• KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
28 August 2026

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From Lenin to Kenesary: What Kazakhstan’s Renamed Streets Say About Power

In July 2026, a new constitutional law on Kazakhstan’s administrative-territorial structure came into force. It retained a layered process for changing place names: local authorities must consider residents’ views, while onomastic commissions review proposals before final decisions are made. The previous legal framework dated to 1993. Replacing it with a constitutional law did not dismantle the machinery of onomastic policy but consolidated the roles of public consultation, local government and official commissions. The law formalized a system built over three decades, during which thousands of streets were renamed but the country’s urban map changed at markedly different speeds. Kazakhstan’s experience is often described as a simple substitution of Lenin with Abai and communist terminology with the symbols of independence. The geography of renaming suggests something more precise: a centralized nation-building project whose reach depends on local demography and the political cost of opposition. Research documenting 6,832 cases across 37 cities between 1991 and 2019 shows the disparity. Five cities accounted for 72% of all recorded renamings: Shymkent had 1,767, Almaty 1,064, Astana 860, Aktobe 783, and Kyzylorda 470. Pavlodar recorded 34, Petropavl 28, Oskemen 23, and Rudny only two. Raw totals partly reflect city size and urban expansion, but the study’s statistical analysis identified both city status and ethnic composition as significant factors. Renaming occurred less frequently where the share of Slavic residents was higher, a pattern the author interpreted as evidence of greater state caution in ethnically mixed cities. The procedure helps explain why a national symbolic agenda produced such local variation. Proposals move through public consultation, local representative and executive bodies, and onomastic commissions. These stages do not guarantee that public preferences will determine the outcome, but they create points at which opposition can slow or redirect a proposal. Astana, extensively rebuilt after becoming the capital in 1997, could remake its urban identity quickly. Established industrial cities in the north and east moved more carefully. The contrast between what disappeared and what survived is equally revealing. Explicitly ideological names associated with Lenin, Marx, Engels, and the October Revolution became far less common, while Almaty retained streets named after Soviet scientists, writers, and figures connected to Kazakhstan’s development. The authorities did not treat every Soviet reference alike. They separated communist ideology from cultural and intellectual contribution, producing selective de-Sovietization rather than wholesale symbolic purification. Municipal practice further complicates a purely nationalist reading. Official data from Kyzylorda for 2025 lists 874 city streets: 497 named after individuals, 270 after localities and water features, and 107 carrying conventional names. This snapshot does not identify which streets were renamed, but it shows that the present naming system encompasses historical figures, local geography, and ordinary municipal conventions. In the expanding Arai-Shugyla neighborhood, seven previously unnamed streets received names drawn from localities and water features. Onomastic policy was therefore organizing new urban space as well as redistributing historical visibility. Naming new streets and replacing old ones use the same administrative machinery, although their political consequences are not always comparable. The politics became clearer when...

At Least One Kazakh Tourist Unaccounted For in Nepal Floods

Kazakh officials are working to locate at least one Kazakh tourist who is unaccounted for following flash floods and mudslides in Nepal that killed hundreds of people and caused widespread destruction. A Kazakh woman was part of a tourist group in the area affected by the disaster near the border between Nepal and China’s Tibet region, the Kazakhstani state news agency Qazinform reported on Thursday. The agency and several other media outlets in Kazakhstan quoted Zhanbolat Usenov, spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as saying the tourist had crossed into China with the group and her whereabouts were unknown. Kazakhstan´s diplomats were working with local officials in a search for the Kazakh tourist, according to the media reports. Some later reports said a second Kazakh woman was unaccounted for in the area of the floods. On Wednesday, the Kazakhstani government had said no Kazakh citizens were reported among the dead and missing. The governments of other Central Asian countries are also monitoring the disaster aftermath. Citing Nepali police, The Kathmandu Post reported on Thursday afternoon that the death toll from the floods had risen to 359. That number is expected to rise. More than 800 people, many of them foreign tourists, are unaccounted for, according to authorities.

