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Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Iran Proposes Defense Cooperation to SCO Partners at Bishkek Meeting

Iran used a Shanghai Cooperation Organization defense meeting in Bishkek to signal that it is ready to share military experience and defense capabilities with other SCO members, giving a sharper geopolitical edge to the gathering hosted by Kyrgyzstan under its current chairmanship of the bloc. The meeting of SCO defense ministers opened on April 28 at the Ala-Archa state residence in Bishkek. Defense officials from the organization’s member states attended, along with SCO Secretary General Nurlan Yermekbayev. Kyrgyzstan’s Defense Minister Ruslan Mukambetov chaired the session. Iran was represented by Deputy Defense Minister Reza Talaei-Nik. In a statement carried by Mehr News Agency, Talaei-Nik said Iran was ready to share its defense weapons capabilities and experience with “independent countries,” especially SCO member states. He also described the SCO as part of a wider shift away from what Tehran called a “unipolar” international order. The remarks came after weeks of fighting between Iran, the United States, and Israel, including Iranian drone and missile strikes on U.S. bases in the region and Israeli sites. A ceasefire announced earlier this month reduced hostilities, but efforts to reach a wider settlement have stalled. Talaei-Nik also used the meeting to frame the recent conflict as a lesson for other states, declaring, “We are ready to share our experiences in defeating America with other members of the organization.” The SCO meeting gave Tehran a platform inside a bloc that now includes China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Iran became a full member in 2023. The SCO also has a wider circle of observer states and dialogue partners, including 15 dialogue partners listed by the organization’s secretariat. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov received the SCO defense delegations before the ministerial session. He said Kyrgyzstan, as the SCO chair, attaches special importance to practical defense cooperation, including joint exercises, experience-sharing, and stronger coordination. He said agreements reached in Bishkek should strengthen defense cooperation and security across the SCO region. Kyrgyzstan’s SCO chairmanship is being held under the slogan “25 Years of the SCO: Together Towards Sustainable Peace, Development, and Prosperity.” Kyrgyzstan’s Defense Minister Mukambetov said the organization needed solidarity, mutual trust, and collective responsibility to respond to current security challenges. Kyrgyz state agency Kabar said the participants discussed military cooperation, regional security, and joint responses to current threats. The SCO began as a border-security framework. Its roots go back to agreements signed in 1996 and 1997 by Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan on military trust and troop reductions along border areas. Uzbekistan later joined, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formally founded in 2001. Since then, the bloc has grown into a wider Eurasian platform covering security, defense contacts, counterterrorism, transport, energy, and economic cooperation. Talaei-Nik also held talks with Russian and Belarusian defense officials on the fringes of the Bishkek meeting, with both sides discussing continued cooperation with Tehran. For Central Asian governments, including non-SCO member Turkmenistan, the Bishkek meeting highlighted the pressures facing multi-vector diplomacy. All five have spent years balancing security...

