• KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
22 September 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 71

Afghanistan’s Regional Ties Grow as Global Reintegration Stalls

For Central Asia, Afghanistan is both a source of risk and a potential route south. Governments across the region increasingly see a more stable Afghanistan as a way to open new markets and expand economic links with South Asia. Afghanistan is a direct neighbor of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The geography is different for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but their political and economic interests are no less significant. Many long-term plans for expanding Central Asia’s connections to the south depend in part on Afghanistan’s future and the role it can play in the regional economy. At the UN Security Council’s September 16, 2026, meeting on Afghanistan, Kazakhstan set out a position that may reflect a wider Central Asian view. Astana argued that engagement with Afghanistan’s current authorities should not be equated with recognition and that isolation could not offer a sustainable solution. Astana proposes moving past the current focus on humanitarian aid. In Kazakhstan’s view, the next phase of international engagement should gradually move Afghanistan from dependence on humanitarian aid toward economic self-reliance through job creation, private-sector development, the restoration of financial channels, and expanded trade and investment. The statement also calls for Afghanistan’s integration into the regional economy. Kazakhstan’s representative specifically discussed connections between Central and South Asia, Kazakh-Afghan business ties, trade houses in Herat and Kabul, and the new UN Regional Centre for the Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty. Astana also expressed concern about restrictions affecting Afghan women and girls. Georgette Gagnon, the UN secretary-general’s deputy special representative for Afghanistan, delivered the main briefing. Five years after the Taliban’s return to power, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) assesses that the de facto authorities face no significant armed or political threat to their control, although risks to long-term stability are accumulating and largely stem from their own policies. UNAMA therefore distinguishes between the Taliban’s control of the country and its prospects for long-term stability. UNAMA views the Doha process as the main multilateral framework for Afghanistan’s gradual reintegration into the international community. It links progress to women’s rights and inclusive governance, along with the fulfillment of counterterrorism commitments. The mission also notes that Kabul prefers bilateral relations to multilateral engagement. Russia and China focused on pragmatic engagement and economic recovery, stressing the need to avoid isolation. China also urged Kabul to step up its efforts against terrorist groups and lift restrictions preventing Afghan women employed by the UN from doing their jobs. Russia called for dialogue without pressure and for steps toward Afghanistan’s international reintegration without preconditions. Afghanistan’s economic ties with some regional partners are expanding while its political normalization at the global level remains unresolved. Kazakhstan’s position illustrates this divide. It allows for engagement without accepting the existing order as permanent or waiting for isolation to change it. Future international discussions on Afghanistan will have to address this tension.

Kazakhstan Laos Seek to Link Transport Corridors Through China

Kazakhstan wants to connect its rail and logistics network with the China-Laos Railway, opening a possible route for Lao goods to Central Asia and Europe and for Kazakh exports into Southeast Asia. Much of the infrastructure already exists: both countries’ networks connect through China. What is missing are the agreements needed to make regular freight traffic between them practical. The idea was one of the main topics during Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith’s first official visit to Kazakhstan on September 3. During talks with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, trade, transport and logistics were high on the agenda. Tokayev specifically offered Lao freight carriers access to Kazakhstan’s logistics hub in Xi’an. From there, cargo can move through Kazakhstan to the Caspian Sea and then onward toward Europe. Astana sees the China-Laos Railway as a potential gateway to Southeast Asian markets. Opened in December 2021, the 414-kilometer section inside Laos connects the capital Vientiane with Boten on the Chinese border, linking the Lao network onward to Kunming through China’s rail system. It has become a central element of Laos’ strategy to transform itself from a landlocked country into a regional land-linked transport hub. Before the railway opened, the World Bank estimated that, with better logistics and simpler border procedures, it could substantially reduce transport costs and integrate Laos more closely into regional production and supply chains. The route is already being used for freight between China and Southeast Asian countries, including Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore. Kazakhstan is looking at this infrastructure as a possible southern extension of its own overland trade routes. Between the two countries lies China’s vast railway system, meaning much of the physical infrastructure needed for such a connection already exists. There is, however, no regular Kazakhstan-Laos freight corridor yet. Regular freight services would require agreements covering transit, tariffs, and customs procedures. The route’s commercial viability would depend on transport costs and delivery times, as well as the ability to generate sufficient cargo volumes. The first potential goods have already been identified. Laos is interested in Kazakh grain, oilseeds, animal feed, and meat products. Coffee and rubber are among the possible Lao exports to Kazakhstan. The search for new trade routes is linked to Astana’s broader plans to expand the geography of its exports. Kazakhstan aims to increase non-commodity exports to $52 billion by 2030. Kazakhstan’s interest in Laos is largely explained by the country’s changing position on Asia’s transport map. The railway connection to China has given Laos direct access to the Chinese network and brought it closer to major regional markets. Kazakhstan’s infrastructure could extend that chain westward through Central Asia and across the Caspian toward Europe.

