• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10562 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10562 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10562 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10562 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10562 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10562 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10562 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10562 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 83

Trump–Putin Talks in Alaska: What Could They Mean for Central Asia?

As U.S. President Donald Trump prepares to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, located just outside of Anchorage, Alaska, hopes and anxieties are reverberating across Central Asia. Trump has signaled that securing a ceasefire in Ukraine is his top priority, warning of “very severe consequences” for Moscow if Putin refuses to halt the war. For the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia, these peace talks carry high stakes. Any truce or breakdown could ripple into their economies and strategic calculus. The war has already fundamentally changed Central Asia’s strategic positioning, accelerating diversification away from Russian dependence. With Trump and Putin poised to negotiate, Central Asian leaders are mindful that all possible outcomes - a ceasefire, a prolonged conflict, or a major power realignment - could each reshape the region’s economic fortunes and foreign policy choices. Central Asian Stances on the Ukraine War All five Central Asian governments have officially maintained neutrality on the Ukraine conflict. On the first UN General Assembly resolution of March 2, 2022, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan abstained, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan did not vote. On subsequent resolutions, Uzbekistan abstained alongside Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; Turkmenistan continued not to vote. None has recognized Russia’s claims to Ukrainian territory. Seated beside Putin at a plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2022, referring to them as “quasi-state territories,” President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan refused to recognize the independence of the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics. “Modern international law is the United Nations Charter,” Tokayev stated. Despite maintaining ties with Russia, Kazakhstan has boosted its engagement with China, Turkey, and Europe during the conflict. Whilst publicly affirming that it will comply with Western sanctions on Russia, Kazakhstan has stated that it will continue to prioritize its economic interests, vowing not to “blindly follow” such measures when they harm its domestic industries. “Kazakhstan will continue to comply with the sanctions but will pursue a balanced policy to minimize the impact on its own economy,” Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin said in August 2024. Uzbekistan has adopted a similar “balanced and neutral” approach to the war in Ukraine. In March 2022, then-Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov stated that Uzbekistan “recognizes the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and does not recognize the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics.” Despite Kamilov leaving his position shortly after making this statement, the nation’s position appears largely unchanged. Calling for an immediate end to “hostilities and violence,” Tashkent has expanded links with Turkey, China, and the EU. According to a U.S. State Department report from 2024, “Uzbekistan formally committed to adhering to U.S. and EU sanctions and trade restrictions on Russia.” Kyrgyzstan has continued to maintain a close economic relationship with Moscow while abstaining from all key United Nations resolutions concerning the Ukraine war. President Sadyr Japarov has said the country “adheres to a neutral position” and that exports to Russia are civilian in nature. In January 2025, Kyrgyzstan’s Keremet Bank was designated by the U.S....

Central Asia Charts New Course as Russian Aviation Falters

Sanctions against Russia may intensify if U.S. President Donald Trump escalates pressure on the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin. But even without additional measures, several sectors of Russia’s economy are already buckling under strain. Among the most vulnerable is civil aviation, now grappling with “fleet cannibalization”, a practice born of scarcity and isolation. In this context, alarmist claims from Russian aviation analysts that Central Asian airlines might soon replace Russian carriers not only on international routes but potentially within Russia itself are being reassessed. So, what is actually happening and why? Squeezing Russia Out One of the most overlooked aviation developments of 2024 was the announcement at the Central Asian Aviation Summit in Astana that regional countries were forming their own civil aviation regulatory body. As Amir Akhmetov, senior advisor to the director of the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan, put it: “In the changing geopolitical environment of the republics of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, together with like-minded countries, they are creating their own regional civil aviation organization, the Eurasian Civil Aviation Conference (EACAC).” This initiative, first proposed by Astana in 2023, includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Mongolia. Although initially scheduled for 2025, the first EACAC meeting took place in Almaty in November 2024. Russian observers have taken note. The publication Versiya, which had predicted Russia’s marginalization in the Central Asian aviation market as early as 2016, commented on the development in stark terms: “It is hard not to notice that this is truly a momentous event in the field of civil aviation regulation within the EAEU member states, aimed precisely at pushing Russia out of the process… which, after the formation of the announced structure, will de facto exist and be managed under direct Anglo-American influence.” However alarmist the tone, the underlying concern is not unfounded. Russia’s aviation sector is increasingly isolated and dependent. By December 2024, it was confirmed that a new aircraft maintenance hub would be built in Aktau, one of Kazakhstan’s four major aviation centers. The project, spearheaded by Turkish Technic, YDA, and ASFAT, will serve civil and military aircraft from Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. According to then-Minister of Transport Marat Karabayev, “The center will serve 411 civil aircraft... As a result of the project, the airport’s cargo handling capacity will increase to 200,000 tons per year, with an annual turnover of 520 billion tenge ($996.7 million).” Aviation in Central Asia: A Regional Snapshot In Kazakhstan, liberalization and competition have allowed the civil aviation sector to flourish. National carrier Air Astana operates hubs in Almaty and Astana and is widely considered among the best airlines in the post-Soviet space. Its low-cost subsidiary, FlyArystan, has grown rapidly, fueled by a strong Airbus fleet, now over 60 aircraft, with new A320 and A321 deliveries annually. Private airline SCAT flies across the former USSR and Asia, while Qazaq Air, now rebranded as Vietjet Qazaqstan, entered into a strategic partnership in 2025 with Vietnam’s Sovico Group, owner...

