International Relations - The Times Of Central Asia

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Iran Israel Natural gas International Relations Israel-Iran Escalation Diplomatic Isolation

Turkmenistan’s Diplomatic Moves Amid Iran-Israel Tensions

One of the elements most highlighted by the recent military confrontation between Israel and the U.S. on one side and Iran on the other is the geographical relevance of Central Asia to the situation. This is particularly true in the case of Turkmenistan, a country that shares a border of almost 1,200 kilometers with Iran. During the most intense days of the conflict, in a particularly unusual move, Turkmenistan opened its borders to foreign citizens seeking to escape from Iranian territory, which was under Israeli air strikes at the time. On the diplomatic front, there have also been several high-level meetings and talks involving Turkmenistan; just after his meeting in Moscow with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, travelled to Ashgabat for a meeting with his Turkmen counterpart, Rashid Meredov. The day after, Meredov had a telephone conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arrived in Ashgabat for a meeting with the Turkmen leader, Serdar Berdimuhamedov. Focusing primarily on the mutual isolation of Turkmenistan and Iran, Luca Anceschi, Professor of Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow, gave The Times of Central Asia his interpretation of these developments: “In my opinion, there is a fundamental issue, which is Turkmen isolation. When we see a small shift, we think that things are changing, but nothing changes. The second isolation is that of Iran, which in this case is not intentional. The reality we have seen in recent days is that Iran is isolated at the regional level. Russia has made it clear that Iran is expendable, and has not given reassuring answers. We see that there is an attempt to remedy this forced isolation on the part of Iran. To get out of these regional arrangements, they have tried to go everywhere, including Ashgabat.” Operational agreements on the energy side are certainly weighing on Tehran's desire to reassure Turkmenistan about the stability of the theocratic regime that rules Iran. These agreements are particularly useful to Iran in meeting the energy needs of the northern part of the country, which is remote and poorly connected to the south, where the country’s main natural gas fields are located. According to Temur Umarov, a Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, “Since 2022, Turkmenistan's visibility in Eurasian politics has certainly increased, and this is also the result of geopolitical changes that have taken place in the region in recent years,” Umarov told TCA. “What happened in Iran further increases Ashgabat's visibility, but it was coincidental that Lavrov's visit to Turkmenistan took place during the clash between Israel and Iran, as it was part of a wider tour of the region by the Russian Foreign Minister.” Another aspect that should be considered is the change in tone on the part of Turkmen diplomacy, which at first glance appears much more assertive than in the past. A few weeks ago, Ashgabat issued a very harsh statement regarding Trump's decision to include Turkmenistan among the countries...

Diplomacy International Relations Trump International Diplomacy

Mirziyoyev Invites Trump to Visit Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has extended his congratulations to Donald Trump on his inauguration as the 47th President of the United States by inviting him to visit Uzbekistan. Mirziyoyev's press secretary, Sherzod Asadov, made the announcement. Republican candidate Donald Trump won the November 2024 U.S. presidential election and was sworn into office on January 20, 2025. In his congratulatory letter, Mirziyoyev expressed confidence that the United States, under Trump’s leadership, would continue to enhance its global influence and prestige. He commended the country’s economic strength and vital role in international affairs. The letter also highlighted Uzbekistan’s appreciation for the United States’ consistent support of its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Mirziyoyev voiced optimism for a new era of strategic partnership between the two nations during Trump’s presidency. He stressed the importance of deepening bilateral ties and expanding collaboration through bilateral and multilateral platforms. President Mirziyoyev also invited Trump to visit Uzbekistan, a gesture aimed at strengthening the relationship between the two countries. Mirziyoyev visited the United States in 2018 during Trump’s previous term as president. When the two leaders met at the White House, Trump remarked on Uzbekistan’s growing influence: “The authority of Uzbekistan is growing. It’s an honor for us to meet with you in the White House.” In addition to Uzbekistan, other Central Asian leaders congratulated Trump on his inauguration. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev sent a telegram expressing confidence in the continued development of mutually beneficial cooperation between Kazakhstan and the United States, particularly concerning energy, nuclear non-proliferation, and international security.

