Transport and Logistics - The Times Of Central Asia

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Food Security

Iran Conflict Drives Food Price Pressures Across Central Asia

The war around Iran is beginning to push up food price risks in Central Asia as disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz raise fertilizer and fuel costs, while Tehran’s halt to some food exports adds pressure in regional markets. The impact is not manifesting as shortages, but as rising costs across the systems that produce, move, and sell food. The United Nations has warned that the crisis is disrupting one of the world’s most important trade corridors for energy and agricultural supplies. A large share of global fertilizer trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and reduced shipping traffic is tightening supply and pushing up prices. Higher fuel costs are adding a second layer of pressure on farmers and transport networks. Fertilizer and fuel are among agriculture’s highest costs. Even modest increases can compress margins quickly, forcing farmers to cut usage or pass costs on, with pressure moving through to retail prices. Central Asia is particularly exposed to this shift in costs. The region relies on imported fuel and fertilizers, and depends on long, multi-stage transport routes. When costs increase at any point in that chain, they accumulate before goods reach markets. The second layer of pressure comes from Iran itself. On March 3, Tehran imposed a ban on exports of food products as part of wartime economic measures. Reporting in Tajikistan indicates that the move could affect the availability and pricing of goods such as dairy, sugar, fruit, and spices, particularly in wholesale and lower-cost retail markets. Iran is not a dominant supplier, but plays a role in specific markets. Tajikistan is the clearest example. Tajikistan has also expanded its economic relationship with Iran in recent years, supported by cooperation in industry and transport. Iranian goods are widely present in retail supply chains, and trade between the two countries has grown steadily in recent years. That growth is part of a broader trend. Iran’s economic ties with Central Asia have expanded under new trade arrangements and bilateral initiatives. Kazakhstan and Iran have discussed increasing trade turnover to $3 billion, reflecting the rising use of Caspian routes and port infrastructure, which are now under threat. [caption id="attachment_46480" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Aralsk Bazaar. Rising transport and fertilizer costs are beginning to push up food prices across the region. Image: Michael J. Bland[/caption] Transport adds a third layer of pressure. As risks rise across the Middle East, airlines and freight operators are avoiding large swathes of Iranian airspace and surrounding routes, forcing rerouting and raising costs across supply chains. European aviation safety authorities have issued conflict-zone bulletins warning of heightened risks in the region, and carriers have adjusted accordingly. Rerouting increases fuel use, extends journey times, and raises insurance costs. Those increases affect cargo as well as passengers, and over time, higher logistics costs feed into the price of imported goods, including food. On land, the same pattern is visible. As southern routes become less predictable, more freight is shifting toward the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route - the Middle Corridor -...

Fuel prices

Central Asia Avoids Fuel Shock as Global Pressures Build

Central Asia has so far avoided the immediate fuel shocks spreading across much of the world following the U.S. and Israel’s war with Iran. There are no lines at gas stations, no visible shortages, and no signs of panic buying. But that stability sits within a rapidly tightening global market, where disruptions in Asia and policy responses in Europe are reshaping fuel flows in ways the region will struggle to avoid. Across Southeast Asia, governments are already taking precautionary steps. Some state agencies and private firms are shifting parts of their workforce to remote work to reduce fuel consumption and prepare for potential price spikes and logistics disruptions, while Thailand is preparing contingency measures, including possible fuel rationing. China, one of Asia’s largest suppliers of refined fuels, has moved to restrict exports of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel in an effort to prevent domestic shortages linked to the war. The move is expected to tighten supplies across Asia, especially for countries that rely on Chinese fuel imports. China supplied about one-third of Australia’s jet fuel last year, highlighting the wider regional impact, and roughly half of the Philippines’ and Bangladesh’s in 2024. Vietnam has already warned airlines to prepare for flight reductions in April due to the risk of shortages caused by these export restrictions. Indonesia is also imposing limits on fuel sales. Fuel-related pressures have begun to emerge in Europe as well. Poland has introduced tax measures aimed at reducing fuel prices, with the government saying this will lower prices for consumers. Slovenia, meanwhile, has introduced significant restrictions on fuel consumption. Under new rules, private motorists are limited to purchasing a maximum of 50 liters per day, while businesses and farmers may purchase up to 200 liters daily. The combined effect of war-driven energy shocks and renewed tariff barriers is raising global costs and adding pressure across trade, transport, and inflation. Against this backdrop, Central Asia’s apparent stability is misleading. It is highly unlikely that import-dependent states such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan will be as well protected as Kazakhstan, which may benefit in the short term from higher crude prices. Starting April 1, Russia is banning gasoline exports in an effort to stabilize its own domestic market. Russia is a key fuel supplier to Central Asia. However, according to assurances from the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, the temporary export ban will not affect supplies to Uzbekistan. Deliveries under intergovernmental agreements are expected to continue, ensuring that at least part of the region’s supply remains uninterrupted. In Kyrgyzstan, despite recent developments, fuel prices and supplies remain relatively stable. The government is considering lowering taxes or temporarily waiving excise duties for fuel importers should the crisis continue. Information from Turkmenistan is difficult to verify independently. Despite reports of fuel shortages at gas stations last year, official media are now indicating a significant increase in domestic gasoline production. The production plan for January-February 2026 was reportedly fulfilled at 122.7%, according to Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Guvancha...

