Business & Economy - The Times Of Central Asia

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Direct Flights

Etihad Flights to Uzbekistan Begin Daily as Almaty Service Moves to 2027

Etihad Airways has launched daily service between Abu Dhabi and Tashkent, adding Uzbekistan to its operated network. A direct service to Almaty that had been scheduled for March 2026 is now expected in 2027. Etihad's inaugural outbound flight departed Abu Dhabi on August 9 and arrived in Tashkent early on August 10. The return flight left later that morning, and the route is operated with an Airbus A320. Etihad senior vice president Jurriaan Pieter Stelder told The Times of Central Asia that the airline had studied Uzbekistan's aviation market for several years before entering it. He said the growth of local airlines and established business demand led Etihad to begin with a higher frequency than it might use in other new markets. Etihad expects the route to perform in line with its network, which recorded an average passenger load factor of 89.7% in the first two months of 2026. Stelder said the carrier expects to fill at least 140 of roughly 160 seats on each leg. The route is supported by a codeshare agreement with Uzbekistan Airways that took effect in May. Etihad customers can buy a single ticket through Tashkent to eight domestic destinations, while Uzbekistan Airways passengers can connect to Abu Dhabi on the Etihad service. The partnership allows Etihad to test demand for Samarkand through Uzbekistan Airways. “We know there is particularly strong demand for Samarkand,” Stelder said. He added that Etihad could eventually operate another route in Uzbekistan if the market grows. Commercial ties between Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have grown rapidly, including through civil aviation cooperation. In January 2025, the two governments set targets to increase bilateral trade by a factor of ten by 2030 and raise the bilateral investment portfolio to $50 billion. Etihad Chief Digital Officer Frank Meyer said the relationship already supports business travel, while tourism demand needs further development. He added that Etihad would hire local staff for airport operations and sales, while local contractors would handle ground services. Etihad already reaches Kazakhstan through a codeshare with Air Astana. The agreement allows customers to book Air Astana-operated connections through Almaty and Astana. Etihad announced plans for its own Almaty route in July 2025, with eight weekly flights scheduled from March 16, 2026. The launch did not take place, but Stelder said the carrier had not abandoned the destination. “We expect to start flying to Kazakhstan, specifically Almaty, sometime in 2027,” he said. “For now, we decided it was better to start with Tashkent.”

Electricity Demand

Kyrgyzstan Electricity Imports to Rise Again in 2026

Kyrgyzstan will again have to import a significant share of its electricity in 2026. With consumption expected to reach 19.6 billion kWh, domestic power plants are projected to generate 15.5 billion kWh. The difference, around 4.1 billion kWh, will have to be covered by imports. For a country where most electricity is generated by hydropower plants along the Naryn River, many of them built during the Soviet period, the current deficit is the result of a long-running gap between rising demand and the construction of new large-scale generating capacity. The new estimates from the Energy Ministry were presented on August 10 during preparations for the heating season. A year earlier, Kyrgyzstan imported about 3.9 billion kWh, meaning that its dependence on external supplies is expected to increase slightly this year. The reasons go far beyond the current period of low water levels. Kyrgyzstan’s power system in its present form developed as part of the integrated Soviet Central Asian network. The republic controlled the upper reaches of the Naryn River, while reservoirs and hydropower plants built along it served two purposes: generating electricity and regulating water flows for agriculture downstream, primarily in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The first major plant on the Naryn was the Uch-Kurgan Hydropower Plant, commissioned in the early 1960s. Construction of the much larger Toktogul hydropower complex began in 1962. Toktogul was commissioned in January 1975. It was followed by the Kurpsai, Tash-Kumyr, and Shamaldy-Sai hydropower plants. This cascade became the backbone of Kyrgyzstan’s electricity sector. The Soviet system was not designed to make each republic self-sufficient in energy. Kyrgyzstan stored water during the colder months and released it for downstream irrigation in summer, generating electricity that fed into the regional grid. In return, it received fuel and power from elsewhere in the Soviet system during winter. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, that integrated system fragmented, while the power plants and reservoirs remained. Construction of new large facilities then almost stopped. Work on Kambarata-2 began in 1986 but was suspended after the collapse of the Soviet Union; its first generating unit was not commissioned until 2010. As a result, a substantial share of Kyrgyzstan’s present-day electricity generation still comes from plants built several decades ago. The hydropower plants themselves are gradually being modernised. Following rehabilitation, Toktogul’s capacity increased from the original 1,200 MW to 1,440 MW. But upgrading existing generating units does not solve the other problem: electricity consumption is growing faster than new sources of generation are being added. In 2025, the country consumed about 19.1 billion kWh, roughly 860 million kWh more than a year earlier. Imports totaled about 3.9 billion kWh from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. This year, imports are expected to increase to 4.1 billion kWh. The situation also depends on water availability. The Toktogul Reservoir allows part of the Naryn’s flow to be shifted between seasons, so its water level directly affects the generating capacity of the country’s largest hydropower plant. At the August 10 meeting, the authorities said the reservoir...

