• KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
15 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 789

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team looks at the role of clusters in Uzbekistan's farming sector, which is key to understanding what Mirziyoyev's comments about farmers receiving some $1 billion in profits from this year's cotton harvest really means. Special guest: Umida Niyazova, the director and founder of the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights.

CSTO Without Armenia: What Keeps Yerevan From Leaving and What the Summit Means for Central Asia

Armenia has effectively stopped participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) but has not formally withdrawn from the military alliance. At the November 11, 2026, summit in Moscow, Armenia lost its voting rights because of unpaid membership dues, while the CSTO's five other members — Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus — agreed to develop collective aviation forces and mobile air defense units. Kazakh political analyst Maksim Kaznacheyev explained to The Times of Central Asia why Armenia's leadership is reluctant to sever ties with the CSTO and what the new military agreements could mean for Central Asian countries. Why Armenia Has Not Left the CSTO Yerevan froze its participation in the organization in February 2024, accusing its allies of failing to ensure Armenia's security during armed clashes with Azerbaijan. Armenia stopped paying membership dues and sending representatives to CSTO bodies. At the November 11 summit, CSTO members decided that Armenia would lose its voting rights and the ability to nominate candidates for senior positions because of unpaid contributions. CSTO Secretary-General Taalatbek Masadykov said, however, that the organization was not considering expelling Armenia. Kaznacheyev attributes Yerevan's reluctance to sever ties with the CSTO to Armenia's domestic political situation. "If Armenia leaves the CSTO or the EAEU, pro-Western actions could trigger an internal crisis and destabilize the country," Kaznacheyev said. He believes Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is seeking to avoid deepening divisions within Armenia as his government pursues closer ties with the European Union. Yerevan, however, has pursued different policies toward the two organizations. Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO but continues to operate within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). On November 5, Pashinyan said the country was not preparing to leave the EAEU. The CSTO has experienced the departure of member states before. Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992, declined to renew it in 1999, rejoined the CSTO in 2006, and suspended its membership again in 2012. Kaznacheyev believes Armenia's situation is substantially different. "Uzbekistan's experience does not apply to Armenia because Uzbekistan had a unified political elite when it left the CSTO," Kaznacheyev said. He noted that Tashkent also had a bilateral security agreement with Russia, allowing it to maintain military cooperation outside the CSTO. For Kazakhstan, Armenia's dispute with the CSTO does not create an immediate security threat. Kaznacheyev said Astana's restrained position reflects its limited direct interests in Armenia and its growing transport links through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward Turkey. "That is why Kazakhstan maintains a restrained, neutral position," he said. What the New Air Defense Agreements Mean for Central Asia At the Moscow summit, CSTO members agreed to develop the organization's Collective Aviation Forces and approved plans for mobile air defense units to protect joint military formations. Plans call for incorporating combat aviation units alongside transport and special-purpose aircraft. Kaznacheyev believes the agreements could expand Russian military-technical assistance to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. He argues that Russia could help other CSTO members modernize their air forces and air defenses, particularly in Kyrgyzstan...

Bishkek’s Vanishing Spaces Through the Eyes of Artist Sonata Raiymkulova

On Abdymomunov Street in Bishkek, a café serves Qurt Mocha, a drink based on coffee, hot chocolate, and qurt, the local extra-salty Kyrgyz cheese. It’s easy to get addicted to it, and the presentation is aesthetic enough to make a captivating Instagram story. Perhaps it’s still a long way before this will become the next matcha latte, coveted by ‘it girls’ around the world, but certainly not for lack of trying on my part. “I always wanted to try this coffee shop,” artist Sonata Raiymkulova tells me. Elegant and slightly coy, she is certainly an ‘it girl’ of the Central Asian art world herself, “… but I’ll take some green tea instead,” she concludes. While I start feeling like an easily gulled tourist, she sits across from me in the Kölökö coffee shop, lightly tapping on her iPad and showing me her virtual portfolio. The coffee shop has a beautiful garden, with dim lights and a serene nightly atmosphere. I can’t help but notice how this contrasts with the air, which is so heavy with smog that it’s hardly breathable. Like the livability of Kyrgyz cities, issues such as pollution are precisely what Sonata, a former architect with a passion for urbanism, tackles in her work. Her drawings, installations, and performances don’t necessarily look Kyrgyz, or at least not like what foreigners would expect Central Asian art to look like. Not so much qurt in them, so to speak. Rather than attaching herself to some recognizable traditional elements, Sonata tackles the present of her city, Bishkek, where she was born and raised, and where, after her architectural studies, she took up contemporary art. Her Dō – I use the Japanese term as her father steeped her and her brother in Japanese traditions - is collaborative and a little unorthodox. In 2016, she joined Estelik (also known as “monument of memory”), a Bishkek project in which artists, artisans and participants swapped brand-new stools for old, colorful ones and piled their haul into an impromptu massive monument. In 2021, she was one of more than 40 artists from the five Central Asian countries involved in Art Plov CA, a British Council-supported project run from Tashkent. Her studies also took her to Moscow to the HSE Design School, where she graduated. In 2023, she won a Prince Claus Fund Seed Award, one of 100 awarded that year across more than 60 countries. She later told her university she had known about the prize for years but had been too scared to apply, and that winning mostly meant doubting herself less. In February 2024, she had a solo show at DREIVIERTEL in Bern, in collaboration with the Residency.ch programme. She has also had shows in Karlsruhe, Milan, Almaty, and Moscow. This summer she was back in Almaty with Bishkek Gothic, a series made with her brother Marat Raiymkulov for Efes Art Space’s Sayran city route. Raiymkulova's work moves between the personal and the political, exploring the human body as well as Bishkek's changing urban...

