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Central Asia’s C6 Takes Shape in Washington as Ambassadors Push for Practical Integration

Less than two weeks after regional leaders gathered in Cholpon Ata, diplomats from the emerging C6 grouping used a discussion in Washington to shift the focus from declarations of unity to the mechanics of integration: customs, railways, digitalized trade, access to European markets, and stronger links across the Caspian. The sharpest political message came from Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to the United States, Edil Baisalov, who said that Central Asian states were increasingly recognizing that they were “enough for each other,” and that resolving differences within the region had become a pragmatic national interest. His comments gave unusually direct language to a trend that has accelerated since the region’s consultative meetings began in 2018. The August 12 event at the Caspian Policy Center brought together the U.S.-based ambassadors of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan, the sixth country in the emerging C6 framework, was not listed among the participants. The event followed a late-July meeting in Cholpon Ata, where leaders concentrated on transport, energy security, investment, and foreign-policy coordination. The C6 label remains shorthand rather than the name of a formal organization. Its political basis, however, has become more concrete since Azerbaijan was admitted as a full participant in the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in November 2025. The shift extended a format once focused on relations among the five Central Asian republics across the Caspian Sea. From Regional Dialogue to Regional Agency Azerbaijan’s ambassador, Khazar Ibrahim, presented Cholpon Ata as evidence that the six states increasingly see themselves as part of one political and economic space. “We are finally holistic. We are all together,” he said. He argued that Azerbaijan’s presence changes the geography of the grouping by turning the Caspian from a dividing line into a connecting space between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. That idea has been developing for some time. TCA has previously examined how Azerbaijan’s entry could turn the C6 framework into a platform for common rules on transport, tariffs, customs systems, and digital data, rather than another layer of summit diplomacy. Kazakhstan’s ambassador, Magzhan Ilyassov, put the emphasis on building an “economically active neighborhood.” He pointed to the frequency of regional meetings and said the value of the current process lies partly in maintaining an inclusive conversation among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has also pushed for stronger coordination on transport planning as the consultative format develops. For Uzbekistan, the discussion was more explicitly about market access. Ambassador Furqat Sidiqov said cooperation with Azerbaijan could give Uzbekistan wider access to European and other export markets. He also called for further digitalization of the Middle Corridor. Sidiqov said Uzbekistan had close to 300 joint ventures with Central Asian countries in 2017, and now has about 1,500 with neighboring states. Corridors Become the Practical Core Digitalizing the Trans-Caspian route is not a new proposal. The countries of the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia, which already brings together the five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, endorsed a digitalization...

Sadyr Japarov

Japarov Says Tashiyev Was His Planned Successor as Prosecutors Seek Nine-Year Terms

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov says he once planned to leave office in 2027 and support Kamchybek Tashiyev as his successor, before deciding that his longtime political partner was not ready for the presidency. The disclosure comes as prosecutors are asking an appeals court to impose nine-year prison terms on Tashiyev and seven other defendants in the “Letter of 75” case. Japarov set out the abandoned succession plan in an interview with journalist Ali Toktakunov released on August 13. He said he had expected to complete the six-year term he won in 2021, then leave politics if Tashiyev was ready to take over. “Kamchy would become president, and I would retire. I had such a plan,” Japarov said. The president said he had told Tashiyev about the plan roughly a year earlier and urged him to prepare for the presidency by imposing more discipline on the people around him. Japarov said he later concluded that Tashiyev was not ready. He cited the conduct of some of Tashiyev’s staff and associates, the appearance of the “Letter of 75,” and signs that parliament was being divided between supporters of the president and supporters of “the general,” a reference to Tashiyev. Japarov said he summoned Tashiyev and told him: “This won’t do. You cannot split people.” He said he informed Tashiyev that he would be removed from office, but claimed he was still prepared to allow him to contest the presidential election without obstruction. That account adds a succession dispute to the explanation Japarov gave when he dismissed Tashiyev on February 10 as chairman of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) and deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers. At the time, the presidency said the decision was needed to “prevent a split in society” and state institutions. Senior GKNB officials were removed soon afterward, the border service was taken out of the hands of the committee, and parliamentary speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu resigned. Japarov has now drawn a sharp distinction between his personal relationship with Tashiyev and their political future. In another part of the interview, he said the two had been friends since 2005, and their families had been close. “He will remain my friend, but I have no plans to appoint him to any position,” Japarov said. He credited Tashiyev with making a major contribution during his five years at the GKNB, but said he should rest and consider where he had made mistakes. Japarov also confirmed for the first time himself that he intends to seek another term. “I intend to run for another term and continue my work,” he said, according to Reuters. His spokesman had said in 2024 that Japarov planned to run again, but the president had not previously made a public declaration of his own. He said a second term was needed to complete reforms already under way. Japarov also promised that rivals would be free to challenge him. “The road is open. Whoever wants to run, let them run,” he said, adding that there...