president Politics Government International Relations Foreign Affairs Foreign Policy International Diplomacy

Diplomacy in Detail: Where Each Central Asian Leader Traveled to in 2024

Central Asia is often synonymous with the term "multi-vector foreign policy," enabling its nations to navigate the competing interests of global and regional powers effectively. This "open door" strategy, grounded in the principle of "my friend's friend is my friend," has consistently granted Central Asian countries a distinctive role on the international stage, aiding them in achieving their foreign policy objectives despite shifting geopolitical dynamics. Drawing from official sources, we analyze the frequency and geography of foreign visits by the leaders of Central Asia in 2024, offering insights into their diplomatic engagements. Turkmenistan President Serdar Berdimuhamedov embarked on eight foreign trips in 2024. Among these, only one - a bilateral visit to Malaysia - was not tied to multilateral events. The other seven engagements showcased Turkmenistan’s participation in global diplomacy: XVI BRICS Summit (Kazan) CIS Heads of State Summit (Moscow) Victory Day Celebration (Moscow) Informal CIS Leaders' Meeting (St. Petersburg) Central Asia-Germany Summit (Astana) Sixth Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders (Astana) UN COP28 Conference (Dubai) This year, Berdimuhamedov visited Russia four times, and Kazakhstan twice, and made single trips to the UAE and Malaysia. In parallel, his father and the previous president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, conducted 10 trips, including four bilateral visits to the UAE and Tajikistan and two to Iran. His international commitments included: One Water Summit (Riyadh) Turkic States’ Council of Elders (Budapest) V World Nomad Games Opening Ceremony (Astana) SCO Summit (Astana) Russia-Islamic World: KazanForum (Kazan) Antalya Diplomatic Forum (Antalya) Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon undertook 22 foreign trips in 2024, six of which were bilateral, with visits to Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Italy/Vatican, and Qatar (twice). Multilateral engagements included: CSTO Summit (Astana) Central Asia-Germany Summit (Astana) Sixth Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders (Astana) SCO Plus Meeting (Astana) COP29 Climate Conference (Baku) Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit (Riyadh) UN COP28 Conference (Dubai) UN General Assembly (New York) Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev made 18 international visits, including state visits to Turkey, China, and Tajikistan. He participated in numerous events: COP29 Climate Conference (Baku) Turkic States Informal Summit (Shusha) Arab-Islamic Summit (Riyadh) UN COP28 Conference (Dubai) SCO Meeting (Astana) BRICS+ Summit (Kazan) Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev led the region in diplomatic outreach with 23 visits. Eleven of these were state visits to Hungary, Serbia, France, Italy/Vatican, Qatar, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Tajikistan, Mongolia, and Singapore. Key multilateral events included: Doha Forum (Doha) One Water Summit (Riyadh) COP29 Climate Conference (Baku) Boao Forum (Boao) Tokayev visited Russia five times, and Azerbaijan three times, and made additional trips to Saudi Arabia, UAE, and other countries in Europe and Asia. Kyrgyzstan President Sadyr Japarov also made 23 foreign visits, including eight state visits to South Korea, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Germany, Austria, and Italy/Vatican. He attended numerous multilateral forums: CSTO Summit (Astana) Central Asia-Germany Summit (Astana) UN COP28 Conference (Dubai) BRICS+ Summit (Kazan) Japarov visited Russia five times, and Kazakhstan four times, and made single trips to several European and Asian countries. In 2024, Tokayev and Japarov led the region in the number of foreign visits. While...

