Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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RFE/RL

Opinion: What the Loss of RFE/RL Would Mean for Central Asia

The decision to terminate the federal grant agreement funding for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a crushing blow for hundreds of millions of people. These people know their governments are not telling them the full truth about what is happening in their countries or in the world outside. The objective information provided by RFE/RL has been important to people such as these. Perhaps as important, since the end of the Cold War, was the platform RFE/RL provides, whenever possible, for people in these countries to explain their views to the outside world. I know, because I worked at RFE/RL for 25 years covering Central Asia. RFE/RL was founded in 1950, and I didn’t show up there until 1997. I can only speak about what I saw and heard when I was an RFE/RL employee. My understanding of my tasks as an RFE/RL employee was that we were supposed to keep close track of what was happening in Central Asia, cover as many of the important topics of the region as possible, and make objective and accurate information on these topics available to the people in Central Asia. During Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, for example, RFE/RL’s Tajik service, Radio Ozodi, was the most trusted source of information for the people of Tajikistan. During the Coronavirus pandemic, the Turkmen government would not even allow the word COVID to be spoken and denied there were any cases of the virus in the country, leaving RFE/RL’s Turkmen service, Azatlyk, as one of the only sources of information for Turkmenistan’s people about the illness. I lived in Central Asia before joining RFE/RL, so I had some idea of what was important to people there. Calling for respect for fundamental rights is a big part of RFE/RL’s work. Read the constitutions of any Central Asian country and you will see enshrined there the right to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to freely receive or disseminate information, and much more. In practice, these rights are not always observed in Central Asia. In such a situations RFE/RL’s Central Asian services are a voice for those who, with good reason, are afraid to speak out publicly, or more importantly, for those who did speak out and are punished for that. At RFE/RL we looked for “impact stories,” testimony from people of the region about unfulfilled government promises, abuses, or state mismanagement that were hurting communities and individuals. Central Asian government officials are among the most faithful RFE/RL listeners, and often RFE/RL reports that raised social issues led officials to rectify the situation. Ramshackle buildings or schools were suddenly repaired, electricity or running water became accessible to city districts and rural areas, sufficient food became available to communities. The pleas of average citizens too often fell on deaf ears in government halls, but the criticism of an international organization such as RFE/RL, which was broadcasting to the entire country and Central Asian region, was too embarrassing for officials to ignore. This made RFE/RL unpopular with Central...

Bilateral Relations

Kazakhstan’s Geoeconomic Rise and Why the U.S. Must Act Now – Opinion

The recent call between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu highlights an evolving but structurally inevitable dynamic: the growing convergence of interests between Washington and Astana. Kazakhstan has been explicit about its priorities — independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and balanced external relations. The U.S. has strategic imperatives that align directly with what Kazakhstan can offer, particularly in the domains of supply chain diversification, energy security, and critical minerals. The two countries now have the opportunity, reinforced by shifts in global economic and security networks, to establish a substantive and resilient bilateral relationship. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has pursued an adaptive strategy of multi-vector diplomacy. This balancing mechanism is not merely a preference but rather an intrinsic requirement for preserving its sovereignty in a structurally asymmetric regional environment that is dictated by its geostrategic positioning. U.S. policymakers should recognize that Kazakhstan’s entanglements with Russia through security frameworks and its economic cooperation with China are not exclusionary choices. They are stabilizing counterweights that act to sustain Kazakhstan’s agency. The U.S. must embed itself within this framework. This means serving as a complementary pillar of economic and strategic equilibrium and not supplanting those existing ties. That means Washington’s approach has to pivot. For too long, U.S. engagement with Kazakhstan has been episodic and reactive, lacking internal logic and conditioned by external crises. Diplomatic rhetoric on democratic values and governance, while relevant, cannot substitute for material economic and strategic interdependence. For the U.S. to secure a meaningful place in Kazakhstan’s geopolitical architecture, it must offer tangible incentives through structured economic integration that reinforces Astana’s sovereignty. The two countries’ geoeconomic interests coincide most strongly in the issue areas of energy security, critical minerals, and telecommunications infrastructure. Vulnerabilities exposed by recent global shocks have forced the U.S. to recalibrate toward supply chain resilience. In this context, redundancy and diversification are no longer inefficiencies but have become security imperatives. Kazakhstan’s relevance to these concerns is a direct consequence of its resource endowments and logistical positioning. Energy security is the first pillar of stabilization. Kazakhstan, one of the world’s foremost uranium producers and a major oil and gas supplier, has continually expanded non-Russian export corridors westward to reduce its dependence on Russian transit routes. The U.S., having maintained a legacy of investment in Kazakhstan’s energy sector, should now move toward embedding its involvement within these diversified export pathways. This win-win solution would ensure that Kazakhstan’s resource flows are not beholden to Russian infrastructure bottlenecks. Critical minerals represent the second pillar. The U.S. legislative push under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS Act mandates a diversification of supply chains for rare earth elements (REEs) and other critical materials. Kazakhstan’s reserves of REEs, copper, and other industrial inputs logically make it an important node in a decentralized, resilient industrial network. However, investment must not remain exclusively extractive in nature. The objective must be to integrate Kazakhstan into midstream processing and value-added production, again producing...

