• KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
28 August 2026

Viewing results 37 - 42 of 713

Kyrgyzstan’s Water Compensation Push Tests Central Asian Unity

Central Asia’s water diplomacy is entering a contentious phase. Kyrgyzstan, where much of the region’s runoff is formed, is reviving calls for economic compensation from downstream users. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have rejected the idea, saying current agreements do not provide for payments for transboundary river water. The dispute comes as the region tries to maintain annual water-allocation deals while adapting agriculture to worsening scarcity and climate pressure. Water has long tied together the region’s upstream and downstream states. The 2021 and 2022 clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border showed how disputes over land, border infrastructure, roads, security posts, and water access can escalate when local tensions are not contained. Yet political will alone does not guarantee agreements between countries. The Central Asian republics cooperate on water issues through two interstate bodies. One is the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, established in 1993 by all five Central Asian republics. Kyrgyzstan suspended its participation in IFAS in 2016, and now attends the fund’s meetings as an observer. The second body is the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination, whose meetings are held once a quarter. At its 93rd meeting in Bukhara in early April, the commission confirmed limits for water withdrawal from transboundary rivers, following decisions approved at the 92nd meeting in Dushanbe. For the Amu Darya, the 2026 water allocations set the total withdrawal limit for the water-management year from October 2025 to October 2026 at about 55.4 billion cubic meters. Of this, 15.9 billion cubic meters is allocated for the cold period, from October to April. Tajikistan has been allocated 9.8 billion cubic meters per year, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan each receive 22 billion. A significant part of the flow, 44 billion cubic meters, must pass through the adjusted section of the Kerki hydrological post, helping secure the lower reaches of the river. For the Syr Darya, the total water withdrawal limit for the non-growing season is 4.219 billion cubic meters. Kazakhstan will receive 460 million cubic meters through the Dustlik Canal, Kyrgyzstan 47 million, and Tajikistan 365 million, while the largest share will go to Uzbekistan, 3.347 billion cubic meters. The inherited framework is also facing pressure from outside the five-state system. Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal, which is being advanced outside the Soviet-era allocation structure, has added uncertainty on the Amu Darya. The Central Asian republics also cooperate in bilateral and trilateral formats. In January, Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan joint working groups met in Turkestan. The sides reaffirmed water cooperation, agreed to continue repairs on the Dostyk canal, and planned automated hydrological posts on the Syr Darya. In May, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed on the operating regime of the Bahri-Tojik Reservoir for the summer of 2026. From June to August, the reservoir is to operate in a coordinated mode to supply irrigation water to farmers in the Maktaaral and Zhetysai districts of southern Kazakhstan. These agreements show that regional mechanisms still work, but experts continue to warn that climate pressure, data gaps, and uneven national interests could overwhelm existing formats. “Forecasting the...

