• KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09159 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09159 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09159 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09159 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09159 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09159 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09159 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09159 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
04 December 2024

Viewing results 13 - 18 of 358

Balancing Regional Integration Amid Global Rivalries

Central Asia has become a focal point for world and regional powers such as China, Russia, the European Union, the United States, and Turkey. Amid geopolitical uncertainty and a shifting global order, regional cooperation seems to be a top priority for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan in their foreign policy. The problem, however, is that the absence of a unified regional identity among Central Asian nations poses a major obstacle to their ambitions to strengthen regional integrations. They have different views on their regional identity due to their unique cultures, histories, politics, and economies. But in spite of that, on June 9, in the Kazakh capital of Astana, leaders of the five Central Asian countries gathered to discuss closer economic cooperation, stability and security in the region. They sought to expand ties in trade, industry, transport and logistics, energy, agriculture, as well as in the water management. As a result of the summit, regional leaders signed several key agreements, including the Roadmap for development of regional cooperation for 2025-2027, as well as the Conceptual framework of development of regional cooperation Central Asia 2040. These documents indicate that the regional integration will be a long-term process that will last for decades. In the meantime, Central Asian states will almost certainly continue strengthening bilateral ties. The Consultative Meetings of the leaders of Central Asian countries gave Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan another opportunity to deepen cooperation in various fields. The two nations, who signed an agreement on allied relations in 2022, announced their plans to adopt a strategic partnership program until 2034, and also to jointly launch several big economic and energy project. Prior to the meeting in Astana, presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan held talks with Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev. They were also scheduled to meet with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, but he canceled his visit to Astana after the Japan Meteorological Agency issued a warning of a potential earthquake in the Nankai Trough. Unlike him, Josep Borrell, Vice-President of the European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, visited Central Asia in early August. He traveled to Kazakhstan and neighboring Kyrgyzstan– a country that signed the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union on June 25. Although both nations are members of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Moscow’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has allowed other actors, including the European Union, to strengthen its presence in the strategically important region. While the EU’s goals in Central Asia are mainly related to energy, Japan’s plans to expand cooperation with the five regional countries serve as Tokyo’s strategic tool to counterbalance China's growing influence in the region. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, seeks to create a strategic energy bridge linking Central Asia and Europe via the South Caucasus. That is why Baku’s collaboration with Central Asian countries in the energy sector has become more crucial than ever. It is no surprise...

Olympic Success Nudges Central Asians Closer Together in Paris

Uzbekistan’s athletes grabbed the most glory for Central Asia at the Olympic Games, delivering eight gold medals, mostly in boxing, and propelling the nation to 13th on the medal table in Paris. But the occasional displays of solidarity among competitors, coaches and fans from Central Asia were just as inspiring for those who want the region’s countries to draw closer together – at a time when the world seems increasingly perilous. One video clip from the games showed ebullient Uzbek fans in the stands with the flags of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan held aloft in the background. “This moment reflects the shared bonds of our region, showcasing Central Asia’s presence on the global stage at Paris 2024,” said the International Institute of Central Asia, a state-run center in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, that promotes regional cooperation. Then there was Uzbek coach Akmal Hasanov, who helped out Kyrgyz boxer Munarbek Seyitbek uulu because his personal trainer and head coach were absent. Competing in the 57kg category, Seyitbek uulu lost to Uzbekistan’s Abdumalik Khalokov in the final, but it was the first Olympic medal for a Kyrgyz boxer. “Unprecedented unity of fans from all five countries. Love, mutual cheering. Before it wasn't like this at all. I hope politicians will see a potential and will speed up integrational processes. People want it,” Nikita Makarenko, a journalist and producer from Uzbekistan, said on the X platform. The politicians see that potential, judging by recent meetings. On Thursday, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbek counterpart Shavkat Mirziyoyev met in Kazakhstan and the leaders talked about cooperation, especially in trade. There are plans, for example, for an industrial facility on the border between the two countries that will speed up cargo delivery and reduce logistics costs. On Friday, Kazakhstan hosted a meeting with the leaders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, all former Soviet republics that today seek to balance their relationships with neighboring powers Russia and China, the United States and Europe, as well as relatively new partners in the Middle East and elsewhere. The goal of Central Asian solidarity – and regional security – is getting more attention as geopolitical tensions simmer, and the war in Ukraine, another former Soviet republic, shows little sign of resolution well into its third year. “Today we notice that the fundamental foundations of the system of international relations have changed. This is a dangerous phenomenon,” Tokayev said at the regional meeting. “It is clear that the current challenges can be overcome only through political dialogue and strengthening measures of mutual trust between our states.” There are moves to translate rhetoric into action. The forces of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan clashed as recently as 2022 over a border dispute, but negotiators of the two countries have pushed methodically toward resolution of the dispute. Last month, several Central Asian countries, plus Azerbaijan, held joint military exercises – Russia, the erstwhile security guarantor in the region, was absent. Water scarcity is acute in Central Asia, whose governments acknowledge they need to collaborate...