Economy

Kyrgyzstan’s Economic Boom or Bust? Calls for Inclusive Growth Persist

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov declared late last year that the country’s economic growth had reached historic milestones, with GDP maintaining positive momentum. However, local economists remain skeptical about the broader impact of this growth. In 2020, Kyrgyzstan’s GDP stood at 639 billion KGS ($7.3 billion), according to official data. By the end of 2025, this figure is projected to reach 1.8 trillion KGS ($22 billion). Growth Without Inclusion In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, economist Nurgul Akimova acknowledged that the reported 9% GDP growth and the so-called “leopard’s leap” frequently mentioned by the government are positive developments. However, she stressed that for economic expansion to be meaningful for ordinary citizens, it must be inclusive. "Nine percent growth is not inclusive because it does not create additional jobs. The main drivers of our economic growth are construction, downstream industries, and the financial sector. These sectors do not contribute to improving human capital. In construction, for instance, a significant portion of costs goes toward imported building materials," Akimova explained. According to Akimova, Kyrgyzstan’s economy has followed an inertia-driven trajectory for the past 30 years, avoiding major shocks but also failing to achieve significant breakthroughs. She pointed out that if the garment sector were growing, it would have a greater impact, as it did 15 years ago when Kyrgyz-made clothing was exported to neighboring countries. "For example, a seamstress spends her income on education, healthcare, and consumption. By doing so, she contributes to the development of other inclusive sectors, benefiting society as a whole," Akimova said, adding that while the economy is expanding, it is not improving the welfare of citizens. A People-Centered Economy Akimova emphasized that economic policy should prioritize people’s wellbeing, as failure to do so could erode public trust in the government. She also criticized official comparisons of Kyrgyzstan’s economic growth with other countries, arguing that such assessments lack context. "Officials claim Kyrgyzstan is growing faster than others, but an economy that produces microchips and one that manufactures T-shirts are fundamentally different. These industries require distinct investment levels, equipment, and human capital." Kyrgyzstan’s economy is currently valued at approximately $14 billion. If the country were to sustain an annual 10% growth rate, as authorities suggest, GDP would increase by $1.4 billion per year. Akimova highlighted that this figure represents only 0.5% of Kazakhstan’s economic growth, 0.06% of Russia’s, and a mere 0.0006% of the United States’ GDP expansion. "When we hear claims that we are growing faster than others, we must consider the scale and complexity of economic processes," the economist concluded.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan: Rentier State or Hostage to Foreign Aid?

