• KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
21 September 2026

Viewing results 31 - 36 of 734

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Give Conflicting Accounts of Four-Country Blackout

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have given differing accounts of what triggered the August 14 blackout that cut electricity across swathes of Central Asia. Three days later, the initiating event remains unresolved, and the times released by the two sides do not fit neatly into the same sequence. Kazakhstan’s national grid operator KEGOC says two hydrogenerators at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant, with a combined capacity of 600 MW, disconnected at 2:37 p.m. Kazakhstan time. KEGOC said the sudden loss of generation overloaded the North-East-South transit corridor, separating southern Kazakhstan from the rest of the national grid and the interconnected systems of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. A special commission is investigating the causes. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan’s National Electric Grid has given a different chronology. It said that at 3:34 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time, an external disconnection occurred on a high-voltage line linking the northern and southern parts of Kazakhstan’s power system. The Central Asian network then split into an isolated section, and Kyrgyzstan temporarily operated separately while automatic protection systems worked to protect equipment. The one-hour difference between the countries’ clocks makes the discrepancy clearer. Kazakhstan has used UTC+5 nationwide since 2024, while Kyrgyzstan uses UTC+6. That puts Kyrgyzstan’s reported line disconnection at 2:34 p.m. Kazakhstan time, three minutes before KEGOC’s stated 2:37 p.m. Toktogul shutdown. The two times may describe different stages of a fast-moving cascade, but they do not establish the same starting point. A third timestamp complicates the sequence. Alatau Zharyq Company said three 500 kV KEGOC transmission lines shut down at 2:38 p.m., and that those lines triggered automatic load-shedding and frequency protection in Almaty and the surrounding region. Taken together, the public statements leave a sequence of 2:34 p.m., 2:37 p.m., and 2:38 p.m. that investigators will need to reconcile. TCA reporters in Almaty and Bishkek experienced power cuts, while local media reported outages in Dushanbe, Khujand, and southern parts of Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, the disturbance affected consumers in the Zhambyl, Turkistan, Kyzylorda, Zhetysu, and Almaty regions, with further restrictions in Karaganda, Ulytau, and Abai. KEGOC said supplies were restored across the affected regions later that afternoon. The four-country impact reflects how tightly the systems are connected. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan operate in parallel through the Central Asian power system. Cross-border links allow operators to share electricity and reserve capacity, but also mean that a sudden loss of generation or a major transmission line can be felt beyond one national grid before protection systems isolate the disturbance. Central Asia has been here before. In January 2022, a major blackout hit southern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The event also involved a sharp imbalance on the regional network and the separation of Kazakhstan’s northern and southern grids. Its precise starting point was disputed in the immediate aftermath. The regional grid dates to the Soviet period. Uzbekistan later withdrew from the old electricity ring, leaving Tajikistan largely isolated for years. Regional links have since been rebuilt; Tajikistan began reconnecting to the unified system in 2024. An Asian Development Bank project is adding...

Psychologists in Kyrgyzstan Face New Regulation Push

Parents in Kyrgyzstan have been contacting member of parliament Elvira Surabaldieva with a basic question: the person counseling their child online calls themselves a psychologist, but are they actually qualified? There is currently no unified system through which families can check. The authorities now want to establish uniform rules for psychologists for the first time. The bill is being prepared by member of parliament Elvira Surabaldieva. The initiative followed requests from parents and other citizens who wanted to verify the qualifications of people offering psychological services online. According to Surabaldieva, some begin providing consultations after two- or three-month courses, while consultations can cost between 3,000 and 10,000 som ($34-$114) per session. Social media has made it considerably easier to enter the psychological services market. To a potential client, a polished page and thousands of followers can appear as convincing as professional qualifications. There is often no straightforward way to verify a consultant’s education and experience before the first session. Work with children is particularly sensitive. Surabaldieva said parents had approached her specifically because their children were receiving online consultations and they wanted to know whether the practitioners involved were properly qualified. The bill proposes establishing the professional status of psychologists in law. Exactly what education will be required remains under discussion. The working group is considering conventional psychology degrees as well as possible routes for people with qualifications in other fields who subsequently receive additional psychology training. Surabaldieva has argued, however, that completing several short-term courses alone should not be enough to qualify someone as a professional psychologist. The second proposal is a unified registry. Before seeking a consultation, clients would be able to check a specialist’s education, qualifications, and professional experience. But that raises another question: who should decide who is qualified to practice? An interagency working group began a clause-by-clause review of the legislation in Bishkek in early August. One option under discussion would give professional bodies a role in assessing applicants. Surabaldieva supports keeping the registry under state oversight rather than transferring that authority to private professional associations. The proposal would therefore give the state a new role in determining who can present themselves as a qualified psychologist. So far, however, there appears to have been little public discussion of whether tighter requirements could reduce the number of practitioners or increase the cost of consultations. Another point of debate concerns people with years of practical experience whose education may not meet the future requirements. That is particularly important because some state institutions already employ psychologists whose original training was in fields such as education or social work. The working group is considering a transition period of two or three years, giving experienced practitioners time to meet the new standards rather than forcing them to leave the profession immediately. Kyrgyzstan is not alone in facing this problem. A 2025 conference abstract published by European Psychiatry describes inadequate regulation of psychological services in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, which has allowed underqualified practitioners, often with only short-term training, to advertise themselves as...

