• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10730 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10730 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10730 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10730 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10730 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10730 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10730 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10730 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
21 January 2026

Viewing results 19 - 24 of 431

Opinion: Ghosts of the Gulag – A View From the Ground

Recently, The Times of Central Asia published an article titled Ghosts of the Gulag: Kazakhstan’s Uneasy Dance With Memory and Moscow. While it is essential to consider outside opinions, it is equally important to articulate how this perspective looks from within. In Kazakhstan, there are three large museums dedicated to the memory of the victims of the communist regime. These are the infamous ALZHIR (Akmolinsk Camp for Wives of Traitors to the Motherland), the museum dedicated to the memory of victims of political repression, KARLAG (Karaganda camp), and a smaller memorial complex to the victims of political repression at Zhanalyk, located about 40 kilometers from Almaty. Historians believe that around 2,500 people are buried there, including prominent members of the Kazakh intelligentsia, such as Akhmet Baitursynov, Mukhamedzhan Tynishpaev, Saken Seifullin, Ilyas Jansugurov, and Beimbet Maily. In addition to these museums, there are monuments to the victims of political repression and the famine of the 1920s–30s in many cities across the country. But it's not just about the number of museums and monuments. What matters most is that the memory of these events is preserved, and it is being carefully studied. In 2020, a state commission for the full rehabilitation of victims of political repression was established by the government. Over several years, 425 scholars, researchers, and experts have participated in its work. More than 2.6 million documents and materials have been declassified. Most importantly, this commission has rehabilitated more than 311,000 victims of political repression within the framework of existing legislation. The results of this work are documented in 72 volumes. There are no sections in these research materials divided by nationality. The approach is the same for everyone: justice and fairness for all. This calls into question the “collective amnesia that obstructs historical reckoning” referred to by Guillaume Tiberghien, a specialist in dark tourism at the University of Glasgow. Regarding any "emphasis on what the prison system ‘contributed’ to the nation” mentioned by Margaret Comer, a memory studies expert at the University of Warsaw, there are conflicts of interest and truths people would rather not face. One of the main purposes of Karlag was to serve as a major base of food supplies for Kazakhstan’s growing coal and metallurgical industries. In addition to industrial development, by 1941 the camp had 70 sheep farms, 45 cattle farms, one horse farm, and two pig farms. By 1950, 4,698 people worked on these farms, including 13 academic scientists. The communist system of corrective labor camps was an integral part of economic development, achieved through what was essentially slave labor. This is the full cynicism of the regime on display: prisoners were expected to “work off” their guilt. “The country is walking a tightrope,” Tiberghien suggests, pointing to President Tokayev’s speech on May 31, the official Day of Remembrance for Victims of Political Repression. “It wants to keep things calm, to avoid upsetting Russia.” In this speech, while calling for the rehabilitation of victims and greater access to archives, Tokayev also condemned the...