Growth Forecasts

Why Central Asia Growth Forecasts Differ So Sharply

How fast can Central Asia continue to grow? The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) give markedly different answers. The contrast is sharpest in Kyrgyzstan, where the EDB expects another year of double-digit growth, while the IMF sees a much more pronounced slowdown. Both institutions are looking at the same countries and have access to broadly the same set of macroeconomic data. Their forecasts, however, reflect different assessments of how much of Central Asia’s recent momentum can be sustained. The EDB expects strong investment to keep growth high, while the IMF is more cautious about how long the recent pace of expansion can continue. The EDB is itself a regional development institution. It was established by Russia and Kazakhstan in 2006, with Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan later becoming shareholders. Uzbekistan joined the bank in 2025. The EDB is headquartered in Almaty. The comparison covers the four Central Asian states that are EDB members; Turkmenistan is not included. Its latest forecast for Central Asia is optimistic. In 2026, the EDB expects growth of 10.2% in Kyrgyzstan, 8.3% in Tajikistan, 7.9% in Uzbekistan, and 5.5% in Kazakhstan. The region’s economy as a whole is expected to grow by more than 6.5%, with its combined GDP exceeding $600 billion for the first time. The IMF gives lower figures. Its latest available country projections put 2026 growth at 4.6% for Kazakhstan, 6.8% for Uzbekistan, 6.1% for Kyrgyzstan, and 6.0% for Tajikistan. These projections were published at different times rather than as a single set of four country forecasts. The largest gap is in Kyrgyzstan, where the forecasts differ by 4.1 percentage points, but there are nevertheless modest percentage point gaps between the forecasts for Tajikistan (2.3), Uzbekistan (1.1), and Kazakhstan (0.9). These differences are large enough to raise the question: why the difference in expectations? Part of the answer lies in how the institutions assess the effect of a more uncertain global economy. The IMF expects the world economy to grow by 3% in 2026 and 3.4% in 2027. Its July update said the conflict in the Middle East was weighing particularly heavily on energy importers and warned that renewed conflict or financial-market disruption could weaken the outlook. For the four countries, this means different things. Kazakhstan exports oil and benefits from high prices, although it also depends on the condition of export routes and external demand. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan import a significant share of their fuel, while their economies are closely linked to migrant remittances. Uzbekistan has a larger domestic market and its own resource base. Kazakhstan illustrates the logic of the IMF forecast particularly well. Its GDP grew by 6.5% in 2025, one of its strongest performances in recent years. The Fund does not expect that surge to be repeated. Oil production is expected to stabilize after last year’s increase, with growth slowing to 4.6% in 2026, according to the IMF forecast. This does not mean that the Fund attributes everything to oil. Domestic demand remains strong,...

Tajik Airlines

Tajikistan’s Somon Air Adds Routes, Receives First Boeing 737 MAX

Somon Air, Tajikistan’s national carrier, says it will start direct flights once a week between Dushanbe and Minsk, Belarus, on August 29. “Flights will operate every Saturday,” said the airline, which received its first Boeing 737 MAX aircraft in Dushanbe on August 3 as part of a fleet expansion. The airline, which is adding international routes and working to strengthen its role in the Central Asian aviation market, committed to ordering up to four 787 Dreamliners and up to 10 737 MAX aircraft in an announcement with Boeing in late 2025. At the time of the agreement’s announcement, Somon Air was operating six Next-Generation 737 airplanes to destinations across Europe, Asia and the Middle East, according to Boeing. The expansion of Somon Air’s international flights will “contribute to the development of tourism, cultural exchange, the expansion of economic relations, and the enhancement of Tajikistan's reputation as a country leading the ‘open door´ policy,” the state Khovar news agency reported on Monday. In 2025, Tajikistan introduced an Open Skies policy that lifted many market restrictions as a way to encourage competition, with the aim of generating better prices for passengers, more efficient service, and route diversification. On August 9, Somon Air began direct flights every Sunday between Dushanbe and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. In June, it also started a weekly direct route between the Tajik capital and Tbilisi, Georgia. In April, the airline introduced a new weekly route between Dushanbe and Ufa in western Russia. Operating since 2009, privately owned Somon Air says it is Tajikistan’s “national air carrier.”

