Turkmenistan Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 49

UNDP

UNDP Opinion: Central Asia – Shared Wildlife, Shared Landscapes, Shared Responsibility

As global leaders gather for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Assembly in Samarkand, Central Asia has an opportunity to send a clear message to the world: protecting biodiversity is not only about saving species — it is about securing water, livelihoods, resilience and long-term stability for millions of people across our region. From the glaciers of the Tien Shan and Pamir mountains to the deserts, steppes and river basins downstream, Central Asia’s ecosystems are deeply interconnected across borders. Rivers flow between countries. Wildlife migrates through shared landscapes. Mountain ecosystems regulate water systems that sustain agriculture, energy production and communities far beyond the highlands themselves. Among the most powerful symbols of this shared natural heritage is the snow leopard — the silent guardian of Central Asia’s mountains. The snow leopard represents far more than a rare and iconic species. Its survival reflects the health of entire ecosystems that millions of people depend upon every day. Healthy mountain landscapes help secure freshwater resources, reduce disaster risks, sustain pastures and agriculture, preserve biodiversity, and strengthen resilience to climate change across the region. But today, these ecosystems are under growing pressure. Climate change is accelerating glacier melting and intensifying water stress. Land degradation, unsustainable grazing, habitat fragmentation and biodiversity loss are placing increasing pressure on fragile mountain environments and rural livelihoods. Communities living closest to nature are often the first to feel the consequences — through declining water availability, degraded pastures, reduced agricultural productivity and increasing climate-related risks. These challenges do not stop at national borders. And neither can the solutions. Only a coordinated regional response can match the scale of the challenge. Protecting Central Asia’s mountain ecosystems requires countries to work together to conserve ecological corridors, strengthen transboundary protected areas, improve water and land governance, and invest in climate-resilient livelihoods for communities whose futures are closely tied to nature. There are already successful examples of regional agreements. For example, a highly successful transboundary nature conservation agreement in Central Asia protects the Ustyurt Plateau and the Turan Temperate Deserts. Spanning across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, this initiative has successfully safeguarded vulnerable ecosystems and migratory species like the saiga antelope and snow leopard. [caption id="attachment_50004" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Photo: Saiga calf. Kazakhstan/UNDP Kazakhstan[/caption] It is encouraging that transboundary cooperation has already taken shape across the region. Across Central Asia, governments, communities and development partners are already demonstrating that conservation and development can advance together. While each country's experience is unique, the lessons are remarkably similar: when communities benefit from healthy ecosystems, nature and people both thrive. In Kazakhstan, the snow leopard has become one of the clearest examples of how coordinated conservation efforts can help restore fragile ecosystems across borders. The species inhabits mountain systems that extend beyond national boundaries into China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan, making its protection inseparable from regional cooperation. Over the past decade, habitat countries have strengthened efforts to protect the species through national conservation strategies, expanded protected areas, and improved ecosystem monitoring. Supported by cooperation between the Government, UNDP, the Global...

