• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
21 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 1996

Uzbekistan Deepens SCO Security Ties While Courting Washington

On November 12, a committee of Uzbekistan’s Senate reviewed legislation to ratify an agreement establishing an expanded security center in Tashkent for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The agreement, signed in Tianjin on September 1, 2025, would establish a Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats. Uzbekistan’s state news agency reported the preliminary review on November 13, after the lower chamber had passed the ratification bill. Uzbekistan is seeking to broaden its external options through cooperation with China and the United States, while assuming obligations that differ substantially by sector. In commerce, a new partnership can open access to finance or technology while binding participants to particular suppliers or operating arrangements. The extent of diversification therefore depends both on the opportunities created and on the freedom retained to work with other partners. Uzbekistan’s Expanding SCO Security Role The proposed center would build on the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent, extending cooperation to information security and transnational organized crime. A dedicated organized-crime unit would operate in Bishkek. UzDaily’s account of the ratification bill describes exchanges of information, joint threat assessments, exercises, and professional training among the participating authorities. The SCO Plus security dialogue held in Samarkand on November 5–6 originated in an initiative by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, according to the SCO Secretariat. Security and intelligence representatives discussed radical groups’ use of artificial intelligence and digital platforms, threats to critical information infrastructure, and cooperation with the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism. Their communiqué set out intentions for joint research and training. Joint assessments and training give participating agencies repeated opportunities to compare information and working methods. More regular exchanges among SCO security agencies could increase the influence of shared threat assessments on Uzbekistan’s security services. The influence could operate through decisions about which threats receive priority and how specialists are trained to respond to them. Its extent would depend on what the agencies share and how Uzbek authorities use the resulting assessments. The published accounts do not establish a transfer of national decision-making authority. At his October 17 meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Mirziyoyev reaffirmed Uzbekistan’s One China policy and cooperation against terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The Chinese readout also attributed to him praise for Xi Jinping’s leadership and support for Xi’s four global initiatives. These were explicit expressions of diplomatic alignment with Beijing’s wider international agenda. Chinese Economic Ties and Transport Diversification China was Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner in January–September 2026, accounting for 23.2% of total foreign trade turnover. Russia accounted for 16%. China supplied 32.5% of Uzbekistan’s imports while taking 8.9% of its exports, giving it substantially greater weight as a supplier than as a market for Uzbek goods and services. Financing terms, commercial access, and security obligations condition Tashkent’s ability to use these options. China accounts for a considerably larger share of Uzbekistan’s foreign trade than of foreign debt owed or guaranteed by the Uzbek government. At midyear 2026, Chinese lenders accounted for $3.89 billion of that $40.71 billion debt total, or approximately 10%, according to finance...

Russia Demands NATO Stay Out of Central Asia, With Regional Governments Absent From Talks

Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping met in Shenzhen on November 19. Meanwhile, U.S. envoys headed to Berlin to discuss Ukraine’s postwar security guarantees with Ukrainian and European negotiators. Russia has demanded that NATO abandon military activity across Central Asia as part of negotiations over Ukraine, in talks that did not include representatives of the five countries whose security relationships could be affected. A Russian paper dated November 10 was circulated during U.S.-mediated negotiations in Abu Dhabi. The New York Times reported that the proposal would rule out NATO expansion and “any military activity” in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. It also demands a rollback of NATO forces and bases to the alliance’s 1997 positions. The wording is not new. Moscow proposed nearly identical restrictions in December 2021, shortly before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Article 7 of its draft Russia-NATO agreement called for NATO members to avoid military activity in Ukraine and other states in “Eastern Europe, in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia.” A separate 2021 draft treaty with Washington went further. Its Article 4 sought to prevent the United States from establishing military bases, using military infrastructure, or developing “bilateral military cooperation” with former Soviet republics outside NATO. That demand would have covered Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The November proposal revives that NATO restriction, though the available reporting does not establish that Moscow has also renewed its separate demand to end bilateral American military cooperation. All five countries are NATO partners through the Partnership for Peace program, with each government setting its own priorities. Kazakhstan has hosted the multinational Steppe Eagle peacekeeping exercises and works with NATO on military education and defense reform. Its partnership program also covers interoperability and training. Kazakhstan also deployed military engineers to Iraq as part of the U.S.-led multinational force between 2003 and 2008. Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry explicitly identifies preparing troops for UN peacekeeping as a principal objective of its NATO partnership. [caption id="attachment_61111" align="aligncenter" width="2048"] U.S. soldiers take part in a multinational military ceremony during the Steppe Eagle 2019 exercises in Kazakhstan. Image: U.S. Army.[/caption] Uzbekistan participates in NATO defense education and has conducted counterterrorism training. Tashkent hosted the alliance’s Central Asia liaison office from 2013 to 2017. Tajikistan has engaged with NATO on border security and counterterrorism. Kyrgyzstan cooperates on military education and UN peacekeeping preparation, and despite its permanent neutrality, even Turkmenistan works with NATO on border security and disaster preparedness, although it does not contribute troops to NATO operations. A blanket ban on NATO military activity could therefore affect programs that regional governments have chosen to pursue. Russia describes its wider proposals as security guarantees intended to limit NATO’s military reach. The 2021 documents invoked the principle of “equal and indivisible security,” arguing that one party should not strengthen its security at another’s expense. Moscow’s proposed restrictions would nevertheless limit security cooperation undertaken by governments that are not parties to the negotiations. Russia already has its own security arrangements in...

