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Organization of Turkic States

Turkic States Focus on AI and Trade at Kazakhstan Summit

Leaders of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) are holding an informal summit in the city of Turkistan, focused on artificial intelligence, digitalization, and economic integration, as Central Asia gains importance as an alternative trade corridor between Europe and China. The meeting brings together the leaders of Kazakhstan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, along with representatives of observer states. Discussions are centered on digital platforms, joint AI projects, transport corridors, and industrial cooperation. The summit comes amid rapid growth of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, which links China and Europe through Central Asia and the Caucasus while bypassing Russia. According to analysts in Kazakhstan, cargo volumes along the route reached 3.3 million tons in 2024, almost six times the 2021 level. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan arrived in Astana on a state visit ahead of the summit and held talks with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. “Kazakhstan and Turkey are connected by enduring friendship, brotherhood, and eternal partnership,” Tokayev said following the meeting. Erdoğan thanked Kazakhstan for the reception and highlighted the escort provided by Kazakh military fighter jets after his aircraft entered the country’s airspace. According to participants at the OTS business forum, the combined GDP of member states exceeds $2.1 trillion, while their total population stands at 178 million people. Despite increasing political coordination, trade between OTS countries still accounts for only around 7% of their total foreign trade turnover, leaving considerable room for deeper economic integration, analysts say. OTS member states are increasingly seeking to expand cooperation beyond cultural and political ties by focusing on logistics, the digital economy, and joint investment projects. Kazakhstan views the organization as one of the instruments for diversifying its foreign economic relations and expanding its role as a transit hub between Asia and Europe.

State Visit

Erdoğan Visit Highlights Kazakhstan’s Middle Corridor Strategy

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Kazakhstan highlighted the growing importance of the Middle Corridor in Ankara-Astana relations, while also showing how Kazakhstan is trying to deepen ties with Turkey without abandoning its multi-vector foreign policy. According to experts, the central issue discussed during negotiations was the development of the Middle Corridor, officially known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). The importance of the route was underscored directly by Erdoğan during a joint media briefing following the talks. The Turkish president highlighted the strategic significance of the East-West-Mediterranean transit corridor crossing the Caspian Sea, describing it as a “modern version of the Silk Road,” the relevance of which is becoming increasingly apparent. The Kazakh side sought to frame the visit within a broader political and cultural context. The declaration signed by the two presidents, along with other documents exchanged by the official delegations, pointed less to a breakthrough than to the continued expansion of existing political, economic, transport, and cultural cooperation. Kazakhstan and Turkey agreed to deepen cultural, humanitarian, and economic cooperation, while continuing joint investment projects, including the further infrastructure development of Almaty International Airport, which is managed by Turkey’s TAV Holding. Political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev noted that the tone of the visit was largely shaped by an unusually emotional and ceremonial welcome. “Tokayev called Erdoğan a ‘dear brother’ and described his visit as a ‘historic event.’ Erdoğan, in turn, thanked the Kazakh leader for the invitation to visit the ‘land of ancestors.’ Tokayev twice emphasized that there are ‘no disagreements or contradictions’ between Kazakhstan and Turkey. He described Erdoğan’s policies as ‘balanced and far-sighted,’ while noting Turkey’s steadily growing influence on the global stage,” Ashimbayev wrote. According to Ashimbayev, Tokayev also praised Turkey as a “golden bridge” connecting Europe and Asia, as well as the broader Turkic world. At the same time, the analyst pointed out that Erdoğan, in an article written for the Kazinform agency, also sharply condemned what he described as Israel’s “crimes” against shared human values, despite Kazakhstan maintaining strong and mutually beneficial ties with Israel. “Contrary to some interpretations, Erdoğan’s visit did not resemble an inspection by a ‘senior brother.’ The Turkish leader was welcomed with maximum ceremony and genuine warmth, but the format of cooperation itself clearly points to equal relations in the economic and humanitarian spheres,” Ashimbayev argued. “Kazakhstan has its own clearly defined position on a broad range of international and domestic issues, and those positions are neither subject to outside discussion nor imply following anyone else’s political line,” he added. Alena Dmitriyeva, head of analysis and communications at the Youth Research Center, said the negotiations reflected the emergence of a new architecture of cooperation across Eurasia. “Ankara gains access to Central Asia, while Astana gains access to alternative transport routes,” Dmitriyeva said, pointing to intensified cooperation on the Trans-Caspian corridor, development of the Aktau and Kuryk ports, and increased oil shipments through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Cooperation with Turkey has already helped reduce cargo transit times along the Middle...

