International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 1933

Fuel Supplies

Tajikistan Holds Fuel Talks With U.S. After Starting Imports From Iran

Tajikistan has discussed fuel supplies with the United States after beginning imports of petroleum products from Iran, whose oil sector is under U.S. sanctions. On October 8, Tajikistan's Minister of Energy and Water Resources Daler Juma met with Carson Relitz Rocker, chargé d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy, to discuss the country's petroleum supplies and other issues. Tajikistan depends almost entirely on imports of petroleum products. From January through September 2026, the country imported approximately 1.37 million metric tons of oil, petroleum products, liquefied gas, and related goods worth $1.13 billion. This included 333,200 metric tons of gasoline, 424,800 metric tons of diesel, and 321,300 metric tons of liquefied gas. Russia remains the country's main fuel supplier, accounting for more than half of its imports. It delivered approximately 708,000 metric tons worth $628.9 million over the nine-month period. Dushanbe purchases some of this fuel duty-free under intergovernmental agreements. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, accounts for a significant share of liquefied gas imports, supplying 225,600 metric tons worth $153.8 million. Imports of petroleum products from Iran totaled 15,600 metric tons worth $14.7 million over the nine-month period. In September, Tajikistan's Ministry of Energy and Water Resources confirmed that shipments of Iranian oil and petroleum products had begun in late August. The two sides had previously discussed potential purchases of up to 2.55 million metric tons annually, but this was a proposed volume rather than an existing contract. Tajikistan's authorities have not disclosed the exact composition of the shipments already received or how they were transported to the country. American restrictions cover Iran's oil sector and can affect international payments, insurance, and transportation. An official at the U.S. Department of the Treasury warned in comments to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in early October that companies operating in Iran's petroleum sector face sanctions risks, but declined to comment on specific possible violations. Washington has not publicly accused Tajikistan of breaching sanctions over the shipments. Separately, Tajikistan is preparing to host the third B5+1 Forum, bringing together business representatives and policymakers from the U.S. and the five Central Asian countries. The meeting is scheduled for April 20–21, 2027. It is being organized by the U.S.-based Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) in cooperation with Tajikistan's government. B5+1 complements C5+1, the diplomatic format between the same six countries, and is intended to address trade, investment, and barriers to doing business. Previous forums were held in Almaty in 2024 and Bishkek in February 2026. According to CIPE, more than 15 memorandums were signed between American companies and Central Asian partners at the meeting in the Kyrgyz capital. The forum is expected to build on discussions of critical minerals, transport, and digitalization. However, CIPE has not announced a detailed agenda for the Dushanbe meeting, and there is no indication that American fuel supplies will be discussed.

Migrants in Russia

They Went to Russia for Work and Ended Up at War: How Central Asians Enter the Russian Military

Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. Relatives of other young Kazakh men say they had taken jobs at a sausage factory and a poultry farm. But according to reports aired in early October on Kazakhstan’s KTK television channel, the men later ended up in or near the combat zone in Ukraine. Some appeared in videos wearing Russian military uniforms and asked Kazakhstan to help bring them home. On October 7, relatives of Kazakh citizens who had reportedly ended up in Russia’s military visited the Foreign Ministry in Astana to seek help bringing them home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied the families, said his list had grown from eight to 21 people as more relatives contacted him. The same day, ministry spokesperson Zhanbolat Ussenov said officials were checking appeals and would send Russia a list of citizens after verification. Negotiations over their return were underway, he said. Exactly how the men ended up in the Russian military remains unclear. One family said their relative had already been wounded, while KTK reported that the circumstances surrounding the signing of the military contracts have not been independently established. For now, much of what is known comes from the men themselves and their relatives. Their stories raise a broader question that neither Moscow nor the capitals of Central Asia have fully answered: how many people from the region have ended up in the Russian military, and under what circumstances did they get there? Nearly 13,000, According to a Ukrainian Database Russia does not publish comprehensive statistics on foreign contract soldiers. Central Asian governments have only fragmented data from criminal cases, consular appeals, and reports from relatives. The most detailed country-by-country breakdown comes from the Ukrainian government project I Want to Live. By May 2026, the project said it had identified 12,919 citizens of the five Central Asian states who had signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense: 4,955 citizens of Uzbekistan, 3,489 of Tajikistan, 2,420 of Kazakhstan, 1,474 of Kyrgyzstan, and 581 of Turkmenistan. These figures cannot be regarded as complete or independently verified. I Want to Live operates within Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and Ukraine is a party to the war. In addition, 12,919 is a cumulative figure, not the number of Central Asians currently at the front. Some may have been killed or captured, completed their service, returned home, or obtained Russian citizenship. Another major estimate comes from the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Truth Hounds, and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law. Their report estimates that Russia recruited at least 27,000 foreign nationals from more than 130 countries after February 2022. More than 10,000 of them, according to the study, came from Central Asia. The study is based on open sources, consultations with Ukrainian authorities and experts, and interviews with 16 prisoners of war and former Russian servicemen. There are no comparable publicly available Russian statistics, meaning it is impossible to...

