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Fertilizer Plant

Kyrgyzstan Fertilizer Plant Opens With $260 Million Chinese Investment

Kyrgyzstan has opened a major mineral fertilizer plant after years of dependence on imports. The $260 million project is being developed with a Chinese investor in the country’s south. Its first production line has an annual capacity of 100,000 tons, while the capacity announced for the completed project would significantly exceed current domestic demand. The plant opened on August 28 in the village of Torobai Kulatov in the Osh region. The first production line is currently operating in test mode. According to the Kyrgyz government, its capacity is 100,000 tons of fertilizer per year. At the next stage, capacity is expected to increase to 300,000 tons, and after completion of the project in 2028, to 1 million tons. For Kyrgyzstan, this represents substantial capacity. In March 2025, a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture estimated the country’s annual demand for mineral fertilizers at about 287,000 tons: 163,500 tons of nitrogen fertilizers, 105,800 tons of phosphate fertilizers, and 17,200 tons of potash fertilizers. The ministry described Kyrgyzstan at the time as entirely dependent on imports. The plant’s intermediate capacity of 300,000 tons would therefore roughly match the country’s current annual demand, although demand is split between different types of fertilizer. If it reaches the government’s stated capacity of 1 million tons, production would far exceed current domestic demand, meaning a substantial share could be exported. According to the Kyrgyz government, the plant will produce ammophos – a fertilizer containing nitrogen and phosphorus – as well as compound fertilizers containing nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium, the main nutrients used by agricultural crops. The project began with the signing of a $260 million investment agreement in May 2023 between Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Agriculture and China’s Hebei Bai Dou Jia. Construction began in 2024. Equipment worth around $15 million was supplied from China. The Chinese investor also plans to participate in distributing the output. A network of local dealers is expected to be established to supply products directly to farmers. Zhao Xuejun, chairman of Baidoujia Fertilizer, told China Daily that the company intends to combine Chinese fertilizer technology and production experience with local raw materials, labor, and agricultural demand. However, figures for the plant’s eventual capacity differ. The Kyrgyz government says it will reach 1 million tons per year by 2028, while Baidoujia told China Daily that the facility will produce 500,000 tons annually once fully operational. Earlier reports from Kyrgyzstan had also put the eventual capacity at 500,000 tons. Neither side has publicly explained the discrepancy. The scale of Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on imports is evident in trade statistics. World Bank trade data show that in 2025, the country imported approximately $44 million worth of fertilizers. Russia accounted for $20.9 million and Uzbekistan for $19 million. Together, the two countries supplied about 91% of Kyrgyzstan’s fertilizer imports by value. The dependence continued in 2026. Between January and April, Kyrgyzstan imported 12,700 tons of mineral fertilizers worth $7.8 million. Import volumes increased by 13.5% year-on-year. Russia supplied 9,100 tons, or more than 71% of the total...