Central Asia’s C6 Takes Shape in Washington as Ambassadors Push for Practical Integration

Less than two weeks after regional leaders gathered in Cholpon Ata, diplomats from the emerging C6 grouping used a discussion in Washington to shift the focus from declarations of unity to the mechanics of integration: customs, railways, digitalized trade, access to European markets, and stronger links across the Caspian. The sharpest political message came from Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to the United States, Edil Baisalov, who said that Central Asian states were increasingly recognizing that they were “enough for each other,” and that resolving differences within the region had become a pragmatic national interest. His comments gave unusually direct language to a trend that has accelerated since the region’s consultative meetings began in 2018. The August 12 event at the Caspian Policy Center brought together the U.S.-based ambassadors of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan, the sixth country in the emerging C6 framework, was not listed among the participants. The event followed a late-July meeting in Cholpon Ata, where leaders concentrated on transport, energy security, investment, and foreign-policy coordination. The C6 label remains shorthand rather than the name of a formal organization. Its political basis, however, has become more concrete since Azerbaijan was admitted as a full participant in the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in November 2025. The shift extended a format once focused on relations among the five Central Asian republics across the Caspian Sea. From Regional Dialogue to Regional Agency Azerbaijan’s ambassador, Khazar Ibrahim, presented Cholpon Ata as evidence that the six states increasingly see themselves as part of one political and economic space. “We are finally holistic. We are all together,” he said. He argued that Azerbaijan’s presence changes the geography of the grouping by turning the Caspian from a dividing line into a connecting space between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. That idea has been developing for some time. TCA has previously examined how Azerbaijan’s entry could turn the C6 framework into a platform for common rules on transport, tariffs, customs systems, and digital data, rather than another layer of summit diplomacy. Kazakhstan’s ambassador, Magzhan Ilyassov, put the emphasis on building an “economically active neighborhood.” He pointed to the frequency of regional meetings and said the value of the current process lies partly in maintaining an inclusive conversation among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has also pushed for stronger coordination on transport planning as the consultative format develops. For Uzbekistan, the discussion was more explicitly about market access. Ambassador Furqat Sidiqov said cooperation with Azerbaijan could give Uzbekistan wider access to European and other export markets. He also called for further digitalization of the Middle Corridor. Sidiqov said Uzbekistan had close to 300 joint ventures with Central Asian countries in 2017, and now has about 1,500 with neighboring states. Corridors Become the Practical Core Digitalizing the Trans-Caspian route is not a new proposal. The countries of the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia, which already brings together the five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, endorsed a digitalization...

Japarov Says Tashiyev Was His Planned Successor as Prosecutors Seek Nine-Year Terms

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov says he once planned to leave office in 2027 and support Kamchybek Tashiyev as his successor, before deciding that his longtime political partner was not ready for the presidency. The disclosure comes as prosecutors are asking an appeals court to impose nine-year prison terms on Tashiyev and seven other defendants in the “Letter of 75” case. Japarov set out the abandoned succession plan in an interview with journalist Ali Toktakunov released on August 13. He said he had expected to complete the six-year term he won in 2021, then leave politics if Tashiyev was ready to take over. “Kamchy would become president, and I would retire. I had such a plan,” Japarov said. The president said he had told Tashiyev about the plan roughly a year earlier and urged him to prepare for the presidency by imposing more discipline on the people around him. Japarov said he later concluded that Tashiyev was not ready. He cited the conduct of some of Tashiyev’s staff and associates, the appearance of the “Letter of 75,” and signs that parliament was being divided between supporters of the president and supporters of “the general,” a reference to Tashiyev. Japarov said he summoned Tashiyev and told him: “This won’t do. You cannot split people.” He said he informed Tashiyev that he would be removed from office, but claimed he was still prepared to allow him to contest the presidential election without obstruction. That account adds a succession dispute to the explanation Japarov gave when he dismissed Tashiyev on February 10 as chairman of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) and deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers. At the time, the presidency said the decision was needed to “prevent a split in society” and state institutions. Senior GKNB officials were removed soon afterward, the border service was taken out of the hands of the committee, and parliamentary speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu resigned. Japarov has now drawn a sharp distinction between his personal relationship with Tashiyev and their political future. In another part of the interview, he said the two had been friends since 2005, and their families had been close. “He will remain my friend, but I have no plans to appoint him to any position,” Japarov said. He credited Tashiyev with making a major contribution during his five years at the GKNB, but said he should rest and consider where he had made mistakes. Japarov also confirmed for the first time himself that he intends to seek another term. “I intend to run for another term and continue my work,” he said, according to Reuters. His spokesman had said in 2024 that Japarov planned to run again, but the president had not previously made a public declaration of his own. He said a second term was needed to complete reforms already under way. Japarov also promised that rivals would be free to challenge him. “The road is open. Whoever wants to run, let them run,” he said, adding that there...

