International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Critical Minerals

Opinion: Supply Chains of Power: How Critical Minerals Are Shaping China–U.S. Competition in Central Asia

Central Asia is no longer a distant frontier for global geopolitics. It is developing into a central arena of competition for critical minerals, supply chains, and industrial power, where minerals are no longer simple commodities but have instead become key components of contemporary statecraft. In essence, this transformation highlights a recognition in Washington and other capitals that critical mineral supply chains are fundamental to next-generation energy systems, the development of artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic defense capabilities. Even as the global economy is multipolar, critical mineral supply chains remain highly concentrated and dominated by China. Control of rare earths is increasingly geopolitical, with clear economic, political, and security consequences. The significance of that imbalance is now shaping U.S. foreign policy, Central Asia’s development strategies, and the future of global economics. China’s Strategy: Control the Chain, Not Just the Mine Though many years in the making, China’s critical minerals strategy is still often misunderstood as focused primarily on resource access. However, Beijing’s efforts are far broader and more effective. Not only securing raw materials, the Chinese leadership has also worked to control the entire supply chain—from extraction to processing, refining, and manufacturing. China’s long-term focus and investments began in the 1980s with efforts that culminated in the Made in China 2025 plan for national and overseas manufacturing. In 2023 alone, Chinese firms invested more than $120 billion in overseas mining and processing, targeting key elements used in energy supply chains. Beijing also fed its industrial base by providing over $220 billion for the production of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable infrastructure. As a result, China now controls approximately 60% of lithium processing, more than 70% of cobalt refining, and over 90% of battery material manufacturing. Strategically, China controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining and associated technologies. Early investments in supplies enabled Beijing to subsequently concentrate funds into refining capacity to feed its industrial sector. This integrated approach has shifted the power dynamic for global supply chains tied to the critical minerals economy. As evidenced by Beijing’s near monopoly on processing, market control is not just associated with geological supplies but with processing capacity. China’s willingness to weaponize access not only to rare earths but also to processing technology demonstrates Beijing’s market muscle. This distinction is critical. Rare earth elements are not inherently scarce, but they are rarely found in concentrated deposits, making them difficult to extract and refine. Over decades, Beijing developed unique refining capabilities and subsidized an industrial base that disincentivized competition and encouraged processing to shift to China. The Vicious Circle Prohibitive investment costs, long development timelines, and market volatility have discouraged Western investment in alternative supply chains. Each stage (mining, processing, refining, manufacturing) is interdependent: miners won’t invest without buyers and offtake agreements, processors and refiners need secure financing and stable mineral supply, and manufacturers need steady inputs. Such interdependence creates an investment standoff and heightens perceptions of risk. By integrating all stages, Beijing exerts influence across global markets, from pricing to production. This has conditioned global markets...

U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations

The American-Uzbek Business Council Launches in Washington

Washington D.C. - At the launch of the American-Uzbek Business and Investment Council in Washington on April 6, the most revealing line came early. Ambassador Sergio Gor, the White House’s special envoy for South and Central Asia, and Co-Chair of the Council, did not begin with trade statistics or a list of deliverables. He began with a blunt assessment of how the region has been treated in Washington. “For too long, this region has not found the attention that it deserves,” he said. That observation is hardly novel to anyone who follows Central Asia. What made it notable was the speaker and the setting. U.S. policy toward the region has often been episodic, driven at different times by Afghanistan, by Russia, by sanctions enforcement, or by concern over Chinese influence rather than sustained by a coherent regional economic strategy. Gor’s remarks suggested an attempt, at least by the current administration, to correct for that pattern. He was equally clear, however, that this was a political opening, not yet a settled doctrine. “Take this opportunity that the next two and a half years present,” he told the room, an unusually candid acknowledgment that Washington’s attention may be real without yet being durable. His other key formulation explained how the administration wants to make that attention count. “Never before in the history of the U.S. government has commercial diplomacy been such a major pillar of U.S. foreign policy,” Gor said. Whatever the phrasing, the intended shift was clear. Washington is signaling that in Central Asia, economic statecraft will not be treated as a side channel to politics, but as a primary instrument of policy. In that sense, the new council is less a ceremonial bilateral upgrade than a mechanism for turning political attention into projects, financing, and institutional follow-through. [caption id="attachment_46673" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Image: TCA[/caption] Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of Uzbekistan’s presidential administration and the Uzbek co-chair of the council, answered that shift with a line that was just as pointed. “We are no longer at the stage where we speak about potential,” she said. “We are at the stage where we must deliver.” For a government that has spent years presenting Uzbekistan as a reforming economy open to outside capital, that was a significant change of emphasis. The argument is no longer that Uzbekistan deserves credit for opening up but that it now expects to be judged by execution. Her most substantive remarks were about institutions rather than ambition. The council matters, she said, because it should help “solve problems quickly, without unnecessary bureaucracy” and ensure that “no project is lost along the way.” That is a more serious claim than the language of partnership that usually fills these forums. Mirziyoyeva was effectively acknowledging the gap that often opens between political endorsement and project delivery. Uzbekistan’s challenge is no longer simply attracting attention from foreign partners but getting projects through financing, approvals, and implementation without losing momentum inside the state apparatus. That urgency reflects the scale of the opportunity. Uzbekistan, with a...