Power Struggle

Japarov, Tashiyev, and the Kompromat War

Kyrgyzstan has seen three revolutions since 2005. It has been a politically active country since becoming independent in late 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. But since the current President Sadyr Japarov came to power after the 2020 revolution, he and his long-time friend and security chief, Kamchybek Tashiyev, have stifled expressions of public discontent. For the last five years, Kyrgyzstan’s political scene has been uncharacteristically quiet. But events since Japarov sacked Tashiyev on February 10 have raised speculation that a fierce political battle between the two powerful men now looms ahead for the country. Japarov has already fired the first shots. Accusations of corruption against Tashiyev and his family have led to arrests. But two can play at that game, and the former security likely has compromising information about Japarov and his family. “You Can't Cook Two Sheep's Heads in One Cauldron” The February 10 announcement of Tashiyev’s firing was arguably Kyrgyzstan’s biggest political shock since the October 2020 revolution that saw Japarov go from a prison cell to simultaneously occupying the posts of prime minister and president within ten days. The two had been friends for decades, they started their political careers about the same time, and both quickly rose through the ranks of government during the presidency of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who was ousted in the 2010 revolution. The day after he was confirmed as president, Japarov appointed Tashiyev to be head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB). The day before Tashiyev was sacked, a group of 75 prominent figures, who included former government officials, released an open letter to President Japarov and the speaker of parliament calling for an early presidential election. The group pointed to the discrepancy over whether Japarov was serving the six-year presidential term mandated in the 2010 constitution or the five-year term stipulated in the constitution adopted in April 2021, three months after the snap presidential election that Japarov won. It quickly became apparent that Tashiyev’s dismissal and the letter were connected. The same day Tashiyev was fired, so were several top GKNB officials, with the sacking of officials said to be close to Tashiyev continuing for days. Japarov’s spokesman said it was necessary to “prevent a split in society.” However, Japarov has avoided any detailed explanation of the reasons for the many changes and repeatedly described Tashiyev as a friend. Member of Parliament Elvira Surabaldiyeva, in an April 24 interview with a Kazakh journalist, said Tashiyev was dismissed because he was planning a coup and had been preparing it for a long time. “The president is going through a very difficult time right now, because his longtime friend tried to remove him from office,” Surabaldiyeva said, and added, “There's a saying: ‘You can't cook two sheep's heads in one cauldron.’ This seems to be exactly the case.” Kompromat Tashiyev was out of Kyrgyzstan when the news broke that he had been fired. He briefly returned on February 13, leaving again on February 17. He returned on March 19 and the...

China

Opinion: Expect China to take its 2+2 diplomacy to Central Asia

China does not do military alliances. Its declared posture is one of non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs. Yet Beijing has long understood that commercial ties alone cannot anchor strategic relationships; only security partnerships can. China’s recent experiments with 2+2 security dialogues – bringing together foreign and defense ministers – signal that it is seeking to move beyond an economics-first approach. The most likely next candidates for this format are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all of which share borders with China. For Central Asian governments, a 2+2 with China may hold appeal, particularly as they seek to manage instability spilling over from Afghanistan at a time when Russia’s security role is being strained by its war in Ukraine. After years of hoping that engagement could stabilize Afghanistan, Central Asian states have largely shifted to a policy of containment – seeking to insulate themselves from cross-border militant threats, narcotics flows and refugee movements rather than attempting to reshape Afghanistan’s internal trajectory. For Beijing, the objective would be to consolidate partnerships across the Eurasian heartland – an outcome Washington would prefer to counter. China shares Central Asia’s risk-management approach toward Afghanistan. Like its neighbors, Beijing has little appetite for deep involvement inside the country itself, focusing instead on preventing instability from spilling northward toward Xinjiang or disrupting Belt and Road corridors that run through the region. A 2+2 format offers China a way to institutionalize security coordination without violating its long-standing aversion to formal alliances. Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Defense Minister Dong Jun traveled to Phnom Penh to hold China’s first-ever 2+2 dialogue with Cambodia. Wang told reporters that China is willing to develop the mechanism into a “strategic platform” for enhancing political and defense security cooperation. He described it as a key instrument for cementing mutual assistance and solidarity, and for advancing the construction of a China-Cambodia “community with a shared future.” Wang also said China was prepared to work with Cambodia to build an “Asian security model” based on shared security and on seeking common ground while reserving differences. China’s deepening security engagement with Cambodia comes as the Southeast Asian nation remains locked in a border dispute with Thailand. Although Wang’s itinerary took him next to Bangkok, Beijing chose to hold a 2+2 only with Cambodia – notably the non-U.S. ally in this pairing. China is new to the 2+2 format. Last April, Beijing hosted its first ever 2+2 with a foreign country – with Indonesia. The trajectory suggests further 2+2 engagements ahead, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – the three Central Asian states that border China. In several aspects, Central Asia may be a more conducive environment for this diplomacy than Southeast Asia: there are no maritime disputes, and the countries are not embedded in U.S. alliance structures. Instead, there is a convergence around defensive security priorities – particularly border control and crisis management linked to Afghanistan – making the 2+2 format a natural fit. China under President Xi Jinping has always had an eye...

