Uranium - The Times Of Central Asia

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Uranium

Kazakh Uranium for Asia: Japan Returns for Fuel, South Korea Expands Cooperation

Kazakhstan accounts for around 40% of global uranium production. China already receives not only raw material from the country but also finished fuel assemblies; Japan is signing new contracts after bringing some of its reactors back online; and South Korea is expanding cooperation with Kazakhstan’s nuclear industry. Kazakhstan itself, which for decades exported almost all of its uranium, is preparing to build its own nuclear power plants. These developments are gradually changing the country’s place in Asia’s nuclear energy sector. In December 2025, Kazatomprom, the world’s largest producer of natural uranium, agreed on new supplies with Kansai Electric Power, one of Japan’s major nuclear power operators. The agreement for the supply of uranium oxide concentrate, U₃O₈, was signed during events connected with a visit by a Kazakh delegation to Japan. This is not finished reactor fuel. U₃O₈, known in the industry as yellowcake, must undergo conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication after mining. For Kansai, the agreement provides another source of raw material for its nuclear fleet, while for Kazakhstan it continues cooperation with the Japanese company that began almost two decades ago. Japanese demand is rising again after a prolonged decline. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in March 2011 led to the gradual shutdown of all the country’s commercial reactors. Restarts began in 2015 after new safety requirements were introduced. In February 2025, the Japanese government approved an energy policy that envisages increasing nuclear power’s share of electricity generation to around 20% by 2040. To achieve this, Tokyo will need not only to restart existing reactors but also to secure their fuel supply. Kansai has a particularly important role in this process. The company operates seven reactors at three sites: Mihama, Takahama, and Ohi. In 2025, it also resumed work to assess the possibility of building a new reactor at the Mihama site. No final decision on construction has yet been made. Kansai’s links with Kazakhstan began long before the current revival of Japan’s nuclear energy sector. In 2006, the company and Sumitomo joined the APPAK uranium mining project in southern Kazakhstan. Kazatomprom currently owns 65% of the company, Sumitomo 25%, and Kansai 10%. APPAK develops the western section of the Mynkuduk deposit in the Turkistan region. For the Japanese company, this provides a presence directly at the source of the raw material. For Kazakhstan, the partnership became one of the first major examples of Asian energy companies participating in its uranium mining industry. China Already Receives Finished Fuel Kazakhstan has gone further with China than simply supplying uranium concentrate. Ulba-FA operates in Ust-Kamenogorsk as a joint venture between the Ulba Metallurgical Plant and China’s CGNPC-URC. The Kazakh side owns 51% and the Chinese side 49%. The plant produces fuel assemblies for Chinese nuclear power plants. Industrial production began in 2021. In December 2022, the first shipment was sent to China, containing just over 30 tonnes of low-enriched uranium in finished fuel assemblies. By the end of 2024, the plant had reached its design capacity of 200 tonnes a year....

