Central Asia’s Sovereignty in the Shadow of the War in Ukraine
The Ukraine war has fundamentally changed Central Asia's strategic positioning, accelerating diversification away from Russian dependence. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are navigating between maintaining necessary ties with Moscow, while asserting sovereignty through expanded partnerships with China, Turkey, and the West. The Sovereignty Imperative When Russian forces crossed into Ukraine in February 2022, the violation of territorial integrity sent immediate shockwaves through Central Asia. For leaders whose nations had endured centuries of Russian and Soviet rule, Vladimir Putin's denial of Ukrainian statehood carried threatening undertones. This concern proved well-founded; since 2014, Russian officials have increasingly questioned Central Asian independence, with Putin dismissing Kazakhstan as never having “any statehood,” and nationalist figures like Zakhar Prilepin suggesting the outright annexation of territories "labor migrants come from." This threat became tangible post-2022. Duma member Konstantin Zatulin warned that "with friends, we don't raise territorial questions... With the rest — like with Ukraine — everything is possible," while media personality Tigran Keosayan told Kazakhstan to "look at Ukraine carefully." Such rhetoric has deepened Central Asia’s resolve to defend its sovereignty, even as economic and security constraints limit dramatic policy shifts. Measured Defiance Despite expectations in some quarters that Kazakhstan would align with Moscow following the Russian-led CSTO intervention during the January 2022 unrest, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev defied such predictions. Sitting beside Putin in June 2022, Tokayev refused to recognize the "quasi-state territories" of Donetsk and Luhansk, drawing fierce Russian criticism. This principled neutrality, supporting neither Russia's war nor “blindly follow[ing]” Western sanctions, has largely succeeded in keeping Kazakhstan shielded from the ire of Moscow. Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev adopted a similar positioning, with then Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov declaring Uzbekistan's recognition of Ukrainian territorial integrity. Though Kamilov was subsequently reassigned amid reports of Russian pressure, Tashkent has maintained its "balanced and neutral position," refusing to endorse any territorial changes achieved through force. Public Opinion is Divided but Shifting The war has polarized Central Asian societies along generational and ethnic lines. In Kazakhstan, surveys show roughly 27-32% of respondents still accept the Kremlin justifications for its invasion of Ukraine, while 24-28% view Russia as the aggressor. Critically, only 15% explicitly support Russia versus 20% backing Ukraine, with the majority remaining neutral. More telling is the growing anxiety about Russia’s intentions: 26% of Kazakhstanis now consider a Russian attack on their country a possibility. In Uzbekistan, state media control limits public polarization, but the historical memory of Russian colonization has reinforced the appreciation for independence. Prilepin's 2023 annexation comments sparked widespread patriotic indignation, while the government's firm rebuttal drew popular praise. Strategic Diversification Accelerates The war has catalyzed Central Asia's pivot toward multiple partnerships, exploiting Russia's distraction and resource constraints. China is already the region's largest economic partner. China has deepened its influence through the first China-Central Asia summit in 2023 and Xi Jinping's pledge that Beijing "categorically opposes" interference in Kazakhstan's internal affairs. Chinese investment in alternative corridors bypassing Russia has accelerated, while modest military cooperation provides security alternatives to Russian guarantees. Ankara has also leveraged its...
