International Relations - The Times Of Central Asia

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Sanctions

Opinion: Bishkek Between Sanctions and Africa: The Quiet Architecture of Proxy Sovereignty

The official visit of Togo’s head of government, Faure Gnassingbé, to Kyrgyzstan on April 28–30 should not be read as an isolated diplomatic event. It is taking place inside an unusually dense cluster of activity: the SCO Council of Defence Ministers, the presence of China’s defence minister, the fifth meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) digital and ICT ministers, and a parallel SCO Forum on Artificial Intelligence. Bishkek, in other words, was not simply hosting an African leader. It was presenting itself — intentionally or not — as a Eurasian platform where security, digital governance, AI, transport, tourism, and external partnerships intersect. This geometry deserves attention. Bishkek as a Digital Interface Over the past several years, Kyrgyzstan has worked to reposition itself — not only as a mountainous transit country, but as a provider of digital state capacity: e-government tools, secure documents, digital identification, fintech infrastructure, and special financial regimes such as the proposed Tamchy special financial and investment territory, which combines Kyrgyz sovereignty with elements of English law and international arbitration. For many African countries, this offer can be attractive. Governments across the continent are looking for administrative modernization, digital sovereignty, and alternatives to legacy Western-controlled infrastructure. For Bishkek, such partnerships offer something equally valuable: visibility, geopolitical relevance, and an opportunity to export state technology beyond Central Asia. Togo is a particularly interesting test case. Lomé is one of West Africa’s important maritime and logistical hubs, with access not only to the Gulf of Guinea but, indirectly, to the Sahel region — Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — where Russia has expanded its security footprint. If Kyrgyz digital infrastructure were to enter this corridor, it would not be a minor technical export. It would connect a Central Asian jurisdiction to one of Africa’s most strategically sensitive zones. It must be said honestly: this remains a hypothesis. Public information about specific Kyrgyz digital products being offered to Togo remains limited. But the political signal is difficult to ignore: Bishkek is not approaching this visit as a routine bilateral courtesy. The Russia Question There is a more sensitive layer to this picture. Kyrgyzstan is a close partner of Russia. Russia, in turn, is under heavy Western sanctions and is searching for alternative financial, commercial, and logistical routes. This creates a natural suspicion that Kyrgyz digital and financial infrastructure could — directly or indirectly — become useful to Russian-linked actors. This does not mean every Kyrgyz initiative abroad is directed from Moscow. That reading is too simplistic. A more precise framing is this: Kyrgyzstan may be becoming part of a distributed sanctions-era infrastructure in which Russian, Chinese, Central Asian, and Global South interests increasingly overlap. In this sense, Bishkek may not be a “front office” for Russia alone. It may be emerging as a Eurasian adapter — a jurisdiction through which larger actors can interact with sensitive markets under a less toxic, more flexible brand. A7A5 and the Closing Window The crypto-financial dimension makes this issue urgent. A7A5, a ruble-pegged stablecoin issued...

