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Iran–Israel War Highlights Central Asia as Zone of Strategic Stability

The explosive conflict between Iran and Israel, including coordinated U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, has drawn global attention to the Persian Gulf and Levant. The escalatory spectacle, however, has blinded most observers to a quieter structural shift. This is the rising indispensability of Central Asia, including its linkages with the South Caucasus. Unaligned in rhetoric and untouched by spillover, Central Asia's very stability quietly threw into relief its increasing centrality to Eurasian energy and logistics calculations. As maritime chokepoints came into question and ideological rhetoric became more inflamed, Central Asia offers a reminder that the most valuable nodes in a network are the ones that continue operating silently and without disruption. Neither Israel nor Iran has real operational depth in Central Asia, and this has made a difference. Unlike Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen — where proxy networks or ideological leverage allowed Tehran to externalize confrontation — no such mechanisms exist east of the Caspian Sea. Iran’s efforts in Tajikistan, grounded in shared linguistic heritage and periodic religious diplomacy, today remain cultural and informational rather than sectarian and clientelist. The influence of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Central Asia is minimal; Israeli presence, while diplomatically steady in places like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, is neither controversial nor militarized. There are no significant arms flows or dual-use infrastructure for either side to use. As a result, Central Asia has remained untouched by the conflict. Although the Iran–Israel conflict is relatively geographically localized, it has shed light on global systems far beyond the immediate zone of combat. Although not so far from the missile trajectories and nuclear facilities, Central Asia and the South Caucasus are remarkably insulated from their effects. Rather than becoming another theater of contestation, they have demonstrated their value as stabilizing elements at a time of heightened geostrategic volatility. It is no longer optional to take into account the Central Asian space, which geoeconomically includes Azerbaijan, now a permanent fixture at the region's summits. As the war now produces a phase of reactive adaptation in international geoeconomics and diplomacy, the region has become a control parameter of the international system rather than a fluctuating variable dependent upon it. The Iran–Israel conflict has drawn new attention to the vulnerability of maritime energy corridors, especially the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes. While contingency planning has focused on naval logistics and airpower deterrents in the Gulf, the Eurasian interior has remained materially unaffected, reflecting its structural indispensability. Central Asia and the South Caucasus, particularly Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, offer existing and potential overland alternatives that bypass maritime chokepoints entirely. Kazakhstan’s oil continues to flow via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline to the Black Sea, while Azerbaijan’s infrastructure, anchored by the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) corridor, links Caspian energy to Mediterranean terminals. These routes are not replacements for Persian Gulf volumes, but, as redundancies, they acquire significance as stabilizing arteries as well as increased relevance in moments of system stress. The war has thus sharpened a fact...

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Kazakhstan Acts Swiftly on Middle East Crisis: Citizens Evacuated, Flights Suspended

In the wake of escalating hostilities in the Middle East, Kazakhstan has undertaken swift measures to safeguard its citizens and adapt its aviation policies. On the night of June 13, Israel launched “Operation Lion’s Roar,” targeting military and strategic sites in Iran, citing concerns over Tehran’s nuclear capabilities. The offensive triggered international concern and widespread flight restrictions, which affected Kazakhstani citizens in the UAE, Iran, and Israel. Stranded Tourists and Initial Evacuations In its immediate response, Kazakhstan’s Aviation Administration imposed a full ban on flights through the airspace of Iran, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. The directive applied to all Kazakh carriers, both commercial and charter, requiring them to halt operations across the affected regions. As a result, around 300 Kazakh nationals, primarily tourists, were unable to return home. Despite prior warnings, flights to the UAE continued to depart with full passenger loads, according to Foreign Ministry spokesman Aibek Smadiyarov. Evacuations began the following day. On June 14, six Kazakh citizens were evacuated from Iran via Azerbaijan. By June 15, another 68 individuals, including diplomats and their families, crossed into Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its gratitude to Iran, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and other partner countries for facilitating the evacuations. Further operations saw 332 Kazakh tourists repatriated from the UAE to Almaty on two FlyDubai flights on June 15, with support from the Turistik Kamkor Foundation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As of June 20, an additional 66 citizens had been evacuated from Israel via Egypt, while 78 others left Iran through Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. “Thanks to joint efforts, more and more citizens are able to return home safely,” the Foreign Ministry noted. Ministry Advisories and Air Travel Disruptions On June 23, the Foreign Ministry issued an official advisory urging Kazakh citizens to refrain from traveling to the Middle East. Those already in the region were instructed to stay alert, avoid large gatherings, monitor official updates, and maintain contact with Kazakh embassies. Airlines also took precautionary measures. Air Astana extended its suspension of flights to Dubai and Doha through June 24, offering passengers the option of free rebooking or a full refund. SCAT Airlines announced delays to flights bound for Sharm el-Sheikh and Antalya, citing bird strikes and the volatile security environment. The airline also cancelled a flight from Astana to Doha. By June 24, Dubai’s Al Maktoum and Dubai International airports had resumed full operations. The airspace over Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait also reopened. UAE authorities have urged travelers to confirm flight details with their airlines and arrive early at airports.

