Escalation in the Middle East has pushed oil back above $100 a barrel. For Kazakhstan, whose budget remains heavily dependent on commodity exports, that should have been good news. But a high price matters only if the oil can reach buyers. For the world’s largest landlocked country, that is where the problem begins.
European refiners are looking for alternatives to disrupted Saudi supplies, while problems along established routes through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are increasing demand for crude from other regions. More than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, however, move through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium system across Russian territory to a terminal near Novorossiysk.
The Middle East crisis is pushing prices and global freight costs higher, while attacks around Russian infrastructure are increasing the risks to Kazakhstan’s main export route.
Over the past decade, Kazakhstan has significantly increased its oil exports. According to the Bureau of National Statistics, volumes rose from 63.6 million metric tons in 2015 to a record 76.3 million tons in 2025, an increase of about 20%.
Exports grew from 65.2 million tons in 2022 to 71 million in 2024 and 76.3 million tons in 2025. Expansion at the Tengiz field contributed to that growth. Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production reached 99.6 million tons in 2025. The government had planned for about 98 million tons in 2026, but export disruptions have already forced temporary output cuts.
Revenue has not risen as steadily as volumes.
“In monetary terms, growth over the past decade was considerably stronger, although the trend, as noted above, was also much more volatile. The value of exports increased from $26.8 billion in 2015 to $40 billion in 2025, or by 49.3%. The highest figure during this period was recorded in 2022, at $46.9 billion,” Ranking.kz said in its analysis.
Physical volumes and export revenue have often moved in different directions.
“This was particularly evident in 2025: Kazakhstan exported 7.4% more oil than a year earlier, but its value fell by 6.8%. The average estimated value of one exported metric ton declined from $604 in 2024 to $524 in 2025,” the analysts calculated.
In the first half of 2026, Kazakhstan exported $40.3 billion worth of goods. Crude oil and petroleum products accounted for 46.5% of the total.
Export statistics and transportation data measure different things. The Bureau of National Statistics records goods cleared for export, while the Energy Ministry and pipeline companies report volumes pumped, transshipped, and transported. The same cargo can pass through several sections of the system, so those figures cannot simply be added together.
In March, Talgat Makuov, acting director of the Energy Ministry’s oil refining and transportation department, said 64.8 million tons of Kazakh oil had moved through CPC in 2025. Another 9.2 million tons went through the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, while 1.1 million tons were shipped through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline toward China.
Against those volumes, the Trans-Caspian route remains small. In 2025, 1.26 million tons were shipped across the Caspian toward the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The plan for 2026 called for an increase to 1.7 million tons.
Even meeting that target would not fundamentally change the picture. CPC carries many times more oil, while the Caspian route is constrained by port and tanker capacity, weather, tariffs, and onward infrastructure.
The vulnerability became clear in the spring and summer. Shipments of Kazakh oil to Germany through the northern branch of the Druzhba pipeline stopped on May 1. Kazakhstan had planned to send 260,000 tons to the Schwedt refinery that month. About 100,000 tons were redirected to Ust-Luga, with the remainder moved into the CPC system.
Ust-Luga did not provide a dependable alternative either. Amid attacks on Russian port and energy infrastructure, shipments fluctuated. According to KazTransOil, Kazakhstan shipped 100,000 tons through Ust-Luga in March, 230,000 in April, 301,000 in May, 286,000 in July, and 200,000 in August.
Kazakhstan also increased flows toward China. In January-August, transportation through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline rose 3% to 7.6 million tons. Direct exports of Kazakh crude to China were much smaller, rising 24% to 863,000 tons. Shipments through Atyrau-Samara rose 2% to 6.9 million tons, while transshipment toward the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline rose 12% to more than 1 million tons.
Those percentages look substantial until compared with CPC. Alternative routes can absorb individual cargoes and provide relief during short-term disruptions, but they cannot yet replace the Black Sea system.
July provided the clearest example. Drone attacks on tankers at the CPC marine terminal near Novorossiysk repeatedly interrupted loading. Operations were halted again after an attack on July 20 and did not fully resume until July 27. With export capacity constrained and storage filling, Kazakhstan had to sharply reduce production, including at Tengiz, its largest oil field. TCA previously reported on the resulting output cuts and the country’s dependence on export routes through Russia.
CPC transports more than two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s export crude. Its shareholders include companies affiliated with Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, and Eni. With Middle Eastern supply routes already under pressure, interruptions at another major export system added to strains on the global market.
For Kazakhstan, the July episode was particularly damaging. If oil cannot be exported, a high global price cannot translate into higher revenue, while lower production reduces tax receipts and flows to the National Fund.
Kazakh oil nevertheless remains exposed to the expansion of the war zone because its main export route crosses Russian territory, leading to growing risks to civilian tankers carrying Kazakh crude through the CPC system.
CPC cannot be replaced quickly; even scheduled maintenance at individual fields can reduce national output, while a major export-system disruption has far more serious consequences.
Meanwhile, some oil has also been directed to the domestic market. In January-August, 4.3 million tons were transported through the Kenkiyak-Atyrau pipeline.
“In January-August 2026, 3.618 million tons of oil were sent there. Compared with the same period of 2025, the figure increased by 261,000 tons, or 8%,” KazTransOil said.
While Kazakhstan searches for available pipelines and ports, Europe is searching for crude. After damage to Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, Saudi Aramco warned European customers of delivery disruptions. Industry sources said full repairs to the route toward the Red Sea port of Yanbu could take five to six weeks.
Poland’s Orlen, the largest refiner in Central Europe, bought 16 additional crude cargoes in September. The oil was sourced from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Norway, Britain, Algeria, the Americas, and other markets to supply refineries in Poland, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic.
Orlen did not disclose how much of the additional oil came from Kazakhstan. A Reuters estimate of about $1.5 billion referred to all 16 additional cargoes, not just Kazakh crude. Before the disruption, Saudi Aramco supplied about 40% of Orlen’s crude.
Kazakhstan’s presence on that list is significant. After moving away from Russian crude, European refineries became more reliant on seaborne supplies from other regions. Disruptions to Saudi exports are forcing them to diversify purchases further still.
Kazakhstan could gain additional demand as a result, but its oil still has to leave the country through Novorossiysk, the Druzhba system, the Chinese border, or across the Caspian Sea.
Marine transportation costs are adding pressure. Problems around the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea have pushed Middle Eastern producers to use ship-to-ship transfers off Oman. In September, about 2.5 million barrels per day were moving through this system, while freight costs for very large crude carriers exceeded $30 a barrel in some cases.
Higher global freight and insurance costs can erode some of the benefit of rising oil prices, particularly when routes become longer or more complicated.
Oil and gas industry expert Abzal Narymbetov sees a new role for CPC in this reshuffling of global flows.
“For Kazakhstan, there is a separate story here. The 11% increase through the Turkish Straits also includes CPC, which runs from Novorossiysk through the Bosphorus. A route we are used to discussing in terms of tariffs and shutdowns now has to be viewed in the context of a global reshuffling of flows,” he wrote on his Energy Analytics Telegram channel.
But it remains the same CPC route around which Kazakhstan has spent years discussing diversification. Middle East disruption increases demand for alternative crude, making Kazakh oil more valuable, while attacks around Russian ports and the Black Sea make that oil harder to export.
The global market needs Kazakh oil, but Kazakhstan can benefit from favorable prices only within the capacity and security constraints of infrastructure beyond its borders.
