• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10438 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10438 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10438 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10438 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10438 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10438 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10438 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10438 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 943

Kyrgyzstan Elected First Vice-Chair of UN Mountain Partnership

Kyrgyzstan has been elected First Vice-Chair of the Steering Committee of the Mountain Partnership for the 2026-2030 period, reflecting its continued engagement in advancing the global mountain agenda. Founded in 2002, the Mountain Partnership is a United Nations alliance of governments and organizations aimed at improving the livelihoods of mountain communities and protecting mountain ecosystems. The initiative was established by the governments of Italy and Switzerland, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Food and Agriculture Organization, which hosts the partnership’s secretariat. The new Steering Committee was elected during the 7th Global Meeting of the Mountain Partnership, held from March 26 to 28 in Andorra under the theme “Mountains for the Future: Responsible Tourism, Thriving Communities.” The meeting brought together representatives from Germany, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Italy, Mongolia, Montenegro, Nepal, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as officials from international organizations including FAO, UN Tourism, UNESCO, the OSCE, UNEP, the United Nations Development Programme, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Italy, the partnership’s main donor, retained its position as Chair. Kyrgyzstan was represented by Dinara Kemelova, the president’s special representative for the mountain agenda, who called for stronger coordination among mountain countries to advance shared priorities on global platforms. Kemelova also announced that the second “Bishkek+25” Global Mountain Summit will be held in Kyrgyzstan from October 21 to 23, 2027. She highlighted the country’s implementation of the Five Years of Action for the Development of Mountain Regions (2023-2027), with a focus on ecotourism and organic production. An exhibition of Kyrgyz mountain products was also organized on the sidelines of the meeting. The meeting concluded with the adoption of the Andorra Declaration, a strategic document aimed at strengthening international commitment to sustainable mountain development. The declaration recognizes the role of mountains in combating climate change, preserving biodiversity, and ensuring food security, while also highlighting their vulnerability to global environmental impacts. Mountains cover around one quarter of the Earth’s land surface and are home to approximately 1.2 billion people, while also encompassing 25 of the world’s 36 biodiversity hotspots. The document outlines several priority areas, including promoting sustainable tourism as a key economic driver for mountain regions, increasing climate and environmental financing, strengthening research and scientific cooperation, and supporting local communities, including women, youth, and indigenous groups. It also emphasizes the need to improve connectivity in mountain areas, reduce the digital divide, and enhance resilience to natural hazards through early warning systems and adapted infrastructure.

Kyrgyzstan Moves Toward Power Consolidation Ahead of 2027 Election

Kyrgyzstan has changed leaders more often than any other country in Central Asia, with power shifts since independence driven by both elections and unrest. With less than ten months remaining before the next presidential vote on January 24, 2027, recent political developments suggest the authorities are now moving to consolidate control well ahead of the contest. Against this backdrop, Russian political analyst Arkady Dubnov, citing sources in Kyrgyzstan, has suggested that recent political decisions, including the sudden removal of Kamchybek Tashiyev on February 10, may be linked to efforts to manage regional and institutional tensions within the country. In particular, discussions since that decision have focused on the long-standing dynamics between northern and southern elites. This dynamic has historically shaped political competition in the country. Recent personnel changes within state institutions have targeted individuals previously associated with former officials. Such administrative reshuffling is not uncommon ahead of major political milestones, including elections, and may reflect efforts to consolidate governance structures ahead of the upcoming election cycle. Kyrgyz political analyst Kanat Nogoybaev, speaking to a Kazakhstani outlet, commented on a petition signed by a group of public figures calling for early presidential elections. He noted that such initiatives typically reflect broader political maneuvering within elite circles. Since the petition was signed, some reports indicate that several individuals connected to this petition have faced legal scrutiny, though details remain unclear. President Sadyr Japarov has addressed the removal of Tashiyev, emphasizing the importance of maintaining stability within state institutions and avoiding internal divisions among public servants. “I believe that by making a swift decision, I ensured stability within the system,” Japarov said in earlier remarks, stressing that unity within government structures remains a priority. Separately, there have been discussions in political circles regarding the review of past high-profile legal cases. Former Jogorku Kenesh (parliamentary) deputy Iskhak Masaliev has suggested reassessing certain cases from recent years. One such case involves journalist Makhabat Tazhibek kyzy, whose legal proceedings have attracted significant public attention. In March, the Supreme Court remanded her case for retrial, and her pretrial detention was changed to house arrest. The case is part of a broader investigation involving media professionals detained in January 2024 on charges related to public unrest. Judicial proceedings in these cases remain ongoing. Economic developments have also intersected with recent political discussions. Investigations involving the state company, Kyrgyzneftegaz, have led to the detention of several individuals, including company executives and former officials. The Kyrgyz authorities have stated that these actions are part of broader efforts to ensure transparency and accountability in the management of state assets. Officials from the State Tax Service have addressed the case, noting that new conditions allowed for a comprehensive audit of the company. Subsequent legal actions were taken following the findings. These developments add an economic dimension to the broader political shifts underway. In parallel, Kyrgyzneftegaz has announced a general shareholders’ meeting scheduled for April 16 in Kochkor-Ata. The agenda includes governance changes, amendments to internal documents, and financial restructuring measures. While the...

