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Middle Corridor

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Are Reinforcing the Middle Corridor’s South Caucasus Link

On April 7 Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev visited Tbilisi to hold talks with Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Bochorishvili and sign a 2026–2027 foreign-ministry cooperation program. He called Georgia “a key link” in the Europe–Asia transport architecture and said the common task was to raise corridor capacity, improve service predictability, and ensure tariff transparency. The materialization of the bilateral cooperation is already evident from last June’s opening of the Poti multimodal terminal by a joint Kazakhstani-Georgian company. The real meaning of Kosherbayev's discussions in Tbilisi lies in their context. On April 2 in Baku, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov said Kazakhstan plans an intergovernmental agreement with Azerbaijan this year to strengthen the status of the Middle Corridor (also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor, TITR), and he proposed moving quickly on the Digital Monitoring Center under the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). On April 6 in Tbilisi, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev called the Azerbaijan–Georgia segment the corridor’s “main transport artery.” Then on April 8 in Baku, Aliyev received Kosherbayev together with Kazakhstan’s transport minister. The official readout ranged from the Middle Corridor to joint investment, green-energy, and fiber-optic projects. Kosherbayev’s April 7 stop in Tbilisi thus belongs to a short Kazakhstan-led diplomatic run across the corridor’s western nodes. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Tighten the Corridor Kazakhstan’s early-April engagement in the South Caucasus rests on its eastward-looking framework with China. Two China–Kazakhstan documents were already in evidence in October 2023: a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on deepening the development of the China-Europe Railway Trans-Caspian route, and an intergovernmental agreement on developing that route. China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) subsequently clarified that the agreement focused on stronger transit organization, fewer administrative barriers, and improved logistics and transport operations. In July 2024, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping jointly attended the opening of the Trans-Caspian direct fast transport service; NDRC then recorded a work mechanism with Kazakhstan’s transport ministry to carry that cooperation forward. On January 1, the first Trans-Caspian train of 2026 departed Xi’an for Baku carrying 45 containers of photovoltaic equipment. Chinese reports assert that the route had accumulated 466 runs by the end of November 2025, moved onto a weekly six-outbound and three-inbound timetable, and cut travel times from the roughly 20-day average recorded in 2025 to a standard 15 days, with the fastest runs taking 11 days. On April 3, it was also reported that there were 85 Xi’an Trans-Caspian trains in the first quarter of 2026, up 150% year-on-year, while the Kazakhstan–Xi’an terminal in Almaty handled more than 6,000 containers in that quarter alone, a 60% increase from a year earlier. A separate quasi-official Chinese trade-services portal reported that Trans-Caspian trains had reached daily service and that 371 such trains had run in January–October 2025, up 33%. China’s NDRC also said in late 2025 that Aktau and Baku should be strengthened as hub nodes in this corridor system. Azerbaijan is the indispensable partner without which the route’s western logic does not function. Bektenov’s...

