• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10714 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10714 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10714 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10714 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10714 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10714 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10714 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10714 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 303

Kazakhstan Looks Abroad in Push to Recover Illegal Assets

Kazakhstan has taken a first step toward joining the Warsaw Convention, a Council of Europe treaty that would make it easier for prosecutors to follow suspected criminal assets across borders. The move remains tentative, however. The draft ratification law appeared on the Open NPA portal on April 23 with public discussion scheduled until May 20, but was removed to an archive two days later after the developer withdrew it for a “press release correction.” For now, the measure remains procedural. Its purpose is more concrete: to give prosecutors a stronger route into foreign jurisdictions where disputed wealth may sit behind companies, property, bank accounts, trusts, or nominees. The Warsaw Convention - formally called the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism - was opened for signature in Warsaw on May 16, 2005, and entered into force on May 1, 2008. Its purpose is practical. States that join it must maintain tools to identify criminal proceeds, freeze them, confiscate them, and cooperate with foreign authorities. For Kazakhstan, that framework would fit a campaign that has grown steadily since the unrest of January 2022. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has made the return of illegally acquired assets part of his wider domestic agenda, linking it to social justice, public finances, and the channeling of seized assets into public projects. A Campaign Moving Abroad Kazakhstan built the domestic legal base in 2023, when Tokayev signed the law on the return of illegally acquired assets to the state. This created procedures for identifying assets, negotiating voluntary returns, filing court claims, and managing property transferred to the state. It also applies to property located abroad when it was allegedly acquired with income illegally received in Kazakhstan. The system gained a sharper foreign component in January 2026, when a new Asset Recovery Service began work under the General Prosecutor’s Office. Its mandate includes representation in foreign courts, requests to freeze property, checks on asset origin, and direct cooperation with overseas authorities. Those tasks are exactly where domestic law alone often runs out of road. Assets rarely sit in one obvious place. They can be routed through companies, trusts, bank accounts, nominees, family members, or real estate in several countries. A Kazakh court order may be the start of a case, but it is far from the end of it. Foreign authorities usually need treaty channels, legal-assistance requests, and evidence that meets their own standards before they freeze or return property. Ratifying the Warsaw Convention would not solve those problems by itself, but it would give Kazakhstan another legal route for cooperation when cases cross borders. That could be important in corruption, money laundering, tax, organized crime, and terrorism-financing cases where property has moved through several jurisdictions. What the Convention Would Change The convention would add practical tools rather than automatic powers. It covers the tracing, freezing, seizure, and confiscation of criminal proceeds, and also applies to property used for financing terrorism, even when the...

Second Attack in Moscow Was Planned Alongside Crocus City Hall Assault

Organizers of the deadly attack at the Crocus City Hall concert venue near Moscow had initially planned a second, simultaneous attack in the Russian capital but later abandoned the idea, according to materials from the ongoing investigation cited by TASS. A participant in the court proceedings told the agency that investigators had identified a coordinator operating from abroad, known by the alias Saifullo, who had prepared a group of recruited and trained attackers for two separate operations in Moscow. The second attack was intended to take place at the same time as the assault on Crocus City Hall, with two individuals assigned to carry it out and three others designated for the concert venue. However, shortly before the attack, the plan was revised. Instead of dividing their forces, the organizers decided to concentrate on a single target, reinforcing the group assigned to Crocus City Hall. The exact location and method of the planned second attack were not disclosed in the case materials, although investigators noted it was also intended to result in mass casualties. According to TASS, one week before the attack the coordinator informed the perpetrators that an additional individual, previously assigned to the second operation, would join the group targeting Crocus City Hall. Several suspects linked to the case have been placed on Russia’s list of designated terrorists, while the alleged coordinator remains at large abroad. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, a man sentenced to life imprisonment in connection with the attack died in pretrial detention, in what Russian authorities described as suicide. Investigations into the organization and execution of the Crocus City Hall attack are ongoing.

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments. When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable. The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed. Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability. However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game. History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained. There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you. This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly. This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia. First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection. Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central...

Tajik Citizen Deported from Germany Over Suspected Terror Plot

German authorities have deported a 21-year-old citizen of Tajikistan who was detained on suspicion of planning attacks in crowded areas. Although no criminal case was formally opened, law enforcement officials cited concerns for public safety as sufficient grounds for deportation. The individual was detained in December 2025 in the city of Magdeburg. According to Die Zeit, the arrest was prompted by concerns that the young man posed a potential threat to public safety. Authorities claimed that although there was insufficient evidence to prosecute him under criminal law, his behavior suggested the possibility of radical intentions. Following several weeks of investigation, a decision was made to deport him. Police linked their concerns to signs of religious radicalization. Reports suggest the individual exhibited ideological extremism and a growing interest in firearms. While enrolled in a vocational school, he allegedly clashed repeatedly with classmates over religious issues. Mario Schwan, head of the Saxony-Anhalt state police, stated that the case was considered an “immediate threat” based on the police’s assessment. The man had entered Germany legally in June 2024 under a visa granted for participation in the Au Pair program. In his application, he expressed interest in German language and culture. He later enrolled in medical studies at the University Hospital of Magdeburg.

