Environment - The Times Of Central Asia

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Semipalatinsk Test Site

Tokayev Calls for Nuclear Talks 35 Years After Semipalatinsk Closure

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has called for negotiations among nuclear powers and urged faster action to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, designed to prohibit all nuclear test explosions, into force as Kazakhstan marked the 35th anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site on August 29. The date also marks the International Day against Nuclear Tests, established by the UN General Assembly at Kazakhstan’s initiative in 2009. “Our country’s position as one of the leaders of the global anti-nuclear movement remains unchanged. We call for negotiations among nuclear powers, the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and decisive multilateral action to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons use,” Tokayev said. He said Kazakhstan’s decision to relinquish the world’s fourth-largest inherited nuclear arsenal reflected a choice in favor of peace, security, and sustainable development. Tokayev also said nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, linking the country’s referendum-backed development of nuclear power to its long-term economic, scientific, and technological development. A Call After New START’s Expiry New START, the last U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms treaty, expired on February 5, 2026. On-site inspections, paused by mutual agreement in March 2020 because of the pandemic, never resumed. Russia blocked inspections in 2022 and halted treaty-required data exchanges after suspending implementation in 2023. The treaty’s expiry removed the last legally binding bilateral limits on deployed U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces, with no successor agreement in place. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has still not entered into force nearly three decades after opening for signature. It has been signed by 188 states and ratified by 179. Ratification by nine of the 44 states whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force is still needed. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States have signed but not ratified. India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not signed, while Russia revoked its ratification in 2023. Speaking at a Stimson Center event in Washington on August 26, co-hosted by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change and attended by The Times of Central Asia, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi made a broader case for renewed engagement. “This is an era for diplomacy,” Grossi said, arguing that growing international fragmentation has made diplomacy more necessary. Tokayev also brings direct experience to the issue. Before becoming president, he served as a UN under-secretary-general and director-general of the UN Office at Geneva, the UN secretary-general’s personal representative to the Conference on Disarmament, and secretary-general of the Conference on Disarmament. Disarmament in Practice The Soviet Union conducted 456 nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk between 1949 and 1989, causing lasting damage to human health and the environment in surrounding regions. After independence, Kazakhstan transferred the nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia, joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state, and worked with the United States to dismantle associated infrastructure under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. Much of that cooperation took place through the program commonly known as Nunn–Lugar....

Opinion

Can Uzbekistan’s Green Transition Offset Its Gas Decline?

Uzbekistan faces a widening energy gap. Natural gas production peaked in 2008 and, after a partial recovery in the late 2010s, has fallen sharply. Official figures show output dropped from 61.6 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2018 to 41.5 bcm in 2024. Production fell another 15% year on year in the first quarter of 2026. The gap is already being filled from abroad. Russian gas deliveries rose 15% in 2025 to nearly 6.5 bcm, while Uzbekistan also imports gas from Turkmenistan. Renewable electricity cannot replace every household or industrial use of gas. It can reduce the volume burned in power stations, leaving more domestic fuel available elsewhere. Declining output is already changing Uzbekistan’s external position. The country, once a net gas exporter, became a net importer in 2023. Imports help protect households and factories from shortages, but they add costs and increase exposure to Russian and Turkmen supplies. Renewable generation therefore serves an energy security purpose even before its climate benefits are counted. Natural gas remains the central concern. In its 2022 review, the International Energy Agency said it provided about 85% of Uzbekistan’s total energy and electricity supplies. The government expected gas demand to rise by 30% to 65 bcm by 2030, while electricity demand would roughly double. The IEA also warned that reserves would last fewer than 20 years at the production rate then prevailing. This was a reserve-to-production estimate, not a fixed depletion date. New discoveries or investment could extend it. Lower consumption would do the same. The government has responded with a rapid renewable buildout. In 2025, solar and wind plants generated more than 10.5 billion kWh of electricity. Renewable generation, including hydropower, reached 16.8 billion kWh. The Ministry of Energy said this saved about 3.2 bcm of natural gas. That saving was equivalent to roughly half the volume Russia supplied during the year. It shows that renewables already ease the shortage. Yet 3.2 bcm remains far below the roughly 20 bcm fall in annual gas production since 2018. On current figures, the green transition is slowing the impact of the decline, not yet offsetting it. The buildout forms part of Uzbekistan’s 2019 Green Economy Transition Strategy. Renewable projects bring foreign investment and create opportunities for domestic suppliers. In December 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said local companies had supplied $700 million of materials and electrical equipment while also providing services to energy projects. Renewable generation also limits import demand by reducing the gas burned in power stations. Large projects depend heavily on decisions by the state. Procurement and land allocation affect who receives contracts. Grid access and investment approvals shape how quickly plants are completed. RFE/RL has documented concerns over opaque subcontracting in Uzbekistan’s solar sector. Its 2024 investigation found that two subcontractors on the Sherabad project were absent from publicly available documents. One company had been incorporated only two days after construction began. A founder denied accusations of corruption, while principal contractor Masdar did not respond to questions. The investigation did not establish that the...