Central Asian Universities Launch EU-Backed Network for Renewable Energy Research

The Central Asia-EU Research Network for Renewable Energy launched in Astana on November 17. One of its first priorities is to study how to connect new solar and wind farms to the grid while keeping the region’s power systems reliable. The network is part of the EU4SustainableCentralAsia: Renewable Energy in Central Asia (EURECA) project. Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev University and Austria’s Centre for Social Innovation signed the agreement with EURECA. The other signatories were Tajik Technical University named after Academician M.S. Osimi and Tashkent State Technical University named after Islam Karimov. Germany’s development agency, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), runs EURECA in all five Central Asian countries on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The European Union (EU) co-funds the project under its Global Gateway strategy. The network will help member universities conduct joint research with European partners and apply for international funding. At a workshop in Porto ahead of the launch, participants discussed joint applications to Horizon Europe, the EU’s research and innovation program. In early 2027, the network will draw up a detailed work plan setting out joint activities and priorities. It expects universities in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan to sign agreements soon, with further expansion planned throughout the year. In December 2025, Kyrgyzstan opened its first large-scale solar power plant, a 100-megawatt (MW) facility in the Kemin district. Tajikistan held an opening ceremony for the Asht solar plant on September 21, 2026. It has a design capacity of 250 MW, and another plant of the same size is under construction in the Jayhun district. As of August 2026, Kazakhstan had more than 3.8 gigawatts (GW) of renewable power capacity in operation, including hydroelectric and biogas plants. In November, the energy minister said the country planned to add at least 8.4 GW of renewable capacity by the end of 2035. By May 2026, Uzbekistan had 20 large solar and wind power plants in operation, with a combined capacity of about 5.6 GW. The country had also brought 12 energy storage systems online, with a combined power rating of about 1.5 GW. Researchers from GIZ and the regional power dispatch center in Tashkent presented a grid study at the Porto workshop. They modeled power systems in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for 2028–2032. At the upper end of their projections, wind and solar generation could exceed electricity demand for 1,300 to 1,400 hours a year. During those hours, operators could store surplus power or export it to neighboring grids. If storage and transmission capacity fell short, they would have to limit the plants’ output. In Uzbekistan, the 1.5 GW Kungrad wind farm now under construction includes a 300 MW battery storage system. Connecting the wind farm to the grid will require about 930 miles (1,500 kilometers) of high-voltage transmission lines. The plans also call for three new substations and upgrades to two others.

Putin Visits Tajikistan as Pressure Mounts on Migrants in Russia

Tajikistan is preparing to receive Vladimir Putin days after the European Union sanctioned Unistream, a Russian bank used by Tajik migrants to send money home. Putin’s November 19–20 visit, at President Emomali Rahmon’s invitation, comes after the EU sanctioned Unistream on November 16. Tajikistan is the world’s most remittance-dependent economy, with personal remittances received equivalent to 57.7% of GDP in 2025, according to the World Bank. In a country of 10.8 million, more than 702,000 people left to work abroad in 2025, most heading to Russia, according to official figures from Dushanbe. Putin’s visit coincides with a regional tour by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, including talks in Dushanbe. Such contacts could bring new investment, but replacing the income Tajik workers earn in Russia would require employment opportunities on a far greater scale. Putin’s visit follows a meeting between the two presidents in Moscow earlier this month. Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said they had “an interest in discussing in greater detail” many aspects of Russian-Tajik relations. The Kremlin said the talks would cover their “strategic partnership and alliance,” alongside regional and international issues. A Transfer Channel Under Sanctions The EU’s official designation named Unistream among the Russian financial institutions added to its restrictions. The Council says the bank offers loan-repayment grace periods to Russian military personnel, including those fighting in Ukraine. It cites this support and the banking sector’s contribution to Russian government revenue as grounds for the listing. Unistream told RBC on November 18 that it does not provide personal loans or repayment holidays, disputing the EU’s explanation. The bank said it expected no significant operational changes because it holds no European assets and settles transfers in rubles and CIS currencies. The measures freeze assets within EU jurisdiction and prohibit making funds or economic resources available to the listed entities. They form part of a wider package covering 12 individuals and 101 entities, including nearly 50 banks and financial institutions. Unistream remains listed in the National Bank of Tajikistan’s published register of payment operators. Its recorded license runs until February 22, 2027. As of November 17, Asia-Plus reported no announced suspension of the service in Tajikistan following the EU decision. However, there is a precedent for sanctions changing how customers use the system. The U.S. Treasury designated Unistream in July 2023. The following month, the company stopped dollar and euro transfers between Russia and Tajikistan, while ruble transfers continued. Other transfer channels have also faced disruption. In July 2026, Uzbekistan’s Aloqabank suspended Zolotaya Korona transfers after the EU sanctioned the system’s operator and settlement center. Russian Earnings Support the Economy The World Bank’s latest country assessment says remittances support household consumption and finance imports in an economy with a limited domestic production base. It attributes much of Tajikistan’s 8.2% growth in the first half of 2026 to those inflows. The World Bank expects a weaker Russian economy and tighter migration rules to reduce the money Tajik workers send home, slowing Tajikistan’s economic growth over the medium term....