Kamchybek Tashiyev

Kyrgyz Prosecutors Seek Nine-Year Prison Terms for Tashiyev and Seven Others

Kyrgyz prosecutors are asking an appeals court to send former security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev and seven other defendants to prison. A lower court convicted all eight in July of preparing to seize power by force, but allowed them to remain free on probation. The appeal is being heard by the Bishkek City Court, with the hearing taking place behind closed doors. Prosecutors are challenging the sentences handed down by the trial court. The “Letter of 75” case arose from an open letter signed on February 9 by 75 politicians, former officials, and public figures. The authors called for an early presidential election amid a dispute over when President Sadyr Japarov’s current term should end. Five of the signatories were among the eight people later charged with preparing to seize power by force. Before his dismissal, Tashiyev had been one of Kyrgyzstan’s most powerful officials and a central figure in Japarov’s government. Japarov appointed his longtime ally to lead the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) after coming to power in 2020, but dismissed him on February 10, 2026, saying the move was needed to “prevent a split in society” and state institutions. The dismissal ended a five-year governing partnership and was followed by personnel changes across the GKNB and other state bodies. Eight people eventually stood trial, including Tashiyev, former Prosecutor General Kurmankul Zulushev, and former parliamentary speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu. The trial court found all eight guilty and sentenced them to four years in prison with confiscation of property, but exempted them from serving the prison terms and placed them under supervised probation for three years. They were acquitted of the separate charge of abuse of office. The Times of Central Asia previously reported in detail on the verdict and the circumstances surrounding the case. Prosecutors had sought nine-year prison terms at the original trial. According to defense lawyers, they are now asking the appeals court to impose the same terms on all eight defendants. Some of the defendants have also appealed their convictions and are seeking acquittal. During the appeal, the defendants again raised one of the disputed issues in the case: why criminal proceedings targeted only some of the people involved when the open letter had 75 signatories. Five defendants who had signed the letter asked the court to give a legal assessment of the actions of the other 70 signatories. The appeals panel granted the request and agreed that the other signatories could be called for questioning, with the defense responsible for securing their attendance. If prosecutors prevail, the appeal would reverse the main practical outcome of the July trial: all eight defendants were convicted of preparing to seize power by force, but none was sent to prison.

Data Center Valley

Kazakhstan Sets June 2027 Launch for First Data Center Valley Facility

Kazakhstan expects to launch the first facility at Data Center Valley, a large data center campus in the country’s northeast, in the summer of 2027. The government says the first 50 MW object now under construction is due to enter service in June 2027, while the site is ultimately planned to expand to as much as 1 GW. Earlier plans put the first 125 MW center in the first half of 2027; the latest statement does not explain how the 50 MW object fits into that figure. The project is aimed not only at domestic demand: Kazakhstan wants to attract foreign technology companies and is also exploring the possibility of hosting data belonging to other countries. The first data center is already under construction in the Pavlodar region, one of Kazakhstan’s main energy-producing areas. The main buildings are scheduled to be completed by the end of 2026, with commissioning work to be finished in May and the launch planned for June 2027. A 215 MW substation has been acquired to supply the site with electricity. The choice of region is primarily linked to access to electricity. The Pavlodar region is home to Ekibastuz, one of Kazakhstan’s largest power-generation centers, with a vast coal basin and major power plants. For data centers, particularly GPU clusters used for artificial intelligence, access to large and stable power supplies is critical. The stated 1 GW capacity is a long-term target rather than capacity already under construction. The campus is expected to expand gradually as customers are secured. Plans call for data centers, GPU clusters for AI, and cloud services to be hosted at the site. Among the project’s foreign partners is U.S.-based Firebird AI, which works with NVIDIA technologies. In April 2026, representatives of the two companies held talks in Astana on the development of AI infrastructure, high-performance computing, and data centers. Firebird AI later reached agreements on cooperation within the Data Center Valley project. The Times of Central Asia previously reported on plans to create a large computing facility in Kazakhstan using NVIDIA technologies. Technology companies may not be the only potential clients. The government is also developing the concept of a Data Embassy, which could allow foreign governments to store data in Kazakhstan while retaining legal sovereignty over it. Such a model already exists. Estonia established its data embassy in Luxembourg, where servers remain under Estonian state control and are used to store critical data and help maintain government digital services in the event of cyberattacks or other major crises. The two countries signed an agreement on the data embassy in 2017. Kazakhstan’s Data Embassy concept is still being developed. It is being considered alongside Data Center Valley, but the government has not said that foreign states’ sovereign data would necessarily be stored at the Ekibastuz campus. Data Center Valley itself is intended to host computing capacity and cloud services for international clients. Foreign investor interest in Kazakhstan’s data center market is not limited to this project. Singapore-based GK Hyperscale Ltd plans...

