• KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10724 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10724 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10724 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10724 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10724 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10724 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10724 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10724 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 1763

Megaprojects Instead of Quotas: How Central Asia’s Water Diplomacy Is Changing

Central Asia’s water politics are moving beyond Soviet-era quotas. As glaciers in the Tien Shan retreat and climate pressure increases, river management has become a question of energy security, food production, and regional stability. The Soviet-era system of river-water allocation has reached its limits, forcing Central Asian states to look beyond traditional negotiations and toward joint ownership of strategic water infrastructure. Even as regional governments learn to cooperate more closely, a new challenge is emerging on Central Asia’s southern frontier, one that could disrupt the region’s hydrological balance. The Illusion of Control Formally, Central Asia’s water resources are governed through a network of interstate institutions. The principal mechanisms are the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). On paper, the system appears effective. Twice a year, ahead of the spring-summer irrigation season and the autumn-winter period, representatives of the region’s countries meet to approve water-withdrawal quotas from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins. At the end of 2025, for example, officials meeting in Ashgabat agreed on water allocations for 2026, setting total withdrawals from the Amu Darya at nearly 55.4 billion cubic meters. This framework has helped prevent open interstate conflicts by providing a permanent forum for dialogue. However, its foundation remains the 1992 Almaty Agreement, which essentially preserved a Soviet-era quota system designed for a single centrally planned state rather than a group of independent countries with competing interests. The greatest weakness of the system is the absence of any meaningful enforcement mechanism. If one country exceeds its agreed allocation during a drought year, there are no legal or economic penalties. Disputes are instead resolved through emergency negotiations between ministries or, in some cases, direct interventions by heads of state. A system dependent on political goodwill and personal relationships is increasingly fragile in an era of climate stress. Turning Water Disputes Into Joint Investments As the quota system shows signs of strain, Central Asian countries have begun experimenting with a more pragmatic approach: shared ownership of infrastructure. The central paradox of the Syr Darya basin is that upstream and downstream countries need water at different times of the year. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which control the river’s headwaters, require releases in the winter to generate electricity and heat their cities. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, meanwhile, need that same water in summer to irrigate millions of hectares of farmland. Winter releases often flow downstream when demand is low, while shortages emerge during the peak agricultural season. The proposed solution is the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant on Kyrgyzstan’s Naryn River, a project now estimated to cost around $4.2 billion. What makes the project unusual is its ownership structure. Under a 2024 agreement, Kyrgyzstan will hold a 34% stake, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will each own 33%. By investing billions of dollars in infrastructure located outside their territory, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are effectively purchasing seats at the decision-making table. As shareholders, they gain a direct role in determining reservoir operations, helping ensure water is...

Opinion: Building Bridges Across Eurasia – Termez Dialogue 2026 Opens in Tashkent