Iran

OTS Faces Security Test from Turkey to Central Asia

Iran's widening war has now reached the institutional space linking Turkey, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Turkey said on March 4 that NATO air defenses destroyed an Iranian ballistic missile entering Turkish airspace, while Azerbaijan said the next day that four Iranian drones crossed into Nakhchivan, injuring four people, and damaging civilian infrastructure at the exclave’s airport. Iran denied targeting Nakhchivan; in the Turkish case, the missile’s intended target has not been fully clear in public reporting. Even so, the combined effect was unmistakable. By March 7, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) had become more than a bystander to a Middle Eastern war that had earlier seemed outside its main agenda. This is what gave the OTS foreign ministers’ meeting in Istanbul its significance. The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced on March 6 that the informal meeting of the OTS Council of Foreign Ministers would be held in Istanbul on March 7, with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosting. After the meeting, the ministers adopted a joint statement declaring that threats to the security of any OTS member are a matter of concern for the whole organization. That language does not make the OTS a military alliance. It does, however, show the organization moving more openly into collective political-security signaling when member states come under attack. Why Nakhchivan Matters Nakhchivan is central to the logic of this story. The exclave is an integral part of Azerbaijan, but is separated from the rest of the country. It borders Armenia, Iran, and Turkey, making it significant out of proportion to its size. A military strike there is not a routine border incident. It reaches one of the most sensitive nodes in the wider Turkic political space: it is a meeting point for Azerbaijani sovereignty, Turkish strategic concern, and Iranian proximity. Until recently, Nakhchivan’s special status and borders were anchored in the 1921 Moscow and Kars treaties, which gave Turkey and Soviet Russia a formal say over the exclave’s autonomy and, it could be argued, its external security. But last year, Baku folded Nakhchivan more tightly into Azerbaijan’s domestic legal order by removing those references (along with other changes) from the constitution of the exclave, which has suddenly become a target in a much wider regional confrontation. Baku’s response to the Iranian attack showed that it saw the incident in political as well as tactical terms. President Ilham Aliyev said Azerbaijan would prepare retaliatory measures. Reuters later reported that Azerbaijan had ordered the evacuation of its diplomats from Iran, citing safety concerns. This is understandable, particularly in light of the January 27, 2023, incident when an armed attacker entered Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran and opened fire, killing the head of the embassy’s security and wounding two other staff. Baku called this a terrorist attack, evacuated most of its diplomatic personnel, and suspended embassy operations. Azerbaijani officials also said the March 5 attack on Nakhchivan violated international law, rejecting any implication that it could have been a technical mishap. The stakes widened further after...

Central Asia and Azerbaijan on Board as the Gaza Peace Effort Gets Underway

As the Trump Administration is trying to drag the world toward the reconstruction of Gaza, an undertaking fraught with security, political, and economic challenges, a gap is emerging between the “old” Europe, skeptical of Trump, and nation-states seeking to expand cooperation with Washington. Central Asian and Caucasian "middle powers" are among the emerging allies in the Trump Administration's latest diplomatic gambit for peace. Kazakhstan took a leadership position as the first Muslim-majority state outside the Middle East to join the Abraham Accords in November 2025. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, an experienced diplomat, former Foreign Minister, and high-level U.N. official, represented his country at the Board of Peace inauguration during the January 2026 session of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. So did Ilham Aliev, President of Azerbaijan, and his First Lady and First Vice President, Mehriban, both of whom met with Trump in Davos. The attendance and participation of leaders of other majority-Muslim states outside the Middle East are also noteworthy. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan, Prabowo Subianto of Indonesia, Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu of Kosovo, and Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif of Pakistan signed the Charter on behalf of their respective nations. Those who chose not to participate are equally noteworthy. France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Portugal, Canada, and Australia, which publicly announced or reaffirmed recognition of a State of Palestine around the U.N. General Assembly in September 2025, each determined not to attend the signing ceremony at Davos, despite the fact that the establishment of the Board was officially welcomed by the UN Security Council in November 2025. This underscores the challenges that will arise as Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict enters its second phase, which foresees Hamas’ disarmament. Similarly, differences in policy toward Israel among the Muslim-majority countries that signed the Charter speak to the complexity of the Board’s task. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan have longstanding diplomatic and trade relations with Israel. This contrasts with the complex and often hostile stances of Qatar, long ruled by the Al Thani family, and Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, both of which support the Muslim Brotherhood and shelter Hamas terrorists. Then there are countries like Indonesia and Pakistan, which have never had diplomatic relations with Israel. Indonesia, under Subianto, continues to condition recognition of Israel on the creation of a Palestinian state. Pakistan has been officially hostile since its founding, and is particularly fearful of Jerusalem’s increasingly close relations with India, though it does have a history of covert information sharing and unofficial cooperation. Once again, navigating the political agendas and moving the reconstruction project forward will require a multi-dimensional chess game. Nevertheless, the Trump White House is working on the Board of Peace's first meeting, set for February 19th. Currently, there is no official word about whether the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will attend, while other leaders plan to, such as President Aliyev, who just signed a Strategic Partnership Charter during a visit by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance to Azerbaijan, and PM Nikol Pashinyan of...

