine power cable. Uzbekistan is also expected to be connected via overland transmission lines. Experts will assess the technical feasibility of transmitting electricity across the Caspian Sea, as well as the scheme's economic viability and environmental impact. The Asian Development Bank will provide another $1 million for the study, bringing its total funding to $2 million. A separate $100,000 grant will support preliminary planning for shore-based infrastructure for Azerbaijan's offshore wind industry. This includes port facilities and vessels, as well as connections between future wind farms and the power grid. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan agreed to develop the energy corridor in November 2024 at the COP29 climate conference in Baku. In March 2026, the Mazhilis, formerly the lower house of Kazakhstan's parliament, approved an agreement on a strategic partnership among the three countries in the production and transmission of green energy. Kazakhstan formally ratified the agreement in April. The corridor would enable exports of renewable electricity from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Azerbaijan, with the possibility of further deliveries to Europe. Regional cooperation plans also cover the production and export of green hydrogen and ammonia using renewable energy. Azerbaijan's Energy Minister Parviz Shahbazov said the agreements would help develop offshore wind energy and expand opportunities to export electricity from the Caspian region and Central Asia. AIIB Chief Investment Officer Konstantin Limitovskiy stressed the importance of preparatory studies in attracting investment to regional energy infrastructure. AIIB's 12th Annual Meeting will take place in Baku, Azerbaijan, on July 14–15, 2027.

Kazakhstan Weighs a Second Major Oil Export Route

Following repeated disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system, Kazakhstan’s leading oil producers are examining a much larger Trans-Caspian export route. A working group representing eight shareholders responsible for production in the Tengiz and Kashagan fields has commissioned a feasibility study for moving crude from the Atyrau area to Aktau, across the Caspian to Baku, and onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. The study is expected to go to shareholders in November. The current proposal follows a policy line set out in July 2022, when President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev identified the Trans-Caspian route as a priority and instructed KazMunayGas to examine options, including possible participation by Tengiz investors. The present study puts a much larger export channel under commercial examination. CPC remains indispensable, carrying more than four-fifths of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. Of the 78.7 million tons of oil that Kazakhstan exported in 2025, 64.8 million went through CPC. Existing alternatives are small by comparison. Even the eastbound flow to China and the Schwedt route through Russia together absorb only a fraction of CPC volumes, while current Trans-Caspian shipments are smaller still. What has changed is the cost of concentrating so much of Kazakhstan’s oil exports on CPC, not its underlying commercial importance. The producers are in fact studying two alternatives, a subsea pipeline or a much larger tanker fleet. The Trans-Caspian pipeline idea itself is not new. Variants surfaced in 2009 and appeared again in 2016. What is new is the present combination of shareholder sponsorship, operational urgency, and contemplated scale. Each option is intended to support volumes of up to 35 million metric tons a year. KazMunayGas (KMG) moved 1.3 million tons from Aktau toward BTC in 2025, while its agreement with SOCAR provides for a phased increase to 2.2 million tons annually. The shareholder proposal would expand the existing Trans-Caspian route into a second major export channel. Why Redundancy Now Repeated interruptions in CPC flows have converted the risks of route concentration into lost oil production and a lower national production target. In July, for example, attacks struck tankers loading or approaching the CPC marine terminal, repeatedly suspending operations. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov later put production lost to January, June, and July disruptions at about 3.5 million tons and reduced the 2026 production target from 98 million to 96 million tons. Even temporary interruptions reduce revenues and force urgent production decisions upstream. A Trans-Caspian route capable of carrying 35 million tons a year would not replace CPC, but it would materially reduce Kazakhstan’s exposure to a prolonged interruption. The reported figure equals more than half the 64.8 million tons exported through CPC in 2025 and is almost sixteen times the 2.2-million-ton level contemplated under the existing KMG–SOCAR expansion agreement. It would allow Kazakhstan to divert a substantially larger share of production during disruptions. Kazakhstan can now reroute one or two million tons relatively quickly, but not the tens of millions carried through CPC. The first constraint is inside Kazakhstan. Tengiz and Kashagan lack a high-volume pipeline connection to...

