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Climate Policy

Kyrgyzstan Adopts Central Asia’s First Framework Climate Law

President Sadyr Japarov signed Kyrgyzstan’s Law on Climate Activity on July 7, giving the country Central Asia’s first framework statute devoted to climate policy. The Jogorku Kenesh (parliament) approved the measure on May 20, and it takes effect on January 1, 2027. The Cabinet has six months from official publication to bring existing regulations into line. The law puts emissions policy and climate adaptation under one legal structure. It covers climate finance, carbon neutrality, research, professional training and technology transfer. It also provides a legal base for carbon units and a national registry. Separate rules will govern how emission cuts are recorded and verified. UNDP gave technical and expert support during its preparation. The regional first refers to the breadth of the framework. Uzbekistan passed a law on limiting greenhouse gas emissions in July 2025, and Kazakhstan already regulates carbon inventories, quotas and emissions trading through its Environmental Code. Kyrgyzstan has now put mitigation and adaptation in one dedicated statute, with provisions for finance and institutional duties. The law replaces a narrower statute adopted in 2007. That measure governed greenhouse gas emissions and removals, with a focus on state regulation, inventories and monitoring. It did not create a full legal base for adaptation or climate finance, and lacked the new law’s provisions on climate technology and education. MP Zhyldyz Egenberdieva set out the case for reform at a parliamentary committee meeting in April. The existing law “does not reflect current realities or practice,” she said. The new statute gives public bodies a basis for climate policy and low-carbon development plans. It also brings resilience measures into the same system. Kyrgyzstan signed the Paris Agreement in September 2016 and ratified it on February 18, 2020. Japarov announced a 2050 carbon-neutrality goal at COP26 in Glasgow in 2021. The Cabinet approved a national carbon-neutrality concept in July 2025. The Coordination Council then approved updated climate targets and the country’s first biennial transparency report in September 2025. The law turns those international pledges and policy documents into a domestic framework. It defines state responsibilities and creates a base for climate finance. The practical detail will come through regulations, including standards for carbon accounting and the operation of a registry. The statute arrives as glacier loss puts pressure on water, farming and electricity supply. Mountain ice feeds rivers used for drinking water and irrigation. The same flows feed the country’s hydropower plants. At COP29 in Baku in November 2024, Japarov gave a stark figure. “Over the past 70 years, the area of glaciers in Kyrgyzstan has shrunk by 16%,” he said. TCA has previously reported on how continued glacier retreat could reduce river flows and deepen water shortages. Hydropower provides about 90% of Kyrgyzstan’s electricity, meaning drought and erratic runoff can cut generation when demand peaks. Floods and mudslides can damage roads and canals, as well as homes and crops. The law now makes adaptation a formal part of national climate policy. Coal-fired heating and traffic drive much of Bishkek’s severe winter smog. Vehicles...

Fuel Imports

Fuel Squeeze Leaves Kyrgyzstan Competing for Costly Alternatives

Kyrgyzstan is moving to secure alternative fuel supplies from China and Belarus as disruptions in Russia’s refining sector expose Bishkek’s dependence on a single supplier. The new arrangements may ease immediate pressure, but they also show how costly and limited Kyrgyzstan’s options remain. First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Daniyar Amangeldiyev said China has confirmed a contract to supply the first 3,000 tons of jet fuel, while negotiations are under way for an additional 5,000 tons of diesel fuel. The government has also signed agreements with Belarus covering 3,000 tons of jet fuel and approximately 10,000 tons of diesel. On July 1, the Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) extended the zero customs duty regime within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) for gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation fuel, marine fuel, and other petroleum products for another year. EEC Minister of Trade Andrey Slepnev said the previous zero rates had expired on June 30 and that proposals from several member states to extend them were quickly coordinated. “The zero rates have been extended for another year,” he said. That buys time but does not remove the main risk. Russian refining disruptions, seasonal demand, and export controls could still reduce the flow of petroleum products to Kyrgyzstan. Imports from alternative suppliers are also likely to come at higher prices and on less favorable terms than those traditionally offered by Moscow. Russia has been Kyrgyzstan’s primary fuel supplier for decades. The country began receiving Russian petroleum products at preferential prices on October 10, 2000, when the prime ministers of Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Mikhail Kasyanov and Amangeldy Muraliev, signed an intergovernmental agreement in Astana governing indirect taxation in bilateral trade. Since then, Kyrgyzstan has received basic petroleum products duty-free at domestic Russian prices. In 2011, then-adviser to the Kyrgyz prime minister Farid Niyazov told the news outlet 24.kg that Russia would supply all petroleum products to Kyrgyzstan indefinitely without export duties, except aviation fuel. “At present, Russia’s export duty on these fuel products is $245 per ton. You can imagine how much we would otherwise have to pay for fuel,” he said. The 2000 bilateral agreement was terminated in 2015 after Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU. Since then, the country has operated under the union’s common customs rules as well as bilateral agreements with Russia. This has left Kyrgyzstan heavily dependent on a single supplier. According to official statements and industry estimates, more than 90% of the country’s fuel consumption for households and agriculture is currently covered by Russian imports. Despite Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak’s assurances that domestic fuel reserves remain sufficient, shortages began to emerge in Russia in early June. Russia has since moved to tighten exports further as refinery disruptions have continued. As a result, Kyrgyzstan’s Cabinet of Ministers has begun searching for alternative suppliers while introducing daily monitoring of existing fuel deliveries. Rising gasoline and diesel prices had already prompted the government to introduce temporary state regulation of motor fuel prices in late May. It has since rolled...