Tokayev Criticizes Delays in Kazakhstan’s School AI Rollout

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has criticized delays in Kazakhstan’s drive to introduce artificial intelligence into schools, saying the government had failed to implement his May decree properly ahead of the new academic year. Speaking at Kazakhstan’s annual August conference for educators, Tokayev said: “Its implementation ahead of the new academic year has not been properly ensured. This is a major shortcoming.” He called for urgent measures to regulate and systematize the use of AI by children and teachers. The May decree set a tight schedule. A comprehensive implementation plan was due by July 1. Pilot schools and their internet connections were to be ready by August 1, along with synchronized regional plans. National standards governing AI use are due by September 1. Tokayev did not specify which targets had been missed. The standards are intended to cover AI-generated educational content, assessment, and academic integrity. The decree also requires stronger protection of students’ personal data and a professional development plan for teachers. It says AI should be used as an additional classroom tool without replacing teachers’ work. Astana sees the program as preparation for employment rather than simply another digital classroom initiative. “Artificial intelligence and its tools are not amusing toys, but a means of earning a living,” Tokayev said. AI material is due to be added to existing digital literacy and computer science courses during the 2026-27 academic year. A separate rural-school pilot is scheduled to begin on September 1 in ten small schools in the Pavlodar and Kyzylorda regions. Officials plan to expand it to 50 schools in November and another 300 in January 2027. The pilot will test personalized learning in fourth-grade mathematics, digital literacy, native-language classes, and AI. The government sees the technology as one way to narrow the longstanding gap in educational opportunities between urban and rural schools. International guidance points to questions the national standards may need to settle. UNESCO recommends a minimum age of 13 for independent use of generative AI, protection of students’ personal data, and teacher training. Kazakhstan’s decree addresses data protection and training but does not specify an age threshold. The government has until September 1 to approve the national standards and its plan for teachers’ professional development.

Opinion: Why Central Asia Cannot Afford to Abandon the Iranian Route

Kazakhstan had barely secured a foothold in Iran’s largest commercial port when renewed military escalation made the southern route risky again. The problem for Central Asia is that Iran is more than a trading partner. For a region without direct access to the open sea, it provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. The agreement allocates two years for construction and the following 25 for operation. Astana expects the terminal to provide more direct access to markets in the Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. The project almost immediately found itself in a different reality. In July, U.S. strikes hit Iranian railway and coastal infrastructure. The Aq Taqeh Khan bridge on a rail route connecting Iran with Turkmenistan and, further north, with Kazakhstan, was damaged. There was no confirmed halt to Central Asian freight traffic, but military risk was no longer an abstract concern for carriers. That risk has now been compounded by a new U.S. sanctions campaign. On August 24, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent launched what Washington calls Operation Economic Outcast, combining direct sanctions with pressure on Iran’s foreign economic partners. The United States said it would set timelines for other countries to shut down economic activity with Iran, while the scope of secondary sanctions was expanded to cover five areas: digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping. Nearly 60 Iran-linked individuals, entities, and vessels were also sanctioned. The United States has not publicly identified which countries could face penalties first. War and sanctions can make the Iranian route more expensive, slower, and more dangerous. They cannot change geography. Iran gives Central Asia overland access to ports on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. From Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, cargo can move onward toward India, the Gulf states, and East Africa. Iran also provides a western overland route toward Turkey. This is one of the fundamental differences between the Iranian route and the Middle Corridor, which crosses the Caspian Sea before continuing through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The Middle Corridor requires cargo to move between rail and maritime transport. Iran offers the possibility of a continuous overland chain while also providing access to ports connected to the Indian Ocean. For Kazakhstan, the southern route is already more than a plan. Trade with Iran increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor reached 3.5 million tons, while rail traffic between Kazakhstan and Iran increased by 69%. It is this expanding transport network that is now exposed to greater military and sanctions risks. There is another factor. A free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, entered into force on May 15, 2025. It significantly reduced tariff barriers to trade in goods between the two sides. Uzbekistan offers...

