Kazakhstan Featurees - The Times Of Central Asia

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Art and Culture

UAE Embracing the Silk Road Narrative: Central Asia at Art Abu Dhabi 2024

More than at any other time in recent history, the entire art world is this year tackling geopolitical identity issues. And while we usually delegate Biennales and non-commercial art events to take the pulse of our contemporary reality, this time an art fair took up this task: Art Abu Dhabi. This year the fair was bigger than ever and had a hugely relevant Central Asian and Caucasus section, curated by Elvira Eevr Djaltchinova-Malec, which was aptly called “Drifting identities.” Founder of the Warsaw Institute for Modern and Contemporary Asian Art (WIMCAA) Foundation - based on the spreading of Asian and global art – Djaltchinova-Malec was invited by the fair's artistic director, Dyala Nusseibeh, to curate a section that presented different aspects of the rich cultural tapestry of the region without shying away from the political concerns and instability which often characterize this part of the world. [caption id="attachment_26543" align="aligncenter" width="928"] From left to right, Abdelmonem Alserkal - prominent art patron based in Dubai, founder of the Alserkal Avenue, Alserkal Foundation, Elvira Eevr Djaltchinova-Malec, Almagul Menlibayeva, and Danagul Tolepbay image: Elvira Eevr Djaltchinova-Malec[/caption] Djaltchinova-Malec has been working on this concept of the Silk Road in different shows – namely Silk Road 2.0 - Artists re-loaded conference in Warsaw, Silk Road 2.0 - New Opportunities panel for art for 021 Art fair in Shanghai - adapting it to the changing geopolitical landscape of the region. "Our foundation was established in 2016, and already, eight years ago, we started to explore the topic of the Silk Road,” Djaltchinova-Malec told TCA. “We wanted to understand the desire of China and countries who joined Chinese projects for the New Silk Road, and we invited artists and art professionals from Vietnam, the United Kingdom, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Germany, Tibet, France, and Ukraine for the foundation’s first conference.” The Belt and Road Initiative, sometimes referred to as the New Silk Road, is a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013 to invest in more than 150 countries and international organizations. [caption id="attachment_26545" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Tapestry by Almagul Menlibayeva; image: Elvira Eevr Djaltchinova-Malec[/caption] It’s the first time that the curator is presenting these artistic geographies in the context of the Gulf. On one hand, this is opening up Central Asian narratives to an Arab public that might be curious to learn more about art in this region. On the other hand, it is helping to open markets and create access to a different pool of new collectors. Thanks to an individual outreach which started well before the fair, the experiment proved successful. "Fortunately, many collectors from the Gulf already know artists from Central Asia, as there are a few art galleries in the UAE which represent them, as well as institutions like the Sharjah Foundation,” Djaltchinova-Malec stated. In addition, many collectors and artists from Russia who are knowledgeable about Central Asian narratives and sensitive to colonization issues, are now based in the UAE. “We tried to involve as many collectors from other circles as...

Criminal Responsibility

Tinker, Tailor, Kazakh Ties: UK Spy Trial Reveals Moscow’s Long Shadow in Kazakh Politics