Aral Sea

Aral Sea Restoration Could Prevent 605 Million Tons of CO2 Emissions

The drying of the Aral Sea has created another environmental problem: according to a study, exposed lakebed sediments released about 748 million tons of CO2 into the atmosphere between 1960 and 2022. Organic carbon remains stored in the sediments, and restoring part of the water cover could prevent the release of another 605 million tons of CO2. This gives efforts to restore the Aral Sea region a new climate dimension. The study, conducted by an international team of researchers led by scientists from Spain’s Centre for Advanced Studies of Blanes (CEAB-CSIC), was published in Science on July 16. The findings add another consideration to restoration efforts already underway across the region, from refilling part of the sea in Kazakhstan to planting saxaul and rehabilitating degraded land in Uzbekistan. The Aral Sea’s Carbon Legacy When the Aral Sea was still a fully-fledged body of water, plants and algae absorbed carbon dioxide, while some organic matter settled on the lakebed. As the water retreated, those sediments were exposed to the air, organic matter began to decompose, and the stored carbon started returning to the atmosphere as CO2. At the same time, winds carry salt and dust from the newly formed Aralkum Desert, spreading the consequences of the sea’s disappearance far beyond its former shoreline. In 2022, researchers conducted an expedition to the dried Aral Sea bed, collecting sediment samples and measuring how much CO2 was being released. Combined with satellite data, this allowed them to estimate carbon losses as the sea retreated. According to the researchers’ calculations, exposed sediments lost about 204 million tons of carbon between 1960 and 2022, equivalent to roughly 748 million tons of CO2. New vegetation growing on the dried lakebed has offset less than 1% of those emissions. A significant amount of organic carbon remains in the sediments. The researchers estimate that restoring water cover could prevent the release of another 605 million tons of CO2. The authors also considered the economics of such an effort. Using 2024 voluntary carbon market prices for land-use and forestry projects as a benchmark, they estimate that the avoided emissions could potentially be worth $3.6 billion to $18 billion in carbon credits. That money could theoretically become one source of funding for ecosystem restoration. Researchers estimate that about $9.7 billion in water-management improvements could increase inflows enough to restore roughly half of the area covered by the Aral Sea in 1960, while potentially generating about 323 million tons of CO2-equivalent carbon credits. Restoring the Entire Aral Sea Is No Longer the Goal Under current conditions, fully restoring the sea is widely considered unrealistic. The central issue is water. The Amu Darya and Syr Darya flow through several Central Asian countries. Significantly increasing the amount of water reaching the Aral Sea would be impossible without basin-wide agreements, irrigation modernization, and reductions in water losses. This is why restoration of the Aral Sea remains a regional issue rather than solely an Uzbek or Kazakh one. Central Asian countries coordinate part of this work...

Desertification

UN Desertification Forum Highlights Central Asian Land Degradation

Mongolia is hosting a United Nations (UN) conference on combating desertification this month, with delegates from Central Asian countries discussing cooperation on the challenges of climate change, water scarcity, and sustaining vast ecosystems such as the Eurasian steppes. Bakhodur Sheralizoda, chairman of Tajikistan’s Committee for Environmental Protection, was among speakers appealing for more regional and international cooperation in the face of land degradation, desertification, and drought. While the meeting in Ulaanbaatar is aimed at the protection of rangeland and grassland ecosystems, Sheralizoda also noted the importance of preserving mountain ecosystems such as those that cover most of Tajikistan’s territory. He said Tajikistan is one of Central Asia's major sources of water and protecting its glaciers is therefore critical, Khovar, Tajikistan’s state news agency, reported on Monday. His comments highlighted the interconnectedness of the environmental challenges being discussed at the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, which started on August 17 and ends on August 28. The conference is focusing on “the arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas, known as the drylands, where some of the most vulnerable ecosystems and peoples can be found,” according to organizers. The goal of the meeting is to promote sustainable rangeland management, climate-resilient land use, and land restoration across those fragile areas. Nearly 77% of Mongolia’s land is already degraded, and limited rainfall and short growing seasons make recovery from degradation difficult, according to the UN. More than 80 million hectares in Central Asia, or an area about four times the size of Kyrgyzstan, are already degraded, the UN says. Along with Tajikistan, the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have been working on ways of mitigating threats to ecosystems, including soil protection and monitoring, drip irrigation, and the planting of seedlings. Late last year, Uzbekistan hosted a major international conference on wildlife trade, held under the UN-linked Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, as countries and international institutions look for ways to counter global conservation pressures. In a commentary on PBS, Dr. Justine Shanti Alexander, Mongolia director for the New York-based Wildlife Conservation Society, said the hosting of the UN event in Ulaanbaatar “provides a unique opportunity to showcase to the world how healthy, high integrity rangelands underpin wildlife, pastoral livelihoods, and climate resilience.”

