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Cryptocurrency

Kazakhstan’s Crypto Aspirations Face a Power Problem

Kazakhstan’s First Deputy Minister of Digital Development, Innovation, and Aerospace Industry, Kanysh Tuleushin, believes that state-regulated cryptocurrency mining could generate substantial revenue and help modernize the country's energy infrastructure. Tuleushin argues that Kazakhstan has the potential to become Central Asia’s leading blockchain hub. However, this vision clashes with the country’s ongoing energy crisis, which continues to impact households and businesses. Optimistic Vision In an article published in the state newspaper Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, Tuleushin outlined how mining operations could contribute to the development of Kazakhstan’s power generation capabilities. He emphasized the use of associated petroleum gas (APG) to produce electricity for mining, which he claims would reduce carbon emissions and boost oil sector profits. “Miners can help modernize the power grid. In the U.S., they participate in grid balancing by consuming excess energy during low-demand periods. Kazakhstan already has a ‘70⁄30’ initiative, where foreign investors upgrade thermal power plants, allocating 70% of new capacity to the general grid and 30% to miners,” Tuleushin wrote. Tuleushin reported that cryptocurrency mining has brought 17.7 billion tenge to the national budget over the past three years. Meanwhile, trading volume on the Astana International Financial Center (AIFC) exchanges increased from $324.2 million in 2023 to $1.4 billion in 2024. From January 1, 2025, miners will be required to sell 75% of their assets through the AIFC. Despite a generally cautious regulatory stance, Kazakhstan permits digital asset trading within the AIFC. Digital assets are categorized as secured (linked to physical assets) or unsecured (such as Bitcoin and Ethereum). In 2023, digital asset transactions in Kazakhstan reached $4.1 billion, but 91.5% occurred in the “gray zone,” beyond state oversight. In 2024 alone, the Financial Monitoring Agency shut down 36 illegal crypto exchanges, froze $4.8 million in assets, and blocked over 3,500 illicit platforms. Tuleushin argues that fully legalizing and regulating these operations could add more than 190 billion tenge annually to the budget, enough to fund major public infrastructure such as schools and hospitals. He proposes extending crypto trading beyond the AIFC, authorizing crypto ATMs, and opening the market to major players, an approach akin to that of the UAE. Tuleushin also claimed that regions like Pavlodar and Karaganda have electricity surpluses and that Kazakhstan's cold climate further lowers operational costs for miners. Unchecked Consumption and Mounting Strain Despite the deputy minister's optimism, Kazakhstan’s Supreme Audit Chamber (SAC) has raised alarms over uncontrolled energy consumption by miners. According to a 2024 audit, miners consumed 901 million kWh worth 13 billion tenge, despite a national energy shortage, by bypassing RFZ LLP, the country’s sole energy purchaser. Former Prime Minister and current head of the Supreme Audit Chamber, Alikhan Smailov, warned, “Miners are consuming up to a billion kilowatt-hours. This is damaging our economy. How can we allow unchecked consumption amid such a crisis?” The audit revealed systemic issues, including deteriorating Soviet-era power plants (55% average wear), a 4,500-worker shortfall in the energy sector, and a lack of financial oversight by the Ministry of Energy. Looming Crisis In January...

Social Media

Tajikistan Decriminalizes Likes and Other Reactions to Provocative Social Media Posts