Kazakhstan Plans Fourth Major Oil Refinery by 2033

Kazakhstan plans to commission a fourth major oil refinery by 2033 and choose its location by the end of 2026. Daulet Arykbayev, director of the Oil Transportation and Refining Department at Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, announced the plans at the Kazakhstan International Oil and Gas Exhibition and Conference (KIOGE 2026) in Almaty. The new refinery is expected to process up to 10 million tons of oil per year. Potential sites are being assessed in Ulytau, Atyrau, Mangystau, and Turkestan regions. “We have decided to accelerate the implementation of the new refinery project. By the end of this year, the assessment of four potential regions will be completed, after which the optimal region for construction will be officially selected. The new plant will become the core of a modern petrochemical cluster,” Arykbayev said. In February 2026, the government set a target of increasing the country’s total oil-refining capacity to around 40 million tons per year by 2033. The previous industry plan envisaged construction of the fourth refinery between 2032 and 2040. At KIOGE, the Energy Ministry provided updated capacity figures. The capacity of the three major refineries is expected to rise to a combined 27.7 million tons per year. Including the recently expanded Caspi Bitum plant, Kazakhstan’s existing refining capacity would reach 29.2 million tons. The fourth refinery would add up to another 10 million tons, bringing the national total to around 39 million tons annually. Kazakhstan’s three largest refineries are in Atyrau in the west, Pavlodar in the northeast, and Shymkent in the south. The Shymkent refinery’s capacity is planned to double from 6 million to 12 million tons per year by 2030. The Pavlodar Petrochemical Plant is expected to expand from 5.5 million to 9 million tons by 2031, while the Atyrau refinery’s capacity is planned to rise from 5.5 million to 6.7 million tons by 2028. To supply the expanded Shymkent refinery, Kazakhstan plans to increase the capacity of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline system. The project includes five new pumping stations and a 189-kilometer parallel pipeline section. Capacity on the Kenkiyak-Atyrau pipeline is planned to increase to 15 million tons per year, while the Kenkiyak-Kumkol section is expected to reach 20 million tons. The government is also seeking foreign investors to help finance the fourth refinery.

Karachaganak Maintenance to Cut Kazakhstan’s Oil Output by Up to 450,000 Tons

Karachaganak, one of Kazakhstan’s three largest oil and gas fields, entered planned maintenance on September 7, a shutdown expected to reduce the country’s oil and gas condensate output by 400,000–450,000 metric tons before work ends on October 1. The interruption comes in a year when the government has already lowered its national production forecast following repeated disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the main export route for Kazakhstan’s oil. In August, Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan had lowered its 2026 oil production target from 98 million to 96 million metric tons. He put production losses from attacks on CPC infrastructure in January, June, and July at about 3.5 million metric tons. CPC loadings rebounded by 22% in August after July’s disruptions, reaching around 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd). CPC exports are expected to fall to about 1.5 million bpd in September, partly because of the Karachaganak maintenance. More than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports move through CPC. The July shutdown at the Black Sea terminal showed how quickly an export disruption can force production cuts at fields far inland. On July 22, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate output fell by about 21%, while output at Tengiz dropped 56%, from roughly 925,000 to 406,000 bpd. Karachaganak also depends on Russian processing infrastructure. Raw gas from the field is sent to Russia’s Orenburg gas processing plant. In June, Karachaganak reduced production after an incident at the plant sharply curtailed its intake of gas from the field. Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (KPO), the field’s operator, is expanding its gas reinjection capacity. The process returns some of the produced gas to the reservoir, helping to maintain pressure and sustain oil and gas condensate output. A fifth gas reinjection compressor began operating in 2024. In June 2026, KPO announced that the KEP-1B project, which includes a sixth compressor, had begun reinjecting gas ahead of schedule. The Energy Ministry has said the two compressors would help maintain Karachaganak’s liquid hydrocarbon production at around 11–12 million metric tons a year. Following the expansion of Tengiz, Kazakhstan had expected national oil production to approach 100 million metric tons a year. Its production capacity has increased, but the events of 2026 have exposed the limits of the infrastructure used to move that oil to market. In May, Akkenzhenov said there was no full-scale alternative to CPC. Some oil can be rerouted across the Caspian into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline or east to China, but these routes cannot absorb CPC-scale volumes. CPC can carry up to 72.5 million metric tons a year from Kazakhstan. Whether or not the maintenance reduction was already incorporated into the revised forecast, Kazakhstan has little room for further disruption to the export and processing infrastructure on which its production depends.

