• KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
16 November 2026

Viewing results 25 - 30 of 1990

Iran Says Samarkand Heritage Posts Targeted U.S.

Iran has said that posts by its embassies about Samarkand’s Persian heritage were directed at the United States. The explanation followed a diplomatic protest from Uzbekistan, which demanded the removal of posts describing the city’s architecture as part of Persian civilization. Esmaeil Baghaei, spokesperson for Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said on October 26 that Tehran attaches great importance to its relations with Uzbekistan and views their shared cultural heritage as a foundation of friendship between the two countries. "Some of our colleagues at certain embassies published their messages as an address to the American side," Baghaei explained. In the reported remarks, Baghaei did not specifically address the architectural claims made in the embassy posts. The dispute followed U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Samarkand on October 19. Accompanied by Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of Uzbekistan’s Presidential Administration, he visited Registan Square, one of Central Asia’s best-known landmarks. Rubio spoke about Samarkand’s historical role in international trade and the region’s importance to relations with Washington. The posts appeared to be a response to a speech Rubio gave in Athens on October 7, in which he recalled the Persian destruction of the Acropolis in 480 BC and sharply criticized Iran’s current leadership. Following Rubio’s visit to Samarkand, Iranian embassies in several countries posted photographs and videos on X showing him in front of the city’s historic monuments, arguing that he was surrounded by the Persian cultural heritage he had attacked earlier that month. Iran’s embassy in Armenia wrote that the site visited by the U.S. secretary of state was part of Persian civilization and architecture. The Iranian diplomatic mission in Zimbabwe described Registan’s arches as a characteristic feature of Iranian-Islamic civilization. On October 23, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Ali Eskandari and delivered a diplomatic note of protest. Tashkent regarded the posts as one-sided and politicized, saying the heritage of Samarkand and other historic Uzbek cities reflected centuries of cultural development and formed part of Uzbekistan’s history. By October 26, Iranian embassies in Armenia, Bulgaria, Zimbabwe, Finland, and China had removed the posts, according to Uzbek Foreign Ministry spokesperson Omonulla Fayziev. The dispute touched on the sensitive issue of competing claims to Central Asia’s cultural heritage. Samarkand was one of the centers of ancient Sogdiana and later belonged to states ruled by different dynasties. Persian language and culture played an important role in the city’s life for centuries. Samarkand also remains home to a substantial Tajik population, and Tajik, a variety of Persian, is still widely spoken, particularly in the historic center. The monuments around Registan Square, built between the 15th and 17th centuries, reflect the city’s history under different rulers and the influence of several cultural traditions. Since Uzbekistan’s independence in 1991, they have also become national symbols.

Trump Reaffirms Support for Kazakhstan Ahead of G20 Summit

United States President Donald Trump has reaffirmed his support for Kazakhstan’s independence and territorial integrity and said he looks forward to meeting President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in December. The remarks were made in a congratulatory message marking Kazakhstan’s Republic Day, published by Kazakhstan’s presidential office on October 27. "Our commitment to your country's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity remains unshakeable," Trump wrote. He also claimed that the U.S. was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan as an independent state in 1991. The U.S. president highlighted growing cooperation in international security and trade. He noted the role of American companies in Kazakhstan’s economy and expressed confidence in the future of bilateral relations. The summit will take place in Doral, near Miami, Florida. Kazakhstan is not a G20 member but has received an invitation from the U.S. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had reported preparations for Tokayev’s participation in the summit as early as August. At the time, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev discussed bilateral relations with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Paul Kapur, including cooperation in energy, critical minerals, digital technologies, and transportation. In November 2025, Tokayev visited Washington, met with Trump, and attended the C5+1 summit, a forum bringing together the U.S. and the five Central Asian countries. During the visit, the two sides announced 29 agreements worth approximately $17 billion, covering sectors including mining, aviation, and technology. Kazakhstan celebrated Republic Day on October 25, with congratulatory messages from world leaders. This year marked the 36th anniversary of the adoption of Kazakhstan’s Declaration of State Sovereignty.