Trade Corridors

Opinion: Eurasia’s New Corridors Are More Than a Transit Race

Across Eurasia, new transport corridors are usually described as instruments of rivalry: routes to bypass Russia, ports to outflank competitors, or rail links to shift influence between regions. The conflict around Iran, the rivalry between India and Pakistan, instability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan zone, crises in the Middle East, sanctions, competition over transport routes, and growing struggles for transit influence all reinforce the image of a continent divided by political contradictions. Increasingly, this is the lens through which Eurasia is viewed. The development of transport routes and connectivity is now often explained through the logic of rivalry. Some corridors are described as alternatives to others. Certain ports are positioned against competing ports. Routes are increasingly perceived as tools of competition, circumvention, or geopolitical influence. The continent can also be viewed differently. Alongside political crises, another reality is visible: the continent continues to connect itself through new routes and networks. Railways, ports, energy grids, dry ports, container corridors, digital cables, and trade chains are gradually linking spaces that only recently were seen as separate regions. In many ways, Eurasia has always been a space of movement, exchange, and connectivity. The Silk Road Was a Network, Not a Single Route A recent article by News Central Asia made a simple but important observation: the Silk Road functioned because it belonged to everyone. This idea contains one of the central lessons of Eurasian history. The Silk Road was never a single road. It was not one unified highway built according to a master plan or controlled by a single center. For centuries, the continent was connected by a vast network of caravan routes, maritime pathways, mountain passes, cities, and trade hubs through which goods, people, knowledge, and ideas circulated. Some routes gained importance while others temporarily declined. States, empires, and commercial centers changed. New pathways emerged. Yet the network itself endured. The strength of the Silk Road lay not in one route, but in the multiplicity of connections. When one corridor became unsafe, trade shifted elsewhere. When political conditions changed, commerce adapted to a new geography. The continental network remained flexible and multilayered. This offers an important lesson for today’s Eurasian space as well. Many modern transport corridors did not emerge from nothing. In many respects, they follow historical logic. Railways have replaced caravan paths, dry ports have succeeded old trade hubs, and container routes continue along directions in which goods moved for centuries. Corridors and the Logic of Rivalry Today, most transport and economic corridors are interpreted as competing projects. Nearly every new route is framed through confrontation, alternatives, or attempts to bypass another direction. The Middle Corridor is often described as an alternative to northern routes. The International North-South Transport Corridor is presented as a separate geo-economic axis. Trans-Afghan projects are portrayed as competitors to other links between Central and South Asia. Chabahar and Gwadar are depicted as rival ports. Even the South Caucasus transport hub is increasingly viewed through the prism of struggles over control of routes and flows. Yet historically,...

Water Security

Opinion: Water Without a Guarantor – Central Asia’s Next Security Test

The Fourth High-Level International Conference on the International Decade for Action, “Water for Sustainable Development,“ taking place in Dushanbe on May 25-28, comes at a difficult moment. Central Asia's water problem is no longer only about environmental management; it is moving into the field of regional security. The conference agenda is familiar and necessary: climate, investment, innovation, transboundary cooperation, and the implementation of the Water Action Decade. The harder question is what happens outside the conference hall. Does Central Asia still have a credible way to stop water stress from becoming an interstate crisis? For decades, the region operated in a post-Soviet setting in which Moscow shaped many security calculations, even though it was never a formal water arbiter. That setting has weakened. Russia has not disappeared from Central Asia, and it still retains military, economic, and institutional leverage. But since 2022, its role as the assumed external stabilizer has become less convincing. The result is not a simple vacuum. It is a more awkward reality: a region with many outside actors, but no trusted water-security guarantor. The Old Backdrop Is Weakening Central Asia's water system was built around a Soviet-era division of functions. Upstream republics, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, controlled the mountains, reservoirs, and hydropower potential. Downstream republics, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, depended on seasonal water flows for agriculture, food security, and social stability. The Soviet system managed those tensions through central planning. After independence, cooperation became more fragile. Water, energy, borders, electricity, and agriculture were separated into national strategies. The rivers, however, remained transboundary. For many years, Russia remained the largest external power around which regional security calculations were organized. That did not make Moscow an effective water manager, but it helped shape the political environment. Today, that environment has changed. The CSTO did not prevent the Kyrgyz-Tajik border escalations of recent years. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan eventually reached a border agreement through direct negotiation rather than outside enforcement. That difference is not academic. Water disputes are rarely settled by conferences alone. They need trusted channels for mediation, compensation, and restraint when pressure builds. Central Asia has plenty of statements about cooperation. It has fewer tools for managing coercion when water becomes scarce. Three Pressure Points The region's water-security stress is already visible in three places. The first is Afghanistan's Qosh-Tepa Canal. The canal draws water from the Amu Darya, a river system critical for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Because Afghanistan was not part of the old Soviet water-allocation arrangements, the Taliban government is creating a new upstream reality outside the inherited regional framework. Estimates of the canal's downstream impact vary widely. Some analyses suggest it could divert between 15 and 30% of the Amu Darya's flow, depending on the completion timeline, irrigation efficiency, and water-management practices. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that reduced Amu Darya flows could indirectly affect Kazakhstan if Uzbekistan compensates by drawing more heavily on the Syr Darya. Carnegie has described the Qosh-Tepa as a serious test for regional water cooperation. The second pressure point...