Trade

Uzbekistan and Russia Focus on Trade and Transit at Termez Meeting

Uzbekistan and Russia used a conference in Termez on March 30–31 to highlight the breadth of their relationship, from trade and industrial projects to transport links and regional planning. The meeting was organized by Uzbekistan’s Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies and Russia’s Kremlin-linked policy forum, the Valdai Discussion Club. Participants included Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Uzbek Deputy Foreign Minister Bobur Usmanov, ISRS director Eldor Aripov, Russian Ambassador Alexei Yerkhov, and other Uzbek and Russian officials, analysts, and business representatives. The meeting comes at a time of shifting regional dynamics, as Central Asian states recalibrate ties with Russia while managing new economic and political pressures from multiple directions. Termez sits by the Friendship Bridge on Uzbekistan’s border with Afghanistan and has become one of Tashkent’s main platforms for trade, logistics, and diplomacy aimed southward. The conference program focused on transport, infrastructure, interregional ties, and industrial cooperation, so the location matters. This aligns Uzbekistan’s relationship with Russia with a wider push for new routes across Eurasia and toward South Asia. The economic backdrop is also substantial. Official Uzbek figures put bilateral trade with Russia at around $13 billion in 2025, making Russia Uzbekistan’s second-largest trading partner after China. Uzbek reporting says that trade has grown sharply since 2017, with Russian investment in Uzbekistan approaching $5 billion. Officials have described the relationship as moving beyond simple trade toward industrial cooperation, technological partnerships, and longer value chains. The conference emphasized the growing role of direct regional links. Uzbek officials highlighted more than 200 regional initiatives worth over $4 billion and identified Tatarstan as a key partner in industry, petrochemicals, engineering, information technology, and education. Projects linked to the Himgrad industrial park model and branches of Kazan Federal University in Uzbekistan show how cooperation now extends through regions, universities, and industrial zones, not just central governments. Energy remains a key part of the relationship. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, on March 24, Uzbekistan and Russia advanced work on Uzbekistan’s planned nuclear power project in the Jizzakh region. Uzbekistan’s nuclear agency, Uzatom, and Russia’s Rosatom signed new documents and began initial concrete works for a small-capacity unit, describing the step as moving the project into a new implementation phase. Transit formed another major part of the agenda. Uzbek reporting states that participants discussed modernizing northern routes and developing a southern route through Afghanistan toward ports on the Indian Ocean. This fits Uzbekistan’s longer effort to turn Termez into a logistics hub for Afghan and South Asian trade. The city hosts the Termez International Trade Center, designed to simplify border trade and business access. The timing also reflects wider regional pressures. TCA previously reported that the war involving Iran is placing a strain on southern routes and increasing the importance of alternative corridors. In that context, a Russia–Uzbekistan meeting focused on trade and transport in Termez underscores how both countries are linking bilateral cooperation to shifting regional logistics. The meeting in Termez did not produce a major treaty or a...