Rubio and Kosherbayev Discuss CPC Ahead of Tokayev’s U.S. Visit

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a telephone conversation with Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev on 29 July. The discussion focused on the situation surrounding the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, energy cooperation, critical minerals, trade and investment ties, and current international issues. According to the U.S. Department of State, Rubio and Kosherbayev discussed the importance of energy security, including the “reliable and uninterrupted” export of Kazakhstan-origin oil through the CPC system. Rubio also thanked Kazakhstan for supporting President Donald Trump’s peace initiatives and expressed interest in deepening bilateral economic cooperation. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the two ministers discussed in detail the situation surrounding the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, cooperation in the energy, transport and logistics sectors, supplies of critical minerals, efforts to attract U.S. investment, and coordination in international organisations. The ministry said the conversation also covered preparations for President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s forthcoming visit to the United States for the G20 summit. The telephone call took place shortly after Kazakhstan resumed crude oil exports through the CPC system. The pipeline carries the vast majority of crude exports from the Tengiz oilfield, whose largest shareholders include the U.S. companies Chevron and ExxonMobil. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry said the two ministers reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining regular political dialogue. The conversation followed President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with U.S. Senator Steve Daines on 8 July, when the two sides discussed expanding trade and economic cooperation, attracting investment and strengthening cooperation in the energy sector. On 28 July, The Times of Central Asia reported that Kazakhstan had resumed oil exports through the CPC system after a week-long disruption at the consortium’s Black Sea marine terminal near Novorossiysk. The interruption more than halved oil production at Tengiz and again highlighted Kazakhstan’s dependence on its principal oil export route.

Tajikistan and UK Discuss Banking Regulation and Sanctions Compliance

Representatives of Tajikistan’s government and banking sector met with Douglas Clark, the United Kingdom’s regional sanctions attaché, in Dushanbe to discuss banking regulation, risk management, and the development of bilateral cooperation in the financial sector. According to the National Bank of Tajikistan, the meeting was attended by First Deputy Prime Minister Hokim Kholikzoda, senior National Bank officials, and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. During the talks, participants reviewed the current state of cooperation and discussed coordination in the financial sector. The agenda included Tajikistan’s banking system, compliance with international standards, supervisory mechanisms, and risk management. Kholikzoda said Tajikistan is interested in expanding mutually beneficial cooperation with international partners. He said the government is taking measures to improve the transparency and resilience of the country’s financial system and align the sector with international standards. Firdavs Tolibzoda, chairman of the National Bank of Tajikistan, briefed participants on efforts to support the stability of the banking system. These include compliance with international supervision and risk-management requirements, along with tighter compliance controls in credit and financial institutions. Clark praised Tajikistan’s engagement with international partners and its work on coordination mechanisms in financial-sector cooperation. At the conclusion of the meeting, both sides reaffirmed their readiness to continue cooperation in areas of mutual interest. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the European Union removed three Tajik banks from its sanctions list in April.

Opinion: Bishkek Between Sanctions and Africa: The Quiet Architecture of Proxy Sovereignty