Inland Water Transportation in Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan’s inland waterways run to 4,302 km with an infrastructure that includes inland ports in Atyrau and Pavlodar, along with small cargo wharves and docks with access roads and ferry lines. Inland navigation is concentrated in the Ural-Caspian, Ili-Balkhash, and Irtysh river basins, and the Irtysh River is navigated via three locks at Bukhtarma, Ust-Kamenogorsk, and Shulbinsk. As such, Kazakhstan's inland waterways have great potential. Transporting cargo and passengers by ship is cheaper and more environmentally friendly than overland alternatives and has a significant multiplier effect on the development of  recreation and tourism in surrounding areas. However, there are a number of challenges to realizing this potential, including the unsatisfactory condition of navigable routes, an insufficient amount and high wear of coastal infrastructure, the state of the inland fleet and waterway locks, and a shortage of specialists. Over time, the Kazakh government's lack of proper attention to developing inland waterways has translated into falling transportation volumes along the country’s main navigable rivers. In turn, the lower handling volumes have led to a dearth of funds to update and repair port facilities, along with a deterioration of coastal infrastructure on navigable waterways, industrial ships, and waterway locks. In the last five years, Kazakhstan’s inland waterway fleet has decreased from 171 to 150 vessels. Meanwhile, 70% of those in operation are past their service life, while the existing coastal infrastructure is unable to process modern types of cargo at the pace required by the market. As reported by  Kazakhstan’s statistics agency, in the first half of 2024, 156,300 tons of cargo and 74,200 passengers travelled  on inland waterways, down 40.8% and 40.1%, respectively, from the same period last year. A key problem lies in the lack of a comprehensive analysis of the classification and volume of cargo carried through inland waterways. Current developments in shipping are focused around the Irtysh, home to the inland fleet and the main cargo base from which crushed stone is exported to Russia. On the Russian side, plans are in place to further increase shipped imports of both stone and other inert materials, alongside a proposal to import timber to Kazakhstan from Khanty-Mansiysk. The shipment of petroleum products to Chinese refineries from Kazakh and Russian plants is also being explored in tandem with the Chinese side sending back construction materials and consumer goods. At the initial stage, the volume of cargo transportation along the Irtysh is estimated at 350,000-400,000 tons a year, which could be ramped up to 1.5 million tons in the future. Experts note the important role of a strategic task set by the government to develop the transit logistics of integrating inland waterways into the multimodal logistics chain. This is especially relevant amid congestion on Kazakhstan’s railways and roads, the gravitation of export-import cargo to the transport system, and energetic discussions on developing the Russia-Kazakhstan-China transit corridor using the Irtysh. The project entails shipping cargo via the river to Lake Zaysan where reloaded onto trains, it continues its journey through a new Maykapshagay–Jeminay border...

SCO and Afghanistan on the Cusp of a New Relationship

The hype surrounding the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Council of Heads of State in Astana has died down, and the expert community has offered differing takeaways, with some experts optimistic and others cautious. Few, however, have considered what new this summit delivered on Afghanistan. In general, what is the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in resolving the political issues around long-suffering Afghanistan and rebuilding its economy? Despite the SCO’s previous hands-off approach to Afghan affairs, the issue of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was raised for the first time at the highest level of the SCO in Astana, which gives hope that the organization will expand its role. In their remarks, almost every SCO head of state touched on Afghanistan in essentially the same vein, stating the need for peace, stability and security, while underlining the fact that Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia. Indeed, Afghanistan was mentioned in the final declaration of the Astana summit, with Member States “reaffirming their commitment to asserting Afghanistan as an independent, neutral and peaceful state free from terrorism, war, and narcotic drugs [and voicing] their readiness to support the international community’s efforts to facilitate peace and development in that country.” At the same time, there was a clear message to the Taliban that “the establishment of an inclusive government involving multiple representatives of all ethnic and political groups of Afghan society is the only way toward attaining lasting peace and stability in that country.” These statements represent a rather big step, considering that previously the SCO failed to find a consensus on Afghanistan and develop its own mechanisms to interact with Kabul. The creation of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group back in 2005 was rather a spontaneous reaction to the US-led coalition's Operation Enduring Freedom in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack. The SCO itself says the contact group was created because of the "concerns of the SCO countries about the negative development of the situation in Afghanistan and the intention of the SCO to establish a specific consultative dialogue with Kabul." While the contact group included the members’ permanent representatives to the SCO, only a few events were ever held. Indeed, interest in the contact group was only really apparent from the Afghan side, which was looking for SCO assistance in rebuilding the Afghan economy and SCO participation in implementing various energy and transport infrastructure projects and creating favorable conditions for Afghan goods to access the markets of SCO countries. However, none of this was realized. The SCO states preferred, as they still do, to conduct relations with Afghanistan bilaterally, and did not support the efforts of the SCO Secretariat to intensify the work of the contact group. In 2010, Uzbekistan directly indicated its interest in building relations with Afghanistan exclusively on a bilateral basis and stated that it would no longer take part in the contact group. In June 2012, Afghanistan’s application for SCO observer status was granted. Yet this step was more symbolic and failed to...