EAEU Trade Frictions Deepen Despite Shymkent Integration Push

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) met in Shymkent on March 26-27 with a long agenda and a familiar promise: deeper integration, smoother trade, and a more modern common market. Kazakhstan, which holds the bloc’s 2026 chairmanship, used the meeting to push artificial intelligence, digital logistics, industrial cooperation, and the removal of internal barriers. Twelve documents were signed, covering areas including industrial cooperation, transport, and digital integration. “Kazakhstan aims to become a fully-fledged digital country. We have built a modern ecosystem, including Astana Hub and the Alem.ai AI center, and are ready to share experience with EAEU partners on digital regulation and economic transformation,” Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov stated. That sounds ambitious, but it also highlights the bloc’s central weakness. The EAEU has no shortage of plans; it has a shortage of trust between its members, and that matters more. The dynamics extend across the bloc, but are most visible in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The EAEU was built to ensure the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor across Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. But the reality keeps drifting away from the treaty. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship agenda calls for a barrier-free internal market, yet the bloc is entering a new phase of tighter controls, retaliatory measures, and disputes over who really benefits. Shymkent made that contradiction impossible to miss. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov promoted an AI-based system to coordinate cargo flows across the union and speed up transit. He also backed the full electronic handling of veterinary and phytosanitary checks, all of which are practical ideas. Central Asia needs faster, cheaper, and more predictable logistics, but digital tools do not solve a political problem. A system becomes more efficient only if its members want it to be open. When they want leverage instead, technology can only make the controls smarter. [caption id="attachment_46024" align="aligncenter" width="1920"] Image: primeminister.kz[/caption] Kazakhstan’s priorities already show where the friction lies. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev opened his chairmanship by calling for digital transformation, better transport links, and the elimination of internal trade barriers. He also pushed a stronger external profile for the EAEU, with wider links across Asia, the Arab world, and the Global South. That is a serious agenda for a bloc trying to present itself as a Eurasian logistics hub. That push for external expansion comes at a time when internal frictions are becoming harder to manage. It sits uneasily beside everyday trade practice inside the union, where growing trade disputes have become part of the EAEU’s normal life, not an exception to it. The clearest recent example is Russia’s SPOT import-control system, which takes effect for road shipments from EAEU countries on April 1. Importers must submit shipment information two days before trucks reach the border and receive a QR code. Moscow has presented the change as a tax-compliance and anti-fraud measure, with additional financial guarantees expected in later phases of its implementation. In practice, it adds cost, time, and uncertainty before goods even reach the border, the opposite of what a customs union...

The Iran Conflict Is Stress-Testing Central Asia’s Southern Corridors

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal of Turkestan city as a venue for Iran-war negotiations shows how directly the conflict had already begun to affect Central Asia itself. The region is no longer simply observing events in Iran. By the time Tokayev made the offer, Central Asian governments were already dealing with evacuations, route disruption, emergency diplomatic coordination, and growing concern over the war’s economic effects. The Iran war has thus become a real test of Central Asia’s southern diversification strategy. Governments across the region have, in recent years, sought to widen access to world markets through Iran, the South Caucasus, and, in some cases, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These channels reduce dependence on northern routes by opening access to Türkiye, Europe, Gulf markets, and the Indian Ocean. The present crisis subjects that strategy to wartime conditions. The strain of war makes it easier to distinguish durable links, conditional ones, and routes that remain more aspirational than real. The C6 and Crisis Coordination The first effects have been practical. Turkmenistan has opened four additional checkpoints along its frontier with Iran, supplementing the Serakhs crossing, while Azerbaijan’s overland route through Astara became another critical outlet, evacuating 312 people from 17 countries between February 28 and March 2. Turkmenistan, according to official reporting, transited more than 200 foreign citizens from 16 countries during the same period. Uzbekistan used the Turkmen route to repatriate its citizens, while Kazakhstan directed its nationals toward overland exits through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Türkiye. The war is already affecting borders, consular work, and the regional diplomatic agenda. This immediate response gives sharper political meaning to the widening of the Central Asian C5 into a C6 with Azerbaijan. The March 2 call among the five Central Asian foreign ministers and Azerbaijan showed that the format was already there to be used under pressure. What had until now appeared mainly as a corridor framework shaped by summit diplomacy and expert work appeared instead as a working format for crisis coordination linking Central Asia to the South Caucasus. The C6 idea is becoming more practical and more overtly diplomatic. The Organization of Turkic States adds a second, broader layer. Its foreign ministers met in Istanbul on March 7 and issued a joint statement expressing concern over the escalation in the Middle East, condemning actions that endanger civilians, warning against further regional destabilization, and affirming that threats to the security and interests of member states concern the organization as a whole. The statement was cautious, and the OTS is not turning into a military instrument. Even so, the war is testing whether a Turkic political space extending from Turkey through the South Caucasus to Central Asia can do more than express concern as regional security deteriorates. The C6 is becoming a working format for immediate coordination, while the OTS remains the broader political frame within which that coordination takes on institutional meaning. Corridor Stress and Resilience The trans-Iran transit option offers Central Asia a continuous land arc from regional railheads and road networks...