South Caucasus

As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches

The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the...

Energy Security

Central Asia’s Fuel Squeeze Becomes a Winter Energy Security Problem

Central Asia’s fuel squeeze is moving from filling stations into winter planning. Governments are now tracking gasoline and diesel, gas pipelines, coal deliveries, power imports, jet fuel, and emergency repair crews. Seasonal fuel and power stress is familiar across the region, but the current pressure - tied to Russia, the main supplier for several regional fuel flows - has arrived early. Russia’s own fuel crisis has sharpened the risk. Ukrainian drone attacks and repair work have cut refinery output, while export limits have pushed more Russian supplies back into the domestic market. Reuters reported queues, regional restrictions, and gasoline above 100 roubles a liter at some independent stations. President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the strain on June 28. “You are well aware that problems for drivers and for businesses persist,” he said, adding that “the harvest depends on” keeping seasonal fuel schedules for farms. For Central Asia, Russian shortages travel through contracts, rail slots, import prices, and public nerves. Kyrgyzstan is among the most exposed. The country consumes about two million tons of fuels and lubricants each year, and almost 95% comes from Russia, according to Deputy Energy Minister Nasipbek Kerimov. “Due to the lack of adequate oil and gas production, we remain a country dependent on imports,” Kerimov said. Bishkek has asked Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan for help securing supplies. That dependence is now impacting households, farmers, and small transport firms. The cabinet has capped pump prices and set a subsidy mechanism through September 30. Kerimov said importers were seeing offers at several prices, but promised that “there should be no shortage on the domestic market.” Oil traders put AI-92 stocks at 30 to 45 days, while diesel remained available for harvest work. Kyrgyzstan is trying to buy time through domestic refining. The modernized Junda refinery in the Chuy Region has been pressed to raise gasoline output to 24,000 tons a month soon, then 50,000 tons a month by the end of 2026, with finished products directed to the domestic market. Those gains would help, but Russian supply still sets the pace. Uzbekistan has the Bukhara and Fergana oil refineries, the Altyaryk unit of the Fergana refinery, and the Uzbekistan GTL complex, but demand has still moved faster than domestic supply. In January-April 2026, gasoline imports reached 568,700 tons, worth $327.1 million, more than double the same period in 2025. Local refineries produced 417,500 tons over those four months. A shift away from AI-80 gasoline has also pushed drivers toward AI-92 and AI-95. The pressure reached the exchange in late June. AI-92 gasoline climbed to a record 13.919 million soums per ton on June 29, about $1,160, after an 11.8% rise since the start of the month. Jet fuel has become an issue, too. Uzbekistan Airways reduced some Russia flight frequencies in June, citing aviation fuel shortages and higher costs. Tashkent is now preparing for winter in concrete volumes. On July 6, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reviewed measures for the 2026-2027 autumn-winter season. The plan includes replacing 53.7...