Russia Tries to Keep the CSTO Relevant in Central Asia

Russia used the November 11 CSTO summit in Moscow to promote closer military cooperation with allies increasingly looking elsewhere for partners. Plans to develop the collective aviation force and supply equipment for Tajikistan's Afghan border would keep their militaries working with Russia, but Armenia's estrangement shows how far confidence in Russian protection has fallen. The summit barred Armenia from voting and appointing representatives to senior posts in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov announced the restrictions, citing its failure to meet its membership obligations. Armenia remains a member, but has withheld contributions and frozen participation after accusing the alliance of failing to defend it. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan continue to participate. They still want military training, cooperation against terrorism, and help securing the region's southern border with Afghanistan. Moscow can offer those services, even as the Ukraine war damages its standing and China, Europe, and the U.S. expand their economic presence. At the previous summit in Bishkek, Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Russian weapons and closer military integration. The Moscow meeting continued that effort. Equipment and joint operations keep Russia involved in its neighbors' defense planning, while agreed declarations allow it to claim diplomatic support beyond Belarus. The Damage in Armenia Armenia's break with Moscow developed through successive security failures. The CSTO provided no military assistance after Azerbaijani attacks on Armenian territory in 2022, leading Yerevan to freeze its participation in 2024. The dispute over unpaid contributions followed the loss of confidence in the alliance, rather than causing it. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict deepened that rupture. Russian peacekeepers deployed after the 2020 war did not prevent Azerbaijan's September 2023 offensive. More than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled, leaving Moscow's claim to be a reliable protector badly damaged. Nagorno-Karabakh was internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory and fell outside the CSTO's collective-defense guarantee. Russia's peacekeeping mission there was separate from the alliance. But that distinction offered little reassurance to an Armenian government that had already failed to obtain military assistance after attacks on Armenia itself. Kazakhstan has a different experience. During the January 2022 unrest, CSTO troops guarded key facilities. Moscow can therefore point to an actual deployment when arguing that membership remains useful, though Armenia's experience makes it harder to promise that help will arrive whenever another member requests it. The Border Program in Tajikistan Tajikistan takes over the CSTO chairmanship in January 2027, and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon used the summit to call for closer attention to carrying out existing commitments. Strengthening the organization should rest on “mutual trust, consideration of the interests of member states and consistent fulfillment of commitments undertaken,” Rahmon said. The Afghan border program has taken years to negotiate. The CSTO decided to develop it in 2013, but leaders approved it only in November 2024. Its published timetable assigned preparations to 2025, priority deliveries to 2026–2027, and further reinforcement through 2029. The border equipment program was still awaiting financing arrangements in April. On October 21, Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov said Tajikistan had selected suppliers and...