Tajik citizens need no longer fear that they will be imprisoned for clicking “like” on social media posts that the Tajik authorities do not like. Among several laws that Tajik President Emomali Rahmon signed on May 14 was one that decriminalized liking posts on social networks that originate from individuals or organizations the Tajik government considers extremist. Crackdown on Social Media In 2018, President Rahmon signed amendments to Article 179 of the Criminal Code, making it a crime to repost, comment favorably on, or like posts that, in the opinion of Tajik authorities, are public calls to commit or justify acts of violence and terrorism. According to that law, those found guilty of liking such posts face up to 15 years in prison. Since the law came into effect, 1,507 Tajik citizens have been imprisoned. The Tajik authorities often have a broad interpretation of what constitutes public calls to commit or justify serious crimes or acts of terrorism, but it usually boils down to comments that are critical of the Tajik government. Weeks after the law was passed, Alijon Sharipov, a resident of the Vakhsh district in Tajikistan’s southern Khatlon Region, was sentenced to 9.5 years in prison for reposting a video of an interview with the leader of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, Muhiddin Kabiri. In July 2019, Ibrohim Kosimov from the western Tajik city of Panjakent received the same prison sentence for “pushing ‘likes’ and ‘shares’ on the posts belong[ing] to opposition figures.” An activist of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Rustam Mamajonov, was sentenced to seven years in prison in June 2021 for reposting a video of Sharofiddin Gadoyev, a leader of the banned organization, Group 24. Mamajonov, who was 59 years old at the time, said he did not know how the video appeared on his Facebook page and the repost was a mistake caused by his poor knowledge of how to use the platform. Tajik political activist Abdullo Shamsiddin was deported from Germany back to Tajikistan in January 2023 and was convicted weeks later in March of sedition and sentenced to seven years in prison. Shamsiddin’s trial was held behind closed doors and it was difficult to obtain details about the case, but apparently, he was convicted for clicking “like” on a social network post, though there is no information about what was in the post. Shamsiddinov’s case shows the social network use of Tajik citizens who are outside Tajikistan is also being monitored by Tajik authorities. A Strange Change of Heart The reasons for the decision to decriminalize “posting a like or other sign on social networks,” as it officially reads in the law Rahmon signed, is unclear. Certainly, rights groups have called on the Tajik authorities to overturn the decision to criminalize likes, comments, or reposts of what to the Tajik government are undesirable posts on social networks. However, for years Tajikistan’s government has ignored appeals from rights organizations, the United Nations, and individual governments over the Tajik authorities’ rights abuses....

Astana International Forum

Astana International Forum: Not Just Another Davos

Kazakhstan’s Astana International Forum (AIF) has quietly entered a new phase in its development. Set to convene again this month, it began in 2008 as a targeted economic forum. Over time it has gradually evolved into a broader diplomatic platform aspiring to serve the so-called “Global South” as a whole. The AIF seeks to offer a deliberately open space for structured yet flexible dialogue across economic, political, and security domains, in a world full of international gatherings either overdetermined by legacy institutions or narrowly focused on crisis response. The AIF does not model itself on any existing institution. It is meant neither to replicate global summits nor to impose consensus, nor to replace regional blocs or legacy mechanisms. Rather, it reflects Kazakhstan’s own diplomatic philosophy — what President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev calls “multi-vector foreign policy” — seeking to extend this philosophy outward through a forum that prioritizes engagement over alignment and dialogue over doctrine. The AIF’s early period, from 2008 through roughly 2015, was defined by foundational work. Then called the Astana Economic Forum, it brought together central bankers, financial policymakers, and development agencies. The scope was technocratic, focusing on macroeconomic modernization and public-sector reform. Even in this limited format, however, the initiative revealed Kazakhstan's national aspiration to connect with wider global trends in institutional development and governance. Those formative years correspond to what, in terms of complex-systems theory, might be called the Forum’s phase of “emergence”: a period of assembling functions, testing formats, and learning the rhythms of international convening. These years were not marked by geopolitical ambition, but they did set in motion a process of institutional self-recognition. Kazakhstan was not just hosting events; it was experimenting with a type of global presence that would grow more distinct in later years. From 2015 to 2022, the Forum entered a more self-defining stage. It retained its core economic focus, but it increasingly attracted participants from beyond financial and development sectors. This broadened its scope to include questions of connectivity, regional stability, and sustainable development. The shift was not an accident. It accompanied Kazakhstan’s growing involvement in regional diplomacy and its active participation in a range of other multilateral structures. During this second period, the Forum took on the character of an institution with internal momentum. (This is what complex-systems theorists might term “autopoiesis,” i.e., the ability of a system to reproduce and maintain itself.) By adapting to a wider field of participants and issues, the AIF began to articulate a mission no longer limited to showcasing Kazakhstan’s domestic reforms but extending toward the creation of new transnational linkages. The rebranding of the old Astana Economic Forum as the Astana International Forum affirmed this shift in mandate, scope, and ambition. That rebranding marked the beginning of what now appears to be a critical inflection point. The cancellation of the 2024 edition due to catastrophic flooding created a rupture; but the organizers, rather than rush a replacement, deferred the Forum and used the intervening time to clarify its structure and message. The...