Russia Politics International Relations Chechnya Chechen

Tensions Rise as Uzbek Leaders Respond to Ramzan Kadyrov’s Remarks

Uzbekistan has placed two residents of Chechnya, Bislan Rasayev and Shamil Temirkhanov, on Interpol’s wanted list. The Times of Central Asia has previously reported that the two men are accused of multiple crimes, including a plot to assassinate Komil Allamjonov, the former head of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's information policy department, and Dmitry Li, head of the National Agency for Prospective Projects (NAPP). Rasayev and Temirkhanov were reportedly offered $1.5 million for the assassinations. Chechnya's leader Ramzan Kadyrov has called the arrest warrants "fabrications". Kadyrov claims that pro-Western media are spreading baseless rumors about divisions within Mirziyoyev’s family as part of a larger effort to destabilize the country’s leadership. The attempt on Allamjonov's life is said to have taken place on October 26 outside his home in Tashkent’s Kibray district. According to Uzbek media, two unidentified individuals fired multiple shots at Allamjonov’s car before fleeing the scene. No injuries were reported. Opposition outlets speculated about a “Chechen connection,” suggesting Kadyrov’s possible involvement in the attack. In an earlier statement, Kadyrov said that “if I had really planned something, I would have completed it with a 100% result.” He also expressed skepticism about the investigation’s timeline, noting that Li was identified as a secondary target only months after the probe began. Kadyrov suggested that the case could be part of internal “behind-the-scenes games” orchestrated by certain groups. In response, Uzbek officials and lawmakers condemned Kadyrov’s statements and threats. Rasul Kusherbayev, a former deputy and adviser to the Minister of Ecology, described Kadyrov’s comments as terrorism. “Open threats to officials in Uzbekistan are terrorism. Those who make such statements or attempt such actions must be held accountable,” he said. Kusherbayev also criticized the Uzbek government for remaining silent in the face of these threats. “Why should the government of Uzbekistan remain silent? How long will we tolerate those who openly threaten us with chauvinistic views? The response should go beyond mere statements - it should involve concrete measures. If necessary, flights to Grozny should be canceled, and every Chechen citizen entering Uzbekistan should be strictly vetted,” he added. Odiljon Tojiyev, a deputy of Uzbekistan’s Legislative Chamber, similarly denounced Kadyrov’s interference in Uzbekistan’s internal affairs and his threats against Uzbek officials. He warned that such actions could harm relations between Uzbekistan and Chechnya. “I call on the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation to assess Ramzan Kadyrov’s threats against Uzbek officials. Moreover, Kadyrov should issue a public apology to the people of Uzbekistan. If he is truly a friend, he should assist Uzbekistan’s Prosecutor General’s Office in locating and extraditing Bislan Rasayev and Shamil Temirkhanov,” Tojiyev stated. Kadyrov’s remarks and the allegations surrounding the assassination attempt have brought tensions between Uzbekistan and Chechnya into the spotlight. While Uzbekistan values its friendly relations with Russia and its regions, the controversy has prompted calls for firm action to protect the country’s sovereignty and ensure accountability.

Global Diplomacy Astana Talks Reintegration Regional Security reintegration of returnees from Iraq and Syria International Relations Russia Syria Extremism

