• KZT/USD = 0.00217
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
27 August 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 2525

What Building Central Asian Supply Chains Taught Me About AI

I took over spare-parts supply at BPK Auto in Ust-Kamenogorsk in the mid-2000s, at the age of 25, moving from selling cars. The company was the general dealer for VAZ in Kazakhstan, assembled Niva models in the city, and was taking on Skoda, Chevrolet, and Kia while building service centers across the country to meet the expectations of those brands for a dealer. My job was to keep parts flowing to all of it. Several thousand vehicles came through in a month, and a single car contains something like 50,000 separate part numbers. The service teams wanted as many of those as possible sitting on the shelves. From where they stood, that made sense, because they were judged on whether a mechanic could start a repair the same day, whether a customer complained, and an ISO audit was running over the service operation at the same time. From the procurement side, the arithmetic looked different. Some parts cost two or three thousand dollars and were fitted once or twice a year, and holding them across four model lines tied up a large share of the company's working capital. I built the forecast in spreadsheets and checked it against actual sales once the month closed in 1C. To run it, I needed the service side's own records: how many vehicles of each type they had seen, and what had been repaired. I asked for them for months. They would not release them. Some of that was habit; a warehouse full of everything being what a well-run operation had looked like for the previous 40 years. More of it sat in how the two departments were counted. My result was recorded the moment the parts moved into the service center. Theirs was recorded much later, when the car left the workshop. Nobody was measured by the number that would have made the forecast work. The forecasting was the straightforward part of that job. The difficult part was building an operation in which people shared the information behind the forecast and were expected to act on its findings. Why a Better Model Would Not Have Changed the Outcome Put one of today's AI demand-forecasting systems into that same warehouse and very little changes. The forecast would be far better than anything I produced by hand. It would still depend on service records that nobody was willing to release, and where records did exist, it would be reading entries written up at the end of a long shift. It could not grant the purchasing manager authority to reorder against it, nor could it alter the measures by which the service department was judged. Better intelligence does not repair the path between operational data and operational action. Every party you add to that path lengthens it. A distribution network across Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan can run from a manufacturer to over 45,000 small retail outlets, served through more than 18 distribution centers, with 1,391 field staff taking and checking orders on the ground. An order begins...

Kazakh Refinery Plans Fuel Exports to Russia Amid Petrol Shortages

A small refinery in western Kazakhstan is preparing to process Russian crude and send most of the resulting petrol and diesel back to Russia as Moscow struggles with fuel shortages. The arrangement was confirmed on August 25, the same day that separate incidents occurred at two of Kazakhstan’s three major refineries. On August 19, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said that, given the situation on the fuel market, the government was “keeping its finger on the pulse” and monitoring supplies daily with companies and regional authorities. According to Novak, Russia had already imposed export restrictions and begun importing petroleum products. Several refineries were also expected to return from repairs, increasing domestic supplies. Russia’s Fuel Shortage The pressure on Russia’s fuel market is illustrated by data published by the industry portal InfoTEK. According to its August 24 snapshot, AI-95 petrol, the widely used 95-octane grade, was available at only 5,620 of Russia’s 26,098 operating filling stations, or 22%. Even in Moscow, it could be found at 161 of 786 operating stations, about 20%. Russia has also temporarily relaxed restrictions on lower environmental grades of fuel, including Euro 4, Euro 3 and Euro 2, known in the Russian classification as K4, K3 and K2. Since 2016, only fuel meeting at least the Euro 5 standard had generally been permitted. Russian economist Boris Grozovsky estimates that, given the refining capacity knocked out by Ukrainian strikes and the number of plants undergoing repairs, Russia is currently short of roughly one-third of the petrol needed at peak demand. August is traditionally a high-demand month because of summer travel and agricultural work. “If it were November now, the situation would be a little easier for the Russian government. Russia is trying to bring in petrol from India, Morocco, Turkey, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, but imports also have limitations. The petrol brought in from India turned out to be too expensive,” Grozovsky said. Kazakh Refinery Steps In Speaking at a government briefing on August 25, Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said that the small Condensat refinery in Aksai, West Kazakhstan Region, would process Russian crude, with around 70% of the petrol and diesel it produces sent to Russia. Up to 30% will remain on the Kazakh market, while the refinery also retains the right to export products outside the Eurasian Economic Union. “Under the agreement we currently have, up to 30% of the petroleum products in demand, petrol and diesel, will remain in Kazakhstan, while the rest will be shipped to the Russian Federation,” the minister told reporters. Akkenzhenov said the arrangement reflected Condensat’s location close to the Russian border. The refinery is not connected by pipeline to either country’s main oil network, meaning both crude deliveries and fuel exports depend on rail capacity. Akkenzhenov also stressed that the refinery’s owner is not under sanctions and said the Energy Ministry did not see sanctions risks for the project. He said the arrangement would also bring investment and preserve jobs at a refinery that has struggled financially. Condensat’s Financial Troubles Condensat was established in...