Water Security

Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal Could Impact Kazakhstan’s Water Security

The construction of the Qosh-Tepa Canal in Afghanistan and its potential implications for Central Asia’s water security were central topics at the recent international conference, Water Security and Transboundary Water Use: Challenges and Solutions, held in Astana. Delegates from Turkey, Israel, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan convened to address the canal’s possible repercussions and broader issues of regional water distribution. Potential Threats to the Syr Darya Kazakhstan’s Deputy Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, Aslan Abdraimov, warned that the Qosh-Tepa Canal could significantly reduce the flow of the Syr Darya River, with direct consequences for the already depleted Aral Sea. While Kazakhstan does not share a border with Afghanistan, the canal's impact is expected to ripple across the region. “No sharp fluctuations in water resources are expected in the near term, but in the long term, a reduction in the Syr Darya’s flow is inevitable,” Abdraimov stated. He emphasized that this would further strain the fragile water balance in the Aral Sea basin. The Aral Sea’s degradation has been ongoing for decades, largely due to the diversion of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers for agricultural use, primarily for irrigating cotton and wheat fields. These diversions have contributed heavily to the sea’s dramatic shrinkage. Azamatkhan Amirtayev, chairman of Kazakhstan’s Baytak Party, expressed concern that the Qosh-Tepa Canal could divert 25-30% of the Amu Darya’s flow. “This means that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will receive less water. Consequently, Uzbekistan may draw more from the Syr Darya, leading to reduced water availability for Kazakhstan, potentially by 30-40%,” Amirtayev said. He urged for regional cooperation and scientifically informed policymaking to mitigate water losses. The Qosh-Tepa Canal and Its Regional Consequences The Qosh-Tepa Canal, under construction in northern Afghanistan, is designed to stretch 285 kilometers and span approximately 100 meters in width. Once operational, it is expected to irrigate over 500,000 hectares of farmland by diverting up to 10 cubic kilometers of water annually from the Amu Darya, roughly a quarter of the river’s average flow. Such a significant withdrawal could disrupt the hydrological balance across Central Asia. Reduced flows in the Syr Darya may accelerate the desiccation of the Aral Sea and exacerbate ecological degradation in Kazakhstan’s downstream regions. Experts at the conference underscored the urgency of strengthening regional water diplomacy and establishing new cooperative frameworks to ensure sustainable water usage and prevent environmental disasters. Hope for Dialogue Afghan representatives have previously signaled a willingness to engage in dialogue on water resource management. Observers suggest that joint initiatives in water management could play a key role in easing regional tensions and improving environmental outcomes. As the region faces mounting water stress due to climate change, population growth, and infrastructure development, coordinated action among Central Asian states and Afghanistan is increasingly seen as essential for long-term water security.

