International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Security

Global Terrorism Index: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan Show Zero Risk of Terrorism

The countries of Central Asia are among those least affected by terrorism globally, according to the newly published Global Terrorism Index 2026 report. However, the report suggests that the region’s stability is increasingly influenced by external factors, particularly its proximity to Afghanistan. Country scores are a composite measure made up of four indicators: incidents, fatalities, injuries and hostages. To measure the impact of terrorism, a five-year weighted average is applied. The main concentrations of terrorist activity remain in Africa and South Asia. The overall level of terrorism worldwide declined in 2025, although the nature of the threats became more complex and less predictable. The report indicates that no terrorist incidents were recorded in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, or Turkmenistan, who all scored 0 for terrorism risk, placing them all joint 163rd out of the 163 nations researched. Uzbekistan (95th) remains in the minimal-risk category. Tajikistan is the only country in the region with a higher threat level, ranking 41st globally. Central Asia’s relative stability is attributed to several factors, including robust security measures, the absence of active armed conflicts, and the limited presence of international terrorist organisations. Despite relative internal stability, risks to Central Asia are increasingly emerging from outside the region. The report highlights growing activity by extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as worsening relations between the two countries, which could potentially escalate into open conflict by 2026. Particular concern is focused on the Tajik-Afghan border, where structural vulnerabilities persist. In addition to external pressures, experts are drawing attention to internal dynamics. The report notes an acceleration of radicalisation, particularly among young people, with digital platforms and online content playing a significant role.

EAEU

EAEU Trade Frictions Deepen Despite Shymkent Integration Push

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) met in Shymkent on March 26-27 with a long agenda and a familiar promise: deeper integration, smoother trade, and a more modern common market. Kazakhstan, which holds the bloc’s 2026 chairmanship, used the meeting to push artificial intelligence, digital logistics, industrial cooperation, and the removal of internal barriers. Twelve documents were signed, covering areas including industrial cooperation, transport, and digital integration. “Kazakhstan aims to become a fully-fledged digital country. We have built a modern ecosystem, including Astana Hub and the Alem.ai AI center, and are ready to share experience with EAEU partners on digital regulation and economic transformation,” Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov stated. That sounds ambitious, but it also highlights the bloc’s central weakness. The EAEU has no shortage of plans; it has a shortage of trust between its members, and that matters more. The dynamics extend across the bloc, but are most visible in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The EAEU was built to ensure the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor across Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. But the reality keeps drifting away from the treaty. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship agenda calls for a barrier-free internal market, yet the bloc is entering a new phase of tighter controls, retaliatory measures, and disputes over who really benefits. Shymkent made that contradiction impossible to miss. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov promoted an AI-based system to coordinate cargo flows across the union and speed up transit. He also backed the full electronic handling of veterinary and phytosanitary checks, all of which are practical ideas. Central Asia needs faster, cheaper, and more predictable logistics, but digital tools do not solve a political problem. A system becomes more efficient only if its members want it to be open. When they want leverage instead, technology can only make the controls smarter. [caption id="attachment_46024" align="aligncenter" width="1920"] Image: primeminister.kz[/caption] Kazakhstan’s priorities already show where the friction lies. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev opened his chairmanship by calling for digital transformation, better transport links, and the elimination of internal trade barriers. He also pushed a stronger external profile for the EAEU, with wider links across Asia, the Arab world, and the Global South. That is a serious agenda for a bloc trying to present itself as a Eurasian logistics hub. That push for external expansion comes at a time when internal frictions are becoming harder to manage. It sits uneasily beside everyday trade practice inside the union, where growing trade disputes have become part of the EAEU’s normal life, not an exception to it. The clearest recent example is Russia’s SPOT import-control system, which takes effect for road shipments from EAEU countries on April 1. Importers must submit shipment information two days before trucks reach the border and receive a QR code. Moscow has presented the change as a tax-compliance and anti-fraud measure, with additional financial guarantees expected in later phases of its implementation. In practice, it adds cost, time, and uncertainty before goods even reach the border, the opposite of what a customs union...