Central Asian Labor Migration Shifts as Russia Loses Some of Its Pull

Russia remains the main destination for many Central Asian labor migrants, but its dominance is weakening. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, tougher Russian migration rules, and rising hostility toward migrants have pushed workers from the region to look elsewhere. South Korea, the Gulf states, the United Kingdom, Poland, Belarus, and other destinations are increasingly competing with Russia for Central Asian labor. The result is not a collapse of the old migration model, but a visible diversification of flows as the geography of labor migration from the region expands. Kazakhstan: From Destination Country to Source of Skilled Migrants Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, most labor migrants from Central Asia have traveled to Russia in search of work. A shortage of local labor, relatively decent wages, familiarity with the language, and a similar mentality have driven many to seek jobs in major Russian cities. Kazakhstan is an exception. It has not seen mass migration of its own citizens into lower-skilled jobs in Russia such as janitorial or construction work. Kazakhstan’s own economy offers such jobs, unemployment has remained low, and employers continue to report shortages in both manual work and skilled professions. The Bureau of National Statistics put unemployment at 4.5% in the first quarter of 2026. For this reason, Kazakhstan has also long been a destination for migrants from neighboring states, even if Russia has traditionally attracted larger flows. Kazakh citizens working abroad generally aim for higher-paying jobs in sectors requiring qualifications. The government was already tracking this in 2024, when the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection reported, using Foreign Ministry data, that 137,000 Kazakh citizens were abroad for employment purposes. The largest numbers were in Russia, South Korea, Turkey, and the UAE, with smaller numbers in Europe, North America, and elsewhere. A later Ministry report showed the same pattern, with Russia still dominant but alternatives clearly visible: of 126,000 Kazakh citizens employed abroad, 102,000 were in Russia, 15,000 in South Korea, and around 2,000 in the United Kingdom and European Union member states. Those leaving include economists, lawyers, technical specialists, teachers, and medical workers. Although outward labor migration remains limited compared with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan, it is adding to official concerns about the loss of qualified specialists. Officials believe Kazakhstan’s labor market is vulnerable to external competition, and a large share of those leaving have higher or technical vocational education. Salary gaps and differences in living standards make these destinations attractive. Qatar has recently joined the list of preferred destinations for labor migration. This has been made possible in large part by intergovernmental agreements signed between Qatar and Kazakhstan. Qatar is now actively recruiting Kazakh specialists, particularly in the oil and gas sector. According to Arman Shokparov, co-founder of People Consulting, around 600-700 Kazakh white-collar professionals currently work in Qatar. Nearly half work in the oil and gas sector, mainly in engineering and production roles. This trend does not mean Kazakhstan is only losing workers. It continues to attract immigrants and...

Kyrgyzstan Begins Updating Red Book as Scientists Survey Rare Species Nationwide

Kyrgyzstan has begun preparing its first comprehensive update of the national Red Book in nearly two decades. On June 3, 2026, the Ministry of Natural Resources, Ecology and Technical Supervision and the National Academy of Sciences signed a cooperation agreement to collect updated data on rare and endangered species of flora and fauna. The project is scheduled to last two years and is estimated to cost about 21 million soms. What Has Been Decided Under the agreement, scientists from the National Academy of Sciences will carry out field and desk-based research across the country to obtain current, reliable information on rare and threatened species. The studies are intended to clarify population sizes, habitat ranges, and extinction risks. At the end of the 24-month project, the scientists will submit a scientific database to the ministry, which will serve as the basis for a new edition of the Red Book. The ministry said updating this information will make it possible to protect vulnerable species more effectively and preserve the country’s biodiversity. A Book Reissued Only Twice in 40 Years A full edition of Kyrgyzstan’s Red Book has been published only twice. The first appeared in 1985, when it was still called the Red Book of the Kirghiz SSR. The second was released in 2006-2007 in two volumes: Animals and Plants and Fungi. Since then, the protected list has been adjusted without a new full edition. In 2019, officials said the list had increased by 22 animal and plant species, but no complete printed edition followed. This is the gap the new revision is intended to close. Since the last edition, both the condition of wildlife populations and monitoring methods have changed. New field data is therefore needed to ensure that the document reflects the current situation. Which Species Are Protected Today The current Red Book of Kyrgyzstan includes 57 bird species, 23 mammal species, two amphibian species, eight reptile species, seven fish species, and 18 arthropod species. In addition to animals, 89 species of higher plants and fungi are protected. These figures will be the starting point for the review. Researchers will need to determine which species are still found in their former habitats, which populations have declined, and which species may need to be added to the list for the first time. Snow Leopard: A National Symbol and a Rare Example of Recovery The best-known inhabitant of Kyrgyzstan’s mountains on the list is the snow leopard. On December 30, 2023, it was officially recognized as a national symbol of the country by presidential decree. The species is listed as vulnerable on the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s Red List and has rare or endangered status in all 12 countries across its range. Kyrgyzstan is also one of the few countries where official figures indicate that the snow leopard population is growing. According to the 2024 count, the country had about 511 individuals, compared with 282 in 2013. Penalties for the illegal capture and export of the animal were also increased...

