• KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
30 October 2026

Viewing results 13 - 18 of 445

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s New Income Growth Plan – Administrative Measures Against Market Realities

Kazakhstan’s government has unveiled a Comprehensive Plan to Increase Household Incomes for 2026-2029. The Ministry of National Economy says it contains 59 measures. The stated goals include higher wages and lower inflation. The plan also aims to ease household debt. The full text of the plan has not yet been published in open access. First Vice Minister Azamat Amrin presented its main provisions at a Government press conference on June 11. The central contradiction lies in the fact that guaranteed income growth applies to only a small segment of the population. The plan creates fundamentally different conditions for the public and private sectors. It provides for mandatory salary indexation for civil servants. Their wages will be revised every three years based on accumulated inflation. According to labor market data, this category includes about 85,000 to 90,000 people less than 1% of the country’s total workforce of around 9.3 million. It is this narrow group that receives a reliable long-term mechanism of financial protection. Indexation is also planned for employees of national companies and natural monopolies. This group includes around 700,000 to 800,000 people, or 8-9% of the labor market. Employees in the social sector, teachers, doctors, and others, receive their salaries directly from the state budget. This category numbers around 1.2 million to 1.3 million people, or 13-14% of the workforce. Under Kazakhstan’s law on public service, these workers are not considered part of the state administrative apparatus. The plan does not introduce automatic three-year indexation for them; their incomes are raised through separate government decrees, usually on an annual basis depending on budgetary capacity. More than 7 million people work in the competitive private sector, small and medium-sized businesses, as well as the self-employed, accounting for more than 75% of the workforce. For this dominant category, the plan offers no direct mechanisms for income growth. Instead of financial guarantees, the document proposes using an administrative lever: officials will hold talks with private business owners to encourage them to raise wages. The only basic indicator directly affecting the incomes of low-paid private sector workers is the minimum wage. However, the government has postponed revising the minimum wage until August 2026. Private business bears the main market risks and forms the country’s tax base. It is these taxes that finance guaranteed incomes in the public sector, which in total accounts for around a quarter of the labor market, while the overwhelming majority of working citizens, about three-quarters, have no comparable protection. Economist Murat Temirkhanov, an adviser to the chairman of Halyk Finance who took part in expert discussions of the government’s plan, says this approach distorts market relations. A directive requirement to raise wages could push businesses away from formal hiring and into the shadow economy to cut costs. In his view, the plan ignores the only real source of income growth: higher labor productivity. The document devotes only one point to this factor, even though international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have directly recommended...

Opinion: Central Asia’s Shift from Silk Road Romance to Infrastructure Finance – What the June Forums Are Building

In mid-June, Tashkent and Baku will host two major international finance gatherings within the same regional window: the fifth Tashkent International Investment Forum in Uzbekistan, and the Islamic Development Bank Group’s 2026 Annual Meetings in Azerbaijan. The overlap in timing is useful less as a calendar coincidence than as a signal of how infrastructure, finance, and regional integration are now being discussed together. In Tashkent, the fifth Tashkent International Investment Forum opens under the theme “Investment Resilience: New Frontiers, New Partnerships.” In Baku, the Islamic Development Bank Group will convene delegates from its 57 member countries under the theme “Regional Integration for Sustainable Prosperity.” Add the Astana International Financial Centre’s increasingly active forum calendar, a new cross-border Islamic finance alliance signed in May among regional industry associations, and a stream of connectivity and green investment pledges from recent regional summits, and the wider region looks increasingly focused on turning connectivity talk into investment structures. The more important question is not how much money is being discussed, but what kinds of projects are becoming investable. One answer keeps surfacing: a multi-thousand-kilometer trade route that carries goods from China across Kazakhstan, over the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, and onward through Georgia and Türkiye to Europe. The Middle Corridor, formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, runs through many of the investment pitches now being made across the region. The forums show how infrastructure, finance, and regional connectivity are increasingly being discussed together. The corridor is one of the clearest tests of whether that agenda can move from conference language into bankable projects. For most of the past century, the world categorized this region under two headings. One is heritage: the caravanserais and blue domes of the old Silk Road. The other is hydrocarbons: the oil and gas beneath the Caspian basin. Both cast the region as a place value came out of or once passed through. The corridor proposes something more ambitious: that value should pass through again, but this time on terms shaped by the region itself. The shift is from selling what lies underground to earning from where the region sits on the map. Freight volumes on the Middle Corridor have risen roughly fivefold over recent years, while transit times have been cut from about a month to roughly two weeks as border procedures and port operations improved. The World Bank’s benchmark study sets out the goal of tripling freight volumes and halving travel time by 2030, and regional projections now point to annual throughput of around ten million tons or more by the end of the decade. For landlocked economies long dependent on a single route to world markets, a second viable artery is less a convenience than a form of strategic insurance. But turning a route on a map into a working corridor requires serious capital. It requires expanded port capacity on the Caspian, additional vessels and ferries, rail upgrades, terminal infrastructure, and the less visible digital and customs systems that allow cargo to clear multiple borders...