Opinion: Ghosts of the Gulag: Kazakhstan’s Uneasy Dance With Memory and Moscow

In May 2025, the authorities in Moscow unveiled a life-size bas‑relief sculpture of Josef Stalin in the Taganskaya metro station. The next month, a statue of Lenin was pulled down in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. Between these two symbolic acts lies Kazakhstan, caught in a tug-of-war over the memory of Soviet-era repression. Between 1920 and 1960, millions of prisoners were deported to more than fifty labor camps across what was later to become the Republic of Kazakhstan. Those who weren’t executed on the spot — political opponents, intellectuals, artists — were forced to work in mines, construction sites, or collective farms feeding Soviet industrial expansion. The death toll remains unknown but is believed to be in the millions. Today, this dark past draws in history buffs and thrill-seekers. But darktourism.com, the go-to website on the topic, warns them: forgotten cemeteries, ghost villages, crumbling camps — this gulag archipelago is well hidden in the steppes. No sign points the way to the Museum of Political Repression in Dolinka, housed in the former headquarters of Karlag, one of the largest camps of the Soviet Gulag system. The only other gulag transformed into a museum is ALZHIR, built on the ruins of the Akmola camp near Astana. It commemorates the 18,000 women imprisoned between 1939 and 1953 for being the wives of “traitors to the motherland.” These two museums now stand as official symbols of Soviet repression in Kazakhstan, and, more subtly, as frontline sites in a broader memory war across the former Soviet Union. Selective Memory When the museums were nationalized in the 2000s, their message became tightly controlled. Portraits and quotes from former president Nursultan Nazarbayev began to cover the walls. Guillaume Tiberghien, a specialist in dark tourism at the University of Glasgow, calls it a “selective interpretation of history.” The goal? To unify the country’s 160 ethnic groups under a shared narrative of collective suffering. At both Karlag and ALZHIR, guides emphasize acts of solidarity between Kazakh villagers and deportees — hospitality, compassion, bits of cheese tossed over barbed wire fences to feed the starving. [caption id="attachment_34338" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Execution scene recreated at the Karlag museum; image: Manon Madec.[/caption] The past is staged. Between wax statues with sunken faces, sound effects mimicking heartbeats, and torture room reconstructions, the visitor is drawn into a visceral experience, sometimes at the cost of accuracy. “You wonder if the museum overdoes it to trigger emotion,” Tiberghien remarks. Margaret Comer, a memory studies expert at the University of Warsaw, explains: “It’s sometimes easier to mourn victims than to identify perpetrators.” [caption id="attachment_34337" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Execution scene and fake blood, reconstructed in the Dolinka museum; image: Manon Madec.[/caption] The complicity of local Kazakhs is never addressed. Russian responsibility is blurred behind vague terms like “NKVD” or “Stalinist repression.” At ALZHIR, visitors learn only about Sergey Barinov — a Russian commandant described as cultured, discreet, and caring toward the women detained. The other two camp directors are never mentioned. In other former Soviet republics — Ukraine, the Baltics, Georgia — such...

Opinion: A Sea of Discord? Intensifying Military Drills Threaten Stability in the Caspian Region

On Monday, Russia and Iran launched joint military exercises in the Caspian Sea under the banner “Together for a Safe and Secure Caspian Sea.” Officially, the drills aim to enhance maritime security and naval cooperation between the two countries and are being coordinated by Iran’s Northern Fleet. While such exercises might once have passed without much notice, their timing and frequency reflect a shifting dynamic: the Caspian region is rapidly emerging as a potential hotspot in global geopolitics. Just one month prior, the same waters hosted joint military exercises between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, held in Aktau, western Kazakhstan. These were followed by the “Tarlan-2025” air and tactical drills in Azerbaijan from July 8-10, which focused on enhancing UAV operations and military coordination. Baku’s strategic alliance with Ankara is a key factor here. Azerbaijan, a close Turkish partner, is now engaged in a more strained relationship with Russia. Moscow’s muted reaction to this cooling suggests an awareness that Ankara is increasingly shaping a Turkic military-political bloc, an emerging force in a region of strategic importance to both Russia and China. Earlier this month, Turkey launched its annual Anadolu-2025 special forces exercises. Participants included troops from 33 nations, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and others but notably excluded Russia. For the first time, in 2024, military exercises were held in the Caspian without Russian involvement. The Birleistik (Unity) 2024 drills were conducted at Kazakhstan’s Oymasha training ground and Cape Tokmak along the Caspian coast. Troops from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan rehearsed scenarios including conflict zone identification, night maritime operations, and amphibious landings. Previously, regional military cooperation had been limited to bilateral engagements, such as the 2023 UZAZ exercises (Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan), Kanzhar-2023 (Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan), and Hazri-2023 (Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan). The spike in joint drills during 2024-2025 underscores growing rivalries between regional and global powers. These operations are not mere formalities but reveal emerging security alignments and geopolitical signals. Three distinct blocs appear to be coalescing in the Caspian, with implications for Central Asia as well. The first bloc includes Russia, Iran, and China. These nations have held annual “Maritime Security Belt” exercises since 2019, with the most recent in March 2025 off the Iranian coast. The second bloc comprises Turkey, Azerbaijan, and members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Defense ties among these countries are becoming a core element of OTS cooperation. At the 10th OTS Summit in Astana in 2023, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized defense as the main guarantor of member state security, citing ongoing regional conflicts and violations of international law. The third bloc, more pragmatic and focused, is the Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan partnership. These countries are cooperating on the basis of the 2018 Caspian Convention to secure maritime communications. Azerbaijan contributes military expertise, particularly in UAV and drone warfare developed during the Karabakh conflicts. Kazakhstan brings diplomatic credibility and promotes regional governance and connectivity, offering a stabilizing complement to Azerbaijan’s military strengths. In sum, the Caspian Sea, once colloquially referred to as “Russia’s lake”, is steadily losing that identity. It is transforming into...