International Relations

South Caucasus Peace Push Faces Political and Regional Roadblocks

This past weekend, discussion of the “historic joint declaration for peace” was nearly impossible to avoid. Optimism ran high, with many expressing hope that peace and cooperation might finally take hold in the South Caucasus. But how realistic is that vision? What was signed in Washington on August 8, 2025, was not a binding treaty but a declaration of intent. That is a meaningful step, but for now it remains a symbolic document. Turning it into lasting peace will require a full treaty with specific commitments. One major hurdle is Armenia’s constitution, which still contains territorial claims to land recognized as part of Azerbaijan. Amending this will be politically difficult. The day after the signing, the opposition Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) issued a sharply critical statement. It accused the declaration of harming Armenia’s sovereignty, legitimizing an Azerbaijani-favored corridor, and violating Armenia’s territory. The ARF demanded the withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces, the release of Artsakh’s political prisoners, and guarantees for the safe return of displaced Armenians. Of the 69 seats in Armenia’s parliament, 28 belong to the “Armenia” faction, 15 of them held by ARF members, giving the party significant influence over this debate. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has also said that the wording of Armenia’s constitution blocked the signing of a treaty in Washington. Alongside the declaration, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan signed economic agreements with the United States to boost trade, transit, energy, infrastructure, and technology in the South Caucasus. Yet these too face obstacles. Iranian official Ali Akbar Velayati vowed to prevent the creation of an “American corridor” in the region and rejected reports of a US-Armenian lease deal for land along Iran’s border, warning it would become “a graveyard for the mercenaries of Donald Trump.” Proponents argue that if such a corridor opens, it could strengthen the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. However, no study has yet confirmed whether the 43-kilometer stretch in question could handle a major traffic increase. After a weekend of high expectations, political realities have brought a more cautious mood. The week ahead promises further developments. President Trump has announced a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska. Some reports claim Putin has proposed a Ukraine ceasefire in exchange for significant territorial concessions and recognition of Russia’s claims. In response, European leaders issued a joint statement affirming Ukraine’s right to decide its own future, calling for robust security guarantees, and insisting that any peace process must begin with a ceasefire or reduced hostilities. Ukrainian President Zelensky reiterated that the constitution already answers the territorial question and that no land will be surrendered. Diplomatic exchanges have been intense. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev spoke with both Zelensky and Aliyev, urging a balanced approach and recalling the saying that “a bad peace is better than a good war.” Putin called the president of Tajikistan, and Zelensky spoke again with Aliyev. Behind the brief official readouts lies a broader search for ways forward. International politics is a delicate process, and disputes built over decades or centuries...

Israel-Iran Escalation

Turkmenistan’s Diplomatic Moves Amid Iran-Israel Tensions

One of the elements most highlighted by the recent military confrontation between Israel and the U.S. on one side and Iran on the other is the geographical relevance of Central Asia to the situation. This is particularly true in the case of Turkmenistan, a country that shares a border of almost 1,200 kilometers with Iran. During the most intense days of the conflict, in a particularly unusual move, Turkmenistan opened its borders to foreign citizens seeking to escape from Iranian territory, which was under Israeli air strikes at the time. On the diplomatic front, there have also been several high-level meetings and talks involving Turkmenistan; just after his meeting in Moscow with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, travelled to Ashgabat for a meeting with his Turkmen counterpart, Rashid Meredov. The day after, Meredov had a telephone conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arrived in Ashgabat for a meeting with the Turkmen leader, Serdar Berdimuhamedov. Focusing primarily on the mutual isolation of Turkmenistan and Iran, Luca Anceschi, Professor of Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow, gave The Times of Central Asia his interpretation of these developments: “In my opinion, there is a fundamental issue, which is Turkmen isolation. When we see a small shift, we think that things are changing, but nothing changes. The second isolation is that of Iran, which in this case is not intentional. The reality we have seen in recent days is that Iran is isolated at the regional level. Russia has made it clear that Iran is expendable, and has not given reassuring answers. We see that there is an attempt to remedy this forced isolation on the part of Iran. To get out of these regional arrangements, they have tried to go everywhere, including Ashgabat.” Operational agreements on the energy side are certainly weighing on Tehran's desire to reassure Turkmenistan about the stability of the theocratic regime that rules Iran. These agreements are particularly useful to Iran in meeting the energy needs of the northern part of the country, which is remote and poorly connected to the south, where the country’s main natural gas fields are located. According to Temur Umarov, a Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, “Since 2022, Turkmenistan's visibility in Eurasian politics has certainly increased, and this is also the result of geopolitical changes that have taken place in the region in recent years,” Umarov told TCA. “What happened in Iran further increases Ashgabat's visibility, but it was coincidental that Lavrov's visit to Turkmenistan took place during the clash between Israel and Iran, as it was part of a wider tour of the region by the Russian Foreign Minister.” Another aspect that should be considered is the change in tone on the part of Turkmen diplomacy, which at first glance appears much more assertive than in the past. A few weeks ago, Ashgabat issued a very harsh statement regarding Trump's decision to include Turkmenistan among the countries...

