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Deportation

Austria to Use Uzbekistan as Transit Route for Afghan Deportations Under New Agreement

Austria’s Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger and Interior Minister Gerhard Karner are expected to visit Uzbekistan on May 7 to sign a mobility agreement aimed at strengthening cooperation on migration, according to Die Presse. The agreement is intended to improve coordination between the two countries, particularly on deportations and the return of migrants. Austrian officials say it will create a more structured framework for handling individuals required to leave the country. A key provision involves the use of Uzbekistan as a transit route for deportations to Afghanistan. Afghan nationals facing removal from Austria could be escorted through Uzbekistan to Kabul. Until now, deportations to Afghanistan have largely taken place via Istanbul, meaning the new arrangement would open what officials describe as a “second route.” Karner said the deal would establish “the conditions for the consistent implementation of deportations as part of a firm and fair asylum policy.” The agreement also covers the readmission of nationals, third-country citizens, and stateless individuals who entered the European Union through Uzbekistan. In return, the document includes provisions to support legal migration from Uzbekistan to Austria. Despite its growing economy, Uzbekistan is heavily reliant on remittances from abroad, with Uzbek migrants sending home $4.8 billion in Q2 of 2025. Over the past few years, Tashkent has been seeking out alternative destinations than traditional routes dominated by Russia. To that effect, both Uzbekistan and Austria have committed to promoting “safe, orderly, and regular mobility of qualified workers” in line with national legislation. Austrian authorities note that Uzbek professionals already have multiple pathways to access the country’s labor market. The agreement does not provide for the establishment of return centers for rejected asylum seekers, an idea Austria has been pursuing with several EU partners, including Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Denmark. The visit to Uzbekistan is part of a broader regional trip that will also include Kazakhstan, which Austrian officials consider an important partner, particularly in the energy sector. The planned agreement comes amid continued migration pressures linked to Afghanistan’s humanitarian situation. According to the United Nations Development Programme, in 2024 around 85% of Afghanistan’s population was living on less than $1 a day. In June 2025, the World Food Programme reported that approximately 15 million people in the country were facing severe hunger. At the same time, large-scale deportations from neighboring countries have added to the strain. In July last year, Tajikistan launched a campaign to detain and deport Afghan refugees, giving them 15 days to leave the country.

Foreign Affairs

Czech Prime Minister Says Foreign Ministry Urged Pressure on Kazakhstan Over Russia Ties

On May 2, Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has claimed that officials at the country’s Foreign Ministry advised him to push Kazakhstan to scale back its ties with Russia and China. Speaking to Czech broadcaster TV Nova, Babiš criticized the recommendation, warning it could harm the Czech Republic’s economic interests. Babiš, a billionaire businessman and populist politician, returned to power in December 2025 after his ANO movement won 35% of the vote in the October 2025 parliamentary election and formed a governing coalition. The prime minister said he received a briefing note prepared by the diplomatic service. “They handed me a memo saying I should call on Kazakhstan to limit its relations with Russia and China,” he said. Babiš was vague about the provenance of the memo, describing it as having been drafted by “some officials,” but he suggested that former Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský, a figure associated with the previous pro-Western coalition government (2021–2025), may have been involved in its preparation. Babiš criticized the foreign policy of the previous administration, arguing that it had damaged the Czech Republic’s economic interests. Relations with several major countries, including China, had deteriorated, negatively affecting business activity, he said. The remarks followed Babiš’s visit to Kazakhstan on April 28-29, during which the two sides discussed expanding economic cooperation, including supplies of Kazakh oil and uranium. The Czech Republic views Kazakhstan as an important strategic partner, he added. According to the Kazakh government, bilateral trade between the Czech Republic and Kazakhstan reached approximately $705 million in 2025, a 13% increase on the previous year.