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team examine a series of major developments across Central Asia, from the results of Kazakhstan's constitutional referendum to the announcement of new Chinese-funded border outposts and fortifications along Tajikistan's frontier. We also look at the continuing fallout from the security shake-up in Kyrgyzstan, with further arrests and resignations, as well as the increasingly strange foreign movements of Turkmenistan's senior leadership while war continues to rage just across the border in Iran, alongside Tehran's threats to strike Turkmen infrastructure. The episode then turns to the escalating conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where some of the heaviest fighting in months is raising fresh questions about border stability, regional security, and the risk of wider spillover. Finally, for our main story, we bring on a panel of experts to discuss the growing issues surrounding the Rogun Dam and its resettlement project, and how both are likely to affect the states downstream. On the show this week: - Eugene Simonov (Rivers Without Boundaries Coalition) - Mark Fodor (Coalition for Human Rights in Development)

Caspian Escalation Raises Stakes for Central Asia

Central Asia, which has increasingly sought to present itself as a coordinated actor on the global political stage, has until recently maintained a cautious, non-aligned stance regarding the escalation in the Middle East. However, attacks affecting infrastructure in the Caspian region have altered the diplomatic balance. The Caspian Sea is a critical transit zone for Central Asia, linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and onward to European and Middle Eastern markets. It forms part of key east–west and north–south trade corridors that have gained importance since Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupted traditional transit routes. In recent years, regional dynamics have also been shaped by Azerbaijan’s growing engagement with Central Asian states, including its formal inclusion in the expanded Central Asian consultative format, which has effectively evolved from the C5 into the C6. Baku has played an important role in regional connectivity. It has developed close relations with both Turkey and Israel, factors that influence geopolitical calculations in the Caspian basin, which directly borders Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This growing alignment has reinforced efforts to develop the Middle Corridor across the Caspian, linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. Turkey maintains political, economic, and cultural influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan through the Organization of Turkic States. Russian political discourse has at times portrayed this cooperation as part of a broader pan-Turkic geopolitical project, a characterization widely dismissed by officials and analysts in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Astana and Baku continue to maintain strong relations with Ankara, a development that has periodically caused concern in Moscow. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has also strengthened ties with Gulf states. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have become significant investors in the country’s economy. In this context, Iranian attacks on Gulf states not directly involved in the conflict have shaped Astana’s diplomatic positioning during the current crisis. Reports of drone attacks widely blamed on Iran targeting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan have further heightened regional tensions. At the initial stage of the escalation, Kazakhstan’s response was largely limited to diplomatic contacts with regional leaders. At the same time, several Central Asian countries, along with Azerbaijan, expressed concern over the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and began dispatching aid to Iran. Azerbaijan sent nearly 30 tons of food and medical supplies on March 10, followed by another 82 tons of humanitarian aid on March 18. Uzbekistan delivered approximately 120 tons of humanitarian supplies, including flour, vegetable oil, sugar, and canned food, according to regional media reports. Turkmenistan also sent humanitarian aid consisting of medicines, medical supplies, and other goods, primarily intended for children. The Tajik government reported sending a convoy of 110 heavy trucks carrying humanitarian cargo to Iran, with a total weight of 3,610 tons. The diplomatic environment shifted further after Israeli air strikes on March 18 targeting Iranian naval facilities in the Caspian Sea. According to Israeli military statements cited by international media, the targets included a major port of the Iranian Navy, where, reportedly, "dozens of ships were destroyed,”...