London's Central Criminal Court, known as the Old Bailey, is currently hearing the trial of several Bulgarian nationals accused by the British authorities of spying for Russia’s intelligence services. The case is likely being scrutinized not only in Moscow but also in Astana, as at least two of the six alleged operations relate to Kazakhstan. A Favor for Nazarbayev The defendants, five Bulgarian citizens, are accused of planning six espionage operations, one of which centers around Bergey Ryskaliyev, a former senior Kazakh official during the presidency of Nursultan Nazarbayev.The accused filmed Ryskaliyev in his London home and plotted to alternately dress up as DHL or Deliveroo drivers, or use a fake ambulance as a cover to access his premises. Ryskaliyev served as akim of the oil-rich Atyrau region from 2006 to 2012, before leaving Kazakhstan amid serious corruption allegations. Both he and his brother Amanzhan - an ex-deputy of the Mazhilis - have been wanted in their homeland for over a decade, facing charges of large-scale corruption, organized crime, false entrepreneurship, and money laundering. Public opinion in Kazakhstan attributes the Ryskaliyev brothers’ prosecution to their alleged involvement in the December 2011 Zhanaozen uprising. According to reports, the uprising was intended to culminate in Nazarbayev’s resignation through a symbolic “march to Astana.” By the summer of 2012, Nazarbayev seemed wary of Ryskaliyev, publicly thanking him for his service during a visit to Atyrau. Shortly after, Ryskaliyev resigned for "health reasons,” while Amanzhan stepped down as a Mazhilis deputy. The brothers remained in hiding for years, with their lawyers claiming in a 2019 trial that their whereabouts were unknown. However, reports later surfaced that Ryskaliyev had filmed and leaked a video of Nazarbayev in London’s Hyde Park, allegedly using it to blackmail the former president. Ryskaliyev denied this, characterizing his actions as a “small rally” outside Nazarbayev’s residence. Despite these allegations, Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court ruled in 2020 to return some of Ryskaliyev’s confiscated assets, including land, money, and shares in various companies, and to reverse property seizures which had affected their spouses. Prosecutors in the London trial allege that Ryskaliyev’s case was part of an operation to foster stronger ties between Moscow and Astana, with Russia suggesting that Kazakhstan might benefit from pursuing him. If accurate, this initiative likely predated January 2022, when Nazarbayev retained significant influence despite stepping down as president. Targeting Tokayev? The second alleged operation appears to have been directed at Kazakhstan’s current president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Prosecutors claim the defendants planned a staged protest outside Kazakhstan’s embassy in London in September 2022, intending to pass information about the “organizers” to the Kazakh authorities. This, they argue, was another effort to bolster Russian-Kazakh relations. However, details reported by Germany’s Der Spiegel suggest a more specific objective. According to the report, the FSB instructed the operatives to stage a protest and send a letter to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, ostensibly from a fabricated group critical of Tokayev. Plans also included splashing fake blood or pig’s blood on the...

US Embassy

U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan Daniel Rosenblum Resigns

U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan Daniel Rosenblum has announced his resignation, effective January 20, 2025. His departure coincides with similar resignations by U.S. Ambassadors Philip Goldberg in South Korea and Mark Libby in Azerbaijan, all stepping down from diplomatic service. The timing of these resignations has sparked speculation, as it aligns with the start of a new presidential term for Donald Trump. End of a Distinguished Career Rosenblum informed the Kazakh government of his decision on November 26, concluding a nearly 28-year career with the U.S. State Department. He has served as Chief of Mission in Kazakhstan since November 2022, representing the United States through five presidential administrations and eight secretaries of state. “It has been a tremendous honor to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan. I have developed a deep respect for the country’s culture, traditions, and people,” Rosenblum said. Under his tenure, bilateral relations flourished, with progress in trade, investment, cultural exchange, university partnerships, and security cooperation. Rosenblum also emphasized his admiration for Kazakhstan’s family-oriented values and expressed optimism about its future: “Kazakhstan’s future is bright, and its opportunities are virtually limitless because the country is built on strong family traditions,” he remarked. While Rosenblum plans to retire from the State Department, he expressed a desire to return to Central Asia, possibly as a tourist or in another capacity. Transition at the U.S. Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission Deborah Robinson will serve as Chargé d’Affaires until a new ambassador is appointed and confirmed. The U.S. Consul General in Almaty, Michelle Erkin, will also continue her work. Rosenblum’s predecessor, William Moser, ended his term in September 2021, preceding Rosenblum’s appointment in late 2022. Resignations in South Korea and Azerbaijan Rosenblum’s resignation coincides with similar announcements by Philip Goldberg, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, and Mark Libby, U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan. Goldberg, who has served in diplomatic roles for nearly 35 years, plans to step down in January 2025. His tenure in South Korea began in July 2022, during the administration of President Yoon Suk-Yeol, and was marked by efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Korea alliance and enhance trilateral cooperation with Japan. Mark Libby’s resignation reflects similar timing, with discussions focusing on the alignment of these departures with the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency. A Broader Diplomatic Crisis? These resignations occur against the backdrop of challenges in the U.S. diplomatic service, highlighted in a report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The report detailed staffing issues during Trump’s first term, with several key State Department positions either unfilled or held by interim appointees. The conclusion of Rosenblum’s distinguished career marks the end of a productive chapter in U.S.-Kazakh relations, leaving his successor with the task of continuing to foster this important bilateral partnership.