Diplomacy

Mirziyoyev Invites Trump to Visit Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has extended his congratulations to Donald Trump on his inauguration as the 47th President of the United States by inviting him to visit Uzbekistan. Mirziyoyev's press secretary, Sherzod Asadov, made the announcement. Republican candidate Donald Trump won the November 2024 U.S. presidential election and was sworn into office on January 20, 2025. In his congratulatory letter, Mirziyoyev expressed confidence that the United States, under Trump’s leadership, would continue to enhance its global influence and prestige. He commended the country’s economic strength and vital role in international affairs. The letter also highlighted Uzbekistan’s appreciation for the United States’ consistent support of its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Mirziyoyev voiced optimism for a new era of strategic partnership between the two nations during Trump’s presidency. He stressed the importance of deepening bilateral ties and expanding collaboration through bilateral and multilateral platforms. President Mirziyoyev also invited Trump to visit Uzbekistan, a gesture aimed at strengthening the relationship between the two countries. Mirziyoyev visited the United States in 2018 during Trump’s previous term as president. When the two leaders met at the White House, Trump remarked on Uzbekistan’s growing influence: “The authority of Uzbekistan is growing. It’s an honor for us to meet with you in the White House.” In addition to Uzbekistan, other Central Asian leaders congratulated Trump on his inauguration. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev sent a telegram expressing confidence in the continued development of mutually beneficial cooperation between Kazakhstan and the United States, particularly concerning energy, nuclear non-proliferation, and international security.

Politics

Diplomacy in Detail: Where Each Central Asian Leader Traveled to in 2024

Central Asia is often synonymous with the term "multi-vector foreign policy," enabling its nations to navigate the competing interests of global and regional powers effectively. This "open door" strategy, grounded in the principle of "my friend's friend is my friend," has consistently granted Central Asian countries a distinctive role on the international stage, aiding them in achieving their foreign policy objectives despite shifting geopolitical dynamics. Drawing from official sources, we analyze the frequency and geography of foreign visits by the leaders of Central Asia in 2024, offering insights into their diplomatic engagements. Turkmenistan President Serdar Berdimuhamedov embarked on eight foreign trips in 2024. Among these, only one - a bilateral visit to Malaysia - was not tied to multilateral events. The other seven engagements showcased Turkmenistan’s participation in global diplomacy: XVI BRICS Summit (Kazan) CIS Heads of State Summit (Moscow) Victory Day Celebration (Moscow) Informal CIS Leaders' Meeting (St. Petersburg) Central Asia-Germany Summit (Astana) Sixth Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders (Astana) UN COP28 Conference (Dubai) This year, Berdimuhamedov visited Russia four times, and Kazakhstan twice, and made single trips to the UAE and Malaysia. In parallel, his father and the previous president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, conducted 10 trips, including four bilateral visits to the UAE and Tajikistan and two to Iran. His international commitments included: One Water Summit (Riyadh) Turkic States’ Council of Elders (Budapest) V World Nomad Games Opening Ceremony (Astana) SCO Summit (Astana) Russia-Islamic World: KazanForum (Kazan) Antalya Diplomatic Forum (Antalya) Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon undertook 22 foreign trips in 2024, six of which were bilateral, with visits to Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Italy/Vatican, and Qatar (twice). Multilateral engagements included: CSTO Summit (Astana) Central Asia-Germany Summit (Astana) Sixth Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders (Astana) SCO Plus Meeting (Astana) COP29 Climate Conference (Baku) Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit (Riyadh) UN COP28 Conference (Dubai) UN General Assembly (New York) Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev made 18 international visits, including state visits to Turkey, China, and Tajikistan. He participated in numerous events: COP29 Climate Conference (Baku) Turkic States Informal Summit (Shusha) Arab-Islamic Summit (Riyadh) UN COP28 Conference (Dubai) SCO Meeting (Astana) BRICS+ Summit (Kazan) Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev led the region in diplomatic outreach with 23 visits. Eleven of these were state visits to Hungary, Serbia, France, Italy/Vatican, Qatar, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Tajikistan, Mongolia, and Singapore. Key multilateral events included: Doha Forum (Doha) One Water Summit (Riyadh) COP29 Climate Conference (Baku) Boao Forum (Boao) Tokayev visited Russia five times, and Azerbaijan three times, and made additional trips to Saudi Arabia, UAE, and other countries in Europe and Asia. Kyrgyzstan President Sadyr Japarov also made 23 foreign visits, including eight state visits to South Korea, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Germany, Austria, and Italy/Vatican. He attended numerous multilateral forums: CSTO Summit (Astana) Central Asia-Germany Summit (Astana) UN COP28 Conference (Dubai) BRICS+ Summit (Kazan) Japarov visited Russia five times, and Kazakhstan four times, and made single trips to several European and Asian countries. In 2024, Tokayev and Japarov led the region in the number of foreign visits. While...