Kyrgyz Prosecutors Seek Nine-Year Prison Terms for Tashiyev and Seven Others

Kyrgyz prosecutors are asking an appeals court to send former security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev and seven other defendants to prison. A lower court convicted all eight in July of preparing to seize power by force, but allowed them to remain free on probation. The appeal is being heard by the Bishkek City Court, with the hearing taking place behind closed doors. Prosecutors are challenging the sentences handed down by the trial court. The “Letter of 75” case arose from an open letter signed on February 9 by 75 politicians, former officials, and public figures. The authors called for an early presidential election amid a dispute over when President Sadyr Japarov’s current term should end. Five of the signatories were among the eight people later charged with preparing to seize power by force. Before his dismissal, Tashiyev had been one of Kyrgyzstan’s most powerful officials and a central figure in Japarov’s government. Japarov appointed his longtime ally to lead the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) after coming to power in 2020, but dismissed him on February 10, 2026, saying the move was needed to “prevent a split in society” and state institutions. The dismissal ended a five-year governing partnership and was followed by personnel changes across the GKNB and other state bodies. Eight people eventually stood trial, including Tashiyev, former Prosecutor General Kurmankul Zulushev, and former parliamentary speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu. The trial court found all eight guilty and sentenced them to four years in prison with confiscation of property, but exempted them from serving the prison terms and placed them under supervised probation for three years. They were acquitted of the separate charge of abuse of office. The Times of Central Asia previously reported in detail on the verdict and the circumstances surrounding the case. Prosecutors had sought nine-year prison terms at the original trial. According to defense lawyers, they are now asking the appeals court to impose the same terms on all eight defendants. Some of the defendants have also appealed their convictions and are seeking acquittal. During the appeal, the defendants again raised one of the disputed issues in the case: why criminal proceedings targeted only some of the people involved when the open letter had 75 signatories. Five defendants who had signed the letter asked the court to give a legal assessment of the actions of the other 70 signatories. The appeals panel granted the request and agreed that the other signatories could be called for questioning, with the defense responsible for securing their attendance. If prosecutors prevail, the appeal would reverse the main practical outcome of the July trial: all eight defendants were convicted of preparing to seize power by force, but none was sent to prison.

Kazakhstan Seeds Clouds as Kyrgyzstan Questions Regional Impact

A small aircraft climbed out of Turkestan airport on July 10 with hygroscopic salt flares fixed beneath its wings. Operated by the United Arab Emirates’ National Center of Meteorology, it was searching for a cloud suitable for seeding. Pilot Ahmed Aljaberi described the aircraft as “specifically equipped with a cloud-seeding flare system.” But no suitable cloud appeared during the mission. Cloud seeding can try to draw more rain from an existing cloud, but it cannot make one from clear air. Kazakhstan launched the project in Turkestan on May 16, targeting more than 911,000 hectares of arable land in the country’s leading cotton-belt. The government puts the potential economic benefit at up to 35 billion tenge, roughly $75 million a year. The partnership gives Kazakhstan access to decades of Emirati experience in weather modification. The UAE program dates to the late 1980s, and Emirati specialists are training Kazakh meteorologists, pilots, engineers, and other staff. Kazakhstan’s government describes the Turkestan operation as the first project of its scale in the region, though weather modification in Central Asia has a longer history. Kochkunbek Bakirov, a geographer at Kyrgyzstan’s National Academy of Sciences, has described Soviet-era research in the Karshi steppe, the Naryn basin, and over Issyk-Kul. Kazakhstan also trialed a different approach in Mangystau in 2021, using an ionization-based system promoted as a way to increase rainfall. Its developer claimed the equipment had begun to influence local moisture. The Mangystau system used ionization; the current program uses aircraft and hygroscopic salt flares. Before operations began, Kazhydromet analyzed data from 39 meteorological stations covering 2020 through 2024, selecting the Turkestan Region after studying atmospheric conditions and terrain. Flights only proceed when naturally formed cumulonimbus clouds with sufficient vertical development are present, with Kazhydromet monitoring satellite imagery, synoptic data, and cloud development before operations. The aircraft releases salt-based particles into suitable clouds. Kazakhstan’s Ecology Ministry lists sodium chloride, potassium chloride, and magnesium compounds among the reagents. In hygroscopic seeding, the particles encourage liquid droplets to collide and coalesce, which can improve precipitation efficiency in a suitable cloud. The cloud and its moisture must already exist. By July 13, crews had completed eleven operational flights, mainly over the Otyrar and Sozak districts. Officials were still analyzing the results of each operation; the number of flights does not show how much extra rain the project has produced. Kazakhstan’s launch materials cite a possible 10 to 20% increase in precipitation under favorable conditions. Results elsewhere vary widely. A 2024 review by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found estimates of 0 to 20% additional precipitation in the studies it examined. The GAO also found that effectiveness remains difficult to evaluate and that suitable clouds must be present. The evidence is much stronger for some cloud-seeding methods than for others. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) says the strongest recent causal evidence comes from wintertime glaciogenic seeding of orographic clouds, while Kazakhstan is using hygroscopic salts in convective clouds. Their large natural variability creates a weak signal-to-noise problem, making the added...