Kyrgyzstan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Innovation Rankings

Central Asia in the Global Innovation Rankings: Supercomputers, Engineers, and the Economics of Government Ambitions

In the Global Innovation Index (GII), published on September 29 by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Kazakhstan climbed eight places to rank 73rd among 139 economies. Uzbekistan ranked 77th and Kyrgyzstan 92nd. Tajikistan placed 112th, while Turkmenistan was not included in the study. The overall rankings, however, conceal some interesting details. Uzbekistan ranks second worldwide in the share of graduates in science and engineering. Kyrgyzstan ranks second in labor productivity growth, while Tajikistan leads in utility model applications relative to the size of its economy. Utility models are a simpler form of patent protection, usually for smaller inventions. Such strong results in individual indicators stand in contrast to the countries' relatively modest overall rankings. Part of the explanation lies in the study's methodology. WIPO evaluates education and scientific capacity alongside infrastructure and investment. It also considers business activity and research output. A country may train large numbers of engineers or register technical innovations while lagging in research output and investment, with limited commercial activity. For Central Asia, the rankings also offer a way to compare economic performance with the scale of governments' technological ambitions. Kazakhstan: Supercomputers in Search of Customers In recent years, Kazakhstan has assembled an impressive portfolio of digital projects. The Alem.Cloud and Al-Farabium supercomputers, along with the Data Center Valley project in Ekibastuz, are intended to improve the country's computing infrastructure. The Alem.ai artificial intelligence (AI) center and the KazLLM and AlemLLM large language models are designed to develop its AI capabilities. Training opportunities are also expanding through AI-Sana and Tomorrow School, with TUMO Astana offering education in AI and other digital fields. However, the wider use of AI remains relatively modest. The Digital Qazaqstan strategy through 2029 cites figures for the second half of 2025 showing that generative AI adoption in Kazakhstan stood at 13.7%, compared with a global average of 16.3%. Kazakhstan ranked 24th in the United Nations (UN) E-Government Development Index in its 2024 survey but 73rd in the 2026 GII. Kazakhstan's digitalization model has long centered on government services. The country's high position in the UN study reflects this focus. Commercial technologies present a more complicated picture: here, the government must rely on research teams, private developers, investors, and customers willing to pay for their services. The arrival of supercomputers expands the country's technical capabilities. How extensively they will be used outside government projects remains to be seen. Uzbekistan: Engineering Education and IT Services Exports The country has long focused on workforce development for the IT industry. An export-oriented digital services sector is growing around IT Park. Foreign companies are operating in the country, while training programs in programming and AI are expanding. Tashkent intends to support its workforce development policies with domestic computing infrastructure. Under the AI development strategy adopted in 2024, Uzbekistan plans $50 million in AI infrastructure spending and the training of one million specialists. AI laboratories are also planned at 15 universities. A smaller supercomputer is already operating, and preparations are underway to acquire a more powerful system....

