• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
02 September 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 21

Europe Must Defend the Distinction It Has Made Between Kazakhstani and Russian Oil

In the early hours of July 30, drones struck two tankers at the marine terminal of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) near Novorossiysk: the Nissos Sifnos while it was loading Tengizchevroil crude at Single Point Mooring 3, and the Marathi as it approached the terminal. Loading was temporarily suspended, although the pipeline remained operational. Neither vessel sank; no casualties or oil spill were reported. Earlier attacks in July had already interrupted CPC loading operations and prompted a formal protest from Kazakhstan. Astana said that an agreed mechanism for exchanging information about civilian vessels entering the Black Sea to load CPC oil had been disregarded. The recurrence was more important than the damage: it could alter commercial expectations and behavior. The pipeline is not the relevant analytical unit; the export chain is. It can remain operational even when the maritime egress of its oil to world markets has ceased to function. Once loading stops and terminal storage fills, CPC must restrict intake from Kazakhstan, transmitting the interruption backward through the system until producers reduce output. After two tankers bound for the CPC terminal were struck in January, Black Sea war-risk premiums rose from 0.6–0.8% to 1% of vessel value, while insurers shortened their review of terms from every 48 hours to every 24 hours. By July, vessels were avoiding the terminal on safety grounds even though no structural damage to it had been reported. Commercial use of CPC was thus impaired despite the integrity of its infrastructure. The concentration of Kazakhstan’s exports magnifies the effect. CPC carries approximately four-fifths of its oil exports, including production from Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak. The July interruption exposed the consequence: full terminal storage obliged CPC to halt intake, while the Kazakhstani government confirmed that producers had reduced output because of export constraints. The vulnerability reaches backward from maritime egress into production. Crude from Kazakhstan occupies a material place in the EU’s non-Russian import structure, giving Europe a direct interest in the matter. Kazakhstan supplied 11.5% of EU petroleum-oil imports in 2024 and 9.6% in the first quarter of 2026, ranking among the Union’s three largest suppliers in both periods. The EU’s sanctions architecture already recognizes that Kazakhstani oil passing through Russian territory does not thereby become Russian oil. Commission guidance treats CPC crude as originating in Kazakhstan when supported by certificates of origin or other documentation, notwithstanding unavoidable admixture with Russian oil. EU legislation also provides targeted derogations permitting goods, technology, and services required for the operation and maintenance of CPC infrastructure. The differentiated treatment is narrow: it attaches to the origin and documentation of the cargo, not indiscriminately to every vessel, facility, or transaction associated with CPC. Cargo, route, terminal, and vessel remain legally separable. The distinction became especially salient when the sanctioned Nelsa, which had carried Russian Urals crude, was attacked at the same terminal after vessels loading Kazakhstani crude had been struck. Europe nevertheless lacks a CPC-specific public-policy position on repeated disruption of the export chain carrying exempted crude, even though its...