Water Security

Kazakhstan Seeds Clouds as Kyrgyzstan Questions Regional Impact

A small aircraft climbed out of Turkestan airport on July 10 with hygroscopic salt flares fixed beneath its wings. Operated by the United Arab Emirates’ National Center of Meteorology, it was searching for a cloud suitable for seeding. Pilot Ahmed Aljaberi described the aircraft as “specifically equipped with a cloud-seeding flare system.” But no suitable cloud appeared during the mission. Cloud seeding can try to draw more rain from an existing cloud, but it cannot make one from clear air. Kazakhstan launched the project in Turkestan on May 16, targeting more than 911,000 hectares of arable land in the country’s leading cotton-belt. The government puts the potential economic benefit at up to 35 billion tenge, roughly $75 million a year. The partnership gives Kazakhstan access to decades of Emirati experience in weather modification. The UAE program dates to the late 1980s, and Emirati specialists are training Kazakh meteorologists, pilots, engineers, and other staff. Kazakhstan’s government describes the Turkestan operation as the first project of its scale in the region, though weather modification in Central Asia has a longer history. Kochkunbek Bakirov, a geographer at Kyrgyzstan’s National Academy of Sciences, has described Soviet-era research in the Karshi steppe, the Naryn basin, and over Issyk-Kul. Kazakhstan also trialed a different approach in Mangystau in 2021, using an ionization-based system promoted as a way to increase rainfall. Its developer claimed the equipment had begun to influence local moisture. The Mangystau system used ionization; the current program uses aircraft and hygroscopic salt flares. Before operations began, Kazhydromet analyzed data from 39 meteorological stations covering 2020 through 2024, selecting the Turkestan Region after studying atmospheric conditions and terrain. Flights only proceed when naturally formed cumulonimbus clouds with sufficient vertical development are present, with Kazhydromet monitoring satellite imagery, synoptic data, and cloud development before operations. The aircraft releases salt-based particles into suitable clouds. Kazakhstan’s Ecology Ministry lists sodium chloride, potassium chloride, and magnesium compounds among the reagents. In hygroscopic seeding, the particles encourage liquid droplets to collide and coalesce, which can improve precipitation efficiency in a suitable cloud. The cloud and its moisture must already exist. By July 13, crews had completed eleven operational flights, mainly over the Otyrar and Sozak districts. Officials were still analyzing the results of each operation; the number of flights does not show how much extra rain the project has produced. Kazakhstan’s launch materials cite a possible 10 to 20% increase in precipitation under favorable conditions. Results elsewhere vary widely. A 2024 review by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found estimates of 0 to 20% additional precipitation in the studies it examined. The GAO also found that effectiveness remains difficult to evaluate and that suitable clouds must be present. The evidence is much stronger for some cloud-seeding methods than for others. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) says the strongest recent causal evidence comes from wintertime glaciogenic seeding of orographic clouds, while Kazakhstan is using hygroscopic salts in convective clouds. Their large natural variability creates a weak signal-to-noise problem, making the added...

Internet Restrictions

Internet Restrictions in Central Asia: How the Five Countries Differ

There is no single Central Asian internet. Crossing a border can turn a freely accessible website into one that is blocked or reachable only through a virtual private network (VPN). The contrast is starkest in Turkmenistan, where years of censorship have created a black market for access to the open internet. Freedom House’s 2025 Freedom on the Net assessment covers three of the five Central Asian countries. Kyrgyzstan scored 47 out of 100 and retained its Partly Free status. Kazakhstan scored 37, while Uzbekistan scored 29; both were classified as Not Free. Turkmenistan has the most restrictive system in the region. The largest measurement study of its internet censorship to date tested 15.5 million domains and found that more than 122,000 were blocked. Researchers also identified filtering rules that inadvertently made more than 5.4 million additional domains inaccessible. Bypassing these restrictions has developed into a market of its own. In July 2025, VPN keys were being sold for around $50 a month, while access through a connection exempt from government filters cost up to $2,000. Turkmen officials were also alleged to have been involved in selling such access. Such claims are difficult to verify independently inside one of the world’s most closed countries. Even so, the market illustrates the effect of years of blocking: for some residents, a working VPN can provide access to large parts of the internet that would otherwise remain unavailable. The situation in Kazakhstan is different. The internet is far more accessible than in Turkmenistan, although the authorities also use technical controls. A study published by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) found evidence that at least 17 news websites and 73 sites for circumvention tools were blocked between June 1, 2023, and June 1, 2024. The affected sites included independent media and major VPN services. Researchers also found evidence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) man-in-the-middle attacks, in which a third party intercepts an encrypted connection between a user and a website. This can allow the third party to read or alter the data passing through the connection. Similar technology prompted an international dispute in 2019, when internet service providers in Kazakhstan instructed users to install a government-issued security certificate capable of intercepting encrypted web traffic. Major browser developers responded by blocking the certificate or preventing their software from trusting it. Kazakhstan does not, however, operate a closed network. OONI found that some circumvention tools remained accessible, unlike in Turkmenistan, where stable access to the open internet can itself be difficult. Kyrgyzstan’s online environment has traditionally been more open than those of its Central Asian neighbors, though restrictions have increased in recent years. Freedom House kept the country in the Partly Free category in 2025, lowering its score from 48 to 47. It cited the detention of journalists and activists, as well as pressure on online media. Government control has also extended to internet infrastructure. In July 2025, President Sadyr Japarov signed a decree giving state-owned operator ElCat a temporary monopoly on international internet traffic. The decree set the one-year trial...