Trade Routes

The Abu Dhabi-Kazakhstan Connection

Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan led a delegation of officials and businessmen from the United Arab Emirates on a visit to Kazakhstan to attend the Kazakhstan-UAE Business Forum on May 12. During the visit, Kazakhstan and the UAE signed deals worth some $5 billion and not surprisingly, three of the nine agreements were with Abu Dhabi Ports Group. Building a new trade route to the south Abu Dhabi Ports Group (AD Ports Group) has been leading the way in connecting Kazakhstan to the Middle East, and in turn, the UAE company is looking to take advantage of Kazakhstan’s key position along the Middle Corridor trade route. In early August 2023, Davud Tafti, the head of AD Ports Group subsidiary Simatech Shipping & Forwarding, met with Kazakhstan’s Minister of Trade Serik Zhumangarin to discuss the shortest direct route for shipping “Kazakh export cargo the markets of the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Pakistan, India and the coast of East Africa.” The route goes from Kazakhstan’s Caspian port of Kuryk to the Iranian Caspian port at Amirabad. From there goods are shipped to the Iranian Persian Gulf port at Bandar Abbas and loaded onto ships heading to UAE ports at Khalifa and Fujairah. The total time from Kuryk to Bandar Abbas is three days. By the time Tafti and Zhumangarin met, AD Ports Group had already purchased four ships with a capacity of 7.500 tons each for transportation of bulk, container, and general cargo along Caspian Sea routes. Tafti said there were plans to buy ten more similar vessels with Amirabad being used as their home port. Simatech Shipping & Forwarding also bought two barges, each capable of transporting 350 trucks, with plans to purchase 1,000 trucks for shipping goods between Amirabad and Bandar Abbas. AD Ports Group signed a strategic partnership agreement with state oil and gas company KazMunaiGas (KMG) in January 2023 aimed at developing Kazakhstan’s tanker fleet in the Caspian and Black seas. The parties formed a joint venture called Caspian Integrated Maritime Solutions (CIMS). CIMS announced in December 2023 that working with KMG subsidiary KazMorTransFlot, Kazakhstan’s national shipping company, it had acquired two oil tankers for use in the Caspian Sea. AD Ports Group reached an agreement in January 2024 to construct a facility on Kazakhstan’s Caspian coast for building and repairing ships. Work started in early 2025 on two container vessels, each with the capacity to carry more than 500 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) and built especially for use on the Caspian Sea. AD Ports Group also formed a joint venture with state railway company Kazakhstan Temir Zholy in December 2023 with the aim of improving logistics operations for transferring goods using rail and maritime routes. At the moment, the CIMS route is by far the fastest way for Kazakhstan to trade with the Middle East. In May 2025, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy sent the first shipment of wheat via Turkmenistan and Iran to Bandar Abbas, and from there by sea...

Russia's War

Opinion: The Ukraine-Russia Peace Talks Need Multiple Platforms for Negotiations

The proposed Istanbul meeting between Zelensky and Putin on May 15 did not take place, with no Russian ministers attending the talks Putin himself had called for, leading Zelensky to describe the Russian delegation as "phony". Hopes for peace remain, however, as other stakeholders have expressed their eagerness to support a resolution. With its unique geopolitical position as a bridge between Europe and Asia, Turkey was an obvious choice to host the negotiations. While Turkey has sought to maintain balanced relations throughout the conflict, its provision of military support to Ukraine, including drones, has complicated its image as a neutral party. Despite this, as a NATO member with significant energy partnerships with Russia, Turkey serves as a crucial intermediary. Furthermore, its active role in initiatives like the Black Sea Grain Agreement has reinforced its credibility in international diplomacy. Turkey’s continued involvement, therefore, benefits not only the peace process but also its own economic and strategic interests. Turkey is not the only stakeholder on the periphery of Russia, however; Kazakhstan is also well-positioned to contribute to the peace negotiations. Kazakhstan’s shared history with Russia and Ukraine as former Soviet republics has shaped mutual economic and security frameworks, rooted in decades of centralized governance and cooperation. The continued use of the Russian language as one medium of communication across these nations underscores intertwined cultural and historical links. Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia spans centuries, marked by alliances, trade, and cultural exchange, further deepening ties beyond the Soviet era. In recent years, Kazakhstan has diversified its alliances through its multi-vector foreign policy. It has forged strong relationships with China, the U.S., the EU, and organizations like the SCO and EAEU while cultivating robust economic ties. Its energy sector has attracted major foreign investors such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Shell. By hosting peace talks and global summits, Kazakhstan has established itself as a neutral mediator, balancing traditional ties with Russia while expanding its global influence. Kazakhstan also has an impressive record in terms of peace negotiations. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev hosted pivotal talks in Almaty in 2024 between Armenia and Azerbaijan, addressing over three decades of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Kazakhstan also played a key role in facilitating the 2018 agreement on the Caspian Sea’s legal status, which resolved disputes over resources and territorial boundaries. The country hosted multiple rounds of Syrian peace talks starting in Astana in 2017, bringing together the Syrian government, opposition groups, and international stakeholders, including Russia and Turkey. Similarly, it provided a platform for the Iran nuclear talks in 2013 and supported the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Kazakhstan’s neutrality and commitment to diplomacy have earned it credibility as a Middle Power in fostering agreements on contentious issues. Additionally, Kazakhstan hosted the 2010 OSCE Summit that led to the adoption of the Astana Declaration. This reaffirmed the Helsinki Principles on peace, security, and cooperation from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It represented a critical collective commitment to territorial integrity, sovereignty, and human rights since the dissolution of the USSR. The summit underscored Kazakhstan’s role in...