International Relations

Tensions Rise as Uzbek Leaders Respond to Ramzan Kadyrov’s Remarks

Uzbekistan has placed two residents of Chechnya, Bislan Rasayev and Shamil Temirkhanov, on Interpol’s wanted list. The Times of Central Asia has previously reported that the two men are accused of multiple crimes, including a plot to assassinate Komil Allamjonov, the former head of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's information policy department, and Dmitry Li, head of the National Agency for Prospective Projects (NAPP). Rasayev and Temirkhanov were reportedly offered $1.5 million for the assassinations. Chechnya's leader Ramzan Kadyrov has called the arrest warrants "fabrications". Kadyrov claims that pro-Western media are spreading baseless rumors about divisions within Mirziyoyev’s family as part of a larger effort to destabilize the country’s leadership. The attempt on Allamjonov's life is said to have taken place on October 26 outside his home in Tashkent’s Kibray district. According to Uzbek media, two unidentified individuals fired multiple shots at Allamjonov’s car before fleeing the scene. No injuries were reported. Opposition outlets speculated about a “Chechen connection,” suggesting Kadyrov’s possible involvement in the attack. In an earlier statement, Kadyrov said that “if I had really planned something, I would have completed it with a 100% result.” He also expressed skepticism about the investigation’s timeline, noting that Li was identified as a secondary target only months after the probe began. Kadyrov suggested that the case could be part of internal “behind-the-scenes games” orchestrated by certain groups. In response, Uzbek officials and lawmakers condemned Kadyrov’s statements and threats. Rasul Kusherbayev, a former deputy and adviser to the Minister of Ecology, described Kadyrov’s comments as terrorism. “Open threats to officials in Uzbekistan are terrorism. Those who make such statements or attempt such actions must be held accountable,” he said. Kusherbayev also criticized the Uzbek government for remaining silent in the face of these threats. “Why should the government of Uzbekistan remain silent? How long will we tolerate those who openly threaten us with chauvinistic views? The response should go beyond mere statements - it should involve concrete measures. If necessary, flights to Grozny should be canceled, and every Chechen citizen entering Uzbekistan should be strictly vetted,” he added. Odiljon Tojiyev, a deputy of Uzbekistan’s Legislative Chamber, similarly denounced Kadyrov’s interference in Uzbekistan’s internal affairs and his threats against Uzbek officials. He warned that such actions could harm relations between Uzbekistan and Chechnya. “I call on the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation to assess Ramzan Kadyrov’s threats against Uzbek officials. Moreover, Kadyrov should issue a public apology to the people of Uzbekistan. If he is truly a friend, he should assist Uzbekistan’s Prosecutor General’s Office in locating and extraditing Bislan Rasayev and Shamil Temirkhanov,” Tojiyev stated. Kadyrov’s remarks and the allegations surrounding the assassination attempt have brought tensions between Uzbekistan and Chechnya into the spotlight. While Uzbekistan values its friendly relations with Russia and its regions, the controversy has prompted calls for firm action to protect the country’s sovereignty and ensure accountability.