Extremism

Central Asia Braces for Return of Radical Islamists Amid Syrian Turmoil

According to experts, the recent collapse of President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria raises concerns about potential destabilization in Central Asia. This development may force regional governments to repatriate citizens who were lured by Islamist propaganda, while the future of the Astana format negotiations on Syria remains uncertain. The swift coup d'état in Syria saw opposition forces capture Damascus and much of the country within days. Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow, leaving a chaotic landscape dominated by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, often described as a successor to ISIS and Al-Qaeda. The situation has plunged Syria into further instability. The Impact of Operation Zhusan Kazakhstan has firsthand experience dealing with the repercussions of Syria's instability. Between 2013 and 2017, hundreds of Kazakh citizens succumbed to Islamist propaganda, crossing borders illegally to join the conflict, often with their families. In response to the humanitarian crisis, Kazakhstan launched Operation Zhusan ("Wormwood") in January 2019 to repatriate citizens trapped in Syria. The operation, conducted in five stages and completed by February 2021, repatriated 607 citizens, 37 men, 157 women and 413 children (34 of whom were orphans). The government set up a rehabilitation center near Aktau on the Caspian Sea to provide treatment, restore documents, and offer vocational training for adults and education for children. All 37 repatriated men were detained and later convicted of terrorism-related activities, receiving sentences ranging between 6 and 14 years, whilst 18 women faced prosecution. Despite the operation’s success, many in Kazakhstan fear the returnees and their children might spread radical ideologies within the country. Lessons from the Region Other Central Asian countries have also grappled with the challenge of repatriating citizens from Syria. Bakhtiyor Babadjanov, an expert from the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under Uzbekistan’s president, detailed the experiences of Uzbek women lured to conflict zones. These women often found themselves deceived and abandoned in dire conditions, as described in an interview. "The 'happy caliphate' turned out to be a myth," Babadjanov explained, recounting stories of women and children abandoned without food or shelter during battles in Mosul. Survivors reported forced marriages, child abuse, and exploitation under the guise of religious duty. The Uncertain Future of the Astana Process Another significant connection between Central Asia and Syria has been the Astana process, a series of negotiations aimed at resolving the Syrian conflict. Since 2017, Kazakhstan has hosted 22 rounds of talks, including discussions on hostages, missing persons, and settlement efforts. However, the recent escalation in Syria casts doubt on the process. In late November and early December, armed opposition groups launched a large-scale offensive, capturing key cities, including Aleppo and Damascus. Despite this upheaval, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov insisted the Astana process remains relevant as a platform for dialogue and consultation, notwithstanding the fact that Assad is now in Moscow. Heightened Risks of Destabilization Experts in Kazakhstan and Central Asia have warned that the fall of Assad's regime could lead to prolonged anarchy, ethnic and religious conflicts, and a refugee crisis. Political scientist,...

