Uzbekistan Deepens SCO Security Ties While Courting Washington
On November 12, a committee of Uzbekistan’s Senate reviewed legislation to ratify an agreement establishing an expanded security center in Tashkent for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The agreement, signed in Tianjin on September 1, 2025, would establish a Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats. Uzbekistan’s state news agency reported the preliminary review on November 13, after the lower chamber had passed the ratification bill. Uzbekistan is seeking to broaden its external options through cooperation with China and the United States, while assuming obligations that differ substantially by sector. In commerce, a new partnership can open access to finance or technology while binding participants to particular suppliers or operating arrangements. The extent of diversification therefore depends both on the opportunities created and on the freedom retained to work with other partners. Uzbekistan’s Expanding SCO Security Role The proposed center would build on the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent, extending cooperation to information security and transnational organized crime. A dedicated organized-crime unit would operate in Bishkek. UzDaily’s account of the ratification bill describes exchanges of information, joint threat assessments, exercises, and professional training among the participating authorities. The SCO Plus security dialogue held in Samarkand on November 5–6 originated in an initiative by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, according to the SCO Secretariat. Security and intelligence representatives discussed radical groups’ use of artificial intelligence and digital platforms, threats to critical information infrastructure, and cooperation with the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism. Their communiqué set out intentions for joint research and training. Joint assessments and training give participating agencies repeated opportunities to compare information and working methods. More regular exchanges among SCO security agencies could increase the influence of shared threat assessments on Uzbekistan’s security services. The influence could operate through decisions about which threats receive priority and how specialists are trained to respond to them. Its extent would depend on what the agencies share and how Uzbek authorities use the resulting assessments. The published accounts do not establish a transfer of national decision-making authority. At his October 17 meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Mirziyoyev reaffirmed Uzbekistan’s One China policy and cooperation against terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The Chinese readout also attributed to him praise for Xi Jinping’s leadership and support for Xi’s four global initiatives. These were explicit expressions of diplomatic alignment with Beijing’s wider international agenda. Chinese Economic Ties and Transport Diversification China was Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner in January–September 2026, accounting for 23.2% of total foreign trade turnover. Russia accounted for 16%. China supplied 32.5% of Uzbekistan’s imports while taking 8.9% of its exports, giving it substantially greater weight as a supplier than as a market for Uzbek goods and services. Financing terms, commercial access, and security obligations condition Tashkent’s ability to use these options. China accounts for a considerably larger share of Uzbekistan’s foreign trade than of foreign debt owed or guaranteed by the Uzbek government. At midyear 2026, Chinese lenders accounted for $3.89 billion of that $40.71 billion debt total, or approximately 10%, according to finance...