The second meeting of the Termez Dialogue on Connectivity between Central and South Asia opened on June 4 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, bringing together senior representatives from Central Asia, South Asia, China, Russia, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran and Afghanistan for a high-level exchange on the future of regional connectivity and cooperation under the theme: “Peace, Connectivity, and Resilience: Shaping the Foundation for Shared Prosperity”. Eldor Aripov, director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan, opened the forum and highlighted its role in strengthening Central–South Asia connectivity. Under his leadership, it has become a respected venue for promoting regional cooperation and sustainable development. Aripov said Eurasia needs “not new dividing lines but spaces of trust, joint development, and open dialogue.” The agenda covered geopolitics, security, trade, investment, culture, climate resilience, and sustainable development. Aripov began by emphasizing the origins of the Termez Dialogue and its strategic purpose, which reflects Uzbekistan’s vision of fostering stronger ties between neighboring regions through cooperation and mutual benefit without sacrificing sovereign autonomy “The Dialogue’s essence lies in consistently building interstate relations on the principles of mutual benefit, good-neighborliness, and preventive diplomacy. What makes this platform unique is its inclusiveness — its ability to bring together not only government officials and diplomats, but also leading experts, scholars, business representatives, and civil society institutions.” This statement positioned the Termez Dialogue as a cornerstone of Uzbekistan’s vision for regional diplomacy. The idea was reinforced in 2022, when the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/76/295, “Strengthening Connectivity between Central and South Asia.” A recurring theme throughout Aripov’s remarks was inclusivity – understood in a non-ideological sense. He argued that lasting regional partnerships require participation from a diverse range of stakeholders. Reflecting on the platform’s progress, Aripov pointed to its rapid evolution into a recognized forum for regional engagement. He acknowledged the need to continue to build trust across sectors and borders. “In just one year, our platform has established itself as an effective venue for discussing transregional connectivity, developing practical initiatives, and strengthening trust among governments, experts, and international organizations,” Aripov said. This achievement demonstrates the Dialogue’s growing influence across Eurasia. The Chairman also made clear that the forum is entering a new phase. The focus, he said, must now shift from ideas to implementation. “Today’s meeting is intended to mark a qualitative transition — from conceptual discussions to practical implementation and the development of concrete mechanisms for transregional cooperation.” The statement reflects a commitment to delivering tangible outcomes and lasting partnerships. Aripov outlined that shared prosperity is one of the strongest foundations for regional stability: “When states are interconnected through shared economic interests and value chains, the risks of confrontation and instability naturally decrease.” This vision places trade, investment, and infrastructure cooperation at the heart of regional peacebuilding. “Alongside economics and climate issues,” Aripov argued, “culture remains an important pillar of our dialogue. Strong connectivity is not measured only in material terms. Very often, it is rooted in shared historical memory and common...

Opinion: Beyond Multivectorism – What Kyrgyzstan’s UN Security Council Win Really Shows

Kyrgyzstan's election to the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term is more than a diplomatic milestone. It is a case study in how a small state can create political weight without possessing a large economy, military power, or a dominant regional position. On June 3, Kyrgyzstan won its first-ever seat on the Security Council after a competitive four-round contest with the Philippines for the Asia-Pacific Group vacancy. Bishkek led from the first round, with 105 votes against Manila's 85, and increased its support through each subsequent ballot. It finished with 142 votes to 49. The result is significant because this was not an uncontested regional rotation. Kyrgyzstan had to assemble a qualified two-thirds majority across the wider UN General Assembly. That required more than support from its immediate neighbors. Bishkek had to build support across regions, institutions, and political blocs. The deeper lesson is that small-state agency should not be measured only by material resources. It should also be measured by the ability to assemble coalitions. A Campaign Larger Than Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan's campaign was not presented simply as a request for national recognition. President Sadyr Japarov framed the bid as a question of representation. When Kyrgyzstan intensified its campaign in 2024, he drew attention to the number of UN member states that had never served on the Council and argued for broader representation, particularly for African countries. Bishkek also positioned itself as a voice for small, developing, landlocked, and mountainous states facing security, climate, and connectivity challenges. That framing gave the vote wider political weight. Kyrgyzstan could not outspend larger states; it could not offer a large domestic market or a major security umbrella. But it could translate its limitations into a broader political language: underrepresentation, sovereign equality, regional balance, and the need for smaller states to have a voice in global decision-making. The campaign also received visible regional backing. In December 2025, all five Central Asian presidents endorsed Kyrgyzstan's candidacy, presenting the bid as a regional effort rather than a purely national one. That was the first layer of the coalition. The second was broader. In May 2026, the African Group at the United Nations received a dedicated briefing on Bishkek’s candidacy from Edil Baisalov, Kyrgyzstan’s newly appointed ambassador to the United States and a special envoy of the president. This followed Kyrgyzstan's public support for wider African representation in the Security Council. Because the UN ballot was secret, it would be impossible to claim that African votes delivered Kyrgyzstan's victory. Nor would it be accurate to reduce the campaign to a simple exchange of support. But the African track was an observable part of a wider coalition strategy. Bishkek aligned its own candidacy with an issue that mattered to a much larger group of states: the imbalance of representation inside the Security Council. From Multivectorism to Coalition Brokerage Central Asian foreign policy is often described through the language of multivectorism. The term usually refers to balancing among Russia, China, the West, Turkiye, and other external powers...