Uzbek Labor Migration to Russia Falls 13.2% in First Half of 2026

Uzbek citizens accounted for more work-related arrivals in Russia than any other nationality in the first half of 2026, despite a 13.2% decline compared with a year earlier. According to data published by TASS on October 26, Uzbek citizens listed employment as the purpose of entry on 1,178,609 occasions. Tajikistan ranked second with 494,518 entries, followed by Kyrgyzstan with 289,061, Kazakhstan and China. The statistics count border entries rather than individual people: a single worker may have crossed the Russian border several times. The Central Bank of Uzbekistan reported approximately 1.358 million such trips in the first half of 2025, nearly 180,000 more than a year later. Russia remains Uzbekistan's largest overseas labor market, but the number of Uzbek citizens working in other countries is growing. In 2025, the number of Uzbek workers in the European Union increased by 13.2%, while the figure for Turkey rose by 10.7%. As of July 1, 2026, approximately 70,000 Uzbek citizens were in Turkey, and 102,200 were in South Korea, both increases from a year earlier. These figures reflect the number of citizens present in the respective countries and do not necessarily correspond to employment statistics. Despite the decline in work-related trips, remittances from Russia to Uzbekistan increased by 8.8% in the first half of 2026. For Uzbekistan, remittances are a significant source of household income. The Central Bank has warned that declining labor migration could eventually reduce household incomes and consumer spending. Meanwhile, the number of advertised vacancies in Uzbekistan fell by 9.8% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2026, while competition for jobs intensified. Unpaid wages are another persistent problem. During the first nine months of 2026, Uzbekistan's Migration Agency handled complaints from 817 citizens concerning unpaid wages and compensation, recovering a total of $850,000 from foreign employers. Of these complaints, 533 came from Russia, 155 from Turkey, and 92 from South Korea. The agency also helped 532 Uzbek citizens recover identity documents withheld by intermediaries or employers. Russia accounted for 331 such cases and Turkey for 185. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Russia accounted for 72.4% of remittances received by Uzbekistan in the first quarter of 2026, despite its declining share.

C5+1 Statement Omits Afghanistan, Prioritizes Trans-Caspian Trade

The United States and the five Central Asian republics have issued a joint statement on economic and security cooperation that makes no mention of Afghanistan, once a central concern of U.S. regional policy. The document followed the October 19 C5+1 ministerial meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Afghanistan's absence from the statement does not mean it has disappeared from negotiations or Washington's strategic interests. Nevertheless, a comparison with earlier C5+1 documents reveals a shift in the published agenda. Where Washington once placed considerable importance on connecting Central Asia with South Asia through Afghanistan, the latest statement focuses on trade across the Caspian Sea and investment in the region's minerals. Afghanistan's Changing Place in C5+1 Talks In July 2021, just weeks before the Taliban retook Kabul, C5+1 participants at a conference in Tashkent explicitly supported closer trade and transport links between Central and South Asia through Afghanistan, as well as efforts to secure peace in the country. That month, the U.S., Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan also announced plans for a quadrilateral platform to support trade and transportation projects linking the two regions. In July 2023, Afghanistan was the subject of a separate C5+1 special session in Astana. Officials called for an inclusive Afghan government that respected women's rights and backed further development of transport and energy links through the country. A joint statement issued by C5+1 leaders that September described Afghanistan as an important factor in Central Asian security. In the 2026 Samarkand statement, Afghanistan goes unmentioned even in the section on border security and terrorism. However, the October 2023 C5+1 connectivity statement had already highlighted the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, which connects Central Asia to Western markets, and also omitted Afghanistan. For Central Asian countries, the Afghan route remains important in practical terms. Uzbekistan is pursuing plans for a railway through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which would give it access to Indian Ocean ports. Kazakhstan is already a major supplier of food to Afghanistan, exporting around $216 million worth of flour and $122 million of wheat in the first seven months of 2026. In September, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also agreed with the United Arab Emirates to study a railway corridor through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan all share borders with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also face the prospect of reduced water supplies from the Amu Darya as Afghanistan builds its Qosh Tepa Canal. Afghanistan's omission from a joint statement should therefore not be taken as a complete account of the policies of all five Central Asian states. What Constrains Washington One possible explanation lies in the U.S. approach to Afghanistan's current authorities. Washington allows practical contacts with representatives of the Taliban but does not recognize the government it has formed. The movement remains designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, although it is not included in the U.S. Department of State's separate list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The designation restricts dealings with the Taliban, although U.S. sanctions rules permit many commercial transactions involving Afghanistan's governing institutions, including civilian infrastructure and transportation projects....

