Kyrgyzstan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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C5+South Korea

South Korea Steps Up Central Asia Critical Minerals Push

The first South Korea–Central Asia summit, held in Seoul on September 16, capped three days of bilateral meetings that produced more than 70 agreements and memorandums. The leaders agreed to meet every two years, a separate C5+1 forum for industry ministers was established, and critical minerals took a central place on the new agenda. The main question now is how many of those documents will translate into mines, processing plants, and long-term contracts. South Korea needs reliable supplies of metals for its automotive, electronics, battery, and energy industries. Central Asia wants to use that demand to develop domestic processing and reduce its reliance on raw material exports. Seoul proposed combining the region’s resources with its own exploration, mineral processing, and manufacturing technologies. President Lee Jae Myung spoke of cooperation across the production chain, from identifying deposits to manufacturing finished products. Rare metals centers being established at key locations in Central Asia are intended to support joint research and specialist training. Until now, South Korea has worked with the region’s countries largely through bilateral ties. The new C5+1 format adds a regional mechanism to those relationships. Kazakhstan will host the next summit in 2028. Kazakh financier and analyst Rasul Rysmambetov believes the value of the new format will depend on the region’s ability to secure tangible industrial results. He sees South Korea as an attractive partner because of its experience with rapid industrialization and its strengths in building industrial facilities. “The priority for Central Asia is to stop selling raw materials. We need to establish processing in the region. The heads of state’s visit to Seoul was highly productive. In fact, all summits in similar formats have been productive. The main question now is how to move away from exporting raw materials and toward joint industrialization,” Rysmambetov told The Times of Central Asia. Uzbekistan put forward a broader regional proposal. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for an investment alliance for critical minerals, with processing clusters bringing together exploration, mining, and the production of high-value goods. Uzbekistan and South Korea are already developing a joint rare metals center and have agreed to strengthen cooperation throughout the production chain. Kazakhstan offered Korean businesses a broader package covering rare metals, nuclear and clean energy, and artificial intelligence. Urban development was also part of the talks, including the Alatau Smart City project near Almaty. The countries upgraded their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership and signed a memorandum on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The energy agreements also cover conventional resources. In April, South Korea said it had secured 18 million barrels of Kazakh crude oil. In Kyrgyzstan, Korean organizations are working with their Kyrgyz counterparts to identify possible antimony and tungsten projects and strengthen exploration capacity. Tajikistan is also offering cooperation on antimony, as well as precious metals, building on the first Korea–Tajikistan Minerals Forum, which took place in August. The minerals agenda is complemented by Korean willingness to invest in transport and infrastructure. South Korea and Uzbekistan agreed to expand Korean participation in...

Central Asia-South Korea Summit 2026

Central Asia’s First Korea Summit Produces Different Deals for Each Country

The first Central Asia-Republic of Korea Summit brought five countries to Seoul with very different records of working with Korean capital. Kazakhstan arrived with commercial agreements worth about $19 billion, while Uzbekistan is discussing multibillion-dollar financing through the state-owned Export-Import Bank of Korea. In Turkmenistan, Korean companies are expanding beyond their traditional role in the gas-chemical industry; Tajikistan is offering mineral resources; and Kyrgyzstan is establishing a dedicated government contact point to help attract Korean businesses. On September 16, the presidents of all five Central Asian states met South Korean President Lee Jae Myung together for the first time. Until now, the Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum, established in 2007, had operated mainly at a ministerial level. A permanent secretariat was established in 2017, and in 2020 the meetings were elevated to the level of foreign ministers. The leaders adopted the Seoul Declaration, agreeing to hold summits every two years, with Kazakhstan set to host the next in 2028. Ministerial meetings in the intervening years will review implementation and prepare the next summit’s agenda. The declaration also envisages Korea Desks across the five Central Asian countries to help businesses address administrative obstacles. The leaders expressed interest in combining Central Asian minerals with Korean technology to build joint production networks, and agreed to pursue measures to reduce non-tariff barriers. Seoul also sees Central Asia as part of its own industrial strategy. South Korea, one of the world’s leading producers of automobiles, electronics, batteries, and ships, needs stable supplies of energy and raw materials. Opening the summit, Lee spoke of combining the region’s resources with Korean exploration and processing technologies. Critical minerals, energy, and supply-chain resilience were among the main issues at the meeting. In 2025, South Korea’s trade with the five countries reached $10 billion for the first time: Korean exports totaled $8.67 billion, while imports from Central Asia amounted to $1.39 billion. Cumulative Korean investment in the region reached $6.48 billion. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan continue to account for most of this trade and investment. The talks in Seoul showed how different the next step could look in each of the five countries. [caption id="attachment_56323" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: Akorda[/caption] Kazakhstan: $19 Billion in Agreements and Large-Scale Industry Kazakhstan arrived at the summit with the largest announced commercial package. On September 15, a day before the regional summit, Kazakhstan and South Korea signed around 80 agreements worth approximately $19 billion through the Kazakhstan-Korea Business Council in Seoul. About $11 billion is associated with projects involving Samruk-Kazyna, Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund, which controls major state assets in oil and gas, energy, transport, telecommunications, and uranium mining. The $19 billion figure represents the value of signed agreements and announced projects at different stages of development. Behind the headline figure are several major industrial projects. QazaqGaz and Hyundai Engineering agreed to implement a gas processing plant at Karachaganak with an annual capacity of 5 billion cubic meters. KazMunayGas and Samsung E&A signed an agreement on expanding the Pavlodar refinery’s capacity to 9 million metric tons a...