Aral Sea

Kazakhstan’s North Aral Recovery Anchors Broader Environmental Push

After decades in which the Aral Sea became a global symbol of ecological collapse, Kazakhstan has achieved a measurable recovery in its northern basin. Built over two decades, the turnaround is now being linked to expanded restoration plans and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s broader Taza Kazakhstan, or “Clean Kazakhstan,” environmental agenda. According to the government, the North Aral’s volume rose from 18.9 billion cubic meters at the end of 2022 to 23 billion by the end of 2025. In July 2026, TCA reported that the Water Resources Ministry had put the volume at approximately 23.5 billion cubic meters. The recovery reflects work centered on the Kokaral Dam, completed in 2005, and management of the Syr Darya. The first phase raised water levels, reduced salinity, and helped restore fishing. Kazakhstan’s Water Resources Ministry and the World Bank have developed plans for a second phase of the restoration program. The proposed project calls for the reconstruction of the Kokaral Dam and aims to increase the sea’s volume to approximately 34 billion cubic meters and expand its surface area to around 3,900 square kilometers. The recovery described here is confined to the North Aral in Kazakhstan. The South Aral remains severely depleted, while further progress in the north depends on Syr Darya flows and cooperation with upstream states. An August 22 government review places the North Aral alongside waste management, reforestation, and environmental education under Taza Kazakhstan. Launched by Tokayev in April 2024 as a nationwide cleanup campaign, the initiative is increasingly being used as a framework for a broader environmental program. Waste Infrastructure Illegal dumping is the clearest area of reported progress. The number of identified dumping sites fell from approximately 8,600 in 2018 to 2,600 in 2026, according to the government. Satellite monitoring is being combined with public reporting through eGov Mobile and TazaQazBot. Public reports have been processed through the two services since 2024. Local authorities have been given responsibility for cleaning public areas, while penalties for illegal disposal have been strengthened. Because the 2018 baseline predates Taza Kazakhstan, the longer-term decline also reflects measures taken before the initiative. The share of municipal waste sorted or processed increased from 25.8% in 2024 to 30.6% in 2025, according to the government. Kazakhstan still faces a serious infrastructure deficit. At the end of 2024, only 20.4% of the country’s municipal waste landfills had the required documentation, while major sites in Astana and Zhezkazgan were at or beyond capacity. A 2023 plan called for 100 new landfills, but a December 2025 government update said only eight had been commissioned. The August 2026 review provided no newer landfill total, but said upgrades were planned for existing sites and additional waste sector projects were moving into operation. Large waste-processing and utilization facilities are also under development in Astana, Almaty, and the Zhambyl region. TCA has previously reported that headline processing rates do not show how much waste becomes reusable material. Only about 1.1% of municipal waste generated in 2024 was converted into secondary raw materials. The...

Environmental Safeguards

Pasture Gives Way to Solar Power in Uzbekistan as Audit Remains Unpublished

Each spring, nine households grazed livestock on a stretch of desert pasture in Uzbekistan’s Bukhara Region. The land is now the site of the Nur Bukhara solar and battery plant, but an audit intended to show whether promised livelihood protections worked remains unpublished. Seven of the households came from the nearby settlement of Kirilishon and used the state-owned pasture without permits or formal agreements. A herder and his partner, identified publicly only as H1 and H2, grazed animals there through a short-term agreement with Alat Qorakolchilik LLC, a local livestock company holding a sublease on the land. The nine households included 43 people. The plant began operating in September 2025 and was inaugurated that December. The Uzbek government awarded the project to Masdar, an Abu Dhabi-based renewable energy developer that built the facility and now operates it. Nur Bukhara combines a 250-megawatt solar plant with a 63-megawatt battery system capable of storing 126 megawatt-hours of electricity. Masdar says it can supply more than 55,000 homes, while the World Bank described it as Central Asia’s first utility-scale renewable energy project to combine solar generation with battery storage. During a consultation on May 7, 2023, Kirilishon residents asked for the solar plant to be moved. If construction went ahead, they wanted replacement grazing land near the village and priority consideration for project jobs. H1 and H2 had a documented right to use the pasture, while the seven Kirilishon households did not. However, the safeguards required by Nur Bukhara’s international lenders covered both formal and informal users whose livelihoods would be disrupted by the project. Masdar commissioned a livelihood restoration plan setting out the assistance the households were to receive before construction cut off access to the site. It identified about 260 hectares of replacement pasture, equivalent to one square mile, for H1 and H2. Alat Qorakolchilik also identified approximately 1,000 hectares, or 3.9 square miles, of additional land available to herders. The seven informal households were to be allowed to use replacement pasture without obtaining formal agreements. The larger tract was not described as land reserved exclusively for those households. The published map did not record which final area each household would receive. The livelihood measures also included priority access to project employment and additional support for households considered vulnerable. In an official statement to The Times of Central Asia, a Masdar spokesperson said replacement grazing arrangements were provided before access to the project site was restricted, “maintaining equivalent grazing conditions,” and that “several members of affected households obtained project-related employment opportunities.” The statement cited monitoring by international lenders and an independent third-party review, with the completion audit finalized in September 2025. It reported no related complaints from affected households through the project’s grievance mechanism. The completion audit was not included with Masdar’s response. As of August 20, 2026, it was also absent from Masdar’s Nur Bukhara page and the International Finance Corporation’s project disclosure. Simonyan Consulting, which says it was engaged by the project company to conduct the audit, lists the assignment as “2025–ongoing.” Without the audit,...