The current geopolitical turbulence presents Afghanistan and the countries of Central Asia with serious challenges. After the Taliban's return to power in 2021, Afghanistan found itself in a state of deep economic crisis, and its continued stability once again depends on external assistance. However, with the shifting global order, traditional donors such as the U.S. and the European Union are scaling back their involvement in Afghan affairs, while new sources of support remain uncertain. This creates significant risks for the countries of the region, which must find ways to minimize the consequences of Afghanistan’s crisis and ensure their own security. Historical context: dependence through the ages Afghanistan has always been dependent on external sources of income. This historical context was explored by Ali Nuriyev (historian, blogger, and researcher of the Ottoman world) in his article for TRT, "Afghanistan: The Graveyard of Empires or a Rentier State?" “As flattering as it may be for Afghans to have a reputation as [a nation that has kept its independence despite incursions from Great Powers], everything comes at a price, including Afghanistan’s independence”. Nuriyev provides a detailed analysis showing that since the founding of modern Afghanistan in the 18th century by Ahmad Shah Durrani, the country has built its economy and politics on external sources of income. Durrani financed his campaigns through raids on India, while his successors received subsidies from the British in exchange for maintaining neutrality in the "Great Game" between the British Empire and Russia. Later, in the 20th century, Afghanistan skillfully played on the rivalry between the USSR and the U.S., securing billions of dollars for infrastructure, education, and military modernization. By the 1970s, two-thirds of the country's state budget came from foreign aid. Even after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan continued to rely on external support. The governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani survived primarily due to funding from the United States and its allies. Today, following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Afghanistan is once again searching for new sources of income. Sanctions and frozen assets have forced the Taliban to seek support from China, Russia, and other nations, further proving that the country’s reliance on foreign aid remains unchanged. This is the historical reality: Afghanistan is a state that, for centuries, has survived thanks to external resources. Its independence has always been closely tied to its ability to extract benefits from the geopolitical maneuvers of great powers. In the present day, this historical context can be interpreted in different ways. However, one fact remains clear, today’s geopolitical turbulence is already having a negative impact on Afghanistan. Afghanistan's adaptation As the global order shifts, the key players on the "Afghan track" are adjusting their strategies toward Afghanistan, exacerbating the country’s economic crisis. United States – For Afghanistan, the new realities in the U.S. mean reduced aid and frozen assets. The U.S., which had long been Afghanistan’s primary donor, is unlikely to increase financial support soon. Following...

Oil and Gas

Opinion: Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan: Kazakhstan Asserts Contract Stability Amid Lawsuits Exceeding $170 Billion

Following statements by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the intrigue surrounding the PSA agreements for Kashagan and Karachaganak and the stabilized contract for Tengiz have taken on new dimensions. Previously, in the articles, Breaking Down Kazakhstan’s Claims Against International Oil Consortiums and Is Kazakhstan Preparing to Take on the Oil Consortium “Whales?, TCA examined the ongoing lawsuits filed by the government and the authorized body, PSA LLC, against the North Caspian Operating Company N.V. (NCOC) and Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (KPO), noting that the Ministry of Energy and KazMunayGas have not raised any claims against the joint venture Tengizchevroil LLP (TCO). While shares in NCOC and KPO are managed by PSA LLC, those in TCO are controlled by the national company, KazMunayGas. What did President Tokayev say? On January 28, President Tokayev held an expanded government meeting addressing the public and political debate surrounding PSA agreements. "Reforms in the subsoil use sector must continue, no matter what," Tokayev stated. "This is a fundamental position that the government should firmly adhere to. The implementation of production-sharing agreements (PSAs) for major oil fields has allowed Kazakhstan to become a reliable supplier of energy resources to the global market. These projects make a significant contribution to the country’s socioeconomic development. However, large investments require a long-term planning horizon. Therefore, the government must intensify negotiations on extending PSA contracts, possibly on updated and more favorable terms for our country." This statement sparked discussions among experts; who exactly was the president referring to? The major PSAs in Kazakhstan are the Karachaganak and Kashagan projects, with contracts expiring in 2038 and 2041, respectively. In contrast, Tengiz does not operate under a PSA but rather a stabilized contract, which is set to expire much sooner, in 2033. I have repeatedly emphasized the need for an audit of Tengiz before the contract expires and have proposed that it should not be extended. Kazakhstan can independently, or with the involvement of foreign oil service companies, develop this highly profitable field under more advantageous conditions. On January 29, Kazakhstan's Minister of Energy, Almassadam Satkaliyev, provided clarification, confirming that the president's directive was specifically about Tengiz. "The directive was given quite openly within the framework of international agreements and international law to conduct consultations with consortium participants. Given the development timelines, the most relevant project for us is Tengizchevroil, which operates the Tengiz field in partnership with Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Lukoil. We plan to start certain preliminary consultations with them, and once we are ready for negotiations, we will proceed with them. The government will first develop an agenda and a list of its demands. One possible demand is an increase in Kazakhstan’s stake in these projects." So, is Tengiz the primary target? Or is Kazakhstan preparing for a broader offensive on all three fronts? “There are Hardliners in the Government” On February 16, the international industry portal Upstream Online published an extensive article titled Kazakhstan Seeks Shake-Up at Crucial Foreign-Led Oil Projects. The article primarily focuses on the production-sharing agreements (PSAs) for Karachaganak...