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Former Kyrgyz Prime Minister Proposes Special Status for Citizens in Russia

At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF-2025), Temir Sariyev, head of the Kyrgyz Chamber of Commerce and Industry and former prime minister, proposed granting Kyrgyz citizens a special status in Russia. The statement sparked mixed reactions in both Moscow and Bishkek. Speaking at the Kyrgyzstan-Russia business dialogue, Sariyev, who was involved in Kyrgyzstan’s accession negotiations to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), highlighted Bishkek’s consistent political and economic support for Moscow. He drew on historical ties, citing Kyrgyz support during the Great Patriotic War. “If we recall the Great Patriotic War, it was the 28 Panfilov Guardsmen who defended Moscow. It was a turning point. When the special military operation began, the first to extend a helping hand, without fear, was the Kyrgyz Republic,” Sariyev said, referring to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He proposed exploring the possibility of granting Kyrgyz migrants in Russia a special status, citing longstanding bilateral ties. However, the initiative met resistance in the Russian State Duma. Konstantin Zatulin, First Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, dismissed the proposal, noting that Kyrgyz citizens already enjoy considerable privileges under the EAEU framework, such as visa-free entry, the right to work without a permit, and exemption from patent requirements. “What additional special status could we be talking about? It is impractical. Kyrgyzstan is already in a more advantageous position than other Central Asian countries that are not members of the Union,” Zatulin said. Pushback also came from within Kyrgyzstan. Deputy Prime Minister Edil Baisalov criticized both Sariyev's proposal and the broader outcomes of Kyrgyzstan's EAEU membership. In a post on X, Baisalov wrote: “Of course, our people have a special status, but not because of their participation in the 1941-1945 war. Special status should come from real membership in the EAEU, which hastily accepted us without sufficient guarantees. In reality, there is neither equal access to the labor market nor full access to our goods.” He urged Kyrgyz authorities not to appeal to “pity” or “sympathy,” but instead to demand the full implementation of EAEU commitments. As of now, Sariyev’s proposal has not been officially introduced. Analysts suggest that amid Russia’s sensitive migration and geopolitical climate, the initiative is unlikely to gain traction in the near term.

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China-Kazakhstan Economic Ties: Strong Trade, Weakening Investment

For the second consecutive year, China remains Kazakhstan's largest foreign economic partner. In 2023, China's share of Kazakhstan's total trade turnover surpassed 20%, up from 15.1% in 2019, according to analysts at Ranking.kz. Trade Dynamics: What Kazakhstan Sells and Buys Data from the National Statistics Bureau of the ASPiR RK show that bilateral trade between Kazakhstan and China reached $30.1 billion in 2023. Kazakhstan exported goods worth $14.9 billion to China, while imports from China totaled $15.2 billion. In the first quarter of 2025, trade turnover stood at $5.9 billion, a 5.1% decrease compared to the same period in 2024. Analysts attribute this dip primarily to reduced exports from Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s exports to China consist predominantly of raw materials: oil and gas, ores, metal concentrates, uranium, and agricultural products. China, in return, exports transport equipment, electronics, construction materials, clothing, and footwear to Kazakhstan. Notably, Kazakhstan spent over $100 million on Chinese sock imports last year. Digital technology also represents a significant share of imports, with Kazakh companies spending approximately $683.6 million on computers and laptops. Chinese Investment: From Energy to Industrial Zones China ranks among the top five foreign investors in Kazakhstan. In 2024, direct investment from China amounted to $1.2 billion, almost 50% less than the previous year. This decline mirrors broader trends affecting other major investor countries. Overall, 2024 marked a record low for gross foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into Kazakhstan. Between 2015 and 2022, 25 joint projects valued at $7.4 billion were implemented. According to KAZAKH INVEST and Halyk Research, an additional 30 major initiatives worth $5.2 billion are in the pipeline. One flagship project is the $1.5 billion copper smelter in the Abai region, a joint venture between KAZ Minerals and Chinese investors, expected to be completed by the end of 2028. Another major initiative is an industrial town in the Zhetysu region’s special economic zone (SEZ), with investments totaling $638 million. The site will host enterprises in non-ferrous metallurgy, electronics, and food production, spanning over 1,000 hectares. China is also a key player in Kazakhstan’s renewable energy sector, financing wind farms in the Abai, Aktobe, Mangistau, and Ulytau regions at an estimated cost of $1.2 billion. As of May 1, 2025, more than 4,100 legal entities with Chinese participation were registered in Kazakhstan, which is 3.5 times the number recorded in 2019, according to the Bureau of National Statistics. Of these, approximately 40.7 percent (about 1,700 companies) are involved in trade, while others operate in industry (354 enterprises), construction (352), and mining (209).