Civil Aviation

Central Asia’s Airspace Is Growing in Value as the Iran Conflict Reshapes Routes

The war involving Iran has made Central Asia’s skies more important, but it has not made them a replacement for the Gulf. The change is narrower and more practical. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the conflict has already reshaped Europe–Asia flight routes, with airlines forced to reroute around high-risk airspace. As EASA’s conflict-zone bulletin for Iran remains in force through March 31, and its broader Middle East and Persian Gulf bulletin advises operators to avoid a wide band of regional airspace, airlines flying between Europe and Asia now have fewer safe and efficient options than they did even a month ago. That matters for Central Asia because the region sits just north of the disrupted corridor. Iran’s airspace is considered high risk and is being widely avoided by airlines, while large parts of the central Middle East corridor are closed or heavily restricted. Safe Airspace’s March 21 summary states that the normal central route has been effectively shut for many operators, while Oman has become a heavily used southern bypass. That leaves a northern arc running through the Caucasus and Central Asia as one of the few workable alternatives for many carriers. The roots of this go back further than this month’s escalation. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many Western and Europe-bound operators have had to rethink routes that once crossed Russian airspace. In January 2025, Uzbekistan Airways began rerouting its Europe flights around Russia and Belarus. The airline said the Tashkent–Munich route grew from 4,849 kilometers to 5,156 kilometers, adding 30 to 40 minutes to each flight. The conflict has now squeezed traffic again, this time from the south. That double squeeze raises a harder question. Can Central Asia handle more strategic weight in the air, not just on a map but in daily operations? Kazakhstan is the strongest candidate. Kazaeronavigatsiya says Kazakhstan’s airspace handled 216,616 flights in the first half of 2025. Of those, 161,029 were flown by foreign airlines in transit or landing operations, while 55,587 were operated by Kazakh carriers. The same state operator lists 124 air traffic service routes with a combined length of 113,530 kilometers. These are substantial figures for a landlocked state positioning itself as a Eurasian transit hub. The country’s broader aviation system has also been expanding. The Civil Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan says airports served 31.8 million passengers in 2025, up from 29.7 million in 2024. Airlines carried 20.7 million passengers, and Kazakhstan’s compliance with international aviation safety standards reached 95.7%. The same report points to a three-year development plan, a new accident investigation center, and continued work on digital systems and urban air mobility rules. Still, higher value does not mean unlimited capacity. Central Asia is not one integrated aviation market. It is a set of separate national systems with uneven infrastructure, uneven investment, and different regulatory speeds. Kazakhstan has scale, but it is also expanding passenger traffic, cargo capacity, and international routes at the same time. More overflights can bring revenue, but...