Uranium

Kyrgyzstan Moves to Introduce Unified Monitoring System for Uranium Waste Sites

Kyrgyzstan is preparing to introduce a unified national system for radiological monitoring of former uranium production sites, tailings storage facilities, and other radioactive waste locations, shifting the focus from cleanup work to long-term oversight of Soviet-era uranium legacy sites. The draft resolution, published for public discussion by the Ministry of Natural Resources, Ecology and Technical Supervision, would establish a single framework for monitoring reclaimed uranium sites across the country. Under the proposed rules, state monitoring would cover protective engineering structures, surface and groundwater, soil, atmospheric air, and other environmental components surrounding radioactive sites. The ministry said the initiative was developed under Kyrgyzstan’s Environmental Security Concept through 2040 and had been coordinated with the International Atomic Energy Agency. “The draft resolution is aimed at establishing a unified procedure for organizing and conducting radioecological monitoring in areas containing former uranium production sites, radioactive tailings, and waste storage facilities after remediation work has been completed,” the ministry said in its explanatory note. Officials said that despite large-scale rehabilitation efforts, former uranium facilities in Kyrgyzstan continue to pose potential radiation risks, making permanent state oversight necessary. According to the ministry, Kyrgyzstan still holds significant volumes of radioactive waste generated by uranium mining and processing during the Soviet era. These tailings and mining dumps remain long-term potential sources of radiation exposure for both local populations and the environment. The ministry said the effectiveness of remediation can only be confirmed through systematic monitoring over an extended period after restoration works are completed. International organizations have also recommended long-term post-remediation monitoring, the ministry added. Kyrgyzstan is one of several Central Asian states still dealing with the environmental legacy of Soviet uranium mining. Sites such as Mailuu-Suu, Min-Kush, Kadji-Sai, and Shekaftar have been priorities for international remediation work because many are located near populated areas, river systems, or unstable terrain. Official data show that Kyrgyzstan has 92 toxic and radionuclide waste burial sites, including 34 that directly contain radioactive materials. A separate rehabilitation track has been carried out jointly by Kyrgyz emergency authorities and Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom. Other remediation efforts have been supported through the Environmental Remediation Account for Central Asia, which is managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Over the past nine years, the Rosatom-linked program has covered more than 27 hectares of land, with more than 1.4 million cubic meters of radioactive tailings relocated. Total investments have exceeded $25 million. The proposed monitoring system would formalize the next stage: checking whether restored sites remain stable and whether contamination risks are contained over time.

Mining

S&P Global Energy Executive Says Kazakhstan Can Move Toward Mining’s Top Tier

Wesley Monteiro, Global Market Engagement Lead at S&P Global Energy/Platts, said Kazakhstan has one of the strongest chances among mining jurisdictions to move from tier-two toward tier-one, speaking to The Times of Central Asia on June 12 on the sidelines of the Astana Mining & Metallurgy Congress in Astana. “This is the country with a big chance to move from tier-two to tier-one,” Monteiro said. He developed that argument around five factors: mineral breadth, scalable copper production, uranium, legacy mining waste, and Kazakhstan’s diplomatic architecture. “Actually, this is the only country in the world that has this combination,” he said. Monteiro used Canada and Australia as reference points for established first-tier mining countries. Kazakhstan is not yet in that category, he said, but the combination he described gives the country a credible path toward it. Monteiro was speaking from the S&P Global Energy/Platts side of the company, which provides market information, price benchmarks, supply-demand analysis, and commodity-sector intelligence, rather than from S&P Global Ratings. Kazakhstan, in his view, is being reassessed as part of a new global commodity framework shaped by energy security and flexibility, and materials security and flexibility. In that environment, Kazakhstan’s position could help reduce investor risk perception and support new or increased investment in the region. “We can see in the short to medium term a reduction in the risk perception that can trigger new investments or can increase the investments in the region,” Monteiro said. He then expanded on each of the five factors. Mineral Breadth The first pillar was mineral breadth. Monteiro pointed to copper, aluminum, zinc, uranium, and other minerals. He described this range as “mineral breadth” or “mineral range,” distinguishing Kazakhstan from mining jurisdictions built around a single resource. For Monteiro, that range was the starting point for the tier-one argument. Scalable Copper Production Within that mineral breadth, Monteiro singled out copper as the second pillar. Copper is central to the infrastructure behind electrification, power grids, data centers, and AI computing, and Monteiro said the demand is not distant or theoretical. “Now everyone needs copper, not 15 years from now — yesterday, actually,” he said. For Monteiro, Kazakhstan’s copper position is therefore not only about reserves. He distinguished between having the resource, having the capacity to produce it, and being able to develop it quickly. “One thing is to have,” he said. “Another thing is the capacity to have the production. The third thing is how fast you can develop this.” Uranium Uranium was the third pillar in Monteiro’s account of Kazakhstan’s mining position. He framed it through the renewed global debate over nuclear power, saying the sector has returned to strategic relevance after years in which some governments moved away from it following the Fukushima accident in 2011. Germany, he said, became the clearest example of that retreat, while France maintained a large nuclear base and, in his view, emerged in a stronger position. “Nuclear is back in the game,” Monteiro said. He said the renewed interest in nuclear power is...

