Uzbekistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Extreme Heat

Extreme Heat Buckles Roads and Strains Power Grids Across Central Asia

Extreme heat across Central Asia in mid-July has buckled concrete highways, pushed electricity demand to record levels, and increased pressure on power grids and ambulance services. Kazakhstan reported road deformation and repeated failures in Almaty, Uzbekistan set consumption and generation records, Kyrgyzstan introduced temporary cuts to protect equipment, and residents in Tajikistan reported local disruptions. Temperatures above 40°C are common in parts of the region, but prolonged heat can strain several systems at once. Demand for cooling rises, road surfaces reach damaging temperatures, and health risks increase. The World Bank says much of Central Asia’s infrastructure was built in the mid-20th century and is overdue for renewal. Kazakhstan’s Roads and Power Networks Struggle Almaty recorded daily temperature highs on three consecutive days. The temperature reached 38°C on July 16, 39.2°C on July 17, and 40°C on July 18. The city’s July record remains 43.4°C, set in 1983. The heat also damaged Kazakhstan’s road network. KazAvtoZhol found temperature-related deformation on six highway sections in the Zhambyl, Pavlodar, and Turkestan regions. The national road operator said concrete surfaces can reach 60 to 70°C, and sometimes higher, during extreme weather. The resulting internal stress can deform concrete slabs. More than 50 workers repaired the affected sections, and traffic continued without restrictions. Road crews were monitoring more than 1,600 kilometers of concrete highway. Almaty’s ambulance service received more than 33,600 calls during the first two weeks of July. Medical officials said many involved sudden spikes in blood pressure and cardiovascular conditions, including coronary heart disease and acute heart attacks. Stroke patients were taken to hospital. Officials advised residents to avoid direct sunlight between 11 a.m. and 5 p.m., drink sufficient fluids, and seek medical help if their condition deteriorated. The city’s electricity network has faced record electricity demand between July 17 and 20 as residents increased their use of air conditioners and other appliances. The Alatau Zharyk Company said technical failures occurred in several districts, sometimes followed by faults on neighboring sections of the network. Thirty-five repair crews were deployed around the clock. The pressure extended beyond Almaty. Kazakhstan consumed 338.66 million kilowatt-hours of electricity on July 14, while domestic generation totaled 314.27 million kilowatt-hours, according to KOREM electricity data. Consumption also exceeded generation on each of the previous three days. Kazakhstan has historically covered such shortfalls through electricity imports, principally from Russia. Record Electricity Demand in Uzbekistan Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Energy warned on July 13 that daily electricity consumption could reach a summer record of 280 million kilowatt-hours, with peak demand rising to between 13 and 13.3 gigawatts. Demand subsequently exceeded that forecast. On July 18, consumption reached 294.4 million kilowatt-hours, 8% above the previous summer record. Peak evening demand rose to 13.7 gigawatts. Power plants produced a record 297.1 million kilowatt-hours on the same day. Despite the increase in production, technical faults caused temporary outages in several districts of Tashkent. At different times, the disruptions affected between several hundred and 2,700 consumers, according to the Ministry of Energy. Supplies were later restored....

