Kyrgyzstan Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Labor Migrants

Kyrgyz Labor Migrants Confront Challenges in Europe

The Center for Employment of Kyrgyz Citizens Abroad has announced the launch of online registration for seasonal agricultural work in the United Kingdom. Alongside migration to Russia, Europe remains one of the most popular destinations for Kyrgyz workers. Tens of thousands of citizens seek employment in Europe, Turkey, and South Korea. However, despite the widely advertised benefits of working abroad, many migrants face significant challenges. According to the state portal migrant.kg, wages for seasonal agricultural work in the UK are set at £11.50 per hour, with a guaranteed minimum of 32 hours per week. Applicants must meet certain conditions, including being in satisfactory physical and psychological health and having at least a basic knowledge of Russian. The Kyrgyz government assures job seekers that employment under state-brokered contracts is free of charge and, most importantly, safe. Migrants are only required to cover the costs of their visa, insurance, and airfare. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Labor, Social Development, and Migration has previously signed agreements on labor migration with companies in the UK, Italy, and Slovakia, as well as with employers in South Korea. In addition to government initiatives, private agencies also facilitate job placements for Kyrgyz citizens abroad. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Rakhim Mirzyaev, a former labor migrant, about his experiences working in the European Union. “In general, Kyrgyz citizens are readily accepted in most EU countries. I worked in Poland for six months at a car parts factory, then moved to the Netherlands for agricultural work. Many people don’t realize it, but this type of labor can be brutal,” Mirzyaev told TCA. The cost of obtaining a visa, insurance, and airfare for his job in Poland totaled $750. “At the factory in Poland, we were paid hourly, only about $5 per hour. An inspector monitored our work every hour. Local regulations required us to meet specific production targets. If you failed to meet the quota, you were first fined, and then, if it continued, you could be fired,” he explained. According to Kyrgyz migrants, inflation has made it increasingly difficult to live and work in Europe. Rising food and housing costs leave little room for savings. Unlike international students, migrant workers receive no financial benefits or subsidies. Nutrition was another major challenge. Mirzyaev noted that adjusting to inexpensive European food was difficult for those accustomed to traditional Central Asian cuisine. “We mostly ate pasta because it was the cheapest option. If we spent money on better food, we wouldn’t be able to save anything to send home. I lost 20 kilograms in six months working at the factory in Poland,” he said. Many Kyrgyz migrants exchange job opportunities and experiences through online messaging groups. It was in one such group that Mirzyaev and a friend found an unofficial job opening in the Netherlands. However, without an official work permit, they faced even greater difficulties. “But in the Netherlands, we didn’t pass the probation period and were fired after three days. The job required us to work on a...