How Could the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Accord Benefit Central Asia?

On August 8, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a peace accord in Washington and committed to the construction of the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity, a trade route that bisects Armenia, connecting the two parts of Azerbaijan. The deal may have far-reaching repercussions on the other side of the Caspian, potentially diversifying the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor by allowing travel from Azerbaijan, through Armenia, and onwards to Turkey. The upbeat mood music may be premature, however. There remain numerous political hurdles to be jumped before any construction can commence, and the entry of the United States into a region where Russia, Iran, and Turkey all have interests could have unintended consequences. “It’s certainly an opportunity, but there are risks,” said Azerbaijani political analyst and non-resident fellow at the China-Global South Project, Yunis Sharifli. “The United States can be a stabilizing force, but it could go in the opposite direction. It can also create a spoiler.” The Problem Armenia and Azerbaijan have maintained ice-cold relations for almost their entire existence as independent states. For over three decades, they tussled over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, a land which lies in the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan, but was, upon independence, populated mainly by Armenians. As well as costing thousands of lives and leading to hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, the enmity has also led to shuttered frontiers, which have choked trade across the South Caucasus. Armenia’s borders with both Azerbaijan and Turkey have been closed since 1993. While Armenia has been cut off from two of its four neighbors, Azerbaijan has also been severed in two, with the exclave of Nakhchivan, which borders Turkey, separated from the rest of the country by a sliver of Armenian territory, just 20 miles wide at its narrowest point. Conflicts in 2016, 2020, and 2023 saw Azerbaijan push Armenian troops from the region, with hundreds of thousands of Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh in fear of Azerbaijani reprisals. Since then, Baku has used its vast military superiority and geopolitical advantage to try to strongarm Armenia into accepting the construction of a corridor across its territory, threatening to use force on numerous occasions if Yerevan did not agree to its demands. The Solution Starting early this year, the United States began facilitating secretive negotiations between the pair, stepping into the vacuum left by Russia. The Kremlin has been sidelined from the process amid its deteriorating relations with both sides – many Armenians view Moscow as having betrayed them in the conflicts of 2020 and 2023, while Azeri-Russian relations have frayed significantly since the shooting down of Azerbaijan Airways Flight 8243 to Grozny earlier this year. The timing of the signing ceremony, on the anniversary of the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, was perhaps designed to reflect this shift in geopolitical alignment in the South Caucasus. Baku and Yerevan have signed up to a project which will see the construction of the corridor run by a U.S. private company, but under the laws of the Republic of Armenia. The...

Armenia’s PM to Visit Kazakhstan Amid Historic Peace Breakthrough and Economic Opportunities