Regional Cooperation

Opinion: Central Asia’s Minilateral Diplomacy and the Limits of Cooperation

In the contemporary, largely fragmented world order, the concept of minilateralism has become increasingly relevant. As less powerful, smaller states are struggling with often ineffective multilateral diplomatic frameworks, cooperation on a smaller scale has been gaining momentum in international relations. Central Asian countries, although with an intrinsic set of strengths and resources, still lack the power to individually address some of their own issues and advocate more proactively for their interests, especially in global forums dominated by major powers and entities. Geopolitical weaknesses of each Central Asian country lie in insufficiently developed domestic economic and military power to compete with much stronger neighbors such as Russia or China. Furthermore, unfavorable geography, where Central Asia, as a landlocked region, has limited access to global trade chains, also dilutes its geopolitical strength. In addition, the transboundary nature of critical resources, especially concerning water flows and supply, often causes tensions among states of Central Asia. In such discouraging circumstances, minilateralism promises more realistic solutions that can place Central Asia on a more equal footing with external partners and enable the region to play a more significant role in regional and, to some extent, international politics. That is why the consultative meetings of the five Central Asian countries (C5), now expanded to include Azerbaijan as C6, and C5+1 dialogues with external partners have become important platforms for Central Asia’s diplomatic standing. Minilateralism and Central Asia Minilateralism represents an international relations concept that implies cooperation of a smaller group of countries (usually three to nine members) in order to resolve shared problems or pursue mutual objectives. While bilateralism remains the main form of cooperation in international politics and multilateralism is necessary for tackling global issues, minilateralism has emerged as a more appropriate response for addressing specific regional issues in a more flexible and efficient manner. One of the main features of minilateralism is prioritizing shared interests over values or ideological principles, which allows collaborating states to focus more on solving issues and avoid being burdened by ideological discrepancies. Take, for example, the Abraham Accords that managed to gather countries with very different ideological views, especially Israel and the United Arab Emirates, but still produced tangible results of cooperation. Another advantage of minilateralism is a quicker response to crises, as well as opportunities, with less of the bureaucratic hassle that often follows multilateral diplomacy. For Central Asia, working together provides a stronger platform for negotiating better outcomes, especially in the economic area. While the current major geopolitical tensions, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Iran war, continue to shake the international order, the Central Asian countries have become more aware of their opportunities, especially in terms of transit routes and natural resource demand. Central Asia has definitely caught the attention of major powers, and its geographical position along alternative transportation routes, as well as its considerable wealth of natural resources, including hydrocarbons and critical materials, opens doors for the region to gain more influence and power. However, for all of these opportunities to materialize, Central...

Water Security

Central Asia Agrees New Water Limits, but National Quotas Remain Unclear

Water has repeatedly caused friction between Central Asian governments. Uncoordinated releases have flooded communities downstream, while disputes over access have contributed to deadly fighting along contested borders. On October 7, the region's countries agreed on water withdrawals from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya for fall and winter 2026–2027, though published results do not reveal how much water each country will receive. The agreements were reached at the 95th meeting of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) in Avaza, on Turkmenistan's Caspian coast near Turkmenbashi. Participants agreed on national water withdrawal limits and projected reservoir operating schedules, but the figures remain in unpublished annexes to the meeting protocol. Regional cooperation has grown in recent years. In June, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan agreed on water releases and electricity supplies for the 2026 irrigation season, continuing efforts to coordinate reservoir operations across borders. Despite this progress, longstanding tensions remain. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan need water in the winter to generate electricity, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan need it in the summer for irrigation. Bishkek has revived proposals for its neighbors to share the costs of maintaining reservoirs, while Afghanistan's Qosh Tepa Canal could put further pressure on the Amu Darya. Countries are also trying to resolve discrepancies in river-flow measurements. [caption id="attachment_58085" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Officials from Central Asian countries attend talks on cross-border cooperation and sustainable development in the Amu Darya basin in Turkmenistan. Image: State News Agency of Turkmenistan[/caption] From Flooded Villages to Border Clashes The competing demands of electricity generation and agriculture are particularly evident in the Syr Darya basin. Kyrgyzstan's Toktogul Reservoir sits on the Naryn River, the Syr Darya's main tributary. In winter, Kyrgyzstan releases water to generate electricity, months before downstream farmers need it for irrigation. When these releases exceed the capacity of reservoirs and canals, the excess water can cause flooding. In February 2004, residents of Kazakhstan's Kyzylorda region experienced the consequences of uncoordinated water releases. The Syr Darya overflowed its banks, forcing the evacuation of at least 200 families. Ice had already restricted the river's flow, worsening the flooding. According to NASA, Kyrgyzstan was releasing more water from its hydropower system than the agreements allowed, with the excess flow entering the Shardara Reservoir. Uzbekistan agreed to divert some of the water into the Arnasay lake system, but it was not possible to divert the entire volume needed. As a result, the river flooded areas farther downstream. In the Amu Darya basin, disagreements developed differently. In 2012, then-Uzbek President Islam Karimov warned that disputes over water resources could lead to war. The source of tension was the construction of the Rogun Hydropower Plant in Tajikistan. Tashkent feared that a large dam on the Vakhsh River, a tributary of the Amu Darya, would allow Dushanbe to influence the volume of water reaching Uzbekistan's agricultural regions. The confrontation was accompanied by interruptions in gas supplies to Tajikistan, transport restrictions, and mutual accusations. Dushanbe linked Tashkent's actions to pressure over the Rogun project, although the Uzbek side disputed that...