Bilateral Relations

Guest Opinion: The View From China on Kyrgyzstan

The 9th Asian Winter Games will kick off in Harbin on February 7, 2025. According to the organizing committee, 1,275 athletes from 34 Asian countries and regions have registered to compete, making it the largest event in the event’s history. The record-high participation partly reflects the growing appeal of winter sports across Asia and showcases the continent’s diversity and unity. Among those attending the event is the delegation from Kyrgyzstan, which is sending around 50 athletes to compete in biathlon, alpine skiing, figure skating, ice hockey, and curling. As this edition of the Asian Winter Games is set to open, the spotlight is not just on the athletes from across the continent, but also on the broader regional ties the event symbolizes. Indeed, in a world where the level of geopolitical uncertainties is high, some partnerships stand the test of time. At the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov will pay a state visit to China from February 4 to 7. Over the past three decades or so, China and Kyrgyzstan have navigated global challenges while steadily strengthening their ties. Through frequent high-level exchanges and growing cooperation across multiple sectors, the two nations have built a bond that’s only grown stronger over the past three decades. At the heart of this partnership are Chinese President Xi Jinping and Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, whose meetings over the years have deepened mutual trust. Back in February 2022, Japarov visited China to attend the Beijing Winter Olympics opening ceremony and held talks with Xi. Later that year, in September, they met again at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Samarkand. In 2023, Japarov made a state visit to China and attended the China-Central Asia Summit. It was during this visit that both nations decided to elevate their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership for a new era. Their most recent bilateral meeting took place in July 2024 during the SCO Summit, with Japarov's state visit to China now taking place from February 4 to 7. Economic Ties China has consistently been Kyrgyzstan's top trading partner - primary import-based - and biggest investor. The two nations continue to strengthen cooperation in energy, transportation, and agriculture, driving regional economic integration. Chinese enterprises in construction, oil refining, cement, and mining have been investing in Kyrgyzstan over the years, and their investments yield tangible results. Trade between China and Kyrgyzstan has been on an upward trajectory. From January to November 2024, bilateral trade reached $19.86 billion, an 11% increase year-on-year, showcasing a positive trend in economic cooperation. A long-anticipated project, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, has finally moved from vision to reality. Once completed, this railway will serve as a crucial trade corridor, enhancing regional connectivity and providing a major boost to Kyrgyzstan’s economic development. Additionally, the partial opening of the Bedel Pass, increasing direct flights between Chinese and Kyrgyz cities, and improved cross-border transportation all contribute to smoother trade and travel between the two countries. Chinese-funded infrastructure projects, such as road network...

EU Relations

Does the European Parliament Judge Central Asia Fairly?

In 2024, European Parliament (EP) resolutions on Central Asia emphasized its increasing significance in a world that is being reshaped by Russia’s war on Ukraine and China’s growing assertiveness. They focused on strengthening the EU’s partnerships with Central Asia while seeking to advance democratic values and human rights. These Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements aim to support economic reforms, foster sustainable development, and encourage regional cooperation. At the same time, reflecting the EU’s strategic focus on stability and resilience in the region, the EP’s resolutions urged the Central Asian states to decrease their dependency on Russian energy and avoid facilitating sanctions evasion. For the Central Asian countries, all these initiatives present opportunities to address pressing challenges and pave the way for growth. Advancing democratic governance and protecting fundamental rights, for example, can foster more inclusive and stable societies. Deeper engagement with the EU also offers access to advanced technologies and investments (as well as global markets), which are necessary for innovation and infrastructure upgrades. Likewise, the diversification of energy sources enhances regional self-reliance, reducing vulnerabilities that are tied to over-dependence on a single partner. Alignment with EU priorities, including resistance to autocratic pressures, gives Central Asia a better chance to develop its resilience and interconnected future. Some voices in the region, however — particularly among government officials and more traditionally-minded citizens — view the European Parliament's 2024 resolutions as overly critical, indeed influenced by special interests that fail to take into account the region’s unique challenges and priorities. From a Central Asian perspective, the criticisms contained in the EP’s resolutions lack essential context, focus narrowly on perceived shortcomings, and fail to give adequate consideration to the complex situation underlying governmental decisions. Such a one-sided approach, they suggest, overlooks essential cultural, historical, socio-political, and geopolitical factors. The result is a significant gap between the EU’s expectations on the one hand, and, on the other, what is reasonable to expect given the realities on the ground. The drafters of these documents often focus excessively on identifying deficiencies in democratic processes. They report violations without contextualizing the governments’ choices and often omit any mention of the views of the general public. The unfortunate consequence is that such criticisms vitiate good-faith attempts to build cooperation and partnership. The ideal becomes the enemy of the possible. Most Europeans still have a poor understanding of Central Asia. Many MEPs lack the time or resources to grasp the region’s complexity. Instead, their decisions are too often informed by resolutions that are drafted by a small group of “experts”. The language of these resolutions often reflects the drafters’ personal biases, which in turn risk deforming Europe’s strategic relationships with the region. A lack of proper scrutiny is all the more alarming in light of the Qatargate scandal, which exposed how state-funded lobbyists can distort human rights narratives to advance specific agendas. Maria Arena, the former head of the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), played a central role in shaping judgments on democratic practices in Central Asia,...