Uzbekistan Extends Sentences for Religious Prisoners Amid Longstanding Security Fears

Two Muslim prisoners of conscience in Uzbekistan — both previously jailed for nonviolent religious activity — have had their sentences extended in recent months under charges that human rights observers describe as vague and politically motivated. While the cases have drawn criticism from international monitors, they also highlight the Uzbek government’s enduring fears over political Islam, concerns shaped by geography, history, and national security calculations. Tulkun Astanov, a 54-year-old activist originally imprisoned in 2020 for defending the rights of fellow Muslims, was sentenced to an additional three years and two months in a strict-regime labor camp this May. Authorities accused him of refusing to attend morning exercises in prison and of disobeying lawful orders. Astanov, who has suffered multiple strokes in custody, submitted a written request to be excused from physical activity on medical grounds — documentation which was reportedly dismissed by prison officials. His family and legal counsel contend the new case was fabricated to prevent his scheduled release later this year. The U.S. State Department has documented repeated concerns about his treatment in its 2022 International Religious Freedom Report. A second prisoner, Fariduddin Abduvokhidov, 30, was arrested in 2020 after participating in private Islamic study circles. He was originally given an 11-year sentence, but earlier this year, his term was extended twice: by ten years in March and an additional year in April. According to his family, the new charges relate to alleged "religious propaganda" while in detention. They say he was not fully informed of the basis of the charges and declined to appeal, citing emotional fatigue and lack of faith in the process. International monitors, including Human Rights Watch, have raised alarm about Uzbekistan’s use of vague extremism provisions to prosecute peaceful religious expression. Trials are often held behind closed doors, with little transparency or legal recourse for defendants. In both cases, court documents have not been made available to families or the public. Uzbekistan shares a 144-kilometer border with Afghanistan, where groups like the Taliban and ISIS-K remain active. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Uzbekistan suffered violent attacks from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a jihadist group aligned with the Taliban and later al-Qaeda. Those experiences left a lasting impact on both policymakers and public opinion, contributing to an enduring suspicion of independent Islamic activism. Several OECD democracies, including France, Belgium, and Austria, have enacted bans on face coverings in public. While controversial, those policies were introduced through public debate and are subject to judicial review. In Uzbekistan, by contrast, the lack of independent courts, competitive elections, and free media means that state regulation of religion is rarely subject to institutional checks. Uzbekistan has made real progress in other aspects of governance. Since independence in 1991, the country has implemented reforms in public administration, economic policy, and digital infrastructure, and it is currently pursuing accession to the World Trade Organization. Engagement with the OECD and OSCE has also deepened. For many observers, Uzbekistan’s evolution will be gradual, and should be allowed to proceed...

Tajik National Arrested in U.S. for Supporting ISIS-K, Faces 45 Years in Prison

A Tajik national has been arrested in the United States on charges of supporting the terrorist group ISIS-Khorasan. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, 33-year-old Manuchehr Mansuri was detained in Brooklyn, New York, on suspicion of terrorist ties, illegal weapons possession, and immigration fraud. Investigation Findings Authorities discovered that Mansuri entered the U.S. in 2016 on a tourist visa but overstayed after it expired. To legalize his status, he allegedly entered into a sham marriage with a U.S. citizen. During his time in the U.S., he worked as a truck driver and traveled frequently across the country. Between December 2021 and April 2023, Mansuri transferred approximately $70,000 to individuals affiliated with ISIS-Khorasan in Turkey and Syria. Among the recipients was a Tajik national arrested in January 2024 by Turkish authorities for participating in an attack on a Catholic church in Istanbul. The terrorist group Wilayat Khorasan later claimed responsibility for the attack. Investigators also found extremist materials in Mansuri’s possession, including content praising convicted terrorist Sayfullo Saipov, who carried out the 2017 New York truck attack. He also had sermons by former ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and material from Gulmurod Halimov, the former head of the Tajik OMON (Special Purpose Police Unit), who joined ISIS in 2015. Most of these materials were in Russian and Tajik. Authorities further determined that Mansuri trained with firearms, despite being legally barred from possessing them. He allegedly sent videos of his training to supporters, declaring his willingness to aid ISIS. Legal Proceedings and Potential Sentence If convicted, Mansuri faces up to 45 years in prison. A team of prosecutors from the Eastern District of New York, supported by counterterrorism experts, is handling the case. A judge will determine his sentence based on federal guidelines and other legal factors. Related Arrests of Tajik Nationals in U.S. Earlier, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested eight Tajik nationals in New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles as part of an FBI counterterrorism investigation. The individuals were under surveillance due to suspected links to ISIS. According to sources, two of them crossed the U.S. southern border in 2023, with one using the CBP One mobile app to apply for asylum. While they have not been formally charged with terrorism, they were arrested for immigration violations and remain in ICE custody, awaiting possible deportation. The investigation into their potential ties to terrorist activity is ongoing, and additional charges may follow.