Oil

National Bank of Kazakhstan Predicts Higher 2025 Oil Prices Than Bank of America

The National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) has revised its forecast for 2025 oil prices, lowering the projected cost from $82.5 to $70 per barrel. Despite this adjustment, the NBK remains more optimistic than Bank of America, which recently reduced its 2025 oil price forecast to $65 per barrel. Bank of America’s Forecast Initially, Bank of America analysts projected Brent oil prices at $80 per barrel for 2025, aligning closely with the NBK's earlier forecast of $82.5. However, last week, Francisco Blanch, head of global commodities and derivatives research at Bank of America, announced a significant revision, citing oversupply and reduced demand driven by the global shift toward cleaner energy sources and transportation. The new forecast sets oil prices at $65 per barrel. NBK’s Adjusted Outlook In its updated Monetary Policy Report, the NBK revised its oil price forecast for 2025 to $70 per barrel, compared to an average of $80.3 in 2024. The adjustment reflects weaker anticipated demand from China and OECD countries, coupled with slower global economic growth. The NBK noted that "the relaxation of production restrictions by OPEC+ countries starting in 2025, alongside increased output from North and South America, will likely create a supply surplus in the oil market." External Influences The U.S. presidential election results could also impact global oil dynamics. President-elect Donald Trump and his administration have pledged to sharply increase domestic oil production beginning in January 2025, aiming to reduce petroleum prices. Additionally, Trump has suggested a potential withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, which could further incentivize support for U.S. oil companies. For Kazakhstan, declining oil prices present significant fiscal challenges. According to the Ministry of Finance, the country collected 655.2 billion KZT ($1.2 billion) in mineral extraction tax (MET) from oil companies during the first 11 months of 2024. Oil export revenues contributed approximately 2 trillion KZT ($3.8 billion), bringing total budget revenues from the oil sector to over 2.3 trillion KZT ($4.4 billion) this year. The potential reduction in oil prices could, therefore, have a substantial impact on Kazakhstan’s economy, particularly on its budgetary revenues derived from the oil industry.

Economic Cooperation

Kazakhstan, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong Forge Trilateral Partnership to Boost Trade, Investment, and Connectivity

Kazakhstan, China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have agreed to establish a joint mechanism for trilateral cooperation. The agreement was reached on December 5 during a meeting in Urumqi, Xinjiang, attended by Kazakhstan's Vice Prime Minister Serik Jumangarin, XUAR Party Committee Secretary Ma Xingrui, and Hong Kong’s Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development Algernon Yau. At the meeting, Ma Xingrui underscored Xinjiang’s strategic role as a bridge connecting Kazakhstan with Hong Kong and the broader Belt and Road Initiative. Highlighting Kazakhstan as a critical transport hub linking Europe and Asia, and Hong Kong as a global trade and logistics center, Ma proposed developing a framework for collaboration. The suggested mechanism would focus on boosting investment and strengthening cooperation in key sectors, including finance, energy, agriculture, logistics, and cultural exchanges such as education, healthcare, tourism, and scientific research. Vice Prime Minister Jumangarin proposed establishing a Kazakhstan-Xinjiang-Hong Kong Cooperation Council to create actionable strategies for enhancing investment, trade, and economic ties. He suggested hosting the council’s inaugural meeting in Kazakhstan next year. Jumangarin also highlighted China’s significant investment in Kazakhstan, noting 145 joint projects worth $38 billion and 5,000 joint ventures currently operating in the country. He invited businesses from Hong Kong and Xinjiang to collaborate on establishing production facilities in Kazakhstan, particularly for the deep processing of agricultural raw materials. “Kazakhstan is a major exporter of grain and oilseed products, with growing livestock exports,” Jumangarin said. “We encourage businesses from Hong Kong and Xinjiang to partner with us in producing value-added food products.” Hong Kong’s Secretary for Commerce, Algernon Yau, emphasized the city’s status as the world’s third-largest financial center and a global aviation hub connecting over 200 destinations. He welcomed Kazakh enterprises to register in Hong Kong, highlighting the city’s strong ties with ASEAN countries, which could provide Kazakh companies with expanded access to those markets. In a separate meeting, Jumangarin and Ma Xingrui discussed plans to double trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang. XUAR is Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner among Chinese regions, accounting for nearly half of the bilateral trade volume. In 2023, trade between Kazakhstan and XUAR grew by 62%, reaching $20.3 billion. During the first nine months of 2024, trade increased by another 22.46%, reaching $17.67 billion. Both sides are working toward the goal set by the presidents of Kazakhstan and China to raise overall trade turnover to $100 billion. Another key topic was the development of river transportation as an alternative to road and rail routes. Kazakhstan proposed creating a multimodal transit corridor through Russia, Kazakhstan, and China using the transboundary Irtysh River, with initial freight traffic volumes projected at 2–2.5 million tons. Additionally, a potential route along the transboundary Ili River was discussed, linking the Kazakh city of Konayev with the Chinese city of Yining. The agreements reached at the trilateral meeting represent a significant step toward closer collaboration between Kazakhstan, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong. With plans to enhance trade, investment, and infrastructure development, the partnership holds great...