From Bishkek to Yakutsk: What Unites Eurasia’s Emerging Cinema

Stepan Burnashev is a Sakha filmmaker from Yakutia who has helped bring Yakut cinema to audiences far beyond the republic. His films have screened at international festivals, appeared on Amazon, and helped turn Yakut cinema into one of the most distinctive regional film movements in Eurasia. In Bishkek, where Burnashev served on the jury of the national KyrgyzBox section, The Times of Central Asia spoke with him about the phenomenon of Yakut cinema, international ambitions, and what connects Yakutsk, Bishkek, and other emerging cinemas of Eurasia. TCA: Stepan, this is not your first time attending the Bishkek International Film Festival. What attracts you to it? Stepan Burnashev: I love Bishkek very much. There is good cinema here, wonderful people, and Kyrgyz culture feels very close to me in many ways. I have attended three of the four festivals held so far. Still, I have never shown my own films here. The first time I came to Bishkek was at the invitation of Erke Jumakmatova, the head of the festival’s industry program. We met back in Busan, and she invited me to participate in a pitching session. Back then, I flew in with a team of Yakut filmmakers: Apollinaria Degtyareva, Alexey Egorov, and me. Apollinaria and I both participated in the pitching, and this year she entered the main competition of the Bishkek Film Festival with that project. The second time, I came on my own initiative because I had really fallen in love with the festival. It has a special warmth and atmosphere. This time I was invited as a jury member for the national KyrgyzBox program. TCA: How do you assess the KyrgyzBox program? Do you see any common ground between Kyrgyz and Yakut cinema? Stepan Burnashev: The program is interesting, though, as everywhere, there are weaker films and stronger ones. From what I understand, mainstream cinema, such as comedies, is more popular here, while in Yakutia, auteur films are also audience-driven. It is interesting, but I noticed that music is used much more actively in Kyrgyz films. In our films, music usually does not dictate anything to the viewer or tell them what to feel. Here I saw films with a different approach. It is curious. TCA: What kind of cinema interests you more today, auteur or mainstream? Stepan Burnashev: In fact, I do not divide cinema into auteur and mainstream. I divide films into good and not-so-good. I even try not to use the word “bad.” It seems unfair to the people who create films. Any director starts working on a film convinced they will make a great one. And I sincerely believe that no one sets out to make a terrible movie. Of course, there are cases where the result does not meet expectations, but behind every project there is the labor of many people. That deserves respect. TCA: What do you think about contemporary Kazakh cinema? Do you know it well? Stepan Burnashev: To say that I know Kazakh cinema very well would be an...

