International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Counter-Terrorism

Turkmenistan Seeks Bigger Counter-Terrorism Role in Central Asia

Turkmenistan wants to host a United Nations counter-terrorism facility that would contribute to cooperation among Central Asian countries, whose security concerns have included online radicalization, instability in Afghanistan, and the repatriation of citizens from Syria and Iraq. Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov discussed the initiative with Alexandre Zouev, a Russian diplomat who is acting under-secretary-general of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), during a visit by Turkmenistan’s top diplomat to the United States last week. In the May 28 meeting, the Turkmen delegation provided details about the plan to establish a program office of UNOCT in Ashgabat, according to the ministry. It said the office “will become a key analytical and expert platform in the region.” Such offices in host countries have a minimum of three staff members, for example, the office head, a project manager, and an administrator, and often rely on funding from the host nation, according to UNOCT, which is based at U.N. headquarters in New York. The offices focus on “capacity-building projects and activities” with a focus on the country or region, the office said. In 2022, U.N. counter-terrorism officials helped to set up what they described as an early warning network with representatives from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The mechanism promotes regional information-sharing. Besides governments, it involves civil society organizations and academics. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan share borders with Afghanistan, where continuing security problems have slowed Central Asian efforts to develop trade routes in deals with the ruling Taliban movement. Chinese interests in Tajikistan have been targeted by cross-border attacks in the past year. Tajikistan’s security forces have stepped up patrols on the border, which is challenging to monitor because of the remote, mountainous terrain. Several Central Asian countries have also organized the repatriation of their citizens from conflict zones in Iraq and Syria. Former male fighters who joined Islamic militant groups can face close monitoring and jail time, while women and children tend to be viewed as victims in need of humanitarian support. U.N. officials have also collaborated on counter-terrorism concerns in Central Asia with the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a regional group that includes Russia and has focused heavily on the threat of extremist infiltration from Afghanistan.

EAEU

As Armenia Looks West, Could Uzbekistan Move Closer to the EAEU?

Armenia’s increasingly uncertain future within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appears to have entered a new phase. On May 29, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement calling on Yerevan to clarify whether it intends to pursue deeper integration with the European Union or remain committed to the Eurasian bloc. The four leaders announced that members of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council would present a report at the next meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in December 2026 outlining the possible consequences of suspending Armenia’s participation in the EAEU treaty framework. “We share the view that the Republic of Armenia should, within the shortest possible timeframe, hold a nationwide referendum on joining the European Union or continuing its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union,” the statement said. Speaking to journalists after the summit in Astana, Russian President Vladimir Putin drew parallels between Armenia’s current trajectory and the developments that preceded the crisis in Ukraine. “I have mentioned this before: the crisis in Ukraine began with attempts to join the EU,” Putin said. He added that significant differences between European and EAEU standards, particularly in agriculture and industry, make simultaneous participation in both integration projects difficult. “Combining the two is practically impossible,” Putin said. “Therefore, we would be forced to curtail much of our economic integration work with Armenia.” The following day, Russia recalled its ambassador to Armenia for consultations amid Yerevan’s growing engagement with the European Union. According to Russian political analyst Arkady Dubnov, the move was a clear diplomatic signal of Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the pro-European course pursued by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government and indicated a downgrading of bilateral relations. Dubnov also argued that Armenia’s representative at the Astana summit, Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, avoided harsher criticism from Putin partly because of the position taken by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. “Kazakhstan itself signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union in 2020,” Dubnov noted, suggesting that arguments about Armenia’s European integration harming the EAEU are largely political rather than economic in nature. One recent poll appears to reinforce confidence within Armenia’s ruling camp. A survey conducted ahead of parliamentary elections indicates that Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party could secure nearly 65% of decided voters, positioning it for a convincing victory and a substantial parliamentary majority. Against that backdrop, Moscow’s pressure on Yerevan may be less about influencing the outcome of Armenia’s elections than about preparing for a longer-term strategic realignment. Supporters of Pashinyan increasingly associate his political project with closer ties to Europe, a perception reinforced not only by European leaders but also by U.S. President Donald Trump, who recently expressed support for Pashinyan’s re-election campaign. For his part, Pashinyan appears focused on a broader regional recalibration. Speaking via Facebook Live on May 31, he emphasized the importance of normalizing relations with neighboring states. “I am convinced that we will achieve the goal of normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye,” he said. “This means that a balanced and balancing...