Central Asia Braces for Return of Radical Islamists Amid Syrian Turmoil

According to experts, the recent collapse of President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria raises concerns about potential destabilization in Central Asia. This development may force regional governments to repatriate citizens who were lured by Islamist propaganda, while the future of the Astana format negotiations on Syria remains uncertain. The swift coup d'état in Syria saw opposition forces capture Damascus and much of the country within days. Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow, leaving a chaotic landscape dominated by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, often described as a successor to ISIS and Al-Qaeda. The situation has plunged Syria into further instability. The Impact of Operation Zhusan Kazakhstan has firsthand experience dealing with the repercussions of Syria's instability. Between 2013 and 2017, hundreds of Kazakh citizens succumbed to Islamist propaganda, crossing borders illegally to join the conflict, often with their families. In response to the humanitarian crisis, Kazakhstan launched Operation Zhusan ("Wormwood") in January 2019 to repatriate citizens trapped in Syria. The operation, conducted in five stages and completed by February 2021, repatriated 607 citizens, 37 men, 157 women and 413 children (34 of whom were orphans). The government set up a rehabilitation center near Aktau on the Caspian Sea to provide treatment, restore documents, and offer vocational training for adults and education for children. All 37 repatriated men were detained and later convicted of terrorism-related activities, receiving sentences ranging between 6 and 14 years, whilst 18 women faced prosecution. Despite the operation’s success, many in Kazakhstan fear the returnees and their children might spread radical ideologies within the country. Lessons from the Region Other Central Asian countries have also grappled with the challenge of repatriating citizens from Syria. Bakhtiyor Babadjanov, an expert from the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under Uzbekistan’s president, detailed the experiences of Uzbek women lured to conflict zones. These women often found themselves deceived and abandoned in dire conditions, as described in an interview. "The 'happy caliphate' turned out to be a myth," Babadjanov explained, recounting stories of women and children abandoned without food or shelter during battles in Mosul. Survivors reported forced marriages, child abuse, and exploitation under the guise of religious duty. The Uncertain Future of the Astana Process Another significant connection between Central Asia and Syria has been the Astana process, a series of negotiations aimed at resolving the Syrian conflict. Since 2017, Kazakhstan has hosted 22 rounds of talks, including discussions on hostages, missing persons, and settlement efforts. However, the recent escalation in Syria casts doubt on the process. In late November and early December, armed opposition groups launched a large-scale offensive, capturing key cities, including Aleppo and Damascus. Despite this upheaval, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov insisted the Astana process remains relevant as a platform for dialogue and consultation, notwithstanding the fact that Assad is now in Moscow. Heightened Risks of Destabilization Experts in Kazakhstan and Central Asia have warned that the fall of Assad's regime could lead to prolonged anarchy, ethnic and religious conflicts, and a refugee crisis. Political scientist,...

Water Management USA transboundary water Water Disputes International Relations Geopolitics Environmental Awareness Afghanistan

Harnessing Diplomacy: Qosh Tepa Canal as a Bridge to U.S. Influence in Central Asia

The Center for the National Interest, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, has released a report titled Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal and Water Security in Central Asia. The report outlines how U.S. support for the Qosh Tepa Canal project could provide an opportunity for the incoming Trump administration to strengthen its influence in the region. Project Overview Currently under construction in northern Afghanistan, the Qosh Tepa Canal aims to divert water from the Amu Darya River to support agriculture and economic growth. The canal will stretch 287 kilometers, with a depth of 8.5 meters and an average width of 100 meters. Once completed, it will irrigate more than 1.2 million acres of farmland and generate approximately 200,000 jobs in northern Afghanistan. While the Taliban has championed the project as a cornerstone of Afghanistan’s development, the canal poses significant challenges for downstream countries reliant on the Amu Darya, particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Concerns include potential water scarcity, environmental degradation, and heightened regional tensions. Implications for Central Asia The report highlights that the canal could exacerbate existing disputes over water allocation in a region already plagued by scarcity. Unlike its Central Asian neighbors, Afghanistan is excluded from water-sharing agreements rooted in the Soviet era. The poorly designed Soviet canals along the Amu Darya continue to undermine water security in the region decades after their construction, a fate experts hope to avoid with Qosh Tepa. Recommendations for U.S. Engagement The report urges the United States to seize this opportunity to engage Afghanistan and the broader region diplomatically and technically: 1. Support for a Well-Engineered Canal The United States should advocate for a well designed canal that prioritizes water-use efficiency. By offering technical assistance and backing the project in principle, the U.S. could pave the way for multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Asian Development Bank, to provide financial and technical support. 2. Promote Regional Water Diplomacy Washington should encourage negotiations for a regional water-sharing agreement among Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 3. Assist Downstream States Additional investments in modernizing irrigation systems in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan could mitigate the canal's impact on downstream water availability. Strategic Context The report underscores the geostrategic importance of Afghanistan and Central Asia, which border three of Washington’s primary global competitors: China, Russia, and Iran. By supporting the Qosh Tepa Canal project and fostering regional water-sharing cooperation, the U.S. could counterbalance the growing influence of Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran in the region. A Watershed Moment As construction progresses into its second phase, involving thousands of workers and heavy machinery, the Qosh Tepa Canal stands at the nexus of development and diplomacy. The report concludes that U.S. involvement in this critical project could serve not only to address Central Asia’s pressing water security challenges but also to reinforce Washington’s strategic position in one of the world’s most complex geopolitical arenas.