Drone Crash

Repeated Drone Incidents Expose Airspace Risks on Russia–Central Asia Frontier

A new drone-related incident in western Kazakhstan has reinforced a pattern that is becoming harder to dismiss. Police in West Kazakhstan Region confirmed that an object resembling an unmanned aerial vehicle was found in the Akzhayik district near the village of Karaulytobe. Images circulating locally appeared to show a largely intact fixed-wing drone. No casualties or damage were reported. “The object was discovered outside a populated area. All circumstances of the incident are being investigated,” the department said. Reports and images of the object initially circulated on messaging apps before being confirmed by regional authorities. This latest discovery fits a sequence of similar incidents across the same region over the past year. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, on March 18, 2025, a drone about three meters long was found near Atameken village in Taskala district, around 60 kilometers from the district center. That case followed another discovery on February 18, 2025, in the Bokeyorda district, where a smaller unidentified object was recovered in a remote area. Within days, further debris was found near the Russian border in Zhanibek district, marking the third such case in a single month. The pattern continued later in the year. On October 23, 2025, a drone of unknown origin exploded near Kyzyltal village in the Burlin district. Residents reported an explosion that damaged rooftops and left a crater near the village, although no casualties were recorded. Authorities opened a criminal case, with the military prosecutor’s office involved alongside police and emergency services. Similar findings have appeared beyond the West Kazakhstan Region. On June 19, 2025, fragments resembling a UAV were found in Mangistau Region near the Bolashak border station. The debris was located in an uninhabited area, and no damage was reported. Taken together, these incidents form a clear geographic cluster along Kazakhstan’s western frontier. Most occurred near the Russian border and in sparsely populated areas. The objects were typically discovered after impact, with no confirmed flight paths or official attribution. Investigations into earlier cases have linked several incidents to areas used for Russian military testing. Western Kazakhstan includes zones connected to long-standing Russian defense activity under bilateral agreements, and parts of the region remain associated with testing operations. This context explains the cautious official response. None of the incidents have been described as attacks, and none have been attributed to a foreign state. At the same time, the repeated discoveries point to a growing exposure that goes beyond routine testing. The wider regional environment has shifted rapidly. The war in Ukraine has driven a sharp expansion in drone use across Eurasia. Both Russia and Ukraine deploy long-range UAVs for reconnaissance and strikes, often over extended distances. Drone activity has already affected infrastructure linked to Kazakhstan’s economy. On February 17, 2025, a drone attack targeted the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s Kropotkinskaya pumping station in Russia’s Krasnodar region, part of a key export route for Kazakh oil. Further attacks on offshore loading facilities and terminals continued later in the year, with additional incidents...

Southern Corridor

The Iran Conflict Is Stress-Testing Central Asia’s Southern Corridors

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal of Turkestan city as a venue for Iran-war negotiations shows how directly the conflict had already begun to affect Central Asia itself. The region is no longer simply observing events in Iran. By the time Tokayev made the offer, Central Asian governments were already dealing with evacuations, route disruption, emergency diplomatic coordination, and growing concern over the war’s economic effects. The Iran war has thus become a real test of Central Asia’s southern diversification strategy. Governments across the region have, in recent years, sought to widen access to world markets through Iran, the South Caucasus, and, in some cases, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These channels reduce dependence on northern routes by opening access to Türkiye, Europe, Gulf markets, and the Indian Ocean. The present crisis subjects that strategy to wartime conditions. The strain of war makes it easier to distinguish durable links, conditional ones, and routes that remain more aspirational than real. The C6 and Crisis Coordination The first effects have been practical. Turkmenistan has opened four additional checkpoints along its frontier with Iran, supplementing the Serakhs crossing, while Azerbaijan’s overland route through Astara became another critical outlet, evacuating 312 people from 17 countries between February 28 and March 2. Turkmenistan, according to official reporting, transited more than 200 foreign citizens from 16 countries during the same period. Uzbekistan used the Turkmen route to repatriate its citizens, while Kazakhstan directed its nationals toward overland exits through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Türkiye. The war is already affecting borders, consular work, and the regional diplomatic agenda. This immediate response gives sharper political meaning to the widening of the Central Asian C5 into a C6 with Azerbaijan. The March 2 call among the five Central Asian foreign ministers and Azerbaijan showed that the format was already there to be used under pressure. What had until now appeared mainly as a corridor framework shaped by summit diplomacy and expert work appeared instead as a working format for crisis coordination linking Central Asia to the South Caucasus. The C6 idea is becoming more practical and more overtly diplomatic. The Organization of Turkic States adds a second, broader layer. Its foreign ministers met in Istanbul on March 7 and issued a joint statement expressing concern over the escalation in the Middle East, condemning actions that endanger civilians, warning against further regional destabilization, and affirming that threats to the security and interests of member states concern the organization as a whole. The statement was cautious, and the OTS is not turning into a military instrument. Even so, the war is testing whether a Turkic political space extending from Turkey through the South Caucasus to Central Asia can do more than express concern as regional security deteriorates. The C6 is becoming a working format for immediate coordination, while the OTS remains the broader political frame within which that coordination takes on institutional meaning. Corridor Stress and Resilience The trans-Iran transit option offers Central Asia a continuous land arc from regional railheads and road networks...