Kyrgyzstan Wins First-Ever Seat on UN Security Council

Kyrgyzstan has been elected to the United Nations Security Council for the 2027–2028 term, securing a non-permanent seat after a closely watched contest for the Asia-Pacific Group’s vacancy. The election marks the first time Kyrgyzstan will serve on the Security Council, the UN’s most powerful body for matters of international peace and security. It also returns Central Asian representation to the Council for the first time in nearly a decade, following Kazakhstan’s 2017–2018 term. Kyrgyzstan defeated the Philippines for the Asia-Pacific seat in the General Assembly vote, joining the incoming class of non-permanent members that will serve two-year terms from January 1, 2027, through December 31, 2028. The 2026 election filled five seats: one for Africa, one for Asia-Pacific, one for Latin America and the Caribbean, and two for the Western European and Others Group. The contest went to four rounds of voting before Kyrgyzstan secured the required two-thirds majority, defeating the Philippines by 142 votes to 49. Austria, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe were also elected to the Council. Kyrgyzstan will replace Pakistan when the new term begins. The Asia-Pacific race was the only contest involving Central Asia, but the wider election produced a surprise in the Western European and Others Group, where Germany failed to win one of the two available seats. Austria and Portugal were elected instead. For Bishkek, the result represents a major diplomatic breakthrough. Kyrgyz officials had framed the campaign as an opportunity to give greater voice to states that have never served on the Council, particularly landlocked and mountainous countries facing security, development, climate, and connectivity challenges. As of 2027, 59 UN member states will still have never served on the Security Council. President Sadyr Japarov had urged world leaders to support Kyrgyzstan’s bid, framing it as a chance to give small, developing, and landlocked states a stronger voice on the UN Security Council. Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev also framed the campaign in broader multilateral terms, arguing that smaller states need a greater role in responding to global security challenges. “No single state can address modern-day threats alone; that is why multilateral diplomacy is critical,” he said, speaking before the vote. The victory also carries broader regional significance. Central Asia sits at the intersection of several issues regularly discussed at the Security Council, including Afghanistan, counterterrorism, water security, transnational crime, and regional stability. Kyrgyzstan’s term is expected to give the region a more direct platform in Council deliberations. The seat will not give Kyrgyzstan veto power, which is held only by the five permanent members. But non-permanent members vote on resolutions, sanctions, peacekeeping mandates, and statements, and each member holds the rotating presidency of the Council for one month during its term. For Central Asia, the timing is significant. Afghanistan remains a recurring security concern, while terrorism, border security, narcotics trafficking, and climate-related instability all carry direct regional implications. Kyrgyzstan’s presence will give Bishkek a formal role in debates that often affect the region but are usually shaped by larger powers. The Security...