UNDP Opinion: Central Asia – Shared Wildlife, Shared Landscapes, Shared Responsibility

As global leaders gather for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Assembly in Samarkand, Central Asia has an opportunity to send a clear message to the world: protecting biodiversity is not only about saving species — it is about securing water, livelihoods, resilience and long-term stability for millions of people across our region. From the glaciers of the Tien Shan and Pamir mountains to the deserts, steppes and river basins downstream, Central Asia’s ecosystems are deeply interconnected across borders. Rivers flow between countries. Wildlife migrates through shared landscapes. Mountain ecosystems regulate water systems that sustain agriculture, energy production and communities far beyond the highlands themselves. Among the most powerful symbols of this shared natural heritage is the snow leopard — the silent guardian of Central Asia’s mountains. The snow leopard represents far more than a rare and iconic species. Its survival reflects the health of entire ecosystems that millions of people depend upon every day. Healthy mountain landscapes help secure freshwater resources, reduce disaster risks, sustain pastures and agriculture, preserve biodiversity, and strengthen resilience to climate change across the region. But today, these ecosystems are under growing pressure. Climate change is accelerating glacier melting and intensifying water stress. Land degradation, unsustainable grazing, habitat fragmentation and biodiversity loss are placing increasing pressure on fragile mountain environments and rural livelihoods. Communities living closest to nature are often the first to feel the consequences — through declining water availability, degraded pastures, reduced agricultural productivity and increasing climate-related risks. These challenges do not stop at national borders. And neither can the solutions. Only a coordinated regional response can match the scale of the challenge. Protecting Central Asia’s mountain ecosystems requires countries to work together to conserve ecological corridors, strengthen transboundary protected areas, improve water and land governance, and invest in climate-resilient livelihoods for communities whose futures are closely tied to nature. There are already successful examples of regional agreements. For example, a highly successful transboundary nature conservation agreement in Central Asia protects the Ustyurt Plateau and the Turan Temperate Deserts. Spanning across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, this initiative has successfully safeguarded vulnerable ecosystems and migratory species like the saiga antelope and snow leopard. [caption id="attachment_50004" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Photo: Saiga calf. Kazakhstan/UNDP Kazakhstan[/caption] It is encouraging that transboundary cooperation has already taken shape across the region. Across Central Asia, governments, communities and development partners are already demonstrating that conservation and development can advance together. While each country's experience is unique, the lessons are remarkably similar: when communities benefit from healthy ecosystems, nature and people both thrive. In Kazakhstan, the snow leopard has become one of the clearest examples of how coordinated conservation efforts can help restore fragile ecosystems across borders. The species inhabits mountain systems that extend beyond national boundaries into China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan, making its protection inseparable from regional cooperation. Over the past decade, habitat countries have strengthened efforts to protect the species through national conservation strategies, expanded protected areas, and improved ecosystem monitoring. Supported by cooperation between the Government, UNDP, the Global...