Japan Sets Sights on Deeper Economic Ties with Kyrgyzstan

In an interview with AKI.TV, Japan’s Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic, Ryuichi Hirano, said that Japan intends to move its longstanding relationship with Kyrgyzstan toward a broader economic partnership based on shared interests. Ambassador Hirano pointed to Kyrgyzstan’s growing economic and diplomatic weight. “I know that Kyrgyzstan’s economy is growing rapidly. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan is strengthening its presence in the international community, particularly as a prospective new member of the UN Security Council,” he said. Kyrgyzstan was elected to a non-permanent Security Council seat on June 3, 2026 for the 2027–2028 term, and will serve on the Council for the first time. Economic data for Kyrgyzstan has been robust in recent years. Official figures put Kyrgyzstan’s real GDP growth at about 11.1% in 2025, the second consecutive year above 11% and well above the 2025 forecasts of the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank. Ambassador Hirano stressed the need for more reciprocal cooperation. “I believe we already have a solid foundation for developing our bilateral relations on a mutually beneficial basis, and I would like to do my part to advance them,” he said. President Sadyr Japarov’s visit to Japan gave fresh impetus to deepening bilateral relations. On December 20, 2025, he met Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, and the two leaders signed a joint statement on the further development of relations through mutually beneficial cooperation. In the interview, Ambassador Hirano said he attended the meeting and described it as productive and positive. The statement builds on the 2023 Joint Statement on Friendship and Comprehensive Partnership in the New Era, signed during Japarov’s November 2023 visit to Japan. The agenda has since shifted toward trade, investment, and commercial opportunities. Japan’s recorded exports to Kyrgyzstan reached ¥13.01 billion (US$82.1 million) in 2025, while imports from Kyrgyzstan totaled ¥79.2 million (US$ 505,000). Bilateral trade therefore remains small and heavily weighted toward Japanese exports, which leaves considerable room for diversification and growth, especially on the Kyrgyz side. Five areas stand out for the emerging partnership: critical minerals, including antimony and silicon; energy, especially hydropower and renewable electricity; transport infrastructure; agriculture and food processing; and digital technologies, satellite applications and education. Transport connectivity also has a regional dimension. The Tokyo Declaration adopted at the Central Asia plus Japan summit in December 2025 made stronger links between Central Asia and international markets a priority, including support for the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. Kyrgyzstan’s role in the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, with tunnels now under construction, could strengthen its position not only in trade between China, Central Asia and Europe, but also in trade with Japan. While not mentioned directly by Ambassador Hirano, stronger institutional groundwork is also being laid. Japan and Kyrgyzstan signed a new double-taxation agreement on December 19, 2025. It entered into force on July 26, 2026, although most of its provisions apply from January 1, 2027. At their December meeting, the two leaders also agreed to establish an intergovernmental commission on trade, economy, culture and human exchange. They said they wanted to conclude a...

Kyrgyzstan Presidential Election: Sadyr Japarov Seeks Second Term

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov has applied to run for a second term in the January 27, 2027, presidential election. Since he came to power in October 2020, Kyrgyzstan has shifted to a presidential system of government, recorded strong economic growth, and seen several prominent politicians and journalists face criminal prosecution. Less than 24 hours after Japarov filed on November 10, the electronic system had recorded 60,000 signatures in his support, the maximum a candidate can submit. Kyrgyzstan’s Central Commission on Elections and Referenda (CEC) must still verify the signatures. By November 11, the commission listed nine applicants, all self-nominated. Alongside Japarov were former members of parliament Iskhak Masaliev and Baktybek Kalmamatov, former financial police chief Syiymyk Japykeev, and Bakytbek Adylov, who previously headed the State Migration Service. Akai Kydyrov, Aimen Kasenov, Azamat Esenbekov, and Aiba Amur also applied. A Second Term Under the New Constitution Mass protests over the results of the October 2020 parliamentary elections brought Japarov to power as acting president. In January 2021, he won an early presidential election with 79.2% of the vote on a turnout of 39.16%. In April of that year, voters approved a new constitution, replacing Kyrgyzstan’s mixed parliamentary and presidential system with a presidential one. The president gained direct control over the executive branch, and the number of seats in the Jogorku Kenesh, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament, fell from 120 to 90. The new constitution allows two five-year terms in place of a single six-year term. Because Japarov was elected before the reform, a dispute arose over the length of his mandate. In February 2026, the Constitutional Court ruled that his six-year term would run to 2027 and count as his first term, allowing him to run again. The vote was originally expected in October 2026. Lawmakers moved it to January 2027 and later set election day for the fourth Wednesday of the month rather than the usual Sunday. Criminal Cases and Political Competition The presidential campaign is taking place under restrictions on rallies and pickets in central Bishkek. In February 2026, Japarov dismissed Kamchybek Tashiyev, his longtime political ally, as head of the State Committee for National Security. In September, the Bishkek City Court found Tashiyev guilty of obstructing electoral rights. Under Kyrgyz election law, the conviction bars him from running for president even if his criminal record is expunged. Opposition politician Adakhan Madumarov, leader of the Butun Kyrgyzstan party, was detained in September 2023 on treason charges related to a 2009 protocol on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. In March 2024, a court found him guilty but imposed no punishment because the statute of limitations had expired. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling in October 2026. Madumarov denies the charges. In September 2025, a court convicted four former employees of the independent news outlet Kloop of inciting mass unrest. Two camera operators received five-year prison sentences, and two accountants received noncustodial sentences. An appeals court released the camera operators on probation that November. Human Rights Watch cited the case as part of a crackdown...