Global Diplomacy

Opinion: What Will a New Trump Presidency Mean for Central Asia?

During his first presidency, Donald Trump introduced a foreign policy approach that recalibrated U.S. engagement with Central Asia, a region strategically critical yet overshadowed by the influence of China and Russia. Trump’s policies, targeting the collective challenge of CRINK (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea), aimed to foster regional autonomy and counter external dependency. This policy shift, aimed at countering the global influence of CRINK has extended to the vital region of Central Asia. Further, it is geographically wedged between Russia and China and serves as a critical bridge for U.S. interests. The CRINK nations, in their regional strategies, have made substantial inroads in Central Asia. Additionally, each nation is pursuing influence through economic, political, or military avenues. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union, for instance, have been noted as major forces reshaping Central Asian economies as well as infrastructure. In 2013, the BRI of China was launched, which has channeled billions into roads, railways, and other infrastructure projects in Central Asia, seeking to create new trade routes connecting Asia to Europe. On the other side, Russia has promoted its Eurasian Economic Union as a trading bloc that has aimed at fostering economic integration among Central Asia and neighboring countries. These initiatives have provided economic incentives for Central Asia but also intensified its reliance on external powers, particularly China and Russia. During his presidency, Trump emphasized a CRINK-focused strategy, which prioritized Central Asia's sovereignty and reduced dependency on China and Russia. This strategy laid the groundwork for U.S. engagement in the region, influencing current policy directions. In 2020, Trump’s administration unveiled a comprehensive strategy for Central Asia, marking the first such effort in over two decades. The policy emphasized U.S. support for border security and defense collaboration, including financial aid to Tajikistan and military training for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. These measures, though initiated under Trump, continue to shape current U.S. approaches to combating terrorism and fostering regional stability. For example, the U.S. has established the C5+1 initiative as a dialogue platform between the United States and the five Central Asian nations (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan). It was developed further to promote mutual goals in regional security, economic development, and environmental resilience. Security cooperation is a vital aspect of this U.S. strategy which has given the threats of terrorism and also potential instability at CRINK’s peripheries (Sciutto, 2024). In particular, Afghanistan’s proximity to Central Asia poses both risks as well as opportunities for these nations. The U.S. has provided financial support to Tajikistan to strengthen border security and counter drug trafficking. Furthermore, while also assisting Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with training and equipment to improve their defense capabilities the US has financially supported the nation. This military cooperation has aimed to prevent the encroachment of extremist groups like ISIS, which could exploit regional instability and threaten U.S. interests. Trump’s presidency emphasized private sector investments as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Although modest compared to China’s commitments, these investments reflected an effort to...

International Finance

Risk and Reward: Why Savvy Investors Should Dive into Central Asia-Caspian Region