Astana is preparing to host Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on an official visit scheduled for late 2025. On August 12, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had a call with Pashinyan, during which, according to an official statement, he praised the "outstanding qualities" of the Armenian Prime Minister, "as a politician with strong political will and a strategic vision of the national interests of his state." The forthcoming trip follows what U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described as "the beginning of a peace deal" between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which was signed in Washington, D.C. on August 8, 2025, marking a pivotal moment in the South Caucasus after decades of conflict. At the White House, Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a framework pledging to respect each other’s territorial integrity, renounce the use of force, and dissolve the long-standing OSCE Minsk Group mediation format. The agreement also approved the creation of a major transit corridor — dubbed the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) — linking Azerbaijan’s mainland to its exclave of Nakhchivan via Armenian territory. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev welcomed the accord as a “historic achievement” that not only ends a decades-long military standoff but also creates space for a deeper regional economic and diplomatic reset. In recent talks, Pashinyan briefed Tokayev on the details of the framework, the decision to dissolve the Minsk Group, and the TRIPP initiative. Both leaders emphasized the potential for new investment opportunities emerging from the stability the deal promises to bring and agreed to maintain an active political dialogue. For Kazakhstan, the visit reinforces its positioning as a neutral mediator between Eurasian powers, willing to offer diplomatic platforms for peace talks. In May 2024, Astana hosted ministerial-level Armenia–Azerbaijan negotiations in Almaty. With the TRIPP corridor set to enhance connectivity across the South Caucasus, Kazakhstan’s role in facilitating regional integration could expand beyond mediation into infrastructure, trade, and energy cooperation. Economically, the corridor offers Armenia new opportunities to become a transit hub between Central Asia and Europe, while Kazakhstan could benefit from more direct westward routes for its exports. Previous bilateral meetings have already laid the groundwork for business forums and joint initiatives in transport, technology, and investment, and the visit could provide the political momentum needed to bring these plans to fruition. Challenges remain, however. In Armenia, nationalist factions have criticized the peace deal, with border demarcation and the fallout from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War remaining sensitive issues. Iran has also expressed opposition to the TRIPP corridor, citing concerns over shifting regional influence. Yet both Yerevan and Astana appear determined to use the current diplomatic window to solidify long-term cooperation. As the South Caucasus recalibrates, Pashinyan’s upcoming visit to Astana will test whether the political optimism generated in Washington can translate into tangible projects. For Kazakhstan, this presents an opportunity to deepen bilateral ties, demonstrate its growing influence as a stabilizing force, and secure a stake in the region’s new economic and geopolitical landscape.

Armenia

Kazakhstan Works with Armenia and Azerbaijan for South Caucasus Peace

By Robert M. Cutler On May 10–11, Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev hosted peace talks between the Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers. These constructive negotiations were strictly bilateral, with Kazakhstan absent from the room and only providing the venue for the meeting. The event illustrates the dedication by Tokayev and his foreign policy to regional stability and mediation. Kazakhstan has done this sort of thing in the past; it hosted Russia–Turkey–Iran talks over Syria until last year. It was also mentioned as a place for bilateral Russia–Ukraine negotiations, although that idea never materialized. Armenia's Future is in the South Caucasus and Asia Tokayev had offered to provide the venue during his first official visit to Armenia, which took place on April 15 this year. His trip to Armenia may in retrospect be seen as a turning point. Former President Nursultan Nazarbayev had been forced to cancel a visit in 2016, following protests in Yerevan against Astana's support of Baku in the Karabakh conflict. Armenia’s participation in the new peace efforts, now under way for a couple of years, marks a significant shift after decades of rejecting such cooperation. It offers the prospect of renewed regional relations. Under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia has lately been trying to shift its foreign policy, reaching out to Western countries such as France and the U.S. in order to decrease its long-standing dependence on (some would say, vassalage to) Russia. But Armenia is a state in the South Caucasus, not in Europe or America. For this reason, the state’s objective interests (as opposed to those of the far-flung diaspora) are geopolitically compatible with those of Azerbaijan and Turkey, and also of Kazakhstan more distantly. Astana’s ties with Baku and Ankara, and Azerbaijan’s strengthening of its own ties with Central Asia, reflect strategic manoeuvring in the region. These partnerships enhance Kazakhstan's and Turkey's roles in promoting stability and development in the South Caucasus. They consequently offer Armenia a new path to prosperity. Peace with Azerbaijan would lead to the lifting of the Turkish embargo on Armenia and open the possibility of Armenia's integration into the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR, "Middle Corridor"). Such an opening would further widen Armenia's diplomatic vistas and decrease its dependence on Russia. Turning to Europe and the U.S. can offer some advantages, but Armenia must be cautious of the influence of a bellicosely irredentist Armenian diaspora, whose interests are not first and foremost the well-being of Armenians living in Armenia. Prioritizing regional integration and cooperation with its South Caucasus neighbours and other TITR participants will enable Armenia proper to build a more stable and prosperous future. Infrastructure and Connectivity Initiatives With the assistance of the international financial institutions, the European Union and Central Asia are developing the TITR as a critical trade corridor that will also contribute significantly to the prosperity and stability of the countries lying along its route. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have long been key players in the promotion and realization of this plan. The Middle Corridor,...