Iraq Seeks Alternative Gas Import Routes Through Turkmenistan Amid Sanctions Challenge

Iraq is intensifying efforts to implement a long-discussed agreement on natural gas imports from Turkmenistan, seeking to stabilize its energy sector and diversify supply sources. According to Ahmed Musa, spokesperson for Iraq’s Ministry of Energy, the plan involves importing around 20 million cubic meters of gas per day through pipelines connecting Turkmenistan and Iran. The route is intended to offset a shortfall caused by reduced gas flows from Iran, which currently supplies approximately one-third of Iraq’s energy needs. However, the implementation of this deal has faced significant hurdles. Chief among them is the issue of payments: the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI) has been unable to issue a letter of credit due to U.S. sanctions on Iran, through whose territory the gas must transit. In an effort to resolve the deadlock, Iraqi Energy Minister Ziad Ali Fadel visited Turkmenistan to explore potential mechanisms to bypass the sanctions and operationalize the agreement. The foundations of this partnership were laid in 2023, when Iraq and Turkmenistan signed a memorandum of understanding, agreeing to continue negotiations on the logistics of fuel transit via Iran. Progress followed in November 2023, when both sides signed a protocol outlining the key commercial terms. Under the deal, Iraq is set to receive 45 billion cubic meters of gas over five years, equivalent to 9 billion cubic meters annually. The arrangement is structured as a swap: Turkmenistan will deliver gas to Iran, which in turn will transfer an equivalent volume to Iraq. Further advancing bilateral ties, Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov discussed gas supplies and the potential opening of an Iraqi embassy in Ashgabat with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani in March 2025. The talks underscored the growing strategic importance of energy cooperation between the two nations. A Strategic Energy Lifeline Iraq's reliance on natural gas to power its electricity grid makes securing reliable fuel sources a national priority. Given the country’s frequent power shortages and its current dependence on Iranian gas, diversifying suppliers is seen as crucial for both energy security and political autonomy. Turkmen gas is viewed as a strategically vital resource that could help stabilize Iraq’s energy sector and reduce vulnerability to geopolitical disruptions. The five-year agreement with Ashgabat aims to establish predictable, long-term supplies. Nevertheless, full-scale gas deliveries have yet to begin. The main obstacle remains the inability to process payments due to U.S. sanctions on Iran. Baghdad must either secure exemptions or devise alternative payment mechanisms to activate the contract. Simultaneously, technical discussions continue among Iraq, Iran, and Turkmenistan on ensuring reliable transport and infrastructure under the swap scheme. If these issues are resolved, Iraq could gain a dependable new energy partner, while Turkmenistan would expand its reach into a key southern market, strengthening both nations' strategic positions.

Kyrgyzstan Offers International Audits of State Firms Amid Russia Sanctions Scrutiny

Kyrgyzstan has expressed its readiness to subject state-owned enterprises to international audits amid rising Western scrutiny over potential sanctions circumvention. The statement was made during a meeting in London between First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Daniyar Amangeldiev and David Reed, Director of Sanctions at the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office. The two officials discussed Kyrgyzstan’s compliance with international sanctions regimes and the need to prevent any circumvention of restrictions, particularly those related to Russia. Reed raised concerns about the activities of certain Kyrgyz companies engaged in foreign trade, specifically naming Capital Bank and Trading Company, both state-owned enterprises. Capital Bank was created to oversee financial transactions involving Russia and has been designated, as of May 1, as a clearing institution for settlements in Russian rubles. The Trading Company is tasked with monitoring transit trade flows. Amangeldiev emphasized that the establishment of these entities was aimed at enhancing transparency and regulatory oversight, not sanctions evasion. He assured the UK side that Kyrgyzstan is fully open to inspections by international auditing firms and reaffirmed that these companies are operating within legal frameworks. Kyrgyzstan’s foreign trade, especially its re-export of goods, has faced growing scrutiny from Western governments amid broader concerns over the enforcement and impact of sanctions on Russia. The Kyrgyz government has consistently denied any role in facilitating sanctions evasion.