Nuclear Diplomacy

Kazakhstan Offers the IAEA a Practical Option on Iran

On May 26, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev received IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi in Astana. The meeting pointed beyond bilateral nuclear cooperation toward Kazakhstan’s possible role in wider nuclear-security problems. Tokayev welcomed a roadmap for deepening Kazakhstan’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency through 2036, alongside documents on nuclear medicine and science. Grossi’s visit also followed Kazakhstan’s referendum on its first post-independence nuclear power plant, which has widened the civilian side of the country’s nuclear profile. Iran was not the subject around which the meeting was organized, but it is the issue that gives the meeting strategic weight. In particular, Kazakhstan’s established IAEA relationship could help give nuclear diplomacy a practical form if political agreement first creates a need for technical implementation. The potential is real, but it is narrow. Any political resolution of the Iran nuclear issue turns on decisions by Tehran, Washington, Israel, regional states, and the IAEA. The parties must first agree politically on an IAEA-led arrangement for Kazakhstan to enter the scene. Tokayev’s own formulation was appropriately limited: Kazakhstan’s assistance would be a gesture of good faith, and only if appropriate international agreements exist. Its involvement would come after the political bargain, not before it. Kazakhstan’s nuclear profile begins with the Soviet nuclear testing site at Semipalatinsk, which made nuclear policy a shared public memory before it became a diplomatic profile. Between 1949 and 1989, this site became one of the central locations of the Soviet nuclear-weapons program. The Nevada–Semipalatinsk movement, founded in 1989 by Olzhas Suleimenov, turned public opposition to testing into a political force before the site was closed in August 1991. Kazakhstan’s nuclear policy still expresses a public memory of Soviet testing and its public-health consequences. That memory does not make Kazakhstani society simply anti-nuclear, but it means that the country's nuclear policy carries a sensitive history. From the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan inherited on its territory one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals. That arsenal included strategic nuclear warheads associated with intercontinental missiles and long-range bombers. Kazakhstan did not merely surrender an arsenal; it made renunciation part of its international profile. The country chose non-nuclear status, transferred the weapons to Russia, and joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. This renunciation gave political restraint an institutional form and gave Kazakhstan a special status in nuclear affairs. That standing has also appeared in earlier Iran-related diplomacy. Kazakhstan hosted two rounds of P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran in Almaty in 2013, and in 2015 Kazatomprom supplied Iran with 60 metric tons of natural uranium as part of the internationally coordinated implementation of the JCPOA. That standing now operates most clearly through Kazakhstan’s long cooperation with the IAEA. The Tokayev-Grossi meeting and the 2026–2036 cooperation roadmap make Kazakhstan’s nuclear development part of a continuing institutional relationship. Grossi’s visit also included agreements on nuclear science, healthcare delivery, and agricultural applications under IAEA programs. Tokayev and Grossi are not improvising a political solution to Iran; they are strengthening an institutional channel through...

EAEU

Putin’s Astana Visit Shows What Russia Still Wants From Kazakhstan

The Eurasian Economic Union summit in Astana gave Vladimir Putin's state visit a wider stage. The summit produced technical documents and familiar language about integration. The bilateral Russia-Kazakhstan package around it was more concrete. It showed what Moscow still wants from Kazakhstan, and what Astana expects in return. The detail lies in infrastructure, where contracts can last for decades. The setting echoed history. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed the treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana on May 29, 2014, with Armenia joining in January 2015, and Kyrgyzstan in August of the same year. In 2026, the bloc returned to Astana for the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and the V Eurasian Economic Forum. The theme of the forum was artificial intelligence, digital regulation, and the EAEU's place in the global technology race. Its website said 14 integration documents were signed on the sidelines, including memoranda, agreements, protocols, and joint action plans. Those documents gave the visit a regional frame. The larger result came on May 28, when Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Putin oversaw a broad set of bilateral agreements. Akorda listed nuclear power, Russian export credit, expanded oil-sector cooperation, a tenge-ruble currency swap, education projects, financial monitoring, transport digitalization, and nuclear safety regulation. That package points to the real agenda: energy, transit, payments, industrial production, and public-facing alliance language. For Moscow, Kazakhstan’s primary value is geographic: it sits between Russia and China, and across routes that connect Central Asia to Europe, the Caspian, and South Asia. Russian crude already crosses Kazakhstan on the Priirtyshsk-Atasu-Alashankou route to China. A KazTransOil contract keeps transit at 10 million tons a year until the end of 2033. The tariff is $15 per ton, excluding VAT. The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline has a design capacity of 20 million tons a year and belongs to Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP, a 50-50 venture between KazTransOil and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company. Reuters has reported that Russia and Kazakhstan agreed last year to raise that flow by 2.5 million tons, although the extra volume had not started flowing before Putin’s visit. The new agreement on oil-sector cooperation gives the issue a political push. For Moscow, the route strengthens access to China as Western sanctions keep pressure on Russian exports and payments. For Kazakhstan, it brings fees and gives Astana a useful position in Russia-China energy flows. The nuclear agreement, meanwhile, gives Russia a long-term role in Kazakhstan’s shift to nuclear power. Kazakhstan and Russia signed a $16.5 billion agreement for the Balkhash nuclear power plant at Ulken, near Lake Balkhash. The project covers two VVER-1200 III+ reactors. Kazakhstan held a groundbreaking ceremony for the plant in August 2025, with the active construction phase expected to begin in 2027, and the first reactor expected in early 2034. Russia will provide export credit for the first plant, with Rosatom leading the Balkhash project after competition with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), France’s EDF, and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. But Kazakhstan has not handed the wider program to Moscow....