International Transport

Development of a Maritime Fleet in a Landlocked Country

It may come as a surprise to some, but despite being a landlocked country far from any ocean, Kazakhstan is actively developing its maritime fleet. The country recognizes that to play a significant role in maritime transport across the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan must enhance the competitiveness of its commercial fleet, alongside improving coastal infrastructure and services. This initiative not only generates revenue for Kazakh transport companies and contributes to the national budget but also safeguards the country's foreign trade. Kazakhstan has set an ambitious goal to establish a regional transit hub based on its Caspian Sea ports, Aktau and Kuryk. It is attracting major international players to develop its logistics services and integrate Kazakhstan into the global trade and transport network. However, the development of the national commercial fleet is lagging. The shortage of a strong fleet means Kazakhstan struggles to compete with the maritime industries of other Caspian nations. It is no secret that most maritime transport between the ports of Aktau/Kuryk and Baku is currently handled by the Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping Company, one of the largest maritime transport operators in the region. The company owns more than 50 transport vessels and over 110 specialized ships and plans to implement a large-scale investment program to modernize its fleet by 2029. Meanwhile, according to Kazakhstan’s Bureau of National Statistics, 263 maritime vessels are registered in the country. However, more than 70% of these vessels are over 25 years old. The aging fleet and weak presence in the maritime transport market prevent Kazakhstan from increasing its share in global supply chains, meaning most of the profits from freight transport go to foreign carriers. The longstanding principle discussed in Kazakhstan’s transport sector — “Our Cargo – Our Port – Our Fleet”— could enable domestic transport companies to earn up to 30% more through logistics-related revenue. According to World Bank estimates, by 2030, cargo transportation via the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route is expected to reach 11 million tons. The Concept for the Development of Kazakhstan’s Transport and Logistics Potential until 2030 forecasts that the volume of containerized transit cargo along this corridor from China will grow by at least 40,000 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent units) in the next five years. Over the past decade, Kazakhstan’s domestic tanker fleet has significantly reduced its oil transport operations, as most of the country's crude oil is now transported via pipelines. However, a recent drone attack on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium's (CPC) largest oil pumping station and a subsequent statement from “Transneft” warning that this could lead to a 30% reduction in Kazakhstan’s oil exports highlight the urgent need for an alternative maritime route for oil transport. This would help maintain stable oil production in the country’s fields. Accelerating the modernization and expansion of Kazakhstan’s national fleet will integrate the country into the regional transport and logistics system, reduce dependency on foreign vessels, and protect foreign trade from volatile freight market conditions — especially given ongoing geopolitical uncertainties in the region. A key initiative expected to strengthen Kazakhstan’s...