Opinion: Beyond Multivectorism – What Kyrgyzstan’s UN Security Council Win Really Shows

Kyrgyzstan's election to the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term is more than a diplomatic milestone. It is a case study in how a small state can create political weight without possessing a large economy, military power, or a dominant regional position. On June 3, Kyrgyzstan won its first-ever seat on the Security Council after a competitive four-round contest with the Philippines for the Asia-Pacific Group vacancy. Bishkek led from the first round, with 105 votes against Manila's 85, and increased its support through each subsequent ballot. It finished with 142 votes to 49. The result is significant because this was not an uncontested regional rotation. Kyrgyzstan had to assemble a qualified two-thirds majority across the wider UN General Assembly. That required more than support from its immediate neighbors. Bishkek had to build support across regions, institutions, and political blocs. The deeper lesson is that small-state agency should not be measured only by material resources. It should also be measured by the ability to assemble coalitions. A Campaign Larger Than Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan's campaign was not presented simply as a request for national recognition. President Sadyr Japarov framed the bid as a question of representation. When Kyrgyzstan intensified its campaign in 2024, he drew attention to the number of UN member states that had never served on the Council and argued for broader representation, particularly for African countries. Bishkek also positioned itself as a voice for small, developing, landlocked, and mountainous states facing security, climate, and connectivity challenges. That framing gave the vote wider political weight. Kyrgyzstan could not outspend larger states; it could not offer a large domestic market or a major security umbrella. But it could translate its limitations into a broader political language: underrepresentation, sovereign equality, regional balance, and the need for smaller states to have a voice in global decision-making. The campaign also received visible regional backing. In December 2025, all five Central Asian presidents endorsed Kyrgyzstan's candidacy, presenting the bid as a regional effort rather than a purely national one. That was the first layer of the coalition. The second was broader. In May 2026, the African Group at the United Nations received a dedicated briefing on Bishkek’s candidacy from Edil Baisalov, Kyrgyzstan’s newly appointed ambassador to the United States and a special envoy of the president. This followed Kyrgyzstan's public support for wider African representation in the Security Council. Because the UN ballot was secret, it would be impossible to claim that African votes delivered Kyrgyzstan's victory. Nor would it be accurate to reduce the campaign to a simple exchange of support. But the African track was an observable part of a wider coalition strategy. Bishkek aligned its own candidacy with an issue that mattered to a much larger group of states: the imbalance of representation inside the Security Council. From Multivectorism to Coalition Brokerage Central Asian foreign policy is often described through the language of multivectorism. The term usually refers to balancing among Russia, China, the West, Turkiye, and other external powers...

Opinion: Eurasia’s New Corridors Are More Than a Transit Race

Across Eurasia, new transport corridors are usually described as instruments of rivalry: routes to bypass Russia, ports to outflank competitors, or rail links to shift influence between regions. The conflict around Iran, the rivalry between India and Pakistan, instability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan zone, crises in the Middle East, sanctions, competition over transport routes, and growing struggles for transit influence all reinforce the image of a continent divided by political contradictions. Increasingly, this is the lens through which Eurasia is viewed. The development of transport routes and connectivity is now often explained through the logic of rivalry. Some corridors are described as alternatives to others. Certain ports are positioned against competing ports. Routes are increasingly perceived as tools of competition, circumvention, or geopolitical influence. The continent can also be viewed differently. Alongside political crises, another reality is visible: the continent continues to connect itself through new routes and networks. Railways, ports, energy grids, dry ports, container corridors, digital cables, and trade chains are gradually linking spaces that only recently were seen as separate regions. In many ways, Eurasia has always been a space of movement, exchange, and connectivity. The Silk Road Was a Network, Not a Single Route A recent article by News Central Asia made a simple but important observation: the Silk Road functioned because it belonged to everyone. This idea contains one of the central lessons of Eurasian history. The Silk Road was never a single road. It was not one unified highway built according to a master plan or controlled by a single center. For centuries, the continent was connected by a vast network of caravan routes, maritime pathways, mountain passes, cities, and trade hubs through which goods, people, knowledge, and ideas circulated. Some routes gained importance while others temporarily declined. States, empires, and commercial centers changed. New pathways emerged. Yet the network itself endured. The strength of the Silk Road lay not in one route, but in the multiplicity of connections. When one corridor became unsafe, trade shifted elsewhere. When political conditions changed, commerce adapted to a new geography. The continental network remained flexible and multilayered. This offers an important lesson for today’s Eurasian space as well. Many modern transport corridors did not emerge from nothing. In many respects, they follow historical logic. Railways have replaced caravan paths, dry ports have succeeded old trade hubs, and container routes continue along directions in which goods moved for centuries. Corridors and the Logic of Rivalry Today, most transport and economic corridors are interpreted as competing projects. Nearly every new route is framed through confrontation, alternatives, or attempts to bypass another direction. The Middle Corridor is often described as an alternative to northern routes. The International North-South Transport Corridor is presented as a separate geo-economic axis. Trans-Afghan projects are portrayed as competitors to other links between Central and South Asia. Chabahar and Gwadar are depicted as rival ports. Even the South Caucasus transport hub is increasingly viewed through the prism of struggles over control of routes and flows. Yet historically,...