TCA Interviews

Kyrgyzstan’s High-Wire Act: Sanctions, Compliance, and National Interest

On September 2, the day after the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Heads of State Summit in Bishkek, The Times of Central Asia spoke with Bakyt Sydykov, Kyrgyzstan’s Minister of Economy and Commerce and Special Presidential Representative for Sanctions Policy. He outlined the government’s approach to sanctions compliance and protecting Kyrgyz businesses. Sanctions exposure can affect Kyrgyz banks and businesses, as well as their international partners. U.S. secondary sanctions and EU and UK measures affecting foreign entities operate through different legal mechanisms. Some portions of the text have been edited for clarity. TCA: The sanctions against Russia adopted by the U.S., EU, and UK are not UN Security Council-mandated. Is it correct that Kyrgyzstan’s compliance policy addresses these measures rather than UN-mandated sanctions? Sydykov: That's correct. Secondary sanctions can affect non-U.S., non-EU, and non-UK entities or persons who knowingly facilitate transactions involving sanctioned parties. Our focus is on establishing better and better mechanisms and frameworks that address this bilateral dimension, that is, Kyrgyzstan's direct exposure through its relations with the sanctioning jurisdictions, in order to mitigate our exposure to potential secondary sanctions. TCA: Kyrgyz citizens and businesses can face sanctions exposure through dealings with sanctioned parties, including the risk of U.S. secondary sanctions. What are Kyrgyzstan’s main challenges in improving its compliance regime, and how are you addressing them? Sydykov: For technical reasons, our compliance regime is moving toward putting in place mechanisms that can flag or be anticipatory. I think you would agree that free markets are complicated and circumvention often comes to light only after it has occurred. We are largely equipped to manage these occurrences. We are moving to put in place firewall-like frameworks which would allow the country to identify and respond to occurrences before the fact. It is a great challenge — and one that every country operating in a free-market economy faces — to develop such a capacity, namely, to anticipate and prevent circumvention before it happens. Despite our best efforts, this remains a structural limitation. TCA: What concrete actions have you taken, or are you planning to take? Sydykov: We have established working groups, task forces, and interagency committees capable of swiftly halting the operations of any company engaged in sanctions circumvention. We are also working closely with commercial banks on these efforts. The banks, for their part, have introduced internal compliance committees and, in some cases, adjusted the composition of their boards of directors to strengthen governance and decision-making around potential circumvention risks. The banks are also developing a joint interbank blacklist of sanctioned entities, so that these entities are unable to operate through the banking system going forward. Those are steps to develop a working forward-looking, predictive approach — one that flags suspicious activity before it materializes – central to the comprehensive framework we are building. TCA: Some foreign investors may be reluctant to invest in Kyrgyzstan because of sanctions exposure. How could the measures you are taking address those concerns? Sydykov: Let me first say that we understand the rationale behind...