Silk Road

Silver, Silk, and Forgotten Power: Central Asia’s Islamic Past Comes to London

At Sotheby’s in London, Central Asia comes into view as a world of dazzling craft and taste. The Arts of the Islamic World & India auction on April 29th gathers rare eastern Islamic works that show how the region turned faith, power, and luxury into art. The standout lot is a 12th or 13th-century silver ewer, catalogued as Persian or Central Asian. Most related vessels are brass or bronze. This one is comparable to vessels from the Harari Hoard, a group of 10th and 11th-century silver objects now largely held in the L.A. Mayer Museum for Islamic Art in Jerusalem. The ewer’s presence gives the sale its sharpest point of entry. It is rare, ambitious, and unusually personal. [caption id="attachment_47817" align="aligncenter" width="2447"] A pair of Seljuk gold bracelets, Persia, Khurasan, 12th century; image: Sotheby's[/caption] A 10th-century Nishapur calligraphic dish shifts the focus from metal to script, turning a simple object into a work shaped by the visual grace of the written word. Timurid horse trappings, Qur’an pages, Sogdian silks, golden Mongol cloths, an embroidered robe, and a Shakhrisabz suzani broaden the picture from courtly power to sacred text and textile brilliance, ending in a tradition still closely associated with Uzbekistan. The timing gives the auction added weight. Uzbekistan is building a major new stage for Islamic heritage. The Times of Central Asia reported in April 2026 that its Center of Islamic Civilization has entered the Guinness World Records as the world’s largest museum. TCA asked Frankie Keyworth, a Specialist in Islamic and Indian Art at Sotheby’s, why Central Asia’s artistic legacy is commanding fresh attention now. [caption id="attachment_47818" align="aligncenter" width="8984"] A turquoise-set silver and brass belt buckle, Bukhara, Central Asia, 19th century; image: Sotheby's[/caption] TCA: Why are the artifacts in this auction so important for understanding Central Asia as a center of artistic production, rather than just a corridor between other civilizations? Keyworth: They really reiterate the breadth of artistic production in Central Asia, which is incredibly rich in terms of medium, design and chronology. The works presented here range from the 8th to the 19th century, from textiles to ceramics, metalwork to manuscripts, and they reveal traditions that are distinct to Central Asia, and others that inform and are informed by artistic production in other regions. The impressive silver ewer is a good example of this. Its nielloed decoration on silver is typical of a distinct group of silver vessels produced in Central Asia, but its form would go on to inform examples in other materials, such as bronze or ceramics produced later in Persia. [caption id="attachment_47819" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] A Timurid or early Ottoman tinned copper goblet (mashrabe), Central Asia or Eastern Anatolia, late 15th century; image: Sotheby's[/caption] TCA: Which object best captures Central Asia’s wider historical importance, and what makes it so revealing? Keyworth: It’s hard to pinpoint such a vast artistic tradition to one object, but luxurious textile production is synonymous with the arts of Central Asia. In this sale, we can see one of the earliest...

Regional Ecological Summit

Regional Ecological Summit in Astana Produces Ecology Declaration and Broader Regional Agenda