Uranium

Kazakh Uranium for Asia: Japan Returns for Fuel, South Korea Expands Cooperation

Kazakhstan accounts for around 40% of global uranium production. China already receives not only raw material from the country but also finished fuel assemblies; Japan is signing new contracts after bringing some of its reactors back online; and South Korea is expanding cooperation with Kazakhstan’s nuclear industry. Kazakhstan itself, which for decades exported almost all of its uranium, is preparing to build its own nuclear power plants. These developments are gradually changing the country’s place in Asia’s nuclear energy sector. In December 2025, Kazatomprom, the world’s largest producer of natural uranium, agreed on new supplies with Kansai Electric Power, one of Japan’s major nuclear power operators. The agreement for the supply of uranium oxide concentrate, U₃O₈, was signed during events connected with a visit by a Kazakh delegation to Japan. This is not finished reactor fuel. U₃O₈, known in the industry as yellowcake, must undergo conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication after mining. For Kansai, the agreement provides another source of raw material for its nuclear fleet, while for Kazakhstan it continues cooperation with the Japanese company that began almost two decades ago. Japanese demand is rising again after a prolonged decline. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in March 2011 led to the gradual shutdown of all the country’s commercial reactors. Restarts began in 2015 after new safety requirements were introduced. In February 2025, the Japanese government approved an energy policy that envisages increasing nuclear power’s share of electricity generation to around 20% by 2040. To achieve this, Tokyo will need not only to restart existing reactors but also to secure their fuel supply. Kansai has a particularly important role in this process. The company operates seven reactors at three sites: Mihama, Takahama, and Ohi. In 2025, it also resumed work to assess the possibility of building a new reactor at the Mihama site. No final decision on construction has yet been made. Kansai’s links with Kazakhstan began long before the current revival of Japan’s nuclear energy sector. In 2006, the company and Sumitomo joined the APPAK uranium mining project in southern Kazakhstan. Kazatomprom currently owns 65% of the company, Sumitomo 25%, and Kansai 10%. APPAK develops the western section of the Mynkuduk deposit in the Turkistan region. For the Japanese company, this provides a presence directly at the source of the raw material. For Kazakhstan, the partnership became one of the first major examples of Asian energy companies participating in its uranium mining industry. China Already Receives Finished Fuel Kazakhstan has gone further with China than simply supplying uranium concentrate. Ulba-FA operates in Ust-Kamenogorsk as a joint venture between the Ulba Metallurgical Plant and China’s CGNPC-URC. The Kazakh side owns 51% and the Chinese side 49%. The plant produces fuel assemblies for Chinese nuclear power plants. Industrial production began in 2021. In December 2022, the first shipment was sent to China, containing just over 30 tonnes of low-enriched uranium in finished fuel assemblies. By the end of 2024, the plant had reached its design capacity of 200 tonnes a year....

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Black Sea Risks Elevate Azerbaijan and Turkey in Kazakhstan’s Export Strategy

Bloomberg reported on August 8 that the Turkish authorities were withholding or delaying transit permission for some vessels bound through the Dardanelles for Novorossiysk. Some applicants were reportedly told that permits were not being issued, while others faced additional review. The practice appeared selective: vessels bound for some other Black Sea destinations continued to transit, while some Ukraine-bound vessels were also reportedly affected. On August 9, however, Turkish officials told Reuters that shipping through the Turkish Straits was proceeding smoothly and described the actions as temporary security measures rather than an ongoing restriction. The reported restrictions followed a sharp increase in attacks on commercial shipping around the Black Sea, including Turkish-linked vessels near Novorossiysk. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry expressed concern after attacks on the Turkish-owned Yaşar and Nadezhda and called on Russia and Ukraine to ensure navigational safety. Novorossiysk is especially important for Kazakhstan, because the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal there handles the overwhelming majority of its oil exports. Although the CPC pipeline itself remains operational, the episode showed how quickly traffic serving Kazakhstan’s principal oil-export outlet could face an additional constraint. The events shed light on an export strategy Kazakhstan began developing several years before the current problems. Tokayev’s July 2022 instructions addressed both oil-export diversification through the Trans-Caspian route and alternative transport chains for other cargo. In particular, he called for greater use of Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports and the development of alternative railway routes. Later that year, KazMunayGas (KMG) and SOCAR established a framework for moving Kazakhstani oil from Aktau across the Caspian Sea and onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, initially for up to 1.5 million tons annually. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey also adopted a 2022–2027 roadmap to remove bottlenecks along the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan continued to develop transport links with Russia and China as it expanded Trans-Caspian routes through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The strategy extended Kazakhstan’s longstanding geopolitical multi-vector policy, which balances relations with partners in multiple directions, into the geoeconomic sphere. Tokayev made the combination explicit in his 2023 State of the Nation address. Relations with Turkey had meanwhile been elevated to an enhanced strategic partnership in May 2022, including transport cooperation and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan deepened their strategic and allied cooperation later that year, likewise emphasizing transport and logistics. Closer ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey widened Kazakhstan’s options without displacing established routes through Russia. The CPC pipeline remains so dominant in Kazakhstan’s oil exports that no other existing route approaches its present scale. Of the 78.7 million tons of oil that Kazakhstan exported in 2025, the Energy Ministry reported the volume moving through the CPC pipeline at 64.8 million tons (the CPC itself reported about 63 million tons), meaning that more than four-fifths of Kazakhstan’s exported oil depended on the CPC system. Kazakhstan moved only about 1.4 million tons through the Aktau–Baku–Ceyhan (ABC) route in 2024, and about 1.3 million tons in 2025. Diversification cannot at present mean replacing CPC. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline gives Kazakhstani oil a westbound egress...