Visa Liberalization

Tajikistan and Iran Expand Visa-Free Travel

Tajikistan says a visa-free regime with Iran has been fully implemented, allowing citizens of each country to travel more freely to the other. As of October 5, Tajik and Iranian citizens with “ordinary foreign passports” can enter, transit through, and stay in the territory of the other country without a visa for up to 30 days within a 90-day period, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said. “This system is implemented through international border crossings, including land crossings, international airports, and air routes from third countries, in compliance with the requirements of the national legislation of both countries,” Tajikistan’s state Khovar news agency reported in a story about the ministry’s statement. The visa-free regime has been in the works for several years. Iran and Tajikistan signed a memorandum of understanding about it in 2023 and introduced the policy in stages. In early 2025, for example, Tajikistan said the measure applied only to air travel between the two countries and that citizens traveling through third countries and/or land border crossings still had to get a visa. Iran and Tajikistan don’t share a land border, but they have close economic and cultural links. Land travel between the two countries would require passing through Afghanistan, or Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Those countries have their own, separate visa and entry requirements. The full implementation of the visa-free regime between Iran and Tajikistan comes as other Central Asian countries look for ways to ease travel requirements and strengthen economic and other ties. Turkmenistan says it has introduced an online visa system from this month as part of a modernization drive, though some details about the new process are lacking.

U.S.-Central Asia Engagement

Central Asia Looks to a Possible Trump Visit

U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed an interest in visiting Uzbekistan, according to one of his special envoys, raising the possibility that Central Asia could eventually receive its first visit by a sitting American president. Paolo Zampolli, Trump’s Special Envoy for Global Partnerships and long-time Trump associate, made the comment in an interview with Uzbekistan 24 while visiting the country. “I know that he wants to come to Uzbekistan,” Zampolli said, adding that Trump had personally told him he wanted to make the trip. Zampolli said he was encouraging the idea, but gave no timetable, and there has been no announcement that a visit is being scheduled. Trump had already publicly indicated that he may visit Kazakhstan. Asked during the November 2025 C5+1 summit if he might become the first U.S. president to visit the country, Trump replied, “I think it’s very possible that we’ll do that.” The comments come as U.S. engagement with Central Asia is accelerating. Trump hosted all five Central Asian presidents at the White House in November 2025. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has invited him to Kazakhstan, while Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has also invited him to Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio is reported to be planning a mid-October visit to Samarkand for a C5+1 ministerial, with a delegation expected to include representatives of more than 100 U.S. companies. Sergio Gor, Trump’s Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, has also been involved in Washington’s engagement across the region. In Uzbekistan, he co-chairs the American-Uzbek Business and Investment Council with Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of the presidential administration. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan bring different economic and strategic profiles to Washington’s expanding engagement with Central Asia. Why Kazakhstan Matters Kazakhstan is Central Asia’s largest economy. Its GDP reached about $306 billion in 2025, accounting for more than half of the combined economy of the five Central Asian states. Its share of accumulated foreign investment is even larger, with Kazakhstan holding roughly two-thirds of the region’s inward FDI stock, according to The Times of Central Asia’s Central Asia Balance Sheet. Its strategic importance extends beyond those measures. Kazakhstan produces close to 40% of the world’s uranium and is a major oil producer and exporter, supplying primarily European markets. It also holds substantial critical mineral resources and occupies a central position on the Middle Corridor connecting China and Europe. Recent U.S.-Kazakh commercial agreements include several large transactions. Wabtec has a $4.2 billion locomotive agreement, while Tau-Ken Samruk and Cove Capital have signed transaction documents for at least $1.1 billion in tungsten development. Other agreements cover agricultural machinery, air-traffic management, and additional Boeing aircraft. Kazakhstan also has a distinct diplomatic role in Trump’s engagement with the Muslim world. In November 2025, Kazakhstan joined the Abraham Accords, becoming the first Central Asian and first non-Arab Muslim-majority country to join the framework. Why Uzbekistan Matters With about 39 million people, Uzbekistan is the most populous country in Central Asia. It is also the only state that borders all four of the other...

CAMCA

Opinion: The 2026 CAMCA Regional Forum Concludes – What’s Next?