Civil Aviation

Iran War Quietly Raises the Strategic Value of Central Asian Airspace

The war in Iran has disrupted one of the main aviation corridors linking Europe and Asia. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has issued safety bulletins warning of high risk to civilian aircraft in Iranian airspace and surrounding regions affected by military activity, missile launches, interceptions, and air defense operations. A separate EASA bulletin covering Iran, valid through March 31, describes a high risk to civil flights at all altitudes within the Tehran flight information region. The consequences reach far beyond the Middle East. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, most Western airlines have been unable to use Russian airspace. With Iranian airspace now considered unsafe for normal commercial transit, the map for long-haul traffic between Europe and Asia has become extremely tight. Reuters mapping of global flight paths shows airlines diverting north via the Caucasus or taking longer southern routes through the eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Peninsula. Many passengers traveling between Europe and Asia still transit through Gulf hubs. However, airports across the region, including Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Kuwait, and Bahrain, have faced disruption and unstable schedules during the conflict. Central Asia sits just beyond that northern bypass. It is not replacing the Gulf as a passenger hub, and is not suddenly becoming the main bridge between Europe and Asia, but the region’s airspace is increasingly strategically valuable as the number of efficient alternatives shrinks. The war has made Central Asia more important as part of a wider arc stretching from Turkey and the Caucasus across the Caspian basin and onward toward South and East Asia. [caption id="attachment_45218" align="aligncenter" width="1290"] Live flight-tracking map (image taken at 840am EST) showing aircraft routes avoiding Iranian airspace during the crisis. Many flights between Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia are being diverted north over the Caspian Sea and across Central Asia instead of flying over Iran; source: Planes Live[/caption] Kazakhstan is the clearest example. Local airlines had already begun to adjust before the current escalation reached its present level. In January, The Times of Central Asia reported that Air Astana had rerouted flights to Sharm el-Sheikh, Dubai, Doha, and Medina to avoid Iranian airspace. After the conflict widened, Air Astana canceled flights to several Middle Eastern destinations following the closure of Iranian airspace and rising regional tensions. Kazakhstan also imposed a temporary ban on flights over or near the airspace of Iran, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. Uzbekistan also moved quickly. As early as October 2024, Kun.uz reported that Uzbekistan Airways was avoiding Iraqi airspace and western Iranian airspace on safety grounds. After the latest escalation, on March 4, Uzbekistan suspended flights to six Middle Eastern countries. The pattern is clear: Central Asian carriers are not immune to the crisis; they are already adjusting networks, schedules, and commercial risk, with the broader economic consequences of the conflict emerging across regional supply chains. However, the region’s aviation systems clearly now carry far greater strategic and economic importance than they did only a few years ago. On its...

Middle Corridor

Freight Volumes on Middle Corridor Through Kazakhstan Rise Fivefold in Seven Years

Freight volumes transported along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) through Kazakhstan have increased more than fivefold over the past seven years, highlighting the growing importance of the corridor as companies seek alternatives to routes passing through Russia. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport, volumes have risen from 0.8 million tons to 4.5 million tons annually. Also known as the Middle Corridor, the TITR is a multimodal transport route linking China and Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The rapid growth of the route reflects wider shifts in Eurasian logistics since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. With many Western companies seeking alternatives to traditional northern routes through Russia, governments and logistics operators across Central Asia and the South Caucasus have accelerated investment in the Trans-Caspian corridor, hoping to position it as a key artery linking Asian manufacturing hubs with European markets. Container transportation has been one of the fastest-growing segments of the corridor. In 2025, approximately 77,000 TEUs were transported along the TITR. Authorities aim to increase this figure to 300,000 TEUs by 2029. Despite rapid growth, the corridor still carries far less cargo than traditional northern routes through Russia, underscoring both its potential and the scale of investment still required. The expansion reflects ongoing infrastructure development and growing cooperation among participating countries and logistics operators. Key contributing factors include improved conditions for international freight transport, such as simplified customs procedures, as well as significantly shorter delivery times, reduced from roughly 28-32 days to 13-17 days. Demand has also risen for integrated “single-window” logistics services designed to enhance transparency and reliability. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia continue to coordinate efforts under joint roadmaps to eliminate remaining bottlenecks along the corridor. To ensure year-round navigation and strengthen competitiveness, Kazakhstan is investing in infrastructure on the Caspian Sea coast. Dredging has already been completed at Kuryk Port, while similar work is planned at Aktau Port this year to increase depth and improve vessel access. Construction is also underway at Kuryk on the Sarzha multifunctional terminal, a project being implemented in cooperation with Abu Dhabi Ports Group from the United Arab Emirates. The terminal is expected to have an annual capacity of five million tons. Meanwhile, a container hub has been launched at Aktau Port, further enhancing maritime logistics capacity along the corridor. Kazakhstan has also expanded its transport infrastructure abroad. A Kazakh-operated terminal with a capacity of 120,000 TEUs has been launched at the Georgian port of Poti, improving cargo handling efficiency along the TITR. The European Union is also supporting the corridor’s development. A grant has been allocated for the reconstruction of Berths No. 3 and No. 12 at Aktau Port. The funding will be used to purchase wind-resistant ship-to-shore cranes to ensure stable operations during adverse weather conditions. On the railway side, Kazakhstan is upgrading more than 2,000 kilometres of rail infrastructure connected to the corridor. In 2025, construction and modernisation work were completed on 911 kilometres of railway lines. Key projects include the construction of second...