The official visit of Togo’s head of government, Faure Gnassingbé, to Kyrgyzstan on April 28–30 should not be read as an isolated diplomatic event. It is taking place inside an unusually dense cluster of activity: the SCO Council of Defence Ministers, the presence of China’s defence minister, the fifth meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) digital and ICT ministers, and a parallel SCO Forum on Artificial Intelligence. Bishkek, in other words, was not simply hosting an African leader. It was presenting itself — intentionally or not — as a Eurasian platform where security, digital governance, AI, transport, tourism, and external partnerships intersect. This geometry deserves attention. Bishkek as a Digital Interface Over the past several years, Kyrgyzstan has worked to reposition itself — not only as a mountainous transit country, but as a provider of digital state capacity: e-government tools, secure documents, digital identification, fintech infrastructure, and special financial regimes such as the proposed Tamchy special financial and investment territory, which combines Kyrgyz sovereignty with elements of English law and international arbitration. For many African countries, this offer can be attractive. Governments across the continent are looking for administrative modernization, digital sovereignty, and alternatives to legacy Western-controlled infrastructure. For Bishkek, such partnerships offer something equally valuable: visibility, geopolitical relevance, and an opportunity to export state technology beyond Central Asia. Togo is a particularly interesting test case. Lomé is one of West Africa’s important maritime and logistical hubs, with access not only to the Gulf of Guinea but, indirectly, to the Sahel region — Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — where Russia has expanded its security footprint. If Kyrgyz digital infrastructure were to enter this corridor, it would not be a minor technical export. It would connect a Central Asian jurisdiction to one of Africa’s most strategically sensitive zones. It must be said honestly: this remains a hypothesis. Public information about specific Kyrgyz digital products being offered to Togo remains limited. But the political signal is difficult to ignore: Bishkek is not approaching this visit as a routine bilateral courtesy. The Russia Question There is a more sensitive layer to this picture. Kyrgyzstan is a close partner of Russia. Russia, in turn, is under heavy Western sanctions and is searching for alternative financial, commercial, and logistical routes. This creates a natural suspicion that Kyrgyz digital and financial infrastructure could — directly or indirectly — become useful to Russian-linked actors. This does not mean every Kyrgyz initiative abroad is directed from Moscow. That reading is too simplistic. A more precise framing is this: Kyrgyzstan may be becoming part of a distributed sanctions-era infrastructure in which Russian, Chinese, Central Asian, and Global South interests increasingly overlap. In this sense, Bishkek may not be a “front office” for Russia alone. It may be emerging as a Eurasian adapter — a jurisdiction through which larger actors can interact with sensitive markets under a less toxic, more flexible brand. A7A5 and the Closing Window The crypto-financial dimension makes this issue urgent. A7A5, a ruble-pegged stablecoin issued...

South Caucasus Peace Push Faces Political and Regional Roadblocks

This past weekend, discussion of the “historic joint declaration for peace” was nearly impossible to avoid. Optimism ran high, with many expressing hope that peace and cooperation might finally take hold in the South Caucasus. But how realistic is that vision? What was signed in Washington on August 8, 2025, was not a binding treaty but a declaration of intent. That is a meaningful step, but for now it remains a symbolic document. Turning it into lasting peace will require a full treaty with specific commitments. One major hurdle is Armenia’s constitution, which still contains territorial claims to land recognized as part of Azerbaijan. Amending this will be politically difficult. The day after the signing, the opposition Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) issued a sharply critical statement. It accused the declaration of harming Armenia’s sovereignty, legitimizing an Azerbaijani-favored corridor, and violating Armenia’s territory. The ARF demanded the withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces, the release of Artsakh’s political prisoners, and guarantees for the safe return of displaced Armenians. Of the 69 seats in Armenia’s parliament, 28 belong to the “Armenia” faction, 15 of them held by ARF members, giving the party significant influence over this debate. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has also said that the wording of Armenia’s constitution blocked the signing of a treaty in Washington. Alongside the declaration, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan signed economic agreements with the United States to boost trade, transit, energy, infrastructure, and technology in the South Caucasus. Yet these too face obstacles. Iranian official Ali Akbar Velayati vowed to prevent the creation of an “American corridor” in the region and rejected reports of a US-Armenian lease deal for land along Iran’s border, warning it would become “a graveyard for the mercenaries of Donald Trump.” Proponents argue that if such a corridor opens, it could strengthen the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. However, no study has yet confirmed whether the 43-kilometer stretch in question could handle a major traffic increase. After a weekend of high expectations, political realities have brought a more cautious mood. The week ahead promises further developments. President Trump has  announced a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska. Some reports claim Putin has proposed a Ukraine ceasefire in exchange for significant territorial concessions and recognition of Russia’s claims. In response, European leaders issued a joint statement affirming Ukraine’s right to decide its own future, calling for robust security guarantees, and insisting that any peace process must begin with a ceasefire or reduced hostilities. Ukrainian President Zelensky reiterated that the constitution already answers the territorial question and that no land will be surrendered. Diplomatic exchanges have been intense. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev spoke with both Zelensky and Aliyev, urging a balanced approach and recalling the saying that “a bad peace is better than a good war.” Putin called the president of Tajikistan, and Zelensky spoke again with Aliyev. Behind the brief official readouts lies a broader search for ways forward. International politics is a delicate process, and disputes built over decades or centuries...