Middle Powers

Opinion: Middle Powers and the “Voice of the Region” – Is Central Asia Becoming a Coordinated Actor?

Against the backdrop of growing global fragmentation and the weakening of universal international institutions, the role of so-called middle powers is increasing. These are states able to influence regional agendas without possessing great-power status. In this changing system, Central Asia is gradually moving beyond its long-standing image as a geopolitical periphery and is beginning to act more like a region with shared interests. For decades, the region was viewed mainly as a space where the interests of external powers, including Russia, China, the U.S., and others, intersected. Today, that paradigm is beginning to shift. Central Asia is showing greater signs of agency through what may be described as a cluster effect: individually, the countries have limited influence, but collectively they form an important transit hub between Europe and Asia, a growing market, a significant resource base, and a strategic security zone. This creates the conditions for a more coordinated regional position, even if a single regional voice is still emerging rather than fully formed. C5+Azerbaijan as a Foundation for Regional Architecture The institutional foundation of this process is the Central Asian leaders' consultative format, which is now expanding through Azerbaijan's participation. That is turning what was once a C5 dialogue into a looser C5+Azerbaijan, or C6, framework focused on transport, energy, and practical cooperation. Within this framework, the countries of the region are learning to act in a more coordinated manner without supranational pressure. In practice, this process is developing through three main areas. The first is transport and logistics. Azerbaijan's participation has strengthened efforts to make the Middle Corridor more coherent, though the route still faces bottlenecks in capacity, customs coordination, and Caspian crossings. Through tariff coordination, simplified border procedures, and investment in port and rail infrastructure, Central Asia and the Caucasus are increasingly functioning as parts of a single transport artery. That gives the region a faster option for cargo between China and Europe, even if it remains far smaller than traditional maritime routes. Shipping goods via the Suez Canal or the northern route can take between 35 and 45 days, whereas the Middle Corridor can reduce transit times to around 13-21 days under favorable conditions. According to forecasts cited by BCG, shipping volumes along the route could increase three- to fourfold during the current decade. Beyond logistics, the project is creating a new economic framework for the region. Its status as a crossroads is attracting investment in transport hubs and manufacturing facilities along the route, with the potential to turn transit corridors into zones of economic growth. This gives participating countries not only transit revenue but a stronger basis for long-term strategic resilience. The second major area is energy integration, where historical disputes over water and fuel resources are increasingly being supplemented by models of joint development. The Kambarata HPP-1 hydropower project in Kyrgyzstan, being developed with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, has created an important precedent for shared management of water and energy interests. The project is expected to support cleaner electricity generation while helping stabilize irrigation flows...