Tourism Development

Kyrgyzstan Looks to Turn Former Uranium Mining Town Into Tourist Destination

The Kyrgyz authorities and international partners are seeking to help transform the village of Min-Kush, one of the country’s former uranium mining centers, into a new tourist destination as part of broader efforts to promote sustainable economic development in remote mountain communities. The issue was the focus of the forum “Development of Min-Kush Village Through Sustainable Tourism: Revival of Forgotten Cities,” held in Min-Kush, in the Jumgal district of the Naryn Region, from May 21 to 23. The forum brought together government officials, international organizations, tourism professionals, civil society groups, and local residents to discuss the tourism, environmental, historical, cultural, and gastronomic potential of Min-Kush and the wider Jumgal district. Founded in 1947 as a uranium mining settlement, Min-Kush became one of the Soviet Union’s major uranium production centers. After the collapse of the USSR and the closure of the mines, the village experienced decades of economic decline. Today, Min-Kush is undergoing environmental rehabilitation efforts supported by the Kyrgyz government and international partners aimed at addressing the legacy of uranium mining. Speaking at the forum, Dinara Kemelova, the Kyrgyz president’s special representative for the mountain agenda, said Min-Kush is now safe for both residents and visitors and has significant potential for the development of a green economy, agriculture, and tourism. An important part of the event was a roundtable discussion devoted to strengthening cooperation among communities located near former uranium legacy sites. Participants emphasized the importance of coordinating the efforts of government institutions, international organizations, businesses, and local communities to transform uranium legacy areas into new centers of green economic growth and sustainable tourism in Kyrgyzstan. The forum was organized by the Kyrgyz government together with the NGO Destination Min-Kush, in cooperation with the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the United Nations Development Programme in Kyrgyzstan, with financial support from the European Union. During the event, UNDP highlighted its grant support mechanism for local initiatives in communities located near uranium legacy sites. Through small grant programs, local civil society organizations, women’s groups, youth initiatives, artisans, and entrepreneurs receive support for practical, community-driven projects aimed at improving livelihoods, increasing environmental awareness, preserving local heritage, and encouraging economic activity. Rémi Duflot, ambassador of the European Union Delegation to Kyrgyzstan, said the forum provided Min-Kush with an opportunity to demonstrate its tourism potential while building on both its natural assets and its unique history as a former uranium mining site. “The EU will continue supporting the efforts undertaken by national and local authorities, in partnership with the EBRD, OSCE, and UNDP, to provide better opportunities for populations living near uranium legacy sites in Kyrgyzstan,” Duflot said.