SCO Summit: A Battle for Influence in Central Asia

For Central Asian countries, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a tool that allows them to improve their position in the global arena, and develop closer economic ties with other members of the world’s largest multilateral group. But for Russia and China, the SCO is an instrument that gives them an opportunity to strengthen their influence in the strategically important region of Central Asia. Last week, the SCO (whose members are Russia, China, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, as well as Belarus, the entrant at the meeting in Astana on July 3-4) held the summit of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO in the Kazakh capital of Astana where its leaders adopted a series of documents – from the Astana Declaration, underscoring the organization’s role in bolstering global peace, security and stability, through the SCO Development Strategy until 2035, to the group’s Economic Development Strategy’s Action Plan until 2030. Prior to the meeting of what is often described as “the world’s least known and least analyzed” multilateral group, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev repeatedly stated that, over the past 20 years it was not possible to implement a single major economic project under the auspices of the SCO. Indeed, ever since its foundation in 2001, the SCO has mostly been focusing on security issues, and during the summit in Astana security was yet again at the top of the agenda. But as the largest Central Asian nation’s Deputy Foreign Minister Roman Vassilenko told me at the briefing with the foreign journalists on July 4, SCO members still work more on a bilateral rather than on a multilateral basis. In his view, advancing economic cooperation within the organization of very diverse nations is not an easy task. Quite aware of that, China seeks to strengthen its economic presence in Central Asia through other formats such as the Belt and Road Initiative, and the China-plus-Central Asia format. In the past, Beijing was actively pushing for closer economic integration between SCO members, but Russia reportedly blocked Chinese initiatives. As a result, the People’s Republic began to sign bilateral agreements with regional countries, aiming to strengthen its role in Central Asia. Kazakhstan, as the region’s largest economy, is no exception. Despite being a Russian ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, Astana seems to see Beijing, rather than Moscow, as the de facto leader of the SCO. As Vassilenko stressed, out of 10,000 people who came to Astana for the summit, more than half of them were Chinese, which indicates that the SCO holds a huge importance in Beijing’s foreign policy. Moreover, Chinese President Xi Jinping seems to have received a warmer welcome in the Kazakh capital than Russian leader Vladimir Putin or the heads of states of other SCO members. At the airport, where Xi was welcomed by his Kazakh counterpart Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, a group of Kazakh children sang the song "Ode to the Motherland" in Chinese, while Chinese...

Two-Dimensional Outlook Characterizes Western Media Response to SCO Summit

The Western media’s binary response to the latest Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana creates an unnecessary – and perhaps unintentional – “us-versus-them” dichotomy. Characterizing the SCO as the “anti-NATO” alliance where China, Russia and Iran come together, this style of coverage makes no mention of the evident efforts of the majority of post-Soviet states to balance Russia’s decades-long influence in the region. It is also notable that the same outlets serving up this black and white coverage are not even in attendance at the summit, preferring to take aim from abroad. Central Asian states cannot escape the realities of their geography and have to largely rely on Russia and China for their economic prosperity. At the same time, their future independence requires that they are a respected part of the international rules-based order as well as on their increased contribution to global supply chains. Kazakhstan’s recent democratic reforms are in direct contrast to the authoritarian image cast on so-called “anti-NATO” countries. Armenia has announced plans to quit Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military alliance. Generally, the countries in the region have – with different degrees of enthusiasm – implemented a multi-vector foreign policy, including following international sanctions against Russia and issuing statements supporting the “territorial integrity of Ukraine.” Uzbekistan’s courts even went so far as to convict a citizen for joining Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. Those looking to force an antiquated one-size-fits-all Cold War paradigm on Central Asia will ultimately be frustrated. The ongoing SCO event in Astana is bringing together a mainly Eastern-centric group of leaders speaking about deeper cooperation among the Organization’s members. While the Western press may simply decry this gathering as anti-Western, the fact that Central Asia stood in support of international sanctions against Russia and stayed neutral in the conflict with Ukraine, much to the chagrin of Vladimir Putin and his retinue, shows the region holds more shades of grey than stark black and white. Central Asia cannot be expected to fall entirely into the orbit of Western or Eastern leaning powers. The region’s republics will, and should, aim to be aligned with both. Arguably, the West, Russia, and China may all be disappointed in the end, but that outcome may well be in the best interests of the Central Asian states.