Rule of Law

Kyrgyz Court Upholds Ex-Security Chief Tashiyev’s Conviction but Changes Charge

On September 10, the Bishkek City Court upheld convictions against former security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev and seven others, but changed the offense from plotting to overthrow the government to interfering with electoral rights. All eight had been convicted in July of plotting the violent overthrow of the government. They received four-year prison sentences, replaced by three years of probation. The change has added to the confusion surrounding the alleged plot. On September 14, Tashiyev’s lawyer asked the Prosecutor General’s Office to investigate the appeal judges’ actions, saying the defense had received no warning of the new charge. The Letter of 75 The saga started in February, when a group of 75 prominent figures in Kyrgyzstan released an open letter calling on President Japarov to call for an early presidential election. The group argued that Japarov was elected in January 2021 under the terms of the previous constitution, which allowed a president one six-year term in office. Several months after Japarov was elected, the country approved a new constitution that gave an individual the right to be elected to two five-year terms as president. Within hours of the letter’s publication, the authorities started rounding up some of the authors of the letter, and President Japarov dismissed his long-time friend Tashiyev as security chief. Japarov said he dismissed Tashiyev to “prevent a split in society,” and for weeks after that, the Kyrgyz president was evasive about the exact reason for sacking a man Japarov continued to call his close friend. In an interview in late April, parliamentary deputy Elvira Surabaldiyeva was the first Kyrgyz official to clarify that Tashiyev was being charged with planning a coup. The trial opened on June 15. Tashiyev’s co-defendants were former Prosecutor General Kurmankul Zulushev, former Parliamentary Speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu, former Deputy Interior Minister Kursan Asanov, former Deputy Prime Minister Aaly Karashev, and politicians Emilbek Uzakbayev, Bekbolot Talgarbekov, and Kurmanbek Dyykanbayev. On July 2, all eight were found guilty of plotting the violent overthrow of the government. The court imposed four-year prison sentences and ordered confiscation of their property, but replaced imprisonment with three years of probation. Most of the defendants and the prosecution appealed the court decision, setting the stage for the court ruling on September 10. Still Guilty, but of Something Different The prosecution sought to have the sentences increased to nine years in prison for all the defendants. The defendants, of course, wanted to be exonerated. On September 10, the Bishkek City Court rendered its verdict. All eight defendants were declared guilty, but not of attempting to overthrow the government. They were guilty of “interfering with exercising voting rights.” The court retained the four-year prison terms but again allowed all eight defendants to serve probation instead. It reduced probation from three years to two and lifted the property confiscation order. Zulushev’s lawyer has said he will appeal to the Supreme Court. Tashiyev’s lawyer has separately asked prosecutors to investigate the appeal judges’ actions, arguing that his client was convicted on a charge the...

CSTO

For the CSTO, Afghanistan Might Be the Last Credible Threat

The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization is conducting its “Rubezh (Frontier) 2026” military exercises from September 12-19. Those exercises are designed with Afghanistan in mind, a country that the CSTO has been talking about frequently in 2026, and also one where militant groups pose a shared threat to its members. And even the Taliban are no longer viewed as the threat they once were. Frontier 2026 The Frontier 2026 exercises are taking place at the Koktal training ground in southeastern Kazakhstan’s Zhetysu Province. The CSTO’s Rapid Deployment Force is practicing to repel cross-border incursions in mountain and desert terrain. The exercises come this time as concerns about infiltration by militants in Afghanistan into CIS territory are increasing. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov said on September 8 that Russia is paying special attention to strengthening Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan. The Tajik authorities have been calling for additional aid for the country’s border forces since a series of attacks from Afghanistan in November 2025 left five Chinese workers in southern Tajikistan dead, followed by an attack in December that killed two Tajik border guards. Tajikistan has regularly asked for international help in guarding its frontier with Afghanistan since independence in 1991. But after the violence at the end of 2025, the Tajik government appealed especially to its fellow members in the CSTO for increased assistance. CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov said at the end of August that the first shipment of weapons and equipment would be sent to Tajikistan this autumn. Raison D’être The Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in 1992 by representatives from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia joined. The purpose was simple. If any of the member states was attacked by an external enemy, that state could request aid, including military assistance, from the other members. In the early 1990s, there were potential enemies for the Treaty members in practically every direction. The Soviet Union had collapsed in late 1991. There were questions about how the former Communist Bloc countries and their new Western allies might act. The theocratic regime in Iran was a possible threat to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and the latter region had unstable Afghanistan to worry about also. China was a concern for Central Asia and Russia. Back then, banding together made sense for the nine newly independent states that signed the treaty. When Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan dropped out in 1999, it appeared the Collective Security Treaty was on the brink of becoming irrelevant. After Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president, he put a new emphasis on a security bloc within the CIS, and in 2002, the remaining six treaty members signed a new charter. However, now, in 2026, the list of the CSTO’s potential external threats is greatly reduced. Far from being a security concern, China is now a leading trade partner for Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and provides military assistance to all four countries. Iran’s relations with the West remain...

Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers world leaders arriving in Bishkek for the SCO summit, one Central Asian state proposing new martial-law amendments that could concentrate enormous power in just a handful of institutions during a national crisis, Tashiev's charges being amended yet again as questions continue to grow over his political future, a Central Asian state striking an unusual military deal with a European partner, the Turkmen Border Service holding talks with its Afghan counterparts, the completion of a major new railway line in Kazakhstan, and plans to build what could become the tallest tower in the region. Before turning to our main story this week, where we look at the World Nomad Games in Kyrgyzstan and what the event tells us about the country, the region, and the way Central Asia is presenting itself to the wider world. - Jonathan Campion (British Alysh Competitor) - Stephen M. Bland (The Times of Central Asia) - K. Krombie (The Times of Central Asia) Special guests: Stephen M. Bland, Managing Editor at TCA; K. Krombie, Senior Editor at TCA, both of whom covered the event on the ground; and Jonathan Campion, who competed for Team GB in the Alysh Wrestling.