Kazakhstan in Afghanistan: From Rhetoric to Infrastructure

The visit of Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu to Kabul (July 10–11) was a turning point not only for bilateral relations but also for the entire regional logistics agenda. While Astana's previous statements about its readiness to participate in the Trans-Afghan Corridor were viewed by many with skepticism as a demonstration of goodwill without practical substance, these doubts have now been dispelled. Kazakhstan has not only reaffirmed its commitment to the project but also reinforced it with concrete commitments. An interdepartmental memorandum on the implementation of the Torgundi-Herat railway line has been signed, and Astana has confirmed its readiness to invest up to $500 million in the Trans-Afghan railway project. This is an important step in the formation of future transport corridors within the Central Asia to South Asia (CA2SA) initiative. Practical matters such as tariff policy, border crossing procedures, logistics, and digitalization were also discussed. The visit also carried diplomatic weight. Kazakhstan is demonstrating its willingness to engage pragmatically with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. This is not a step towards recognizing the Taliban regime, but an effort to involve Kabul in economic processes without altering Kazakhstan’s legal or political stance. Attempts to link this visit to Russia's recognition of the Taliban appear superficial. Such trips are not planned spontaneously — in diplomatic practice, visits at this level are prepared for weeks, if not months. The very structure of the negotiations made it clear what the priorities were: infrastructure, transport security, and economic cooperation, not political recognition. Given Kazakhstan’s balanced foreign policy, formal de jure recognition of the Taliban regime is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The current status quo — practical cooperation without political legitimization — is acceptable to all parties, regional states, and Afghanistan alike. At most, we may see an elevation of diplomatic representation. Currently, both countries are represented by temporary chargés d'affaires. After the visit, extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassadors may be appointed. However, even this would not mean recognition. Diplomatic missions are a means of communication, not a political endorsement. Kazakhstan’s position continues to be guided by that of the United Nations. Until the Credentials Committee changes its position on the Afghan side's participation in the General Assembly, Astana will not force events. From 2021 to 2024, the committee rejected the Taliban's applications for accreditation, which de facto means a refusal of international recognition at the global level. Although these decisions are not legally binding, they serve as the main political guideline for states that adhere to a collective approach. In matters of recognition, it is essential not to get ahead of geopolitical realities. It is important that Kazakhstan's actions are not isolated: they are in line with other countries in the region, especially those bordering Afghanistan. Whereas previously the policy of Central Asian countries towards their southern neighbor was determined by security issues, the focus is now shifting to trade, logistics, and infrastructure development. Across all regional capitals, there is growing recognition that supporting Afghanistan is not a formality, but a rational strategic choice. After...