CPC Halts Oil Loadings Again After Two More Tankers Attacked Near Novorossiysk

The Caspian Pipeline Consortium has stopped oil loading at its Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk after two more tankers were attacked early on July 30. The suspension came only three days after Kazakhstan resumed exports through the route following a week-long disruption. The Marshall Islands-flagged NISSOS SIFNOS was attacked at 1:48 a.m. Moscow time while loading Tengizchevroil crude at single-point mooring SPM-3, CPC said. A drone hit the cargo deck near the manifolds used to receive oil. The strike caused a fire, which the crew extinguished with help from three CPC support vessels. CPC said no employees or contractors were injured, no oil spill occurred, and the crew did not request medical assistance or evacuation. Okeanis Eco Tankers, the vessel’s owner, said NISSOS SIFNOS sustained only minor damage, its crew was safe, and no spill or pollution occurred. The company said the tanker was continuing its voyage operations. The tanker MARATHI was also attacked while awaiting a berth at the CPC terminal, about six nautical miles, or eleven kilometres, offshore. Dynacom Tankers, the vessel’s operator, said it was struck by two projectiles of unknown origin. The resulting fire was extinguished by the crew, all of whom were safe and accounted for. No pollution was reported. Dynacom said it had activated its emergency response plan and remained in contact with the crew and the relevant authorities. “Oil loading has been stopped, while pipeline facilities are operating normally,” CPC said. The consortium did not identify who carried out either attack. No party had claimed responsibility when the suspension was announced. Ukraine’s drone forces later said they had struck four Russian tankers in the Black and Azov seas overnight but did not identify the vessels or locations. The statement therefore did not establish responsibility for the attacks on NISSOS SIFNOS or MARATHI. CPC said appeals from Kazakhstan and its foreign shareholders had been ignored. It said some representations were made through the U.S. State Department. On July 23, the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia, Bill Huizenga, told The Times of Central Asia that further strikes affecting CPC infrastructure would “not be tolerated.” CPC said attacks near loading equipment could cause a major fire and oil spill. The consortium also warned of damage to Kazakhstan and to shippers including Chevron, ExxonMobil, Eni, TotalEnergies, and Shell. On July 27, CPC had restarted tanker loadings and resumed accepting oil from Kazakhstan after storage constraints forced producers to cut output. The July 30 incidents bring the number of tankers struck near or while serving the CPC terminal during July to at least eight. The sequence began with the Chevron-chartered Yasa Polaris on July 7. Nordic Zenith was hit on July 17. ASIA and NISSOS IOS were attacked while loading Kazakh crude on July 19. NELSA was struck at SPM-1 on July 20, and HERA was reported damaged while approaching the terminal on July 23. The earlier attacks repeatedly stopped loadings. CPC then stopped accepting crude, and tankers scheduled to collect...

Central Asia Rethinks Energy Security After the 2026 Fuel Crisis

The summer of 2026 marked a turning point for energy security in Central Asia. In July, drone strikes temporarily halted crude oil receipts and loadings at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) marine terminal in Novorossiysk. Although CPC resumed normal operations on July 27, the incident exposed the vulnerability of one of the region’s principal export routes to external security risks. Russia, which for decades has been Central Asia’s principal supplier of refined petroleum products, has also faced prolonged pressure in its domestic fuel market. Reduced utilization at some refineries and rising domestic demand have created longer-term challenges. Restrictions on gasoline and diesel exports have added to the pressure, affecting the Russian economy and neighboring states that have traditionally relied on Russian supplies. For three decades, Central Asia’s system for supplying refined fuels remained relatively stable. Russian refineries covered shortages in local markets, providing fuel that was both comparatively affordable and predictable in volume. The events of 2026, however, reaffirmed a basic principle of national security: during large-scale crises, governments tend to prioritize domestic stability over external trade commitments. For Central Asian states, this has prompted a fundamental reassessment of long-established approaches to energy security. Any strategy dependent on a single external supplier ultimately becomes vulnerable to disruptions beyond its control, regardless of their origin. The current crisis has also revealed significant differences in how well prepared the region’s governments are to protect their domestic fuel markets. Kyrgyzstan has proved the most vulnerable. The country consumes around 1.6 million metric tons of fuel annually, with 90-95% of supplies imported from Russia. Faced with a sharp reduction in available supplies during May and June 2026, the Kyrgyz authorities were forced to begin urgent negotiations with alternative suppliers, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. Uzbekistan has been in a somewhat stronger position. Until recently, Russian companies dominated the country’s imported gasoline market. During the first five months of 2026, Uzbekistan spent more than $1 billion on imports of crude oil and petroleum products, while spending on motor gasoline imports increased by 85.1% compared with the same period a year earlier. Tashkent has responded by prioritizing strategic fuel reserves. Ahead of the coming autumn and winter season, the government has begun building a 120,000-metric-ton reserve of motor gasoline. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, enjoys a considerably higher degree of energy self-sufficiency thanks to its developed refining sector, centered on the modernized refineries in Atyrau, Pavlodar, and Shymkent. It is therefore unsurprising that Bishkek turned first to Astana when seeking emergency fuel supplies. Kazakhstan’s potential to serve as a regional supplier nevertheless has clear limits. The country’s domestic fuel market periodically comes under structural pressure during the spring and autumn agricultural seasons and when planned maintenance is carried out at its refineries. As a result, Astana must balance support for its regional partners with maintaining stability at home. Although Kazakhstan annually agrees with Russia on duty-free import quotas of up to 1.12 million metric tons of Russian petroleum products under the indicative fuel balance mechanism, the current...