Central Asia-Caspian basin has long been a geopolitical chessboard — fragmented by conflict but dependent on cooperation. In an era of shifting alliances, political instability, and economic uncertainty, multinational corporations (MNCs) must reassess their strategies. While the region's challenges remain considerable, it also presents unique investment opportunities that should not be overlooked. Since the 1990s, operating in post-Soviet Eurasia has been synonymous with political risks. The Central Asian states have sought foreign direct investment (FDI) but face significant obstacles, including weak rule-of-law, inconsistent regulatory frameworks, and entrenched corruption. Yet despite these barriers, the region continues to attract international capital, signaling its long-term potential. Traditionally reliant on oil and gas exports, these countries are now pivoting toward diversification. Nations like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are strengthening ties with the European Union (EU) to balance their historical reliance on Russia’s energy network. This shift is opening new frontiers for investment, particularly in green energy, infrastructure, and technology. However, geopolitical instability remains a critical risk. The war in Ukraine has intensified uncertainties, with Russia, China, the EU, and the U.S. vying for influence. Energy security, once an afterthought, has become a central issue. The closure of the Novorossiysk terminal in early 2023, halting Kazakh oil exports, underscored how quickly geopolitical disruptions can affect supply chains, prompting companies like ExxonMobil to reassess their regional strategies. Yet this volatility also creates opportunities. The region’s economic shift away from resource dependence toward a knowledge-based economy offers fertile ground for businesses willing to invest in infrastructure, technology, and renewable energy. The Caspian basin’s strategic location, as a transit hub for energy to Europe, only heightens its importance in the EU’s efforts to reduce dependency on Russian supplies. For international businesses, this means new markets, sectors, and investment channels are emerging. The post-Covid landscape adds complexity, with digital transformation accelerating across industries. Countries in the Central Asia-Caspian basin are under pressure to adopt these technologies, which could drive long-term economic growth. Yet the gap between ambitious reform plans and their implementation remains wide. Regulatory inefficiencies and bureaucratic hurdles continue to hamper progress, presenting a challenge for foreign investors looking for stability. For multinational corporations, the region presents both risks and significant upsides. On one hand, border disputes, political unpredictability, and regulatory uncertainty create barriers. On the other, the region’s growing role as an energy transit hub and its emerging sectors, from green energy to infrastructure, offer promising avenues for investment. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, in particular, have been proactive in bolstering energy exports to Europe, positioning themselves as critical players in the global energy transition. If the conflict in Ukraine continues to escalate, the region’s geopolitical risks will undoubtedly increase. However, external actors — particularly the U.S., the EU, and China — are also likely to deepen their involvement, further reshaping the region’s economic and political landscape. The rise of Sino-American tensions only adds another layer of complexity to an already volatile environment. Yet, for companies that can navigate these complexities, the rewards are significant. Central Asia-Caspian basin remains...

Organization of Turkic States

How Central Asia Is Shifting From Russia Towards Turkey

For Turkey, a NATO member and EU hopeful, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is an instrument that helps Ankara increase its presence in the strategically important region of Central Asia. For Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the Turkish-dominated group seems to be a tool that allows them to achieve their economic goals, while also continuing to distance themselves from Russia. Although Moscow still has a relatively strong foothold in Central Asia, it does not seem able to prevent the growing role of the Organization of Turkic States in the post-Soviet space. This entity – whose members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, while Turkmenistan, Hungary, and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus hold observer status – has the potential to eventually serve as a counterbalance not only to Russian, but also Chinese influence in the region. Since its foundation in 2009, the OTS has held ten summits of its leaders. Over this period, the intergovernmental organization’s working bodies have also convened dozens of times. On November 5-6 in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, the OTS heads of states will meet for the eleventh time to discuss the future of the Turkic world. Although the agenda has yet to be announced, it is believed that the OTS leaders will seek to strengthen economic cooperation between its members. Currently, their major trade partners are nations outside the bloc. For instance, Turkey’s largest trading partner is Germany, Azerbaijan’s is Italy, while China has recently become Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partner with bilateral trade hitting $31.5 billion. For neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, China and Russia remain the most important economic partners. One of the group’s major problems is the fact that its members, excluding Turkey, are landlocked countries heavily-dependent on Russia and China geographically. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, as major energy exporters, rely on oil and gas pipelines traversing Russian territory to reach their customers in Europe. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Organization of Turkic States governments’ agreed in September to create a simplified customs corridor, aiming at reducing the number of documents required for customs operations and customs procedures between OTS member states. In other words, they plan to increase trade among themselves. According to Omer Kocaman, OTS Deputy Secretary-General, the Turkic nations are also looking to “continue cooperation to stimulate positive changes in their financial systems.” That is why the organization has recently launched the Turkic Investment Fund – the first joint financial institution for economic integration of the Turkic countries, with an initial capital of $500 million. Kyrgyzstan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry announced on October 17 that, starting in January 2025, the Turkic Investment Fund will begin financing major joint projects in OTS nations. However, in July, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said that the current structure of the Organization of Turkic States does not meet its established goals, and that its budget is insufficient for their implementation. In order to change that, on October 19, ministers of economy and trade of the OTS nations met in Bishkek to...