C6+1

Opinion: Trump Has Golden Opportunity to Launch C6+1 on Sidelines of UN

Representatives of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan — along with Azerbaijan, are expected in New York for the United Nations General Assembly in September. Historically, meetings between the Central Asian states and the United States – the C5+1 – have taken place on the sidelines of the United Nations. It is the most natural and logistically efficient venue for President Donald Trump to re-engage with the C5 partners he hosted at the White House last November. As of now, only foreign ministers are expected to attend the UNGA. But this could change if Trump extends an invitation to the leaders, according to a Central Asian diplomatic source. This time, however, he has the opportunity to add Azerbaijan, transforming the format into a C6+1. Baku has already been invited to participate as a full member in Central Asian gatherings, and Washington should build on that momentum. Azerbaijan is uniquely positioned: close to both Israel and Turkey – two of America’s most important regional partners – it sits astride one of the most important connectivity corridors linking Europe and Asia. Its inclusion would turn the C5+1 into a genuinely trans‑Caspian framework that reflects the emerging realities of Eurasian integration. The move would also link two major diplomatic achievements of Trump’s second term: the launch of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a 43-km strategic transit corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia, and Trump’s elevation of the C5+1 to a White House-level summit. While TRIPP was discussed at the C5+1 meeting in November, bringing Azerbaijan into the next gathering would allow the administration to present itself as the architect of a new Eurasian trade and energy map. Strategically, a C6+1 format carries significant implications for great-power competition with China. This is because Central Asia is so crucial to Beijing’s grand strategy. In its recently adopted 15th five-year plan, neighborhood diplomacy is listed as the top priority — ahead of relations with major powers or developing countries. Beijing seeks to build a “community with a shared future” with 17 neighboring states, including all five in Central Asia, to “create a favorable external environment” for national rejuvenation, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated. For China, Central Asia is a vital “hinterland” for energy and resource security, and a buffer against maritime disruptions. The United States does not need to dominate the Eurasian Heartland or force Central Asian states to choose between Washington and Beijing. It simply needs to ensure that any Chinese westward access runs through a vast landmass of countries that maintain constructive relations with the United States. A C6+1 format helps shape that environment without confrontation. A stable Middle Corridor – the energy and trade route running through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan to Turkey and the Mediterranean – also benefits America's energy-hungry allies in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea. Both increasingly look to Kazakhstan as an alternative oil supplier as they...

Iran

The Iran War Is Repricing Central Asia’s Connectivity

Europe’s aviation regulator has extended its current conflict-zone bulletin for the Middle East and Persian Gulf through April 10 and continues to advise operators to avoid Iranian and adjacent airspace at all altitudes. Reuters reported soon after that the squeeze on normal flight paths was pushing more traffic into narrower routes, notably over Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The Strait of Hormuz, meanwhile, has not returned to normal commercial use. A limited number of exempted vessels have crossed, but passage remains selective, politicized, and uncertain rather than routine. The question, consequently, is no longer only whether Central Asia has alternatives to single-route dependence but whether those alternatives remain commercially usable, taking into account the increased risk, delay, insurance, fuel burn, and congestion. What has changed is the cost of maintaining reliable connectivity. The Cost of Reliability The Iran conflict imposes higher operating costs on the wider Eurasian air corridor that is now taking displaced traffic. EUROCONTROL estimates that about 1,150 flights a day continue to be affected by re-routing linked to the Middle East crisis. These add roughly 206,000 kilometers of flying and 602 tons of extra fuel burn per day. Maritime trends are similar. In March, war-risk premiums in or near the Gulf had risen more than tenfold in some cases, with hull war premiums moving from about 0.25% of vessel value to as much as 3%. Air-freight rates on some routes rose by as much as 70% as shippers redirected urgent cargo away from disrupted sea lanes and restricted airspace. Higher surcharges and narrower margins for operational error can make routes lose commercial value even if they remain formally open. The wider macroeconomic setting has also made resilience more expensive. Higher oil prices make every detour costlier, raising freight charges, power costs, and production costs across the region’s trading partners. Even where Central Asian cargo does not move through Iranian waters, the same pattern is still present. Asian policymakers were already confronting a combined oil-price and currency shock at a moment when roughly 80% of the oil shipped through Hormuz normally goes to Asia. The World Bank’s March food and nutrition security update notes that around 20% of global oil supplies and about one-third of global fertilizer trade transit the Strait of Hormuz. Urea prices, for example, surged by nearly 46% month on month between February and March 2026. Importers in Central Asia, as well as in Europe and the South Caucasus, remain under pressure from higher household food costs and tighter producer margins. The price of resilience is now showing up in increased costs for farm inputs, food costs, and household budgets. How the Burden Falls Kazakhstan remains the best placed in the region to absorb the shift. The CPC pipeline still carries about 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports; oil income contributes 52% of the state budget. Earlier disruptions had constrained Kazakhstan to reroute 300,000 tons of crude, and the country continues to rely on supplementary outlets such as Ust-Luga, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, and China when its main...