Nuclear Diplomacy

Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Diplomacy Offers Lessons for Iran Crisis

Ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran have yet to resolve a key issue: what will happen to the enriched uranium currently held by a country engulfed in conflict. Beyond political considerations, there are also significant technical challenges, namely, how such material could be safely removed from Iran if an agreement is reached. Kazakhstan, however, has previously carried out a unique operation of this kind, later documented in detail through U.S. and Kazakh accounts, and has a long track record of constructive engagement in nuclear diplomacy. The Uranium Question The parties to the conflict, the United States, Israel, and Iran, remain deeply divided on core issues. Various countries, including Pakistan, have been involved as mediators. At the same time, the situation is complicated by broader military and economic tensions, including the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian oil exports and Iran’s continuing obstruction of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz dominates headlines, often diverting attention from the central issue: the fate of Iran’s uranium stockpile. Axios reported that U.S. and Iranian negotiators had discussed a possible arrangement involving the release of frozen Iranian funds, with a figure of $20 billion under discussion. One U.S. official described that figure as a U.S. proposal, while U.S. President Donald Trump later denied that any money would change hands. IAEA-linked figures put Iran’s stockpile at about 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, close to weapons-grade levels if further enriched. Trump has expressed confidence that Iran will agree to a deal and that the uranium can be removed. Iranian officials, however, have rejected this claim, stating that they do not intend to transfer enriched uranium to the United States or any other country. Tokayev’s Position On April 17, 2026, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev addressed the issue during a diplomatic forum in Antalya, warning that excessive focus on trade routes and the Strait of Hormuz risks overshadowing the core problem, the nuclear issue. “The essence of the problem lies in the proliferation of nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons. This must be the central topic of negotiations when it comes to the conflict around Iran,” Tokayev said. Experts have since highlighted the complexity of the task facing policymakers: not only negotiating terms but physically removing enriched uranium from Iran. This would involve dealing with potentially damaged facilities, ensuring security, deploying specialist teams, defining transport routes, establishing international oversight, and determining a final destination for the material. Against this backdrop, Tokayev’s remarks carry particular weight. While the United States is reported to be insisting not only on limiting future enrichment but also on transferring existing stockpiles, Iran is seeking to separate the nuclear issue from the broader regional crisis. Tokayev, by contrast, has emphasized that energy and shipping disruptions are symptoms of a deeper conflict, with the nuclear issue at its core. Operation Sapphire Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan inherited the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal, after Russia, the United States, and Ukraine. The country was also...

Labor Migration

Kyrgyzstan Expands Efforts to Promote Safe and Organized Labor Migration

A new office of the Center for Employment of Citizens Abroad and the Pre-Departure Training and Migrant Reintegration Center has opened in Osh, Kyrgyzstan’s second city, as part of efforts to promote safer and more structured labor migration. The opening ceremony took place on April 29. The project was implemented by the International Organization for Migration under the “Labour Migration - Central Asia” program, with support from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. The new center in Osh is designed to provide comprehensive support to citizens at all stages of labor migration from pre-departure preparation to reintegration upon return. Services include information on legal and safe employment channels abroad, pre-departure training, consultations on migrant rights and contract conditions, as well as guidance on the risks of labor exploitation and human trafficking. In addition, the center assists job seekers in finding vacancies and organizes online interviews with prospective employers. According to Esenbek Ergeshov, head of the labor migration department at the Center for Employment of Citizens Abroad, around 5,500 Kyrgyz citizens were placed in jobs overseas through the center in 2025, while private agencies facilitated employment abroad for an additional 19,500 people. Kyrgyzstan is also working to diversify its labor migration destinations. While Russia remains the primary destination, interest is growing in countries such as Turkey, South Korea, Japan, and several European countries.

Healthcare

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan Plan Joint Hospital Project in Mazar-i-Sharif