Aral Sea Restoration Could Prevent 605 Million Tons of CO2 Emissions

The drying of the Aral Sea has created another environmental problem: according to a study, exposed lakebed sediments released about 748 million tons of CO2 into the atmosphere between 1960 and 2022. Organic carbon remains stored in the sediments, and restoring part of the water cover could prevent the release of another 605 million tons of CO2. This gives efforts to restore the Aral Sea region a new climate dimension. The study, conducted by an international team of researchers led by scientists from Spain’s Centre for Advanced Studies of Blanes (CEAB-CSIC), was published in Science on July 16. The findings add another consideration to restoration efforts already underway across the region, from refilling part of the sea in Kazakhstan to planting saxaul and rehabilitating degraded land in Uzbekistan. The Aral Sea’s Carbon Legacy When the Aral Sea was still a fully-fledged body of water, plants and algae absorbed carbon dioxide, while some organic matter settled on the lakebed. As the water retreated, those sediments were exposed to the air, organic matter began to decompose, and the stored carbon started returning to the atmosphere as CO2. At the same time, winds carry salt and dust from the newly formed Aralkum Desert, spreading the consequences of the sea’s disappearance far beyond its former shoreline. In 2022, researchers conducted an expedition to the dried Aral Sea bed, collecting sediment samples and measuring how much CO2 was being released. Combined with satellite data, this allowed them to estimate carbon losses as the sea retreated. According to the researchers’ calculations, exposed sediments lost about 204 million tons of carbon between 1960 and 2022, equivalent to roughly 748 million tons of CO2. New vegetation growing on the dried lakebed has offset less than 1% of those emissions. A significant amount of organic carbon remains in the sediments. The researchers estimate that restoring water cover could prevent the release of another 605 million tons of CO2. The authors also considered the economics of such an effort. Using 2024 voluntary carbon market prices for land-use and forestry projects as a benchmark, they estimate that the avoided emissions could potentially be worth $3.6 billion to $18 billion in carbon credits. That money could theoretically become one source of funding for ecosystem restoration. Researchers estimate that about $9.7 billion in water-management improvements could increase inflows enough to restore roughly half of the area covered by the Aral Sea in 1960, while potentially generating about 323 million tons of CO2-equivalent carbon credits. Restoring the Entire Aral Sea Is No Longer the Goal Under current conditions, fully restoring the sea is widely considered unrealistic. The central issue is water. The Amu Darya and Syr Darya flow through several Central Asian countries. Significantly increasing the amount of water reaching the Aral Sea would be impossible without basin-wide agreements, irrigation modernization, and reductions in water losses. This is why restoration of the Aral Sea remains a regional issue rather than solely an Uzbek or Kazakh one. Central Asian countries coordinate part of this work...