EAEU

EAEU Leaders Meet in Astana Amid Growing Internal Trade Disputes

Astana is hosting Eurasian Economic Union events on May 28-29, with leaders arriving on Thursday and the main meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council scheduled for Friday, May 29. The first part of Thursday was dominated by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his delegation during Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan. At the Palace of Independence, Tokayev and Putin introduced their official delegations to each other during the Russian president’s state visit, while Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov said the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting would begin on Friday morning in narrow and expanded formats. The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council is the highest body of the Eurasian Economic Union, which came into force on January 1, 2015. Now more than a decade old, the bloc is facing deepening internal contradictions driven largely by external economic pressure on Russia, the Union’s core member. Some of those tensions are linked to the bloc’s expansion beyond its original Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan core. To understand the current state of Eurasian integration, it is necessary to revisit its origins, particularly the role played by Kazakhstan and its first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had sought to preserve a looser union among the Soviet republics as the USSR collapsed. As prime minister and later president of the Kazakh SSR, Nazarbayev understood the economic consequences that would follow the collapse of the integrated Soviet economic system, and how deeply Kazakhstan remained tied to Soviet-era supply chains, infrastructure, and decision-making structures centered in Moscow. Nazarbayev first publicly proposed the idea of Eurasian integration in 1994 during a lecture at Moscow State University. At the time, however, the administration of Russian President Boris Yeltsin showed little interest in the concept. That changed after Vladimir Putin came to power. In 2001, the Eurasian Economic Community, known as EurAsEC, was established, bringing together Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. The founding agreement had been signed in Astana in October 2000. Uzbekistan joined EurAsEC in 2006, but suspended its membership only two years later. Meanwhile, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan launched work in 2007 on creating a Customs Union, which officially came into existence in 2010. In the autumn of 2011, Putin announced plans to establish a Eurasian Economic Union based on a future Single Economic Space. Two years later, Nazarbayev proposed dissolving EurAsEC in connection with the planned creation of the EAEU by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia were invited to join the Customs Union. However, by 2014, when the treaty establishing the EAEU and dissolving EurAsEC was signed, neither Armenia nor Kyrgyzstan had initially been central to the Eurasian project. At that stage, much of the discussion revolved around the possible accession of Ukraine. Russian political commentator and current State Duma deputy Anatoly Wasserman devoted several books to the idea of integrating Ukraine into the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan project, including Ukraine and the Rest of Russia. Wasserman argued that Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine needed to move away from a raw-materials-based economic model by creating a unified market...

U.S. Diplomacy

Top U.S. State Department Official Travels to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

Sarah B. Rogers, a senior official at the United States Department of State whose job includes engaging foreign publics through educational, cultural, and other means, will visit Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as part of a trip to Central Asia and South Asia. Rogers, the under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs, will also visit India and Nepal during the May 27-June 10 tour, according to the State Department. President Donald Trump nominated Rogers, a lawyer, to the post early last year and she was sworn in on October 10, 2025. The president has since nominated her to head the U.S Agency for Global Media, a federal agency tasked with disseminating information to international audiences that has been in turmoil since early in Trump’s second term. If confirmed, Rogers would keep her current job while also running the agency. The Trump administration sharply scaled back the operations of the global media agency, which oversees Voice of America and other U.S.-funded outlets, as part of a broader reduction in funding for U.S. aid projects around the world. Central Asia was among the affected regions where some U.S. funding was withdrawn, even as Washington ramped up economic and diplomatic initiatives with governments in that region. U.S. administration officials have alleged that the global media agency was vulnerable to political bias and management, though supporters said it played a valuable role in disseminating information in countries led by authoritarian governments. Lawsuits and court rulings have slowed the push to dismantle the agency. In her role as under secretary, Rogers has criticized what she calls censorship in Europe, saying speech regulation there is placing unfair restrictions on U.S. tech companies and undermining democracy. Opponents say she is seeking common cause with ideological allies of the Trump administration in Europe. “Truth-telling and censorship circumvention, including in closed societies, are critical causes for me,” Rogers said after her March nomination to lead the U.S. Agency for Global Media.