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan have agreed to build a hospital in the Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif under a public-private partnership, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Health said. The agreement was reached during a visit by an Uzbek delegation led by Health Minister Asilbek Khudayarov to Afghanistan, where talks were held with Afghan Health Minister Mawlawi Noor Jalal, Balkh regional governor Mohammad Yusuf Wafa, and other officials. According to the ministry, the Afghan side highlighted the need to expand cooperation in healthcare, noting that many districts in the country still lack hospitals. Officials also pointed to a rise in cancer cases in recent years and requested Uzbekistan’s support in building a medical facility in Mazar-i-Sharif, training specialists, and simplifying procedures for Afghan patients seeking treatment in Uzbekistan. Wafa expressed appreciation for Uzbekistan’s continued support, particularly during difficult periods such as natural disasters, and emphasized the importance of strengthening humanitarian ties between the two countries. During the visit, the Uzbek delegation also toured healthcare facilities in Balkh province, including a district clinic in Dehdadi and the Abu Ali Ibn Sina Central Hospital in Mazar-i-Sharif, where they met with medical staff and reviewed current conditions. As a result of the talks, the parties agreed to establish a joint working group to develop proposals for supporting Afghanistan’s public healthcare system. Plans were also outlined to organize reciprocal visits by Afghan medical delegations to Uzbekistan. The sides discussed launching training programs that would allow up to 100 Afghan specialists each year to improve their qualifications at Uzbekistan’s specialized medical centers. In addition, the possibility of allocating annual scholarships for up to 50 Afghan students to study at Uzbek medical universities was considered. The Uzbek side also agreed to explore simplifying the issuance of medical visas for Afghan patients and easing procedures for the supply and registration of pharmaceuticals produced in Uzbekistan, which Afghan officials said are in strong demand in the local market. A key outcome of the visit was the agreement to construct a hospital in Mazar-i-Sharif in cooperation with Arman Group. Under the arrangement, the Afghan side will invest in the project, adapt an existing building for medical use, and procure modern equipment, while Uzbekistan will provide qualified medical personnel. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that in March, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan established a joint Business Council aimed at strengthening trade and economic ties, bringing together representatives from both countries’ business communities and institutions. The new healthcare agreement reflects a broader trend toward expanding cooperation between the two neighbors.

Abraham Accords

Kazakhstan’s Abraham Accords Dividend

Astana’s entry into the Abraham Accords is not the opening of a relationship with Israel so much as the re-platforming of one. Kazakhstan recognized Israel in the early 1990s and has maintained a functional, if understated, partnership since then. What has changed is the format. An existing bilateral channel is being placed inside diplomatic architecture with better access to political attention, private capital, and commercially useful networks. Kazakhstan announced its intention to join the Accords on November 6, 2025, ahead of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with Donald Trump in Washington. The Times of Central Asia described Kazakhstan as the first Central Asian state and the only non-Middle Eastern or North African country to enter the framework. An official accession ceremony is still pending. For Kazakhstan, the value lies not in symbolism but in the Accords’ convening power. The Accords make Kazakhstan more legible to Israeli technology firms, Gulf investors, American policymakers, and the growing ecosystem of institutions and policy platforms built around regional economic integration. For Astana, this is the practical utility of membership. It does not need the Accords to talk to Israel. It can use them to widen the circle around specific projects. The formulation is also consistent with Kazakhstan’s foreign-policy habits. Astana has not presented the decision as a strategic turn against any other partner. Its Foreign Ministry said accession was made “solely in the interests of Kazakhstan,” and was consistent with a “balanced, constructive, and peaceful foreign policy.” The same statement reaffirmed support for a two-state settlement of the Middle East conflict. That wording appears carefully calibrated. It allows Astana to engage with a Trump-associated diplomatic framework while presenting the decision as an extension of Kazakhstan’s established multi-vector foreign policy, not a departure from it. The better interpretation is additive multi-vectorism in the form of another channel, another table, and another set of possible transactions. A Times of Central Asia analysis made this point directly, arguing that Kazakhstan’s aims include converting symbolic capital into policy traction, developing Gulf co-financing, and preserving equilibrium with Moscow and Beijing. The commercial agenda is already visible. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s January 2026 visit to Astana, the first by an Israeli foreign minister in 16 years, produced a package of institutional and economic steps. A Kazakhstan-Israel business forum ran alongside the official meetings, and the sides identified a project map covering high-tech agriculture, water management, digital technologies, artificial intelligence, infrastructure, logistics, energy efficiency, renewables, healthcare, and pharmaceuticals. These sectors are not ornamental but match Kazakhstan’s own reform priorities of productivity, digital administration, non-resource growth, infrastructure modernization, and technology transfer. Israel’s appeal lies less in its market size than in its applied capability. Gulf participation, where available, adds scale and financing. The Accords can help package those elements into projects that are easier for companies, development institutions, and governments to recognize. Energy and infrastructure may become the most consequential tests. The Times of Central Asia has argued that the Accords could give Israeli firms a clearer political and legal framework for...