Kazakhstan’s North Aral Recovery Anchors Broader Environmental Push

After decades in which the Aral Sea became a global symbol of ecological collapse, Kazakhstan has achieved a measurable recovery in its northern basin. Built over two decades, the turnaround is now being linked to expanded restoration plans and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s broader Taza Kazakhstan, or “Clean Kazakhstan,” environmental agenda. According to the government, the North Aral’s volume rose from 18.9 billion cubic meters at the end of 2022 to 23 billion by the end of 2025. In July 2026, TCA reported that the Water Resources Ministry had put the volume at approximately 23.5 billion cubic meters. The recovery reflects work centered on the Kokaral Dam, completed in 2005, and management of the Syr Darya. The first phase raised water levels, reduced salinity, and helped restore fishing. Kazakhstan’s Water Resources Ministry and the World Bank have developed plans for a second phase of the restoration program. The proposed project calls for the reconstruction of the Kokaral Dam and aims to increase the sea’s volume to approximately 34 billion cubic meters and expand its surface area to around 3,900 square kilometers. The recovery described here is confined to the North Aral in Kazakhstan. The South Aral remains severely depleted, while further progress in the north depends on Syr Darya flows and cooperation with upstream states. An August 22 government review places the North Aral alongside waste management, reforestation, and environmental education under Taza Kazakhstan. Launched by Tokayev in April 2024 as a nationwide cleanup campaign, the initiative is increasingly being used as a framework for a broader environmental program. Waste Infrastructure Illegal dumping is the clearest area of reported progress. The number of identified dumping sites fell from approximately 8,600 in 2018 to 2,600 in 2026, according to the government. Satellite monitoring is being combined with public reporting through eGov Mobile and TazaQazBot. Public reports have been processed through the two services since 2024. Local authorities have been given responsibility for cleaning public areas, while penalties for illegal disposal have been strengthened. Because the 2018 baseline predates Taza Kazakhstan, the longer-term decline also reflects measures taken before the initiative. The share of municipal waste sorted or processed increased from 25.8% in 2024 to 30.6% in 2025, according to the government. Kazakhstan still faces a serious infrastructure deficit. At the end of 2024, only 20.4% of the country’s municipal waste landfills had the required documentation, while major sites in Astana and Zhezkazgan were at or beyond capacity. A 2023 plan called for 100 new landfills, but a December 2025 government update said only eight had been commissioned. The August 2026 review provided no newer landfill total, but said upgrades were planned for existing sites and additional waste sector projects were moving into operation. Large waste-processing and utilization facilities are also under development in Astana, Almaty, and the Zhambyl region. TCA has previously reported that headline processing rates do not show how much waste becomes reusable material. Only about 1.1% of municipal waste generated in 2024 was converted into secondary raw materials. The...

Uzbekistan’s Reported Chinese Jet Deal in a Changing Arms Market

China’s J-10CE could become Uzbekistan’s first new combat fighter in decades that was designed neither in Russia nor the Soviet Union. This summer, defense publications and analysts reported that Tashkent had allegedly already received the first aircraft and could eventually acquire 24 jets. Neither Uzbekistan nor China has confirmed the deal. If the reports prove accurate, the purchase would mark a notable shift for a region whose armed forces still rely heavily on Soviet- and Russian-made equipment. For decades, Russia was the natural source of new weapons, spare parts and maintenance. Its position is no longer unchallenged. China can offer combat aircraft and air-defense systems, Turkey has established itself in the drone market, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are developing their own defense industries. Whether or not the reports prove accurate, they point to two broader trends: Central Asian countries are increasingly looking beyond Russia for newer military technology, while some are also trying to produce more equipment at home. Shadow Purchase In July, reports emerged of the alleged delivery of four J-10CEs to Uzbekistan. The aircraft is the export version of the Chinese J-10C multirole fighter manufactured by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. Its export variant has already been purchased by Pakistan. Subsequent reports spoke of a possible contract for 24 aircraft and of Uzbek pilots undergoing training in China. Uzbek news outlet Kun.uz attempted to verify the claims and contacted the country’s Ministry of Defense. The ministry responded that it had no information it could provide on the matter. Chinese authorities and manufacturers have also made no public announcement of a sale. Nevertheless, throughout the summer, reports of Uzbekistan purchasing J-10CEs have refused to die down. Russian Weapons Remain the Backbone of Existing Arsenals Uzbekistan inherited a combat aircraft fleet from the Soviet Union built primarily around MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters. These aircraft were developed in the Soviet era, and after the collapse of the USSR, Russia remained the main source of compatible spare parts, weapons, repairs, and upgrades. The reports about the J-10CE challenge this established model. A new fighter comes with a different weapons, maintenance and training ecosystem. Over time, this creates dependence on a new supplier. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, Russian exports of major arms in 2021–2025 were 64% lower than during the previous five-year period. Russia’s share of global arms exports fell from 21% to 6.8%, leaving it the world’s third-largest supplier after the United States and France. Those figures do not mean that China has replaced Russia as Central Asia’s dominant arms supplier. Russia retains a strong position, above all because of the equipment Central Asian militaries already operate. Kazakhstan is perhaps the clearest example. According to SIPRI data for 2021–2025, Russia accounted for 83% of Kazakhstan’s imports of major arms. Spain accounted for 7.9% and France for 3.6%. Kazakhstan operates Russian Su-30SM fighters, as well as helicopters, armored vehicles and air-defense systems. Any abrupt change in procurement policy would raise questions over the compatibility of ammunition, communications systems, maintenance, and the training of crews...