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Central Asian Migrants Coerced Into Russia’s War in Ukraine

Citizens of Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, are increasingly being coerced into joining Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, according to a recent statement from Ukraine’s military intelligence agency. Many of those affected are labor migrants who originally traveled to Russia for work but were later pressured or misled into signing military contracts. Reports suggest that Russian army representatives have been enticing migrants with promises of fast money through short-term enlistment. In practice, however, many of these so-called “volunteers” are deployed to the most dangerous front-line positions. Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence claims most do not survive. Among the recently reported casualties were nationals from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan who had enlisted earlier this year. Ukraine's warning also highlights the legal risks facing survivors. Returning home after fighting in a foreign conflict can expose them to criminal charges and potentially long prison sentences under national laws that prohibit participation in overseas military operations. Russian officials have also acknowledged the recruitment of migrants. Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, stated during a legal forum in St. Petersburg that his office had identified around 80,000 individuals who received Russian citizenship but then attempted to evade military service. Of those, approximately 20,000 are currently serving on the front lines in Ukraine, according to Bastrykin. As of September 2024, Russia hosted nearly four million citizens from Central Asia. Uzbekistan accounted for the largest share with an estimated 1.79 million migrants, followed by Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. While some migrants sign military contracts out of economic desperation, others reportedly face coercion, threatened with the loss of citizenship or imprisonment for avoiding conscription. The practice of deploying foreign labor migrants to the battlefield has caused mounting concern across Central Asia. Families fear for the fate of relatives drawn into a distant and escalating conflict, often without clear legal protection or state support.

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Central Asia and Israel, a Pragmatic Relationship That Never Truly Blossomed

The conflict between Israel and Iran is having both international and regional repercussions. The situation has been further inflamed by the U.S. bombing of several Iranian nuclear sites over the weekend, with Tehran responding by threatening retaliation on U.S. soil through the use of sleeper terrorist cells and the possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which over a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes. While Israel's geographical position places it at the heart of the Middle East, Iran's location brings the Islamic Republic into close contact with Central Asia. The consequences of the conflict are therefore likely to be felt heavily in the Central Asian region. The close relations between Tehran and the capitals of Central Asia, due in part to their geographical proximity, are often highlighted. Less explored is the nature of the relationship between Tel Aviv and Central Asia and the lines along which it has developed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On both the Israeli and Central Asian sides, despite all the differences, relations began in the early 1990s, mainly based on certain mutual interests. From Israel's point of view, relations with Central Asia would mean expanding the circle of Muslim countries with which it had friendly ties, gaining greater influence in the region, and reducing its diplomatic isolation. From the Central Asian perspective, the appeal lay in increasing the number of its international partners, coupled with a desire to access Israeli know-how in numerous fields, and the possibility, through relations with Tel Aviv, of having a privileged channel of dialogue with the United States. More than three decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, relations remain good for the most part. “The positive relationship between Israel and Central Asia is driven by a combination of strategic, economic, and geopolitical factors,” Dr Zeev Levin, Coordinator of the Central Asian Research Unit at the Harry S. Truman Institute, told The Times of Central Asia. “One of the primary drivers is mutual interest in security and counterterrorism. Economically, Israel’s expertise in water management, agriculture, and technology is highly attractive to the arid, resource-seeking nations of Central Asia that aim to modernize their infrastructure and diversify their economies beyond oil and gas. Additionally, fostering ties with Israel provides a means of diversifying the foreign policy portfolios of the Central Asian republics.” This positive relationship, however, seems to have lost momentum in recent years due to several factors. Central Asian republics have increasingly oriented towards the East, moving closer to China and other players such as South Korea, Japan, and India, or towards other partners, such as the European ones, with Italy at the forefront in this regard. As Levin points out, the relation has cooled due to several factors: “Central Asian republics did look to Israel in the first decade of independence, but in the last decade to a much lesser extent, since Turkey and China are less complicated and cheaper options. For Israel, the region was never a priority or a point of...