Fuel Supply

Kyrgyzstan Looks Beyond Russia as Fuel Squeeze Hits Central Asia

Kyrgyzstan has asked Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to help secure its fuel supplies as shortages inside Russia put new strain on Central Asia's fuel market. The move follows reduced Russian refining capacity after Ukrainian drone strikes on oil refineries, seasonal demand, and tighter export controls. “Due to the lack of adequate oil and gas production, we remain a country dependent on imports,” Deputy Energy Minister Nasipbek Kerimov told Birinchi Radio. “Kyrgyzstan annually consumes approximately 2 million tons of various types of fuel and lubricants, and almost 95% of this volume comes from Russia.” The dependence rests on long-standing trade terms; Russia supplies oil products to Kyrgyzstan duty-free under annual indicative balances within the Eurasian Economic Union. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk said in October 2025 that balances for 2026 had already been signed. The system has helped hold down prices, but it also leaves the market exposed when Russian refineries or export rules change. Kyrgyz officials have tried to calm consumers. The Energy Ministry said fuel reserves were sufficient, supplies were moving under existing contracts, and that “official requests have been sent” to relevant governments to support stable supplies. Local officials also pressed Kyrgyzneftegaz and the Junda refinery to increase domestic production and deliveries. The pressure is not equal across all fuel types. AI-95 and AI-98 gasoline have disappeared from some filling stations, while AI-92 reserves remain stronger. Oil Traders Association head Kanatbek Eshatov told Kaktus.media that AI-92 stocks would last 30 to 45 days, depending on the company. He said the AI-95 problem could be solved “in a couple of weeks, if refineries recover after the shelling.” Diesel remains available, and farmers had stocked up before harvest work began, he added. As of July 6, AI-95 remained unavailable at some Bishkek filling stations. Bishkek has also moved on prices, with the Cabinet introducing temporary price regulation under Resolution No. 369 of May 25, 2026. The system subsidizes importers and sellers until September 30 by compensating the gap between market prices and fixed benchmark import prices. In Bishkek, capped pump prices are 79.9 soms per liter for AI-92 gasoline, 88.9 soms for AI-95 and 93.9 soms for diesel, equal to about $3.46, $3.85 and $4.06 per U.S. gallon. The state is using subsidies to prevent a sharper jump at the pump. Kerimov said prices would stay unchanged while talks continued with suppliers. “We are currently offered fuel at various prices,” he said, and even if purchase prices rise, “there should be no shortage on the domestic market.” President Vladimir Putin acknowledged on June 28 that fuel shortages inside Russia had created queues at filling stations. “Problems for drivers and for businesses persist,” he said, adding that “the harvest depends on” keeping seasonal fuel schedules for farms. Russian officials said gasoline reserves stood at 1.7 million metric tons, but Moscow was considering a complete ban on diesel exports. Russia had already imposed temporary restrictions on gasoline exports, with exemptions for some intergovernmental arrangements. Reuters reported on June...

Kamchybek Tashiyev

Kyrgyz Court Convicts Former Security Chief Tashiyev, Parliamentary Speaker, and Six Others

The trial of high-ranking Kyrgyz officials accused of plotting to overthrow the government concluded on July 2. All eight defendants, including the former chief of Kyrgyzstan’s security service and the former speaker of parliament, were found guilty and sentenced to four years in prison. However, none will actually serve any prison time as the court ordered them all placed on probation for the next three years. The Letter of 75 It all started on February 9, 2026, when a group of 75 people, including former state officials, released an open letter calling on President Sadyr Japarov and Speaker of Parliament Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu to call an early presidential election. Japarov became acting president in the wake of the October 2020 protests that ousted President Sooronbai Jeenbekov. One of his first moves as acting president was to appoint his long-time friend Kamchybek Tashiyev to be the head of the State National Security Service (GKNB). The presidential election of January 2021 resulted in victory for Japarov, with a concurrent vote approving a change from a parliamentary to a presidential form of government. A new constitution was drafted and approved in a referendum in April 2021. Japarov was elected president under the constitution that was scrapped in that referendum. The previous constitution stipulated a president could serve one six-year term in office. The new constitution allowed a president to serve two five-year terms. The open letter the 75 people published said a snap presidential election could clarify Japarov’s term. But Japarov and others saw the letter as an attempt to oust him from power. On February 10, Japarov sacked Kamchybek Tashiyev and several of the authors of the open letter were detained, with Japarov saying this was necessary to “prevent a split in society.” Japarov was evasive about the reason, repeating that he and Tashiyev remained friends. In the days that followed, a series of top GKNB officials were dismissed, as were the governors of Kyrgyzstan’s second and third largest cities, Osh and Manas (formerly Jalal-Abad), respectively. Several ministers and officials in other state bodies were also changed. The government was restructured so that the GKNB was under the control of the president. Tashiyev was in Germany for a medical exam, and Turgunbek uulu was in Turkey when the open letter was released. Turgunbek uulu stepped down from his position and handed in his resignation as a parliamentary deputy directly after his returned to Kyrgyzstan. Tashiyev returned briefly on February 13, but only stayed in Kyrgyzstan for a few days before again leaving the country. He finally came back on March 19 for questioning by the Interior Ministry and has been in Kyrgyzstan since then, though he kept a low profile. It was clear early on that the state prosecutor was building an attempted coup case against some of the 75 authors of the letter. But Japarov and other officials declined to specify which charges Tashiyev might face, or whether he would face any charges at all. The announcement that Tashiyev was dismissed...