Nuclear Energy

Kazakhstan Recasts Its Nuclear Past

At the United Nations in late April, Robert Floyd, executive secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, warned that any renewed nuclear test by Russia, the United States, or another state could draw other nuclear powers back into testing. His remarks followed the re-emergence of nuclear testing as an issue in international political debate. Kazakhstan enters this debate from the opposite side of nuclear history. It is a former Soviet nuclear test ground that now defines its nuclear policy through civilian power, peaceful use, and non-proliferation. Kazakhstan’s nuclear future is shaped by its nuclear past. The country was a Soviet nuclear test ground at Semipalatinsk, now Semey, where late-Soviet public-health concerns helped force nuclear testing into public politics before the site’s closure. After independence, Kazakhstan renounced the Soviet-era nuclear weapons it inherited on its territory. Its present nuclear-energy policy begins from that record. It is not a search for nuclear status, but a civilian program formed by restraint, public memory, and national development. Semipalatinsk is the source of Kazakhstan’s authority on nuclear testing. Between 1949 and 1989, the Soviet Union used the site as one of its principal nuclear testing grounds. In total, 456 nuclear tests were conducted there, including 340 underground and 116 atmospheric tests. Kazakhstan closed the site in 1991. These facts remove the subject from arms-control abstraction. For Kazakhstan, nuclear testing is a territorial, social, public-health, and political inheritance, bound to the eastern steppe and the communities around the former test range. Atomic Lake gives that history a single, physical form. In January 1965, the Soviet Union carried out the Chagan underground nuclear explosion at the Semipalatinsk Test Site. The blast, with a yield of 140 kilotons, was part of a Soviet program for using underground nuclear explosions in civil engineering, including reservoirs and channels in water-scarce regions. It created the crater later known as Atomic Lake. The site remains a physical residue of the Soviet claim that nuclear explosions could serve economic and social development. This is why nuclear technology in Kazakhstan cannot be politically neutral. Independence gave Kazakhstan agency in that history. Kazakhstan transferred Soviet-era nuclear weapons to Russia by April 1995 and took part in cooperative threat reduction, including the sealing of test-site boreholes and tunnels. More recently, it became host to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Low Enriched Uranium Bank at Ulba, in Oskemen. The bank is an IAEA-owned fuel-assurance reserve for peaceful nuclear power, designed to support access to nuclear fuel without encouraging additional enrichment programs. Kazakhstan’s civilian nuclear claim, therefore, rests on practice: disarmament, threat reduction, and non-proliferation infrastructure. The policy now turns on a practical paradox. Kazakhstan has been the world’s leading uranium producer since 2009 and produced about 40% of the world’s uranium in 2025. Yet it has no operating nuclear power plant. Its Soviet-era BN-350 reactor, near Aktau on the Caspian Sea, was decommissioned in 1999 after decades of electricity generation and desalination. Kazakhstan is central to the global nuclear fuel cycle but has...

Nuclear Diplomacy

Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Diplomacy Offers Lessons for Iran Crisis

Ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran have yet to resolve a key issue: what will happen to the enriched uranium currently held by a country engulfed in conflict. Beyond political considerations, there are also significant technical challenges, namely, how such material could be safely removed from Iran if an agreement is reached. Kazakhstan, however, has previously carried out a unique operation of this kind, later documented in detail through U.S. and Kazakh accounts, and has a long track record of constructive engagement in nuclear diplomacy. The Uranium Question The parties to the conflict, the United States, Israel, and Iran, remain deeply divided on core issues. Various countries, including Pakistan, have been involved as mediators. At the same time, the situation is complicated by broader military and economic tensions, including the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian oil exports and Iran’s continuing obstruction of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz dominates headlines, often diverting attention from the central issue: the fate of Iran’s uranium stockpile. Axios reported that U.S. and Iranian negotiators had discussed a possible arrangement involving the release of frozen Iranian funds, with a figure of $20 billion under discussion. One U.S. official described that figure as a U.S. proposal, while U.S. President Donald Trump later denied that any money would change hands. IAEA-linked figures put Iran’s stockpile at about 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, close to weapons-grade levels if further enriched. Trump has expressed confidence that Iran will agree to a deal and that the uranium can be removed. Iranian officials, however, have rejected this claim, stating that they do not intend to transfer enriched uranium to the United States or any other country. Tokayev’s Position On April 17, 2026, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev addressed the issue during a diplomatic forum in Antalya, warning that excessive focus on trade routes and the Strait of Hormuz risks overshadowing the core problem, the nuclear issue. “The essence of the problem lies in the proliferation of nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons. This must be the central topic of negotiations when it comes to the conflict around Iran,” Tokayev said. Experts have since highlighted the complexity of the task facing policymakers: not only negotiating terms but physically removing enriched uranium from Iran. This would involve dealing with potentially damaged facilities, ensuring security, deploying specialist teams, defining transport routes, establishing international oversight, and determining a final destination for the material. Against this backdrop, Tokayev’s remarks carry particular weight. While the United States is reported to be insisting not only on limiting future enrichment but also on transferring existing stockpiles, Iran is seeking to separate the nuclear issue from the broader regional crisis. Tokayev, by contrast, has emphasized that energy and shipping disruptions are symptoms of a deeper conflict, with the nuclear issue at its core. Operation Sapphire Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan inherited the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal, after Russia, the United States, and Ukraine. The country was also...