The 2026 CAMCA Regional Forum has concluded in Baku after two full days of conversation on a range of topics shaping the future of the region. The closing ceremony included an official announcement that next year’s Forum will take place in Uzbekistan in June of 2027. The question now is: in the lead-up to next year’s convening, how do we build on the connections, ideas and momentum built in Baku to truly advance regional cooperation in the months ahead? How do we turn conversation into action? The mechanism and catalyst for this will be the CAMCA Network – the dynamic collection of more than 300 talented leaders spread throughout the entire region and beyond – united by a common conviction that a successful future of the CAMCA region lies in intraregional cooperation and collaboration. Through existing initiatives, such as CAMCA Talking magazine, and forthcoming projects – CAMCA TV and the CAMCA Conversations podcast – the network will utilize these innovative platforms to raise awareness around the important developments taking place within the CAMCA region, and, most importantly, to highlight where regional cooperation is well underway, where more is needed, and how leaders across sectors can do their part to drive tangible collaboration to the next level. While the CAMCA Network can serve as an important stimulus of this effort, it is critical that we continue to expand the CAMCA community across all sectors and build partnerships with individuals, organizations and companies that share our vision for CAMCA’s connected, collaborative and prosperous future. This is the charge we take from Baku and will be an integral part of CAMCA’s next chapter. From his time in public service and at the outset of the Rumsfeld Foundation’s work with rising leaders from the region, Secretary Rumsfeld believed in the incredible potential of the CAMCA region, predicated on the ten countries themselves recognizing the benefit of their enhanced cooperation. 20 years ago, there were few who shared his vision or his optimism. Today, on the heels of the 12th annual CAMCA Forum, this vision has come to life, and global interest and momentum are in CAMCA’s favor. As we look towards the 2027 CAMCA convening in Uzbekistan, we are eager to invite partners from within the region and across the globe to join us in building CAMCA’s next chapter. The groundwork has been laid, and a dedicated and energetic network of regional trailblazers now exists – let’s put it to work and bring CAMCA to a new level. The CAMCA Regional Forum is an annual, non-partisan event dedicated to promoting dialogue, cooperation, and sustainable economic growth across Central Asia, Mongolia, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan. Established as a premier platform for high-level engagement, the Forum convenes diverse stakeholders from government, business, academia, civil society, and beyond. The Forum is co-organized by the Rumsfeld Foundation, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, and the CAMCA Network. Learn more at www.camcaforum.org. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy...

Trade and Investment

Oman Trade Corridor Could Link Kazakhstan to Indian Ocean

Kazakhstan could gain a new trade route to the Indian Ocean through Oman’s ports, offering an alternative to its traditional northern and Caspian corridors. Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, the sultan of Oman, raised the proposal during talks with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana on October 6. He arrived in Astana on October 5, becoming the first Omani sultan to visit Central Asia “We look forward to developing cooperation in transport and logistics, including the development of a trade corridor through Oman’s ports, as well as strengthening air links between our countries,” the Sultan said. For landlocked Kazakhstan, Omani ports would provide another potential route to the Indian Ocean. Kazakhstan is already developing the Middle Corridor across the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the United Arab Emirates are studying the CASA railway project through Afghanistan to Pakistani ports. No route, transit countries, cargo volumes, costs, or launch timetable have yet been announced for the Omani proposal. The talks came immediately after Kazakhstan signed an agreement aimed at settling a long-running dispute over Dunga, an oil field in western Kazakhstan near the Caspian coast. KazMunayGas controls a 60% interest in the project through Dunga Operating GmbH, while Oman Oil Company Limited and Thailand’s PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Limited (PTTEP) each hold 20%. The dispute concerned costs accumulated under the production-sharing agreement that Kazakhstan considered non-recoverable. On October 5, the Energy Ministry and KazMunayGas signed an agreement to resolve the disputed issues. The agreement will now be sent to the foreign partners, Oman Oil Company Limited and PTTEP, for signature. A new development plan for 2026-2039 provides for production of 67.4 million barrels of oil, as well as capital and operating investment. Omani capital is also present in Kazakhstan’s gold industry. Maaden International Investment, an Omani state-owned investment fund, held 31.7% of Solidcore’s voting rights as of March 31, 2026, making it the company’s largest shareholder. Solidcore operates gold-mining assets in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan and Oman have assembled a portfolio of five major joint projects worth around $3 billion. Two projects totaling approximately $1.1 billion have already been implemented in the energy and railway sectors, while others, including ore-processing projects, are at various stages of development. Oman Investment Authority and Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund Samruk-Kazyna are among the main partners. During the visit, Samruk-Kazyna and the Oman Investment Authority exchanged an implementation agreement on establishing a joint investment fund and a term sheet for a Rixos hotel project at Blue City in Oman. KazMunayGas and OQ Exploration and Production also agreed to cooperate on investment opportunities in oil and gas exploration and production. The package of agreements covered areas including transport, agriculture, technology, healthcare, mining, and renewable energy. Despite a joint investment portfolio measured in billions of dollars, merchandise trade between the two countries remains modest. On October 5, the Chamber of International Commerce of Kazakhstan and the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry signed a memorandum of understanding. Kazakhstan proposed expanding exports of grain, meat, and...