Organization of Turkic States

Meeting of the Organization of Turkic States Held in Baku

On April 2, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met with participants of a meeting of the heads of government of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in Baku, outlining key areas of cooperation. Among those attending were Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov, Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Adylbek Kasymaliev, Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan Nokerguly Atagulyev, Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Unal Ustel, and OTS Secretary General Kubanychbek Omuraliev. Opening the meeting, Aliyev stressed the importance of dialogue. “This meeting of the heads of government of the Organization of Turkic States is being held in Baku. I warmly welcome you all,” he said. According to Aliyev, such meetings allow not only for the discussion of economic issues but also for reaffirming unity among member states. He noted that cooperation within the organization remains a priority of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. He also reiterated a key message that ran throughout his speech: “We have repeatedly stated from various platforms that the Turkic world is our family; we have no other family,” Aliyev said. Special attention was devoted to economic cooperation. According to the president, trade between member states is growing, and investment volumes are increasing. He noted that Azerbaijan has invested more than $20 billion in the economies of OTS member states. Most of this has been directed to Turkey, though investment activity is expanding elsewhere. In particular, joint funds have been established with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan to support project implementation. Aliyev also thanked partners for their participation in the reconstruction of Karabakh. Facilities built with the support of OTS countries are already operational in the region, including the Mirza Ulugbek School, the Kurmangazy Children’s Creative Center, and the Manas School. In addition, a garment factory has been opened in Khankendi with the participation of Uzbekistan. He also highlighted mutual support among member states. Following the earthquake in Turkey, Azerbaijan financed the construction of the “Azerbaijani Quarter” in Kahramanmaraş, valued at $100 million. Transport and logistics projects were another key topic. According to the president, infrastructure development remains a top priority. These include the Middle Corridor, the Trans-Caspian route, and the Zangezur Corridor, all of which are gaining importance in the current geopolitical environment. Aliyev said that infrastructure within Azerbaijan is largely complete. Railways, the Baku port, highways, and airports are operational. Construction of the Zangezur Corridor is also progressing, with the highway nearly 90% complete and the railway approximately 70% complete. He also noted the construction of the Kars-Nakhchivan railway line in Turkey, which is expected to enable a new international route with an initial capacity of about 15 million tons of cargo. In conclusion, Aliyev said these projects are aimed not only at serving regional interests but also at expanding international transport connectivity. He expressed confidence that the meeting would contribute to the further development of the OTS and strengthen cooperation among member states.

Freedom in the World

Central Asia Pushes Back on “Not Free” Label as Debate Over Rankings Grows

According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2026 report, all five countries in Central Asia are classified as “Not Free.” Nevertheless, governments in the region are increasingly questioning the impartiality of such assessments. At the same time, some regional experts point to ongoing political and economic reforms as signs that the region is making progress. A “Not Free” Region In its report released on March 19, 2026, Freedom House classifies all five Central Asian states as "Not Free." The designation is based on Freedom House’s assessment of political rights and civil liberties. According to the report’s authors, the ranking reflects pressure on independent media, tightening control over civil society, and the absence of genuine political competition. Kazakhstan received 23 points out of 100. The report highlights restrictions on opposition groups and civil society activists, pressure on independent journalism, and tightly managed elections that do not ensure genuine political competition. Kyrgyzstan, long considered the most politically open country in the region, scored 25 out of 100 and was also classified as “Not Free.” The organization says the score fell by one point from the previous year, reflecting continued pressure on independent media, the designation of several outlets as ‘extremist,’ and criminal cases against journalists, alongside concerns about election integrity. Uzbekistan scored 12 out of 100. Freedom House points to the concentration of power in the executive branch, the absence of a genuine parliamentary opposition, and severe restrictions on independent human rights defenders and journalists. Since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in 2016, Uzbekistan has pursued a series of controlled political and economic reforms aimed at opening the country after decades of isolation. These have included currency liberalization, efforts to end the use of forced labor in the cotton sector, and steps to ease restrictions on business and foreign investment. While critics say political liberalization remains limited, supporters argue the reforms mark a significant shift from the policies of the previous era. Tajikistan received just 5 points. The report highlights the long rule of President Emomali Rahmon, the elimination of legal opposition, systematic persecution of its members and their families, and a de facto lack of electoral competition. Turkmenistan recorded one of the lowest scores globally, with just 1 point. The report describes the country as one of the most repressive in the world, citing total state control over political life and the media, the absence of opposition participation in elections, and harsh punishment for dissent. Turkmenistan remains one of the most closed countries in the world, with extremely limited access for foreign media and independent observers. Political life is tightly controlled, and reliable information about internal developments is scarce. While the authorities have signaled gradual generational change following the 2022 transfer of power to President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, there has been little visible shift in the country’s political system. Impartiality in Doubt? Trust in international assessments has also been affected by developments in U.S. foreign aid policy and a wider shift in global perceptions about the appropriateness of Western-linked organizations categorising...