EU’s Kaja Kallas: Russia Must Not Use Central Asia to Bypass Sanctions

European Union sanctions against Russia are affecting Central Asian economies, but the EU remains determined to prevent the region from being used to circumvent those measures. This was emphasized by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas during the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting held in Turkmenistan's capital, Ashgabat. “The EU has introduced 16 sanctions packages to weaken Russia’s military machine, and we are working on the 17th,” Kallas stated. “I understand these sanctions impact your economy, but we all want this war to end. Russian companies must not use Central Asia to bypass these restrictions.” The ministerial meeting on March 27 brought together the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Discussions centered on preparations for the upcoming EU-Central Asia Summit, scheduled for April 2025 in Samarkand. Strengthening U.S.-Uzbekistan Ties In a parallel development, U.S.-Uzbekistan relations are showing signs of deeper engagement. On March 26, Ambassador Furkat Sidikov hosted a Congressional Breakfast with U.S. Representative Trent Kelly, focused on trade and investment opportunities. Congressman Kelly praised Uzbekistan’s ongoing reforms and expressed support for lifting the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, a Cold War-era restriction on trade. A Shift in U.S. Strategy Toward Kazakhstan Meanwhile, experts are calling for a more nuanced U.S. approach to Kazakhstan. Dr. Robert M. Cutler, Times of Central Asia correspondent, noted that Kazakhstan’s close ties with Russia and China stem from geopolitical necessity rather than ideological alignment. He urged Washington to maintain consistent engagement with Kazakhstan and prioritize economic and strategic cooperation over political pressure.

EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting Highlights Enhanced Cooperation and Strategic Priorities

The 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting took place on March 27 in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, reaffirming the parties’ strong political will to deepen engagement and strengthen cooperation in strategically significant areas. The meeting brought together the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, along with the foreign ministers of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the deputy foreign ministers of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. A key item on the agenda was preparation for the inaugural EU-Central Asia Summit, scheduled for April 4, 2025, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Advancing Strategic Cooperation Kallas and Central Asian ministers discussed a broad spectrum of mutual priorities under the EU’s Global Gateway Flagship Initiatives, including trade, transport, energy, water resource management, climate change, digitalization, and critical raw materials. Both sides also highlighted advancing cooperation in education, vocational training, research, and skills development to foster deeper people-to-people ties. In a joint communiqué adopted at the meeting, the EU and Central Asian states reaffirmed their shared commitment to further strengthening their comprehensive partnership, grounded in mutual interests and values. The discussions were guided by the “Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia,” previously adopted in Luxembourg in October 2023. Focus on Connectivity and the Trans-Caspian Corridor Connectivity emerged as a central theme, with the participants stressing the need to expand sustainable connections between Central Asia and Europe. The EU’s Global Gateway Strategy was highlighted as a key vehicle for supporting regional infrastructure in trade, transport, water, and energy. The participants recalled the success of the Global Gateway Investors Forum on EU-Central Asia Transport Connectivity, held in Brussels in January 2024. They welcomed commitments by European and international financial institutions to invest €10 billion in the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC), aimed at significantly enhancing East-West transport links. Critical Raw Materials and Local Value Chains Another focal point was the growing strategic importance of critical raw materials (CRMs). Ministers reviewed progress following the signing of a Strategic Partnership Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the CRM sector. The meeting acknowledged EU support for strengthening local value chains in Central Asia. Discussions stressed alignment with international labor and environmental standards and the development of sustainable investment projects across the region. Sanctions Compliance The EU also briefed participants on its restrictive measures in the current geopolitical environment, underlining the need to prevent sanctions circumvention. Central Asian countries expressed readiness to continue cooperating with the EU to prevent re-exports of sensitive items, particularly those classified as “high priority.” Strategic Outlook The meeting reaffirmed the EU’s 2019 Strategy on Central Asia, which recognizes the region’s increasing strategic relevance to Europe. The Ashgabat gathering further solidified this recognition, highlighting Central Asia’s growing role in regional connectivity, resource security, and global diplomacy.