SCO Summit

SCO Summit Delivers Institutional Reform but Leaves Development Bank Unsettled

Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization adopted amendments to the bloc's Charter and approved regulations for two security bodies in Bishkek on September 1, but stopped short of launching the proposed SCO Development Bank. The official outcome list contains 28 documents. They include the Bishkek Declaration marking the SCO's 25th anniversary, a statement on assistance to countries affected by emergencies, and measures covering transport, digital policy, energy, and climate cooperation. For Kyrgyzstan, which used its fourth chairmanship to press for new financial and emergency response mechanisms, the results were mixed. The emergency statement gave political backing to a Kyrgyz initiative, while the bank remained under negotiation. Kazakhstan then made a competing offer to host its headquarters. An institutional package The member states signed a protocol amending the 2002 SCO Charter and approved regulations for the Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats. They also approved rules for the executive committee of the SCO Anti-Drug Center. The package included programs against drug addiction and synthetic narcotics through 2030, as well as amendments to the 2010 agreement on cooperation against crime. The decisions continue an institutional reorganization begun at the 2025 Tianjin summit. That meeting approved agreements establishing the Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe and a Universal Center based on the SCO's existing regional counterterrorism structure in Tashkent. President Sadyr Japarov said the organization should remain free of bloc politics and confrontation. He called for the rapid launch of the Universal Center and said Bishkek had prepared the conditions for an SCO center against transnational organized crime. Opening the meeting, he said the anniversary should become the start of a new phase for the organization. Bank progress, but no launch The Bishkek Declaration records progress toward creating an SCO Development Bank among interested member states during Kyrgyzstan's chairmanship, though the wording is qualified. The summit did not produce a founding agreement, capital commitment, or a launch date. Japarov urged members to reach a practical decision on the bank and invited them to use Kyrgyzstan's Tamchy Special Financial Investment Territory for joint projects. Kyrgyzstan had already proposed Bishkek as the bank's headquarters. However, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev used his summit address to make a rival offer. Kazakhstan supports directing the proposed bank's resources toward infrastructure, technology, and industry, he said. "If there is consensus among the member states, Kazakhstan could host this institution, its headquarters," Tokayev said in the official transcript. The two bids underline how much remains unresolved. Members reached political consensus to establish the bank in Tianjin last year, but its membership, governance, capital, and location are still being negotiated. Kyrgyz emergency initiative advances The heads of state adopted a separate statement on assistance to countries affected by emergencies. Kyrgyzstan had spent its chairmanship promoting an SCO assistance mechanism and, in May, sought support for a special account to finance emergency aid after major natural disasters. The statement's adoption is a clear political success for Bishkek. Its published title does not establish whether members accepted the proposed special account or how...

Education Ban Mo

Kazakhstan to Open First Ban Mo Workshop as China Expands Industrial Training

China is expanding another dimension of its presence in Kazakhstan – training specialists for industry. The country’s first Ban Mo Workshop will open in Almaty, where students will be trained to work with modern manufacturing technologies and equipment. Ban Mo is a Shandong-backed vocational education initiative designed to link technical training with the needs of companies operating overseas. The center will be established at Satbayev University in partnership with Shandong University of Engineering and Vocational Technologies, after an agreement was reached during a visit by a Kazakh delegation to Shandong Province. The workshop aims to give students practical experience with industrial equipment while still at university. Satbayev University explicitly links the program to the needs of companies developing manufacturing operations in Kazakhstan. “It is important to us that future engineers work with modern equipment while they are still studying, participate in technology projects, and gain hands-on experience in production. The Ban Mo Workshop will allow us to train students with the technologies and real-world needs of our industrial partners in mind,” said Sapar Shalabayev, vice rector of Satbayev University, in the university’s announcement of the project. The wider industrial context is particularly visible in the automotive sector. Astana Motors Manufacturing Kazakhstan, a car plant that opened in Almaty’s industrial zone in September 2025, can produce up to 120,000 vehicles a year, with welding, painting, and assembly carried out at the site. The plant makes Chery, Changan, Haval, and Tank vehicles for Chinese manufacturers. Against this backdrop, Chinese education projects address a very practical need: along with production lines and equipment, new factories need local specialists who know how to operate them. Ban Mo is a relatively new Shandong model for taking vocational education overseas. The province launched its overseas Ban Mo College initiative in 2023, with programs based on cooperation between educational institutions and companies with operations abroad. The name combines two figures from ancient China: Lu Ban, the legendary craftsman and inventor associated with building and engineering, and Mozi, a philosopher whose work encompassed logic, optics, mechanics, and military engineering. Together, the two figures represent the combination of practical craftsmanship and technical knowledge that the program seeks to promote. One of the first overseas projects was Ban Mo College in Zambia, established with the participation of Weihai Vocational College, Copperbelt University, and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation. An agreement to establish it was signed in January 2024, and an official launch ceremony was held in July that year. The program combines vocational skills, Chinese-language instruction, and training for industry. Its focus is construction engineering, with students moving between university study and practical training linked to the Chinese company’s operations in Zambia. For Kazakhstan, this model is not emerging in a vacuum. The country already has three Luban Workshops, part of a better-known Chinese vocational education initiative. The first opened in 2023 at East Kazakhstan Technical University, followed by centers at Eurasian National University in Astana and ALT University in Almaty. For Kazakhstan, this model offers a way to train...