Opinion: Silk Seven or the OTS? Central Asia May Not Have to Choose

A new proposal circulating in Washington – the Silk Seven Plus (S7+) initiative – aims to reshape Central Asia by linking its five post-Soviet states with Afghanistan and Pakistan into an integrated economic region. Azerbaijan is also seen as a potential addition. The idea, advanced by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, is straightforward: connect landlocked Central Asia to the Black Sea and Arabian Sea through new trade corridors. On paper, the bloc looks compelling. The seven countries form a contiguous zone in the heart of Eurasia, potentially turning geography from a constraint to an advantage. “Central Asia needs an organization built by Central Asian states and for Central Asian states,” said Justin Burke, a resident senior fellow at the New Lines Institute, at a recent event in Washington. “If Central Asia can speak with one voice rather than five different voices, that will make it a more reliable investment destination.” There are signs of momentum. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev made back-to-back visits to Pakistan earlier this year, highlighting regional connectivity. Proponents argue that if Afghanistan stabilizes, the Silk Seven could become a formidable cluster. But that is a big “if.” It also raises a deeper question: why construct a new, geographically convenient bloc when an existing organization – the Organization of Turkic States (OTS)—already offers something deeper: shared language, history, and identity? While the Silk Seven spans broadly Muslim-majority countries, it is linguistically and culturally diverse. The grouping spans Turkic-speaking Central Asia, Persian-speaking Tajikistan, and Indo-Aryan Pakistan. ASEAN offers a cautionary example. Despite decades of cooperation, its religious, linguistic, and geopolitical diversity – combined with consensus-based decision-making – has often prevented it from speaking with one voice, particularly on China. In The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington wrote that when ASEAN was created in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, it was an organization of “one Sinic, one Buddhist, one Christian, and two Muslim member states.” Such multicivilizational regional organizations have limits, he said. The Silk Seven risks similar limitations. The OTS, by contrast, rests on a narrower but deeper foundation: its core members—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan—share closely related languages and overlapping historical experiences. Tucked away in the eight-page document issued after the informal OTS summit earlier this month was a revealing signal of intent: clauses dedicated to cataloguing Turkic cultural heritage, promoting youth engagement through Khiva’s designation as the 2026 Youth Capital, and launching a “Turkic Heritage” digital platform. Together, they show that the OTS is actively building a shared cultural space. Yet even as members emphasize common heritage, differences remain over how far the organization should evolve politically. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the summit host, stressed in his remarks that “the Organization of Turkic States is neither a geopolitical project nor a military organization,” but rather “a unique platform” for cooperation across trade, technology, culture, and humanitarian ties. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev struck a more ambitious note, saying that “the Turkic world must grow into one of the influential geopolitical centers of the 21st century,” and pledging...