Xi Jinping Heads to Bishkek as Kyrgyzstan Prepares to Host 21 Heads of State

Chinese President Xi Jinping will attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek and make a state visit to Kyrgyzstan, Beijing has confirmed. The trip, which also includes a state visit to Egypt, will run from August 30 to September 3. The formal meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State is scheduled for September 1. As many as 21 heads of state are expected in Kyrgyzstan during the week, according to presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov. Xi had long been expected to be among the leaders traveling to the Kyrgyz capital, but the formal confirmation turns attention from the guest list to the business that may be conducted around the main session. For Kyrgyzstan, the most consequential part of the visit may come in Xi's talks with President Sadyr Japarov rather than in the summit hall. The Times of Central Asia will be reporting from Bishkek as the delegations arrive, and from the opening ceremony of the World Nomad Games on August 31. Several visiting heads of state are expected to attend the ceremony, which will bring summit diplomacy and Kyrgyzstan’s biggest cultural showcase together on the eve of the SCO meeting. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has already confirmed that he will be there. The spectacle will be considerable, but the substance is likely to emerge in the bilateral meetings, signed agreements, and final documents released around the September 1 summit. The State Visit and the Railway The state visit format gives Xi and Japarov a bilateral program alongside the summit. The most prominent economic issue is likely to be the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, a project discussed for decades that is now under construction across some of Kyrgyzstan's most difficult terrain. The Kyrgyz authorities put the railway’s construction cost at about $4.7 billion. China holds 51% of China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Company LLC, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. Roughly half of the cost is being financed through a 35-year Chinese loan to the company. The summit could bring clearer evidence of how quickly construction is progressing. Any new financing, contracts, or cross-border arrangements would be more significant than another general statement of political support. The railway also places Kyrgyzstan inside a larger shift in regional trade. Commerce between China and the five Central Asian states passed $100 billion in 2025. Bishkek wants a larger share of that traffic and more of the value created along transit routes. Xi's visit offers Japarov an opportunity to press the case for logistics hubs, local employment and supporting roads rather than transit alone. The Documents Behind the Ceremony The SCO's national coordinators have been finalizing the outcome documents in the weeks leading up to the summit. Under Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship, the SCO has emphasized regional stability and economic cooperation, alongside digital transformation, cyber threats, environmental policy, and cultural exchange. SCO decisions require consensus, which tends to soften disagreements in final communiqués. Any agreements that specify funding, deadlines, or responsibility would give the Bishkek package more weight. Bilateral Meetings Around the Summit The summit will bring...

Kazakhstan Forecasts GDP Growth Above 5% in 2027–2029

Kazakhstan’s government has approved a socioeconomic development forecast and draft republican budget for 2027–2029, projecting average annual real GDP growth above 5% as manufacturing, agriculture, construction, transport, and other non-oil sectors expand. The forecast was prepared with reference to the global economic outlook and conditions in external markets. The accompanying draft budget, approved at the same government meeting chaired by Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov, will be submitted to the Kurultai for consideration. Under the government’s baseline scenario, real GDP is projected to grow by 5.3% in 2027, 5.5% in 2028, and 5.4% in 2029. Nominal GDP is expected to rise from KZT 199.3 trillion in 2027 to KZT 245 trillion in 2029, an increase of almost 23%. Non-oil sectors are expected to provide the main impetus for expansion. Manufacturing output is forecast to grow by an average of 5.9% a year, substantially faster than the 2% projected for mining. Metallurgy, mechanical engineering, construction materials, chemicals, and food production are expected to make the largest contributions. Oil exports and the broader mining sector will remain central to the economy and public finances, but the forecast assumes that manufacturing and other non-oil activities will account for a larger share of new output. TCA reported in July that Kazakhstan’s economy expanded by 4.1% in the first half of 2026 despite an 8.4% decline in oil production. The non-oil economy grew by more than 5%, with manufacturing, construction, trade, and transport accounting for more than 80% of overall growth. Manufacturing output increased by 9.8%. Agriculture is expected to expand by at least 5% annually. Construction is projected to remain among the fastest-growing sectors, increasing by 16% in 2027 and 17.3% in 2029. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin said the expansion would be supported by transport and logistics, energy, and water projects, together with the modernization of housing, utilities, and social infrastructure. The services sector is also expected to maintain strong momentum. Trade is forecast to expand by an average of 5.7% annually, information and communications by 9.2%, and transport and warehousing by 10.4%. The transport forecast builds on rapid expansion along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor. Annual freight volumes through Kazakhstan have risen from 0.8 million to 4.5 million tons over seven years, while delivery times fell from approximately 28–32 days to 13–17 days. The route still carries substantially less cargo than established northern corridors, and participating countries continue to work on remaining bottlenecks. Infrastructure spending is a central element of the draft budget, but Bektenov said it must be accompanied by stronger financial discipline. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s instructions, accelerated construction of infrastructure and social facilities has been designated as a principal budget priority. Government bodies were told to meet the approved economic targets, while administrators of budget programs were directed to increase the return on every tenge spent. The headline budget deficit is forecast to fall from 2.3% of GDP in 2027 to just 0.4% in 2029. However, the non-oil deficit, which measures the...