J-10CE Fighter Jets

Uzbekistan J-10CE Fighter Jets Confirmed in Official Footage

Uzbekistan has publicly unveiled Chinese J-10CE fighter jets for the first time, ending months of speculation over the aircraft’s arrival in its air force. Official footage shows at least six aircraft carrying Uzbek military markings. For three decades, Soviet-designed MiG-29s and Su-27s have formed the backbone of Uzbekistan’s fighter fleet. The country has now become the first Central Asian state to operate a modern Chinese fighter and the second confirmed foreign operator of the J-10CE after Pakistan. The first reports of a potential J-10CE purchase appeared several months before the aircraft were publicly unveiled. Confirmation came on August 28, when footage marking the 35th anniversary of Uzbekistan’s independence showed Chinese-built fighters carrying Uzbek insignia. Uzbekistan’s Defense Ministry subsequently released its own video of the new aircraft. At least six J-10CEs have now been publicly shown, while earlier reports that Uzbekistan had ordered 24 aircraft remain unconfirmed. The need to modernize the fleet has been apparent for years. Much of the country’s combat fleet consists of Soviet-designed aircraft, but open sources do not establish how many are currently combat-ready. GlobalMilitary.net, which updated its Uzbekistan inventory in July 2026, lists 38 MiG-29s, 25 Su-27s, and 13 Su-25 ground-attack aircraft as active. The J-10CE gives Uzbekistan a modern platform as an alternative to relying exclusively on aging Soviet-designed fighters. The export version of China’s J-10C is equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and can employ modern Chinese guided weapons. But the significance of the acquisition goes beyond the capabilities of the aircraft itself. Switching to a new fighter type requires training pilots and engineers, securing spare parts and munitions, maintaining engines and electronics, and, over time, developing domestic maintenance infrastructure. In combat aviation, choosing a new platform can create a relationship with its supplier that lasts for decades. In Uzbekistan’s case, some of that infrastructure could build on existing military cooperation with China. Tashkent previously acquired Chinese FD-2000 air defense systems, the export version of the HQ-9. In 2019, the Uzbek military conducted the first publicly reported live-fire tests of the systems. Chinese military analyst Zhang Junshe told the Global Times on August 31 that the six aircraft displayed could be the first batch of a larger delivery. The newspaper also raised the possibility of integrating the J-10CE with Chinese-made ground-based air defense systems through data links. Diversifying Beyond Russia The J-10CE acquisition, however, does not necessarily signal a sudden Uzbek shift from Russia to China. Tashkent has long diversified its military procurement and operates equipment from multiple suppliers. This is particularly visible in transport aviation. Alongside Soviet-designed Il-76s, An-26s, and An-12s, Uzbekistan has acquired European Airbus C295s. In February 2026, Brazil’s Embraer officially identified Uzbekistan as the previously undisclosed customer for its C-390 Millennium and the first operator of the aircraft in Central Asia. Fighter aviation had been different. For decades, the MiG-29 and Su-27 were the staples of its air force. China has now entered this segment for the first time. It is therefore premature to speak of...