Oil Exports

Drone Strikes on Russian Baltic Ports Raise Risks for Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports

Drone attacks on Russian Baltic ports have heightened concerns about potential risks to Kazakhstan’s oil export routes. Ukrainian drone strikes targeted the ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga in Russia’s Leningrad Oblast earlier this week, disrupting operations at both major oil export hubs. Primorsk has an estimated capacity of around one million barrels of crude oil and approximately 300,000 barrels of diesel fuel per day. Large fuel storage facilities are also located at both ports. Further strikes were reported on March 25, when drones again targeted both ports. Media reports indicated that shipments of oil and petroleum products were suspended, and that fires broke out at Ust-Luga. As of March 26, loadings at both ports were reportedly still suspended following the latest strikes, with no confirmed return to normal operations. Kazakhstan has increasingly used Baltic routes for part of its oil exports following periodic disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system. Commenting on the situation, Kazakh oil and gas journalist Oleg Chervinsky said that the port of Ust-Luga has been used to export Kazakh crude marketed under the KEBCO brand, with volumes rising after earlier challenges affecting CPC shipments. Kazakhstan’s national pipeline operator, KazTransOil, transports crude through Russian pipeline infrastructure under agreements with Russia’s Transneft. From there, oil can be delivered to Germany, shipped via Baltic ports such as Ust-Luga, or exported through Black Sea terminals, including Novorossiysk, which has also been targeted by drone attacks in the past year. According to open-source intelligence analysts cited in international media, energy infrastructure in the Ust-Luga industrial zone, including facilities linked to NOVATEK’s gas processing complex, was affected by the latest strike. The Ust-Luga site is located roughly 850 kilometres from the Ukrainian border. A similar attack on infrastructure in the Ust-Luga area was reported in August 2025. At that time, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy stated that Kazakh oil exports had not been affected. As of March 26, the ministry had not publicly commented on the latest incidents. Officials have previously emphasized the importance of diversifying export routes amid geopolitical risks and infrastructure disruptions.

Caspian

Caspian Escalation Raises Stakes for Central Asia

Central Asia, which has increasingly sought to present itself as a coordinated actor on the global political stage, has until recently maintained a cautious, non-aligned stance regarding the escalation in the Middle East. However, attacks affecting infrastructure in the Caspian region have altered the diplomatic balance. The Caspian Sea is a critical transit zone for Central Asia, linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and onward to European and Middle Eastern markets. It forms part of key east–west and north–south trade corridors that have gained importance since Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupted traditional transit routes. In recent years, regional dynamics have also been shaped by Azerbaijan’s growing engagement with Central Asian states, including its formal inclusion in the expanded Central Asian consultative format, which has effectively evolved from the C5 into the C6. Baku has played an important role in regional connectivity. It has developed close relations with both Turkey and Israel, factors that influence geopolitical calculations in the Caspian basin, which directly borders Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This growing alignment has reinforced efforts to develop the Middle Corridor across the Caspian, linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. Turkey maintains political, economic, and cultural influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan through the Organization of Turkic States. Russian political discourse has at times portrayed this cooperation as part of a broader pan-Turkic geopolitical project, a characterization widely dismissed by officials and analysts in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Astana and Baku continue to maintain strong relations with Ankara, a development that has periodically caused concern in Moscow. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has also strengthened ties with Gulf states. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have become significant investors in the country’s economy. In this context, Iranian attacks on Gulf states not directly involved in the conflict have shaped Astana’s diplomatic positioning during the current crisis. Reports of drone attacks widely blamed on Iran targeting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan have further heightened regional tensions. At the initial stage of the escalation, Kazakhstan’s response was largely limited to diplomatic contacts with regional leaders. At the same time, several Central Asian countries, along with Azerbaijan, expressed concern over the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and began dispatching aid to Iran. Azerbaijan sent nearly 30 tons of food and medical supplies on March 10, followed by another 82 tons of humanitarian aid on March 18. Uzbekistan delivered approximately 120 tons of humanitarian supplies, including flour, vegetable oil, sugar, and canned food, according to regional media reports. Turkmenistan also sent humanitarian aid consisting of medicines, medical supplies, and other goods, primarily intended for children. The Tajik government reported sending a convoy of 110 heavy trucks carrying humanitarian cargo to Iran, with a total weight of 3,610 tons. The diplomatic environment shifted further after Israeli air strikes on March 18 targeting Iranian naval facilities in the Caspian Sea. According to Israeli military statements cited by international media, the targets included a major port of the Iranian Navy, where, reportedly, "dozens of ships were destroyed,”...