Vegetable Oil Exports

Kazakhstan Begins Vegetable Oil Exports to Iran via Caspian Route

Vegetable oil producers in Kazakhstan have launched a new export route to Iran across the Caspian Sea, completing several trial shipments of rapeseed and sunflower oil in spring 2026, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Agriculture said. According to Kazakhstan’s National Association of Oilseed Processors (NAOPK), the first shipment, consisting of 5,000 tons of rapeseed oil, departed from the Port of Aktau on April 4. The buyer was the Iranian company Kourosh Food Industry, while the supplier was one of Kazakhstan’s largest oil-processing plants affiliated with the association. On May 13, loading was completed for a second vessel carrying 5,000 tons of sunflower oil. The Agriculture Ministry said the shipments demonstrate strong interest among Iranian importers in products from Kazakhstan and point to the potential of the Caspian export corridor. NAOPK Chairman Yadykar Ibragimov said the Iranian market holds significant potential for exports of Kazakhstan’s oil and fat products. According to Ibragimov, Iran imports around 3.5 million tons of vegetable oils and oilseed meal annually, including approximately 1.5 million tons of vegetable oils. “Our countries share a border across the Caspian Sea and also benefit from a preferential customs regime under the free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran,” Ibragimov said. He noted that Kazakhstan exported more than 100,000 tons of oil and fat products to Iran over the past three years, with around 94% consisting of oilseed meal. “The launch of vegetable oil transshipment through the Port of Aktau will significantly increase supply volumes,” he added. According to association estimates, the Aktau route could handle three to four shipments per month, allowing annual exports of 150,000-200,000 tons of vegetable oil through the new corridor. In the longer term, exports of vegetable oils and oilseed meal to Iran could exceed 500,000 tons annually. Kazakhstan’s Agriculture Ministry said development of the route will help diversify export destinations and reduce pressure on existing logistics corridors. “The launch of this new supply channel will help move closer to the goal of increasing the sector’s foreign currency revenues to $1 billion, as outlined in the 2026-2028 Road Map,” the ministry said. Kazakhstan previously reported record sunflower oil exports: between January and October 2025, the country exported more than 523,000 tons of sunflower oil worth approximately $532 million. Authorities aim to position Kazakhstan among the world’s top three vegetable oil exporters. At the same time, Deputy Foreign Minister Arman Issetov said in April that several joint projects between Kazakhstan and Iran had been frozen amid military tensions in the region. Despite geopolitical tensions, Astana and Tehran continue expanding trade and economic cooperation. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kazakhstan and Iran aim to increase bilateral trade turnover to $1 billion in the coming years, with plans to eventually double that figure.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan Labor Minister Briefs on Kazzinc Explosion and Effects of AI

Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Labor and Social Protection is considering several possible causes behind the explosion at a Kazzinc plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk that killed three people. The incident occurred on the morning of May 5, when a dust collection unit exploded inside one of the plant’s workshops, triggering a fire and the partial collapse of structures. Two employees died at the scene, while another later died in hospital from his injuries. Five more were injured. “We are now determining the exact cause and who is responsible: whether it was non-compliance with safety regulations, failure to properly instruct workers on safety procedures, a technological malfunction at the enterprise, or a failure to replace outdated equipment,” First Vice Minister of Labor Yerbol Tuyaqbayev said during a briefing in the Senate. “We will determine the cause, and believe me, responsibility will follow,” he added. The Kazzinc plant, 70 per cent owned by Anglo-Swiss Commodity giant Glencore, has been operating at reduced capacity since the incident. Last year, Kazzinc produced over 200,000 tonnes of zinc, and more than 500,000 troy ounces of gold. According to the vice minister, large industrial enterprises employing between 5,000 and 10,000 workers in Kazakhstan are classified as high-risk facilities and undergo annual preventive inspections. Tuyaqbayev noted that Kazzinc has previously undergone annual inspections and "the company complied with all orders on time. No fines were imposed.” During the same briefing, the official also commented on the impact of artificial intelligence on Kazakhstan’s labor market. According to estimates by Kazakhstan’s Center for Labor Resources Development, the introduction of AI technologies could eliminate between 300,000 and 400,000 jobs over the next decade. “This primarily concerns secondary support personnel, such as accountants and lawyers, areas where direct human involvement is not always required,” he said. Tuyaqbayev added that the Labor Ministry is already implementing professional retraining programs. Since the beginning of the year, approximately 186,000 people have completed retraining courses. Around 112,000 vacancies are currently registered on Kazakhstan’s Enbek electronic employment platform. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that, according to the Center for Labor Resources Development, artificial intelligence could directly or indirectly affect around 4 million jobs in Kazakhstan over the next decade.