Badakhshan Fighting Raises Risks for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

In Nusay district, Badakhshan province (northeast Afghanistan), fighting began around August 11 between Taliban forces and followers of Juma Khan Fateh, a local Taliban commander of ethnic Tajik origin who had resisted efforts to disarm his network. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED) identifies the immediate trigger as an attempt to remove military equipment and vehicles from areas under Fateh’s control, amid longer-running tensions over disarmament, local authority, and control of gold mining. Similar disputes over gold mines have repeatedly produced clashes between local commanders and Taliban forces since 2021. Fateh surrendered on August 17 after nearly a week of fighting. By August 22, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said his case was being prepared for trial. Post-surrender reporting also indicated weapons seizures and disarmament activity around Fateh-linked sites and associates, although the scale of the reported seizures and disarmament remained incompletely verified. The Fateh episode came amid a broader increase in armed instability in Badakhshan during 2026. ACLED recorded 22 anti-Taliban armed-opposition events in the province from January through July, compared with four from June through December 2025. In July, one opposition group temporarily seized the Yaftal-e Sufla district headquarters, while the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) reportedly fought Taliban forces in Zebak. The Yaftal-e Sufla and Zebak operations were separate from the Fateh confrontation, and there is no credible evidence of coordination with Fateh’s network. Fateh’s surrender ended the immediate confrontation, while separate armed-opposition activity in Badakhshan continued. The fighting has already had a direct cross-border consequence for Tajikistan. Nusay lies opposite Tajikistan’s Darvoz district. On August 13, gunfire from the Afghan side crossed into Darvoz, killing a 21-year-old woman inside her home and damaging residential property. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest, saying the fighting had violated the country’s airspace and demanding respect for the state border and measures to prevent a recurrence. The Afghan Foreign Ministry acknowledged the death and expressed regret while blaming “disruptive and opportunistic elements.” The one confirmed limited incident does not show that the conflict has extended into Tajikistan on a sustained basis, but it makes the cross-border dimension more than hypothetical. Tajikistan shares a 1,374-kilometer frontier with Afghanistan, much of it facing Afghan Badakhshan. Dushanbe had already treated this border as a persistent security problem. In late November 2025, two attacks launched from Afghanistan’s territory killed five Chinese nationals and wounded five others in Tajikistan, which then instituted tighter border measures, while the Taliban pledged to cooperate on security and investigations. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also implementing a program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan frontier with weapons, equipment, and other border-protection means. Its 2026–27 implementation phase antedates the present fighting. A 2026 Security Council monitoring report said Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was active mainly in northern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan, and was developing cells capable of projecting a regional threat, with Central Asia remaining a key focus. It also reported concern in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the role of their nationals in the organization and the possible...