Opinion: As Kazakhstan-China Trade Booms, Tokayev and XI Strengthen Relations

On June 16th, Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping and the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in Astana at the second China-Central Asia Summit. The six countries signed the 'Treaty of Permanent Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation', which reinforced their strategic cooperation in multiple areas, particularly in trade and investment. Aggregate China-Central Asia trade is up 10.4% this year. Kazakhstan is a pivotal player in transcontinental Eurasian trade and integration. Its geographic location, multimodal transport networks, and strategic partnerships with neighboring countries, particularly China, position Kazakhstan as Central Asia’s primary overland gateway to Europe and West Asia. It’s no surprise, therefore, that President Xi Jinping visited Astana – his sixth trip to Kazakhstan and sixteenth to Central Asia. Over the past two decades, Kazakhstan has reclaimed its historic role as a nation of merchants and intermediaries, revitalizing trade routes like the middle corridor and logistics hubs such as Khorgos Gateway—a dry port facilitating container transshipment between Chinese and Kazakh railways en route to Europe. These are just two examples of infrastructure projects in Kazakhstan; there are many more in development. In Astana, Presidents Tokayev and Xi underscored the importance of further socio-economic progress arising from enhanced economic linkages. Tokayev reiterated Kazakhstan’s support for mutually beneficial business opportunities, emphasizing the principle of national sovereignty and independence. Recent trade figures reflect the robust economic ties in infrastructure and connectivity. Kazakhstan’s construction sector, driven by investments in transport, are poised to increase by 6.8% in 2025, according to Kazakhstani economists. Sino-Central Asian trade, according to China’s General Administration of Customs, reached $94.8 billion in 2024, with Kazakhstan accounting for 46% of that total—$43.8 billion—making it China’s largest partner in the region. This contrasts with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan's combined total of $28.1 billion, and Kyrgyzstan’s $22.7 billion, driven largely by re-exports and gold. Kazakhstan remains the anchor economy in Central Asia – the strategic hinge between China and the West – as confirmed not only by the volumes of freight entering and leaving Kazakhstan, but by its upstream and downstream economic benefits, causing a multiplier effect across the country. Over 80% of land cargo from China to Europe passes through Kazakhstan. What factors have led to this development? A key factor has been global demand for raw materials, but that’s only part of the story. What stands out as the principal driver of Kazakhstan’s success in boosting trade over the past 20 years was its commitment soon after independence in 1991 to invest in transport and logistics, while creating a regulatory and legal framework in parallel to facilitate operability. In other words, Kazakhstan’s success is no accident. It was the country in Central Asia to embrace economic liberalization not as ideology, but as a pragmatic approach to address the inefficiencies of a centralized command economy. This visionary approach facilitated economic liberalization, including getting rid of oppressive centralized planning and embracing private capital and deregulation without relinquishing sovereignty. Kazakhstan also pushed ahead in developing a banking sector that over time provided a...

Opinion: The U.S. Dollar Loses Its Luster as the Uzbek Som Shines

From May 20, 2025, to June 19, 2025, the U.S. dollar declined from 12,885 Uzbek som to 12,625 som, reaching its lowest level since early December 2023. This trend is anticipated to persist. Over the past 30 days, the dollar has depreciated by 2.08% against the som. The Central Bank of Uzbekistan adheres to a flexible exchange rate mechanism, commonly referred to as a floating exchange rate. This approach allows the value of the Uzbek som to be primarily influenced by market forces of supply and demand, rather than being fixed or pegged to another currency. In the context of Uzbekistan, the Central Bank defines the market-determined exchange rate, permitting the som to fluctuate freely based on the interactions between buyers and sellers in the foreign exchange market. In 2017, Uzbekistan transitioned to a flexible exchange rate regime, aligning the som with market conditions and narrowing the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates. This move is expected to enhance export competitiveness, as noted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). While the market predominantly determines the exchange rate, the Central Bank reserves the right to intervene in the foreign exchange market to mitigate excessive fluctuations or address significant imbalances. However, it does not maintain a fixed exchange rate. The primary objective of the Central Bank is to uphold price stability, ensuring low and stable inflation. The flexible exchange rate regime empowers the Central Bank to utilize interest rates as a tool to influence inflation and manage the overall economy. Since 2020, the Central Bank of Uzbekistan has been implementing an inflation targeting framework that guides its monetary policy decisions, including those related to the exchange rate. Uzbekistan has recently achieved a remarkable milestone, with its international reserves soaring to an unprecedented $49.6 billion, primarily driven by a substantial increase in gold prices. This significant figure, recorded at the end of last week, represents the highest level of international reserves since the Central Bank of Uzbekistan began tracking this data in 2013. Uzbekistan has been on a remarkable journey of financial growth, marked by a sustained increase in its reserves over the past five months. Since the beginning of the year, the country's reserves have increased by an impressive $8.48 billion, reaching a new historic high of $49.66 billion. In May alone, the reserves saw a substantial boost of $410.2 million, translating to a 0.8% increase compared to April. This consistent upward momentum not only highlights the resilience of Uzbekistan's economy but also demonstrates its ability to adapt and thrive in a dynamic global landscape. Central to this financial ascent has been the role of gold, which has enjoyed significant demand due to its elevated prices in international markets. Over the last month, gold prices surged by 3.27%, rising from $3,280 to $3,390.07 per ounce. When examining the broader trends, it is evident that gold has significantly appreciated, with a striking 25.5% increase since the start of this year and an even more impressive 41.3% surge over...