CSTO in No Hurry to Help Tajikistan

The authorities in Tajikistan have been ringing the alarm bells over events in neighboring Afghanistan for more than three decades. The Tajik government did so again after violence broke out along a small section of the Tajik-Afghan border in the last months of 2025, and specifically called on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for assistance. The CSTO has responded, but the promised aid has yet to arrive as Tajikistan continues to seek stronger border defenses. The Perennial Border Problem There had been unrest in Afghanistan since the late 1970s, long before Tajikistan became independent in late 1991, and the instability along Tajikistan’s approximately 1,360-kilometer border with Afghanistan has continued ever since. Most of the border area is mountainous and sparsely inhabited, making it ideal for narcotics and weapons smuggling. Weapons smuggling was a huge problem during Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, when weapons were being brought back and forth across the Afghan frontier to fuel civil conflicts in both countries. From the first day of Tajikistan’s independence until June 2005, Russian border guards helped keep watch on Tajikistan’s Afghan frontier. At least several hundred Russian and Tajik border guards, and Tajik and Afghan smugglers and militants have been killed along the Tajik-Afghan border in the last 35 years. Many countries worried about Tajikistan’s border problems with Afghanistan. Neighbors such as China, the other Central Asian states, and not so far away, Russia did not want narcotics or militants from Afghanistan reaching their countries. In the mid- and late-1990s, the Taliban push through Afghanistan to the Central Asian border increased these neighbors’ concerns. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the United States and its allies used facilities in Central Asia to support troops in Afghanistan. All these countries, and more, contributed to Tajikistan’s border defenses in some way, either by simply donating housing materials or winter uniforms, or providing security monitoring equipment and weaponry. It has never been enough to totally stem the border problems, but the security aid Tajikistan received is far more than the country could ever have allocated for that purpose from its state coffers. Emomali Rahmon was Tajikistan’s president in the late 1990s when the Taliban first seized power in Afghanistan. Rahmon viewed the Taliban as a threat, and Tajikistan’s policies toward the Afghan militant group reflected that. Rahmon’s opinion of the Taliban did not change when they regained power in 2021, and despite the other Central Asian states establishing a dialogue and trade ties with the Taliban, Tajikistan has been slow to engage the returned rulers of Afghanistan. In June 2024, Rahmon’s eldest son and heir apparent, Rustam Emomali, told a meeting of the CSTO’s Parliamentary Assembly Council that “Afghanistan has once again become a breeding ground for terrorism.” Emomali said more than 1,000 radical madrassahs had been established in Afghanistan, some in areas close to Tajikistan’s border, and that these religious schools were also preparing suicide bombers. A Turbulent End to 2025 In late August 2025, Tajik border guards...

A First for Kyrgyzstan – Japarov’s Historic Visit to Armenia

For the first time, a Kyrgyz head of state has made an official visit to Armenia. President Sadyr Japarov arrived in Yerevan on October 15 at the invitation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and called the three-day trip “historic.” Talks remained firmly bilateral and produced ten signed agreements, a joint commitment to protect Lake Issyk-Kul and Lake Sevan (Armenia), and a stated interest in expanding transit links. Nothing in Japarov’s statement framed cooperation as directed against any third country. He presented it in terms of trade, cooperation, and friendly relations, with dialogue and peace underpinning regional stability. Japarov opened his remarks by noting that Pashinyan had visited Kyrgyzstan twice this year, including the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council session in Cholpon-Ata in August. Pashinyan, for his part, said Japarov’s first official visit to Armenia would open a new page in bilateral relations. Kyrgyzstan and Armenia have been independent since 1991, and both belong to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a five-nation bloc with a common market for goods, services, capital, and labor. Even so, their leaders have mostly met on the sidelines of multilateral summits. Quiet to Active Diplomacy Under Japarov, Kyrgyzstan has abandoned its quiet diplomacy and begun taking a more active role in international affairs. This year, Japarov has traveled to Armenia (October 15-17), Azerbaijan (October 14-15 and May 17), Turkmenistan (October 8-9), the United States (from September 19), South Korea (September 15-18), Kazakhstan (July 29, May 28-29, and May 15) and Russia (April 23). He reached Armenia fresh from the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Baku, where Central Asian leaders linked trade and security issues. Bishkek’s shift in foreign policy emphasis owes less to geopolitics than to economic necessity and a practical, non-ideological pursuit of national interests. Its commitment to dialogue, regional stability and good-neighborliness is central to a foreign policy aimed at win-win results. Biodiversity Diplomacy In Yerevan, Japarov attended the opening of the Leaders' Summit within the 17th UN Conference of the Parties on Biological Diversity (COP17). On October 16, he addressed the plenary, presenting initiatives on glacier melt and biodiversity in Central Asia, and met UNESCO Director-General Khaled El-Enany. Among the specific proposals, Japarov recommended a special mountain program within the Global Environment Facility at the World Bank to fund environmental projects in mountain regions, and a UN-backed trust fund for Issyk-Kul, to which Kyrgyzstan proposed an initial $10 million contribution from its state budget. He also called for a Global Center for Mountain Region Resilience in Bishkek, where countries could share knowledge and experience on environmental protection. Japarov further backed a debt-for-nature swap mechanism, which would let countries use financial resources more effectively to protect ecosystems, and urged stronger regional cooperation to protect rare animals and birds. The Yerevan Declaration followed the usual diplomatic template, restricted mainly to high-level language. Japarov invited Pashinyan to attend “Bishkek+25,” the Second Global Mountain Summit, on 21–23 October 2027, to mark the culmination of Kyrgyzstan’s Five Years of Action for Mountain Development. Transport at...