Critical Minerals

Central Asia Enters the Minerals Race

Central Asia is entering the critical minerals race at a time when deposits alone no longer confer strategic advantage. The Astana Mining & Metallurgy Congress, scheduled for June 11–12 at Hilton Astana, gives the issue operational form: supply chains, investment, and commercial projects. U.S. Under Secretary Jacob Helberg will participate there and in the preceding C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue on June 10–11. The Astana agenda also puts Central Asia’s role in global supply chains directly into view. The test is how quickly governments, investors, and industrial buyers can finance, process, move, and purchase minerals before they are locked into industrial supply chains. The G7 is moving in the same direction, but through institutional design rather than industrial action. The group is discussing a permanent critical minerals secretariat to maintain continuity across changing G7 presidencies, possibly at either the International Energy Agency or the OECD. The proposal acknowledges a real deficiency in Western coordination, but it also reveals the larger problem: continuity is useful only if it becomes execution. At the same time, reports have circulated about disagreements over stockpiling and leadership, including European resistance to both a single shared stockpile and a U.S.-led structure. For Central Asia, the practical question is not institutional architecture alone, but whether such coordination produces finance, processing capacity, and long-term offtake. The June dialogue in Astana is part of a wider C5+1 movement from diplomacy toward operational cooperation. Its participants are trying to convert the platform from a talk shop into a vehicle for business transactions. As TCA has reported, U.S. engagement in the region is increasingly tied to business mechanisms, export-credit support, and project finance. Kazakhstan has already moved into this framework track. Kazakhstan and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding on critical minerals cooperation during Tokayev’s November 2025 visit to Washington, and the agreement took immediate shape through the Tau-Ken Samruk–Cove Capital tungsten project. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry later described the MOU as the first agreement of its kind in Central Asia, providing for processing capacity in Kazakhstan, technology transfer, and expanded access for Kazakh products to the U.S. market. In February 2026, Uzbekistan followed with its own U.S. critical minerals track: TCA reported that Tashkent signed a critical minerals MOU on February 4, and that DFC heads of terms for a Joint Investment Framework followed on February 19. Central Asian governments are not passive terrain for outside competition. Kazakhstan, with Central Asia’s most developed mining and metallurgical base, and Uzbekistan, with a rapidly expanding minerals program, are using minerals competition to attract capital and build processing capacity. They are seeking to diversify partners and move beyond dependence on raw material exports. The regional objective is industrial upgrading while preserving room for maneuver between China, Russia, the United States, Europe, and other partners. The minerals question cannot be separated from the larger Eurasian setting. Central Asia is trying to widen its own field of choice before its options are narrowed by what Hudson Institute senior fellow Ken Moriyasu called, in comments to...

Organization of Turkic States

Opinion: Turkey’s Third Vector: How the Turkic States Are Expanding Central Asia’s Room for Maneuver

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s May 13-14 state visit to Kazakhstan and the May 15 informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States in Turkistan should not be read as isolated diplomatic events. Together, they point to a larger shift in Central Asia’s geopolitical architecture. During Erdoğan’s visit to Astana, Kazakhstan and Turkey signed the Declaration on Eternal Friendship and Expanded Strategic Partnership, along with agreements covering trade, transport, energy, education, investment, defense cooperation, oil and gas, and financial-sector collaboration. The two sides also reaffirmed their goal of raising bilateral trade to $15 billion. Erdoğan was awarded the newly established Khoja Ahmed Yassawi Order, a symbolic gesture tied to the summit being hosted in Turkistan, the city most closely associated with Yassawi’s legacy. A day later, Turkistan hosted the informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States under the theme “Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development.” The timing matters. Central Asia is no longer operating inside a simple Russia-China framework. Russia remains deeply embedded in the region through security history, infrastructure, language, labor migration, and energy networks. China remains the region’s main infrastructure and trade heavyweight. The West is increasingly focused on sanctions, critical minerals, connectivity, and the Middle Corridor. But Turkey is becoming something different: not a replacement for Russia or China, but a useful third vector. Its influence is built on identity, logistics, defense technology, education, digital cooperation, and institutional networking through the Turkic States framework, rather than overwhelming capital or military dominance. Turkey as a Corridor Power Turkey cannot match China’s investment scale in Central Asia. It also cannot match Russia’s historical security depth. Ankara does not need to replace either power to matter. Its comparative advantage is different. Turkey connects Central Asia westward, to the South Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and Europe. It also offers a language of partnership that is culturally familiar and politically less threatening than great-power patronage. Tokayev captured this dimension during the joint statements in Astana, describing Turkey as a “golden bridge” connecting Europe and Asia. The framing is telling: not a partner of equal weight, but a connector, exactly the function of a corridor power. A corridor power does not dominate a region directly. It expands the routes, partnerships, platforms, and strategic options available to states that do not want to be trapped between larger powers. That is why the Erdoğan-Tokayev meeting and the Turkistan summit matter. The issue goes beyond bilateral trade. It is the gradual construction of a Turkic corridor linking identity, transport, defense, digital governance, and markets. The OTS as Identity Infrastructure The Organization of Turkic States is often dismissed as symbolic: summits, speeches, flags, cultural rhetoric, and references to shared history. That reading is incomplete. Identity is not just emotion. In international politics, identity can become infrastructure. Shared language, educational networks, media links, cultural affinity, and repeated institutional contact reduce the cost of trust-building. They make it easier to sign agreements, build transport projects, expand student exchanges, coordinate business forums, and create political habits of consultation. The...