Central Asian leaders have adopted the Astana declaration on ecology and sustainable development, giving the Regional Ecological Summit in Astana a formal political outcome while a wider package of biodiversity, climate, and pollution initiatives takes shape around it. Kazakhstan’s environment ministry says the five heads of state adopted the document, titled “Ecological Solidarity of Central Asia,” during the April 22 to 24 Summit. The declaration sets out a common regional position on several of Central Asia’s biggest environmental pressures. According to the ministry summary, the text calls for closer coordination in climate negotiations, glacier preservation, the mountain agenda, biodiversity, chemical and waste management, plastic pollution, air quality, land degradation, and desertification. It also presents the declaration as a contribution to ecological sustainability, inclusive economic growth, and a sustainable future for the region. Water runs through the document, but the language is careful. The declaration welcomes work on an interstate program to conserve the Caspian Sea and expresses concern about declining water levels and the shallowing of lakes in Central Asia. It also notes Kazakhstan’s proposal for a possible International Water Organization within the United Nations system, but stops short of endorsing its creation. The summit’s outcome does not rest on a single document. On April 24, the United Nations Environment Programme said the Astana meeting had launched new regional partnerships on circular economy and glaciers, while countries established common approaches on biodiversity, climate action, and air pollution. UNEP also said a regional climate and ecology investment portfolio was set up to widen access to international finance for environmental projects. A separate biodiversity track had already produced its own result earlier in the week. On April 22, UNDP in Kazakhstan said Central Asian countries had signed a regional declaration on biodiversity conservation during a high-level plenary session in Astana. According to UNDP, the document envisages an umbrella programme and action plan, as well as a regional resource mobilization plan to be presented at COP17 in Armenia. Outside confirmation of the main declaration has also become clearer. EFE reported on April 22 that the five Central Asian republics had approved the Astana Declaration of Ecological Solidarity, linking it to Tokayev’s focus on water security, the Aral Sea, and the Caspian. Put together, the Astana summit now looks like a broader regional attempt to turn shared ecological pressure into a workable political agenda. The summit’s next test will be whether these declarations and partnerships are followed by funding, coordination, and cross-border implementation.

EU Sanctions

EU Sanctions Put Kyrgyzstan’s Transit Trade Under Scrutiny

The European Union has stepped up sanctions pressure on Kyrgyzstan by restricting supplies of sensitive technologies and imposing measures on the country’s financial institutions. The decision, adopted as part of the EU’s 20th sanctions package against Russia, reflects growing concerns in Brussels that the Central Asian republic may be used as a transit hub to circumvent restrictions. The move marks a shift in the EU’s approach, from diplomatic warnings to tighter controls on trade and financial channels in third countries. A key argument for Brussels has been trade data. According to European Commission materials, imports of sensitive goods from the EU to Kyrgyzstan surged by nearly 800% in 2025 compared to pre-war levels. Meanwhile, exports of similar goods from Kyrgyzstan to Russia rose by approximately 1,200%. European officials say this dynamic indicates a systemic pattern of re-exports. As a result, the EU has added Kyrgyzstan to its list of countries posing a “systematic and persistent” risk of sanctions circumvention, a designation previously applied only selectively. The restrictions primarily target dual-use goods. These include metalworking machinery and numerically controlled equipment, as well as a wide range of telecommunications devices, from routers and modems to data, voice, and image transmission equipment. According to the EU, these categories present the highest risk of being used by Russia’s defense-industrial complex. European exporters will face tougher checks to show that sensitive goods are not likely to be re-exported to Russia. This creates an additional administrative barrier and raises risks for businesses. For many companies, the effect is a ‘presumption of guilt’ regime around trade with Kyrgyzstan. The sanctions package also affects the country’s financial system. Keremet Bank and Capital Bank have been included in the restrictions, which are set to take effect in May 2026. Particular attention has been paid to the cryptocurrency sector. The EU has sanctioned TengriCoin, a Bishkek-registered entity linked to the Meer platform, which European regulators say facilitated trading in a stablecoin affiliated with Russia’s Promsvyazbank. This move signals the EU’s expanding sanctions policy into digital financial instruments increasingly used to bypass traditional restrictions. Additional measures affect the transport sector. Several Kyrgyz logistics companies have been restricted from accessing European infrastructure, including ports and transport networks. This is likely to increase shipping costs and complicate foreign trade operations, putting additional pressure on export-oriented businesses. Analysts also warn of a potential shortage of European industrial equipment on the Kyrgyz market. The risk of secondary sanctions may lead EU suppliers to withdraw even from legitimate transactions. The tightening of sanctions comes amid intensified foreign policy engagement by Kyrgyzstan. On the day the package was approved, President Sadyr Japarov reaffirmed a strategic partnership with Vladimir Putin during a visit to Moscow. At the same time, Bishkek is strengthening cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), preparing to host a summit and receive high-level delegations, including Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun. Kyrgyz authorities have previously criticized EU sanctions policy. Japarov has described it as unjustified and as pressure that hampers economic development. Despite a series...