CA5+UK

Opinion: UK’s C6 Engagement and the Opportunity for British Geostrategic Renewal

Along with Nicholas Spykman, Sir Halford Mackinder is one of the most pre-eminent thinkers in the field of geopolitics. Whilst today geopolitics is a term used interchangeably with “world affairs,” “international relations,” and “foreign policy,” Spykman and Mackinder used the phrase to describe the narrow academic study of how geography influences international relations and the conduct of states. In the 1904 paper, The Geographical Pivot of History, Mackinder theorized that the key to controlling the balance of power in the world rested in a “heartland” of Eurasia, comprising Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Mackinder described the heartland region as the “pivot region” for regional and global hegemony. The word “pivot” has recently been popularized in international relations, with examples including President Obama’s pivot to the Pacific and Britain’s Indo-Pacific pivot in the 2021 Integrated Review. In 1997, former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski built on Mackinder’s ideas in his work, The Grand Chessboard. Brzezinski defined a geopolitical pivot as being “determined by their geography, which in some cases gives them a special role either in defining access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player. In some cases, a geopolitical pivot may act as a defensive shield for a vital state or even a region.” To Mackinder and Brzezinski, Central Asia was a crucial geostrategic pivot. Central Asia - comprising the five states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, collectively termed the C5 - is located between China, Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan. Thus, the near abroad of the region is defined by conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Iran and Israel/U.S., and between Taliban-run Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pragmatic engagement is a necessity for the C5 but has not stopped them from pursuing greater diversification in security and economic arrangements, and they remain committed to U.S.-led diplomatic initiatives. Faced with a regionally assertive superpower in China, risks created by Russia’s war in Ukraine, theocratic Iran, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, Central Asia has continued to show its desire to build and deepen its economic and security partnerships from beyond traditional powers – such as China and Russia – to states in the Gulf, the Caucasus, Western Europe, and elsewhere. The United Kingdom has emerged as a new and important partner. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised concerns in the Central Asian states about its regional revisionism, territorial ambitions, and Putin’s reconstruction of the Soviet Union. In 2014, Putin credited Nursultan Nazarbayev with having “created a state in a territory that had never had a state before,” adding that “the Kazakhs never had any statehood.” The remarks sparked anger in Kazakhstan and fed concern about Moscow’s view of post-Soviet sovereignty. Finally, Putin said that it would be best for Kazakhstan to “remain in the greater Russian world.” In The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski predicted that “Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians.” Central Asia has been a...

Afghanistan

Opinion: The Southern Dimension of the Middle Corridor – Afghanistan’s Role in Eurasia’s New Logistics Landscape

Afghanistan’s integration into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is extending beyond local logistics and evolving into one of Eurasia’s key geo-economic projects. Amid the global transformation of supply chains, Central Asia has an opportunity to move beyond its role as a transit periphery and become an active participant in shaping new economic corridors, creating a full-fledged “southern dimension” of Eurasian connectivity. Two Routes: Strategic and Operational Two main directions for Afghanistan’s integration into the Eurasian transport system are currently under discussion, each reflecting a distinct development logic: strategic and pragmatic. The “Eastern Branch” (Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar) is traditionally viewed as the primary trans-Afghan route. Its key advantage is direct access to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar, providing the shortest connection between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. At the same time, geography makes the project highly complex. The route passes through the central and eastern regions of Afghanistan, including the Hindu Kush mountain range, where long tunnels and bridges would be required. This would sharply increase construction and maintenance costs, extend implementation timelines, and heighten security and infrastructure risks. According to available estimates, the project could cost around $5 billion and handle 15-20 million tons of cargo annually. However, the lengthy investment cycle and dependence on political stability mean implementation remains a long-term prospect. The “Western Branch” (Turgundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak) represents an alternative logistics corridor based on more favorable geography. Western Afghanistan is characterized by predominantly flat, semi-arid terrain, reducing the need for complex engineering structures and allowing the project to be implemented in phases. This significantly lowers capital costs, shortens construction timelines, and reduces infrastructure risks. The western route’s initial capacity is estimated at 7-10 million tons of cargo annually, making it the more realistic option for medium-term planning. An additional advantage is its geo-economic flexibility. Via Herat, the route could be integrated not only southward through Pakistan, but also westward through Iran, providing access to Persian Gulf ports. This would transform it into a multi-directional corridor capable of serving several logistics flows simultaneously. The Eastern Branch, therefore, remains the strategic option offering the shortest route to the ocean but requiring substantial investment and time. The Western Branch, meanwhile, presents a more pragmatic solution: faster to implement and more flexible from a geo-economic standpoint. The Role of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in the “Western Maneuver” The implementation of the western trans-Afghan corridor depends on close coordination between two key regional players, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which form the northern foundation of the future route by providing access to the Caspian Sea and, beyond it, global markets. Astana and Ashgabat are effectively creating a new geo-economic framework that could transform Central Asia from an isolated region into a strategic crossroads linking the Caspian Sea with the Indian Ocean. In 2026, Kazakhstan moved toward deeper institutionalization of the initiative, making the route through Herat and Kandahar a government priority. Astana’s strategy is multifaceted. In addition to establishing a permanent interdepartmental commission, Kazakhstan is actively seeking to attract international operators such as the Emirati AD...