Kazakhstan Oil Output Falls 21% as CPC Halt More Than Halves Tengiz Production

Kazakhstan's oil and gas condensate output fell by about 21% on July 22 after the Caspian Pipeline Consortium stopped receiving Kazakh crude and suspended loadings at its Black Sea terminal. Output dropped to 1.63 million barrels per day from a July average of 2.07 million, Reuters said, citing an industry source. The sharpest reduction came at Tengiz, Kazakhstan's largest oilfield. Production fell by 56%, from an average 925,000 barrels per day in July to about 406,000 on Wednesday, reflecting how quickly a halt at Novorossiysk can force cuts at a field more than 1,500 kilometres away. Kazakhstan's Energy Ministry confirmed the reduction, stating that producers had cut output because CPC had restricted intake and their storage tanks were nearing capacity. "The adjustment was a technical measure intended to keep production operations stable," the ministry said. It added that CPC’s production facilities remained operational and could resume shipments when conditions allowed. Consultations were continuing with the consortium, producers, shipowners, and state agencies. No timetable was given. Tengiz Bears the Brunt Chevron began production from the $48 billion Future Growth Project in January 2025. The expansion was designed to add 260,000 barrels of crude per day and raise total Tengiz output to about one million barrels of oil equivalent per day at full capacity. Chevron owns 50% of Tengizchevroil, while ExxonMobil holds 25%, KazMunayGas 20%, and Lukoil 5%. The field provides a large share of Kazakhstan's oil production and export income. After the tanker ASIA was struck on July 19, Chevron told The Times of Central Asia that the crew was safe and the vessel was stable. "There has been no impact to TCO operations or exports," the company said. However, by July 22, the export halt had forced cuts at Tengiz. Chevron did not immediately comment on the new production figures cited by Reuters. The cut compounds a difficult year for the sector. Kazakhstan produced 45.7 million tonnes of oil in the first half of 2026, down 8.4% from a year earlier. The Energy Ministry still expects 98 million tonnes for the full year, after lowering its previous target because of Tengiz outages and earlier CPC disruption. Kazakhstan's OPEC+ crude quota rose to 1.608 million barrels per day for July. The national output figure includes gas condensate and cannot be compared directly with the crude allocation. The latest reduction removes barrels Kazakhstan intended to export. The timing adds to the revenue loss. Brent rose above $100 on July 23 after attacks on Saudi tankers in the Red Sea added to disruption around the Strait of Hormuz. Tanker Attacks Halt CPC Loadings The production cuts followed a series of attacks on tankers near CPC's marine terminal. The Chevron-chartered Yasa Polaris was hit on July 7 while empty and waiting offshore. Its crew was safe, and no pollution or major hull damage was reported. Nordic Zenith was struck on July 17 while empty and approaching the terminal. ASIA and NISSOS IOS were hit on July 19 while loading Kazakhstan-produced crude. Loading briefly resumed...

CPC Reportedly Stops Accepting Kazakh Oil as Storage Tanks Reach Capacity After Tanker Attacks