Washington Links TRIPP and Jackson-Vanik Repeal in Push Toward Central Asia

A notable strategic shift is taking place in U.S. foreign policy, one that could have a long-term impact on the economic architecture of Eurasia. After decades in which Central Asia and the South Caucasus were viewed largely through the lens of security, counterterrorism, and competition with Russia and China, Washington is increasingly emphasizing trade, investment, transport routes, and access to critical minerals. One of the clearest signs of this shift came during a recent hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where Senator Steve Daines and Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the implementation of the U.S.-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) framework, as well as the need to remove the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions. At first glance, these may appear to be separate issues: the peace process in the South Caucasus and Cold War-era trade legislation. In reality, however, they are closely connected. Together, they point to a broader U.S. effort to link Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Western markets through trade, transport, and investment. In recent years, Republican Senator Steve Daines of Montana has emerged as one of the most active advocates of expanding America’s presence in Central Asia. As co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus and one of the leading proponents of legislative efforts to repeal Jackson-Vanik restrictions, Daines has consistently argued for stronger trade and investment ties between the United States and the countries of the region. During the hearing, Daines placed particular emphasis on the importance of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, describing it as one of the most underappreciated diplomatic efforts of recent years. According to the senator, resolving the conflict could open the door to a large-scale economic transformation of the wider region. Particularly noteworthy was his reference to a geopolitical concept associated with former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. In Daines’ formulation, Central Asia represents the “bottle,” while Azerbaijan serves as its “cork.” Opening transport routes through the South Caucasus, he argued, would allow flows of oil, gas, critical minerals, and other resources to move toward Western markets rather than toward Russia, China, or Iran. Daines said this approach helped address some of the most difficult issues in the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement process and laid the foundation for what he called a “landmark agreement” after nearly four decades of conflict. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described TRIPP as an initiative capable of fundamentally transforming Armenia’s economic role in the region. According to Rubio, the framework not only addresses the issue of transport access, which had long been a source of disagreement between Baku and Yerevan, but also creates an opportunity for Armenia to become a major trade and logistics hub connecting Europe and Asia. Rubio described TRIPP as central to the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement framework, emphasizing that the project could generate substantial investment flows and attract U.S. companies to infrastructure and transport projects across the region. Washington’s argument is that trade, transit, investment, and infrastructure can give the political settlement a stronger economic base. Unlike many previous peace...

Kazakhstan’s Middle Power Moment: From Balancer to Regional Organizer

In “What Is the Status of Middle Powers?”, Michel Duclos of the Institut Montaigne presents Kazakhstan as a test case for whether middle powers can still influence outcomes in an era of intensifying great power rivalry. Writing after the Regional Ecological Summit in Astana, which brought together nine heads of state around President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Duclos notes that Kazakhstan “plays a leadership role” among states navigating pressures between China and Russia. He also argues that Tokayev, drawing on his experience as a former senior UN official, is seeking to elevate Kazakhstan into an intermediate power on multilateral issues. That is a useful lens for understanding Tokayev’s foreign policy. Rather than treating Kazakhstan’s position between larger powers as a liability, he has sought to turn geography, energy resources, logistics, diplomatic reliability, and convening power into regional agency. The result is an emerging model of middle power leadership rooted not in confrontation, but in coordination, credibility, and practical cooperation. That assessment places Tokayev’s foreign policy in a broader category than traditional balancing. Kazakhstan’s importance does not rest only on its raw assets — uranium, oil, minerals, logistics, or its position along Central Asian land routes. It also rests on how Astana uses those assets: as a convening state, a reliable partner, and a practical organizer of regional cooperation. Under Tokayev, multi-vector diplomacy has become less a defensive posture than an operating strategy, aimed at keeping Kazakhstan open to multiple partners while building platforms others have reason to use. In that sense, Kazakhstan is being presented not simply as a state located between great powers, but as one increasingly able to give structure to the space between them. Moving from “balancer” to “regional organizer” is only possible if Kazakhstan turns geography, resources, and diplomacy into practical systems others have reason to use. The clearest operational evidence of this shift is transport. Kazakhstan’s geography has often been described as a constraint. It is landlocked, vast, and positioned between larger powers. But the growth of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, allows Astana to recast that geography as a strategic advantage. In the first quarter of 2026, 125 container trains transited Kazakhstan via the Middle Corridor, a 34.4% increase from the same period in 2025. The Times of Central Asia also reported that freight volumes along the route through Kazakhstan have grown more than fivefold over seven years, from 0.8 million tons to 4.5 million tons annually. These figures show that Kazakhstan is not simply selling potential; it is building operational value into the corridor. This is where the idea of Kazakhstan as a regional organizer becomes concrete. A balancing state tries to avoid overdependence on any single power. An organizing state builds systems that others have a reason to use. If Kazakhstan can make the Middle Corridor faster, more predictable, more digitalized, and more commercially reliable, it is not merely balancing Russia, China, Europe, Türkiye, and the South Caucasus. It is creating connective tissue between them. World Bank analysis suggests that infrastructure...