Book Launch

Farewell to Russia: An Interview with Joe Luc Barnes on Central Asia’s Changing Role

In Moscow, before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Joe Luc Barnes met residents who distrusted their government but believed its assurances that war was not coming. The shock that followed opens his book, Farewell to Russia: A Journey Through the Former USSR. Barnes, a journalist, editor and contributor to The Times of Central Asia, has visited all 15 former Soviet republics since February 2022. His book explores how people have built their lives since independence, and how deeply Russia remains woven into them. Speaking to TCA, Barnes recalls meeting rural residents in Central Asia who were more supportive of Russia than their urban, Russian-speaking counterparts. He also reflects on why Russia remains a destination for young people seeking opportunities, despite the discrimination many face there. TCA: At the start of the book, you describe Muscovites’ conviction that Russia would not invade Ukraine. What sustained that certainty, and how did people respond when events shattered it? Joe Luc Barnes: I think it was mainly down to people not wanting to believe it. The amazing thing is that Muscovites (and Russians at large, in my experience) are fully aware that their government is full of crooks whom they wouldn’t trust with anything, but simultaneously most of them are in lockstep with the Kremlin’s foreign policy position. The war started just as Russia was trying to get the country vaccinated against Covid. In the end, the government struggled to persuade even 50% of people to have a single dose of the vaccine, but meanwhile those same people were sure the Kremlin was telling the truth when it said that its soldiers were massing on Ukraine’s borders as part of “routine exercises”. When the war did begin and that illusion collapsed, the main reaction was shock. For the first few days, there was a kind of numbness over the city. Many people had friends or relatives in Ukraine; others were stunned that something they had been denying had actually come to pass. Many in their 20s or 30s were disgusted with their government and began to look for a way out of the country. But people were generally focused on looking after themselves – worrying about things like finances, getting money out of their bank accounts, things like that. I think there was also a belief among many that it would be a short war. When I left Russia in March 2022, I don’t think I, or anyone around me, expected the war to still be raging four and a half years later. [caption id="attachment_58058" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Lenin still stands in Bishkek, though not on his original plinth. Image: Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] TCA: Your title suggests a departure from Russia. Where in Central Asia did that feel most real, and where did everyday life complicate the idea? Joe Luc Barnes: I think in urban Central Asia, you can often feel like you’re in a Russian city. People speak Russian, you get around using Yandex Taxi, your mobile provider is Beeline, and architecturally you still...