Pakistan Wants Turkmenistan to Join Central Asia Electricity Project

Pakistan has invited Turkmenistan to participate in the Central Asia–South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000), which would facilitate electricity trade between the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the South Asian countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Awais Leghari, Pakistan’s energy minister, suggested the idea to Annageldi Saparov, his Turkmen counterpart, during a meeting in Islamabad on Monday. “He also shared that Pakistan has encouraged Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to explore extending the CASA-1000 transmission line to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,” the Pakistani government’s information service said. Leghari also commented on another power transmission project called TAP, which stands for Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan. He said Pakistan had already provided three of seven technical data sets required for progress, and that Turkmenistan needs to expedite the information. The Pakistani side proposed a meeting of technical working groups of both countries as soon as possible, in order “to chalk out a clear roadmap within a few weeks.” Pakistan, which has suffered severe electricity shortages, high costs and other problems over the years, believes the two power transmission projects with Central Asia can help to meet its needs and develop its economy. There are various challenges, including security concerns and geopolitical shifts,  the tense relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as the possible impact of climate change and growing local demand on hydropower resources in mountainous Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Work on the Afghan portion of the CASA-1000 project stopped for several years after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021. Then work resumed under a process overseen by the World Bank. Additionally, CASA-1000 was approved in 2014 as primarily a one-way electricity transmission system – Central Asia to South Asia -- and Pakistan is now looking to adjust terms of the deal because it currently has a domestic surplus of electricity. “Converting it into a two-way flow will enable power exchange during mutual times of need. It will also make the project economically and financially more sustainable,” Leghari said, according to the Pakistani government statement. Saparov, the Turkmen energy minister, told Leghari that Turkmenistan would soon share the required data for the TAP power transmission project and that Ashgabat had completed laying the transmission line up to the Afghan border, according to the Pakistani statement. Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan’s foreign minister, was leading his country’s delegation in Islamabad for discussions with other countries on Eurasian economic issues. Turkmenistan noted the strategic importance of another energy project, the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline, as well as Turkmenistan’s readiness to increase electricity exports, according to the foreign ministry. “The need to involve Afghanistan in regional economic processes was also highlighted,” the Turkmen ministry said.

Landau’s Central Asia Tour Puts Turkmen Energy Export Routes on U.S. Agenda

The United States will promote alternative export routes for Turkmenistan’s energy during Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau’s regional tour. His November 16–24 itinerary includes Tajikistan and Türkiye before concluding in Ashgabat. The State Department’s travel announcement explicitly connects cooperation with Turkmenistan to the Trans-Caspian corridor and the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP. Landau will meet government leaders and representatives of American and Turkmen businesses. The emphasis on export routes addresses a longstanding priority for Ashgabat. China remains the largest buyer of Turkmen gas, giving Turkmenistan a strong commercial reason to develop additional markets. At October’s Oil and Gas of Turkmenistan conference, Turkmengaz chairman Maksat Babayev reaffirmed plans to diversify exports eastward, southward and westward. A proposed Trans-Caspian gas pipeline would carry supplies across the Caspian seabed to Azerbaijan, with onward access through Türkiye to Europe. Construction of the proposed pipeline has not begun. Turkmenistan is also pursuing a southern route through the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India pipeline. Babayev said in October that construction was continuing on the section toward Herat. He also highlighted the importance of long-term commitments and project financing from international partners. In Dushanbe, Landau’s agenda includes security cooperation and a health memorandum under the Trump administration’s America First Global Health Strategy. Talks with officials and private-sector representatives will also cover technology and investment. Landau’s Istanbul meetings will focus on commercial ties, alongside energy and supply chain security.