ISKP Islamic State – Khorasan

Islamic State Khorasan Province Expands Reach Beyond Afghanistan

More than a decade has passed since the formal emergence of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). For Central Asia, the history of this group is especially significant: the region features prominently in its propaganda and recruitment, and people from Central Asian countries have become part of transnational networks linked to ISKP. Today, ISKP must be assessed as more than an armed group operating in Afghanistan. Over the past decade, it has repeatedly lost leaders, been driven from most of its original territorial strongholds, and endured several major campaigns against it. Yet it has not disappeared. The current iteration of ISKP differs markedly from the organization that tried to establish itself in eastern Afghanistan in 2015-16. The main change is that it has learned to survive and spread its influence without controlling substantial territory. This transformation makes it especially important for Central Asia. Distance from the Afghan border and the number of districts under the group’s control are becoming less important measures of the threat. Its ability to maintain transnational ties, address audiences in local languages, and use migrant and digital networks is becoming more important. A large body of recent research, including a recently published monograph by the Usanas Foundation, makes it possible to trace this transformation. The group’s decade-long history is important for what it reveals about changes in the modern terrorist threat: loss of territory and a decline in membership do not necessarily mean an organization will disappear. ISKP did not emerge in a vacuum. Its original core was formed largely by members of existing jihadist organizations. They included former commanders of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Taliban members, and representatives of other groups who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State’s leadership after the organization emerged in Iraq and Syria. On January 26, 2015, Islamic State officially announced the creation of its “Khorasan Province.” Eastern Afghanistan became its main territorial base. This choice was no accident. Significant Salafi communities and religious networks had long existed in the region. Their development can be traced at least to the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s, and by 1990, Kunar Province already had its own Salafi political-religious movement, which briefly established the Islamic Emirate of Kunar. These networks should not automatically be equated with jihadism, but the presence of an established religious milieu and long-standing tensions between some Salafis and the Taliban gave ISKP more favorable conditions for its initial recruitment and entrenchment. The initial strategy largely replicated the Islamic State model in Iraq and Syria. ISKP sought to do more than carry out terrorist attacks. It tried to establish itself on the ground, build bases and its own control structures, collect local revenue, and demonstrate an ability to impose an alternative order. It was an effort to implement a specific territorial project. That effort to establish a territorial foothold soon became the group’s main source of vulnerability. From the middle of the decade, ISKP came under pressure from several adversaries at once. The armed forces of the former Afghan government and the...

SCO Summit

Kyrgyzstan Hosts SCO Summit as Bloc Marks 25 Years

Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's ten member states are due in Bishkek on September 1 for the final summit of Kyrgyzstan's 2025-2026 chairmanship. The meeting is expected to produce a Bishkek Declaration marking the SCO's 25th anniversary, alongside thematic statements and other decisions. For Kyrgyzstan, the gathering is more than a turn in the organization's rotating chairmanship. As many as 21 heads of state are expected in the country during the week, according to presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov. The summit coincides with Kyrgyzstan's Independence Day and the August 31 opening of the World Nomad Games. The member-state session will bring together Belarus, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with President Sadyr Japarov as host. Chinese President Xi Jinping will also make a state visit, giving the summit a substantial bilateral program alongside the formal meetings. Kyrgyzstan's Diplomatic Week The summit comes less than three months after Kyrgyzstan was elected to the UN Security Council for 2027-2028, its first term on the body. Hosting the SCO gives Japarov an opportunity to reinforce that diplomatic profile before the Security Council term begins in January. The SCO's foreign ministers reiterated in July that Central Asia is the organization's core and backed a larger role for it in the region's security and economic development. Their statement also praised Kyrgyzstan's chairmanship and confirmed that the Council of Heads of State and SCO Plus meetings would take place in Bishkek on August 31 and September 1. What Cholpon Ata Already Settled At their July 24 meeting in Cholpon Ata, SCO foreign ministers approved the draft declaration and accompanying documents as a basis for the summit. The language is therefore largely negotiated before the leaders arrive, although the final package can still change. The ministerial statement gives a clearer indication of the political agenda, supporting a multipolar world order and rejecting unilateral sanctions. It also calls for more intra-SCO trade. Terrorism, separatism, extremism, drug trafficking, and transnational organized crime remain its stated security priorities. The statement says the SCO is entering a period of institutional reform, including changes to its legal framework and cooperation procedures. A Development Bank Still Taking Shape Economic cooperation will occupy a significant part of the summit. In Tianjin last year, interested member states reached political consensus to establish an SCO Development Bank. The institution is not yet operational. At the fourth consultation meeting in Shenzhen in June, delegates discussed its key elements and the next stage of negotiations. A timetable or capital commitments announced in Bishkek would move the proposal beyond its current design stage. The bank could eventually provide another source of finance for infrastructure, but its structure and membership remain unsettled. Currency diversification will also remain part of the discussion. The 2024 Astana Declaration called for gradual growth in the use of national currencies for settlements among interested members. Sanctions on Russia and Iran have increased the political importance of that effort, although the SCO has not created a common payment system. SCO Plus, but Not...