Political Trials

Kyrgyzstan Court Jails Kadyr Atambayev and Temirlan Sultanbekov

A court in Kyrgyzstan has sentenced Kadyr Atambayev, the son of former President Almazbek Atambayev, to four years in prison and opposition Social Democrats leader Temirlan Sultanbekov to seven years over an alleged plot to seize power following last year's parliamentary elections. The defendants denied the allegations, and Sultanbekov described the prosecution as politically motivated shortly before the October 8 verdict. The trial at Bishkek’s Pervomaisky District Court was held behind closed doors despite defense lawyers’ requests for public hearings, preventing independent scrutiny of much of the evidence. Kadyr Atambayev entered politics in 2021, when he was elected to Bishkek's city council as a Social Democrats representative. His father served as Kyrgyzstan's president from 2011 to 2017 but fell into conflict with his successor, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, and subsequently faced several criminal prosecutions. Sultanbekov leads the Social Democrats, a party closely associated with the former president's political circle. He is also a vice president of the Socialist International, an international association of socialist and social democratic parties. He was previously convicted in a separate case involving allegations of vote buying during the November 2024 local elections. His new seven-year prison term takes into account the earlier sentence. The latest case began on November 22, 2025, eight days before Kyrgyzstan's early parliamentary elections. Police detained ten people, including Social Democrats members, former lawmakers, and associates of Almazbek Atambayev. Investigators alleged that the group was preparing to organize unrest after the vote. Atambayev and Sultanbekov were among those charged with preparing a forcible seizure of power. Defense lawyers challenged the prosecution's evidence. Lawyer Asel Argymbaeva questioned a recording used in the case, alleging that it was made before investigators obtained judicial authorization for surveillance and that expert examinations found no calls for violence. The court acquitted former lawmaker Kubanychbek Kadyrov, while some other defendants received lesser penalties or were released from custody. Those convicted have the right to appeal. The verdicts come less than four months before Kyrgyzstan's presidential election on January 27, 2027, in which incumbent President Sadyr Japarov intends to seek a second term. Since Japarov came to power in 2020, Kyrgyzstan has adopted a presidential system that concentrates greater authority in the head of state. The presidential election is taking place amid criminal prosecutions of several prominent political figures and restrictions on rallies in central Bishkek.

Migrants in Russia

They Went to Russia for Work and Ended Up at War: How Central Asians Enter the Russian Military

Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. Relatives of other young Kazakh men say they had taken jobs at a sausage factory and a poultry farm. But according to reports aired in early October on Kazakhstan’s KTK television channel, the men later ended up in or near the combat zone in Ukraine. Some appeared in videos wearing Russian military uniforms and asked Kazakhstan to help bring them home. On October 7, relatives of Kazakh citizens who had reportedly ended up in Russia’s military visited the Foreign Ministry in Astana to seek help bringing them home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied the families, said his list had grown from eight to 21 people as more relatives contacted him. The same day, ministry spokesperson Zhanbolat Ussenov said officials were checking appeals and would send Russia a list of citizens after verification. Negotiations over their return were underway, he said. Exactly how the men ended up in the Russian military remains unclear. One family said their relative had already been wounded, while KTK reported that the circumstances surrounding the signing of the military contracts have not been independently established. For now, much of what is known comes from the men themselves and their relatives. Their stories raise a broader question that neither Moscow nor the capitals of Central Asia have fully answered: how many people from the region have ended up in the Russian military, and under what circumstances did they get there? Nearly 13,000, According to a Ukrainian Database Russia does not publish comprehensive statistics on foreign contract soldiers. Central Asian governments have only fragmented data from criminal cases, consular appeals, and reports from relatives. The most detailed country-by-country breakdown comes from the Ukrainian government project I Want to Live. By May 2026, the project said it had identified 12,919 citizens of the five Central Asian states who had signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense: 4,955 citizens of Uzbekistan, 3,489 of Tajikistan, 2,420 of Kazakhstan, 1,474 of Kyrgyzstan, and 581 of Turkmenistan. These figures cannot be regarded as complete or independently verified. I Want to Live operates within Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and Ukraine is a party to the war. In addition, 12,919 is a cumulative figure, not the number of Central Asians currently at the front. Some may have been killed or captured, completed their service, returned home, or obtained Russian citizenship. Another major estimate comes from the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Truth Hounds, and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law. Their report estimates that Russia recruited at least 27,000 foreign nationals from more than 130 countries after February 2022. More than 10,000 of them, according to the study, came from Central Asia. The study is based on open sources, consultations with Ukrainian authorities and experts, and interviews with 16 prisoners of war and former Russian servicemen. There are no comparable publicly available Russian statistics, meaning it is impossible to...