Uzbekistan Plans Joint Venture to Oversee Nuclear Power Plant

Uzbekistan has proposed creating a joint engineering venture with a foreign partner to provide independent technical oversight of its first nuclear power plant. The venture would review the plant’s design and equipment and monitor construction quality at the site in the Jizzakh region. Uzbekistan’s Atomic Energy Agency (Uzatom) set out the proposal in a September 4 report. The agency has not named potential foreign participants or said when the venture could be established. Construction formally began on June 4 with the first concrete pour for the plant’s first small modular reactor unit. Foundation work is now underway. The project calls for two VVER-1000 reactors and two small modular RITM-200N reactors at a single site. Uzbekistan describes this configuration as an integrated nuclear power plant. Uzatom says design work and construction of external utility networks will continue through the end of 2026. In 2027, authorities plan to order major equipment with lengthy manufacturing lead times. From June 22 to 26, the International Atomic Energy Agency conducted a Phase 2 Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review follow-up mission in Uzbekistan. The IAEA said Uzbekistan had made “significant progress” since its 2021 review, while identifying further work needed to improve the nuclear regulator and complete feasibility studies. The final mission report is expected to be published by the agency. Uzatom says the project’s environmental impact assessment has been approved and the necessary permits and licenses have been obtained for the siting and construction of the small modular units. Licensing for the larger VVER reactors is due to continue in 2027. More than 30 companies in Uzbekistan are being considered to supply cables and construction materials for the plant. Uzatom estimates that locally produced goods could account for around 21%, while authorities intend to raise the share above 30%. A specialized 200-hectare industrial zone has been proposed in the Forish district, around 25 kilometers from the nuclear power plant. It could support production in 15 sectors and create up to 2,000 jobs. Domestic firms are also expected to handle much of the work on the site’s utility and transport connections. A new town planned nearby would eventually house up to 33,000 people. At the peak of construction, the project will require more than 10,000 workers and specialists. Authorities plan for local personnel to account for 65%–70% of the workforce. Since 2023, 216 students have graduated from the Tashkent branch of Russia’s National Research Nuclear University MEPhI. Of these, 83 are continuing their studies at universities in China, Hungary, France, Italy, and South Korea. Four universities in Uzbekistan are training around 100 more specialists. Uzatom also plans to use the proposed engineering venture to transfer technical and project-management expertise to local specialists.

After CPC Disruptions, Kazakhstan Wants to Refine More Oil at Home

Kazakhstan wants to more than double its oil refining capacity and sell more petrol and diesel to neighboring countries. The case for reducing its reliance on crude exports has gained urgency. Disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) this year have already forced the country to cut its 2026 oil production forecast by 2 million tonnes. Kazakhstan produced 99.6 million tonnes of oil in 2025 but refined only 18.4 million tonnes. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said at a briefing on August 25 that refining capacity is planned to increase to 40 million tonnes. “We want to bring this ratio, as in other developed countries that are also producers, to one to two or one to three,” Akkenzhenov said. According to him, Kazakhstan eventually expects to supply neighboring countries with motor fuel and expand its export potential. This does not mean abandoning crude oil exports: even after refining capacity reaches 40 million tonnes, a significant share of production will continue to be exported. Astana is instead seeking to shift the balance toward finished products. The oil refining industry development concept runs through 2040. According to the Energy Ministry, Kazakhstan’s refineries processed 18.4 million tonnes of oil in 2025 and produced 15.47 million tonnes of petroleum products. The concept adopted in 2025 envisaged refining rising to 39.2 million tonnes a year by 2040. The government has since accelerated the timetable, targeting 40 million tonnes of annual capacity by 2033. Average refining depth at the country’s three main refineries reached 90% in 2025 and is targeted to rise to 94%. To achieve this, Kazakhstan is preparing to build a fourth major refinery with capacity of up to 10 million tonnes a year. Possible locations include the Mangystau, Atyrau and Turkestan regions, as well as Ulytau, with the authorities expecting to select a site by the end of the year. The new plant could begin operating by 2033, with the Energy Ministry expecting its launch to fully cover domestic demand for jet fuel and allow Kazakhstan to expand exports of K5-standard petroleum products, broadly equivalent to Europe’s Euro 5 standard. Problems with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Kazakhstan’s main route for getting oil to the global market, have strengthened the case for diversifying the way Kazakhstan uses and exports its oil. The pipeline runs through Russia to a Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk, meaning disruptions there can quickly affect production in Kazakhstan. On August 25, Akkenzhenov said the country’s oil production forecast for 2026 had been cut from 98 million to 96 million tonnes. He estimated production losses resulting from attacks on CPC infrastructure at around 3.5 million tonnes. The authorities are trying to compensate for part of the lost volumes by rescheduling major maintenance at large oil fields. Astana is also looking for additional routes to global markets. Akkenzhenov identified Baku-Supsa, the pipeline running from Azerbaijan to Georgia’s Black Sea coast, as one option, saying it could carry around 5 million tonnes a year. The route has seen only limited use since 2022, although...