Citing three industry sources, on July 21 Reuters said the Caspian Pipeline Consortium had stopped accepting crude from Kazakhstan after tanker attacks halted Black Sea loadings. Two of the sources said the terminal's storage tanks were full. CPC has so far declined to comment. The stoppage marks a sharper disruption than the loading suspension announced on July 20. LSEG ship-tracking data showed that at least two tankers due to collect crude changed direction. Chevron owns 15% of CPC, while ExxonMobil is also a shareholder through Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company. Chevron told Reuters that "Chevron continues to monitor the situation at CPC. The safety and security of personnel remain our top priority." ASIA was one of the tankers struck before loadings were suspended. It was hit on July 19 while loading Tengizchevroil crude at the CPC terminal. Following the attack on ASIA, a Chevron spokesperson told The Times of Central Asia: “Chevron is aware of reports of an incident involving a vessel loading at Caspian Pipeline Consortium facilities near Novorossiysk. All crew are safe, and the vessel remains stable. The vessel has been moved to a safe anchorage, and we are coordinating with the ship operator and relevant authorities. There has been no impact to TCO operations or exports. Further questions regarding CPC operations should be directed to CPC.” As of early July 22, no producer had announced new output cuts in response to the CPC halt. The intake stoppage nevertheless removes the main export outlet for crude from Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak. The 1,510-kilometer pipeline carries oil from western Kazakhstan to the terminal near Novorossiysk. Terminal tanks normally buffer crude flows before tankers load offshore, but once they are full, the system has little room to receive additional oil. A prolonged shutdown could force producers to reduce output. Kazakhstan has not confirmed such reductions. CPC oil supplies fell 7% from May to 1.699 million barrels a day in June. Reuters linked the fall to a late-May accident at Tengiz and lower Russian volumes. The route handles about 80% of Kazakhstan's oil exports and almost 2% of global oil supply. The latest halt followed attacks on four tankers over four days. Nordic Zenith was hit on July 17 while approaching the terminal empty. ASIA and NISSOS IOS were struck on July 19 while loading Kazakh crude. NISSOS IOS was loading crude from Kashagan B.V. and Maten. Loadings briefly resumed that evening. A drone then struck NELSA at SPM-1 on July 20. A fire broke out on deck and in several compartments. CPC evacuated 20 of the ship's 22 crew members by tugboat, while the captain and chief officer remained aboard. The tanker stayed afloat; no casualties or oil spill were recorded, and the crude in its cargo tanks did not ignite. The NELSA was carrying Russian Urals crude, according to S&P Global shipping data. CPC then suspended oil loading. Kazakhstan's Energy Ministry said it remained in contact with the consortium while specialists assessed the vessel and the consequences of the strike....

When the War Reaches Kazakh Oil

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine unleashed the war now expanding across the Black Sea, but it did not erase the distinction between Russian military logistics and the lawful commerce of other states. Kazakhstan is not a party to the war, yet its principal oil export route passes through an expanding maritime target zone. The attacks near the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal therefore raise a larger question: can civilian trade carrying Kazakh crude be treated as part of Russia’s war economy simply because geography places its outlet on the Russian coast? Four vessels were attacked near CPC’s Black Sea terminal on July 17, 19, and 20. Nordic Zenith, chartered by ExxonMobil according to Reuters, was empty and approaching the terminal when it was hit on July 17. Two days later, ASIA and NISSOS IOS were struck at single-point moorings off Novorossiysk while loading Kazakhstan-produced oil. ASIA was taking Tengizchevroil (TCO) crude; NISSOS IOS was loading oil from Kashagan B.V. and Maten. A fire on ASIA was extinguished; no one was injured, both vessels remained afloat, and no oil entered the sea. Chevron told The Times of Central Asia that the crew was safe, the vessel was stable, and there had been “no impact to TCO operations or exports.” Loading briefly resumed that evening, but on July 20 a drone struck NELSA while it was loading at SPM-1. The impact on the tanker’s starboard side caused a fire on deck and in several compartments. Its 22-member international crew was evacuated except for the captain and chief officer; the vessel remained afloat, the fire was extinguished, and no oil spill occurred. CPC suspended loadings again. Ukraine’s General Staff said separately that its forces had struck two tankers used to transport Russian oil, petroleum products, and fuel for the Russian military in the Black Sea. It did not identify the vessels or connect the claim to the attacks at the CPC terminal. Russia’s Foreign Ministry blamed Kyiv, while CPC itself did not publicly attribute the attacks. Astana’s response to the attacks has remained measured and legalistic. The Foreign Ministry called the attacks an infringement on Kazakhstan’s economic interests and a threat to lawful international trade. It said an agreed mechanism for sharing information on civilian vessels entering the Black Sea to load CPC oil had been disregarded, endangering crews. It reserved Kazakhstan’s right to seek compensation under international law. Following the strike on NELSA, the Energy Ministry said it remained in constant contact with CPC while the tanker’s technical condition and the consequences of the attack were assessed. The statements focused on Kazakhstan’s rights. That is the distinction Astana is asserting: Kazakh cargoes, revenues, crews, and commercial partners should not be treated as extensions of Russia’s war economy merely because they use a terminal on Russian territory. Kazakh Crude and the Western Stake Russia’s invasion created the maritime battlefield in which these incidents occurred, and Ukraine has a legitimate interest in weakening the military logistics that sustain Russia’s campaign. But Kazakhstan is not Russia,...