Chongara and Tash-Tobo: The Villages That Changed Countries Without Moving

About 2,500 people in Chongara and Tash-Tobo now live under Kyrgyz jurisdiction. The transfer reduces the number of Uzbek enclaves in Kyrgyzstan and clears the way for a much shorter road across the Batken Region. For Umitbek, the change first appeared online. Chongara, his home village, passed from Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Region into Kyrgyzstan when the legal border moved. “We are welcoming the decision with joy,” Umitbek told Azattyk. “Ninety-nine percent of our village is Kyrgyz.” Umitbek already holds a Kyrgyz passport, while many neighbors have Uzbek documents. Some households include citizens of both countries. The village has Kyrgyz and Uzbek schools, and families have chosen between them. Kyrgyz presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov announced the transfer on June 23. “Now registration procedures will be conducted in these villages, after which their residents will be granted Kyrgyz citizenship,” Alagozov said. He did not give a timetable for the process. Kyrgyzstan transferred plots of equal area to Uzbekistan as part of the settlement. Public announcement did not identify those plots or state their total size. The two governments also conducted a separate exchange involving 236 hectares. That land will support a road between the villages of Sai and Tayan, and shorten the journey between Aidarken and Batken from 225 kilometers to 55, or about 76% of the present route. Officials have yet to publish a construction date or budget. A Century Inside Another Republic Chongara and Tash-Tobo were Uzbek exclaves, pieces of Uzbekistan completely surrounded by Kyrgyz territory. Their unusual status grew from Soviet boundary decisions made a century ago. Chongara’s administrative link to the Uzbek Republic dates to territorial decisions around Sokh in 1925. Tash-Tobo was also assigned to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic that year. A parity commission confirmed its enclave status in 1955. These lines served as internal administrative boundaries during the Soviet period. Villages that had shared roads, water systems and family links found themselves divided by customs posts and citizenship rules. Uzbekistan previously had four exclaves inside Kyrgyzstan: Sokh, Shakhimardan, Chongara, and Tash-Tobo. Following the latest transfer, only Sokh and Shakhimardan remain under Uzbek jurisdiction. Sokh is the largest and most complicated. It lies within Kyrgyzstan, but has a largely ethnic Tajik population. Roads around the enclave have long shaped travel through the western Batken Region. A Settlement Built Over Two Decades Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan began formal border negotiations in 2000. Progress remained slow while relations between the two governments were strained. The process accelerated after Shavkat Mirziyoyev became Uzbekistan’s president in 2016. A 2017 agreement settled about 1,170 kilometers of the roughly 1,378-kilometer frontier. The remaining sections involved land, roads, and water infrastructure. The two foreign ministers signed a further border treaty in Bishkek on November 3, 2022, which covered sections left outside the 2017 settlement. On January 27, 2023, Mirziyoyev and Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov exchanged ratification instruments during a state visit to Bishkek. The legal delimitation fixed the agreed line on maps. Physical demarcation then placed that line on the ground. The 2022 package also...

The Fragile U.S.–Iran Truce: What Central Asia Stands to Gain and Lose

The preliminary memorandum signed in mid-June between the United States and Iran, followed by renewed talks between Washington and Tehran, has extended a U.S.–Iran truce and opened a 60-day window for negotiations on a final agreement. The nuclear terms remain unresolved, while Israel’s continued military presence in southern Lebanon, despite U.S. pressure for a withdrawal, underscores how fragile the broader regional de-escalation remains. At the end of this period, the parties may sign a final agreement, return to hostilities, or mutually agree to extend the interim arrangement. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, along with neighboring Azerbaijan, have welcomed efforts to de-escalate the conflict between the United States and Iran. The fighting briefly boosted demand for alternative routes through Central Asia, but prolonged instability would disrupt trade, raise transport and insurance costs, and increase security risks. The question now is what the region could gain if the pause holds. Those effects would vary across the region. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan stand to benefit most directly from safer southern rail access through Iran to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are less directly connected to these corridors and less exposed to oil price swings, would feel the consequences mainly through freight costs, fuel prices, and wider regional trade. For Azerbaijan, a sustained pause would reinforce its role as the Caspian link between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, while renewed instability would push more freight toward Trans-Caspian alternatives. That interest is not merely theoretical. Tajik-Iranian trade reached $119.6 million in the first quarter of 2026, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The opportunity, however, is conditional. A truce can reduce military risk, but it does not by itself remove the banking, insurance, and compliance problems that have long complicated trade through Iran. For Central Asian exporters and logistics companies, the question is not only whether routes are physically open, but whether carriers, lenders, insurers, and buyers are prepared to use them during a temporary 60-day window. Analysts interviewed by Deutsche Welle said the framework leaves several important provisions unresolved, making a final agreement uncertain. For Central Asia, the most immediate economic variable is the Strait of Hormuz. Kazakh historian and political analyst Sultan Akimbekov identifies its reopening as the key to easing global supply fears. A durable reopening, combined with the temporary U.S. waiver allowing Iranian oil sales through August 21, could put downward pressure on global energy prices. The effects would vary across Central Asia: weaker prices could strain hydrocarbon revenues, while lower fuel, fertilizer, and freight costs could ease imported inflation in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. For Kazakhstan, lower global oil prices would have significant implications. National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov has said oil generates more than 50% of the country’s export revenues and over 30% of the state budget and National Fund revenues. That would reverse one of the conflict’s few short-term economic benefits for Kazakhstan. Higher crude prices had briefly improved the outlook for export revenues,...