Economic Growth

Uzbekistan Raises 2026 Growth Forecast to 8.1%

Uzbekistan has raised its 2026 economic growth forecast from 6.6% to 8.1%, after stronger-than-expected performance last year and in the first quarter of 2026. The Ministry of Economy and Finance’s updated Fiscal Strategy for 2027-2029 projects nominal GDP of 2.183 quadrillion soums this year (about $180 billion). The revision follows growth of 7.7% in 2025, above the original 6.6% forecast, and an 8.7% expansion in the first quarter of 2026. The ministry expects market services to grow by 16.6% in 2026, industrial production by 8%, construction by 12.4%, and agriculture by 5%. Inflation is forecast to slow to 6.5%, while unemployment falls from 4.8% in 2025 to 4.5%. The stronger projection rests partly on domestic demand. The strategy expects non-gold exports to rise by 20%, capital investment by 12.9%, and remittance growth to remain around 10%. Separate Central Bank figures show that remittances rose 13% to $3.8 billion in the first quarter, helping to support household spending even as Russia’s share of transfers declined. Growth is forecast to slow to 6.9% in 2027, before rising to 7.1% in 2028 and 7.4% in 2029. Inflation is projected at 5-6% in 2027 and 5% in 2028 and 2029. The government also intends to keep the fiscal deficit within its rules and public debt below 40% of GDP. The Ministry of Economy and Finance says meeting these targets will require stronger tax administration, fewer ineffective exemptions, tighter oversight of public-private partnerships, and further action against the shadow economy. It also plans more transparent medium-term budgeting and closer scrutiny of fiscal risks. The success of those reforms will determine whether rapid growth can be sustained without weakening public finances. The fiscal strategy uses the IMF’s April global outlook as part of its external assumptions. The government’s estimate is considerably more optimistic than the IMF’s 6.8% forecast. In its June assessment, the Fund said Uzbekistan’s outlook remained favorable but warned that the economy could be running above its potential. It identified weaker global conditions and domestic overheating as the principal risks. The revised figures also strengthen the government’s claim that the Uzbekistan-2030 Strategy target of an economy worth more than $240 billion remains achievable. The plan relies on private investment, export growth, higher productivity, and continued macroeconomic reforms. Economist Otabek Bakirov said the 8.1% projection would mark the strongest growth in Uzbekistan’s recent history. “According to the Fiscal Strategy forecasts, economic growth will accelerate to 8.1% in 2026. If this happens, it will become a new record for the country’s recent history,” he wrote in an analysis of the forecast. In a separate calculation, Bakirov put nominal GDP above $205 billion in 2027, $228 billion in 2028, and $257 billion in 2029. On that path, the $240 billion target would be surpassed a year early. However, he cautioned that the scenario depends on maintaining strong growth, low inflation, and exchange-rate stability, without a major domestic or external crisis. A weaker soum would reduce the dollar value of GDP even if output continued to rise quickly...

Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers a heatwave sweeping across Central Asia, anti-Taliban forces briefly seizing a district headquarters in a worrying sign of cracks in the Taliban's control, a shootout between different branches of Kyrgyzstan's security forces near the Uzbek border, promising new talks between Turkmenistan and Georgia, and a major shake-up inside Uzbekistan's presidential security services. Before then turning to our main story this week, where a growing number of countries are working with Central Asian governments to forcibly return Central Asian nationals, often into incredibly dangerous situations. - Steve Swedlow (Associate Professor of the Practice of Human Rights) - Bakhtiyor "Bakh" Safarov (Central Asia Consulting)

External Debt

The Central Asia Debt Divide: Why the Region’s Borrowing Risks Are Not the Same

Central Asia’s biggest debtor is not necessarily its most vulnerable. Kazakhstan accounts for roughly two-thirds of the region’s external liabilities, but much of that debt sits on corporate balance sheets rather than the government’s. Tajikistan owes a fraction of the amount, yet remains at high risk of debt distress. The contrast highlights the Central Asia debt divide. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rely more heavily on sovereign and concessional borrowing, while Uzbekistan’s external liabilities are now split almost evenly between the public and corporate sectors. Based on the latest available figures from national authorities and international financial institutions, the combined external debt of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan approached $275 billion in early 2026. Turkmenistan has not been included in the estimate because the country does not publish comprehensive official external debt statistics that can be directly compared with those of its regional neighbors. The total is an approximate calculation compiled from national statistics rather than a regional aggregate published by a single institution. The countries also release their debt data for different reporting dates and use different classifications, requiring caution when making direct comparisons. Total external debt includes obligations owed to non-residents by governments, central banks, commercial banks, private companies, and, in some countries, local subsidiaries of foreign corporations. Government external debt is a narrower measure covering liabilities that are directly serviced or guaranteed by the state. China remains an important bilateral creditor, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while multilateral institutions provide much of the region’s infrastructure and public-sector financing. Kyrgyzstan: Rising Debt, but a Broader Creditor Base Kyrgyzstan’s public debt has risen alongside increased infrastructure spending and domestic borrowing, although its creditor base has become more diversified. A smaller share is now owed to a single bilateral lender, while multilateral financing and the domestic securities market have grown in importance. According to the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance’s public debt data, the country’s total public debt stood at approximately $8.94 billion as of May 31, 2026, including around $6.1 billion in external obligations. The debt debate has also become part of President Sadyr Japarov’s broader economic narrative. In an interview with the Kabar national news agency published on October 8, 2025, Japarov said his government was continuing to borrow but argued that new loans were being directed toward commercial projects expected to repay their own financing rather than place an additional burden on the state budget. He also said Kyrgyzstan intended to repay its older debts by 2035. The International Monetary Fund said in its 2026 Article IV consultation that Kyrgyzstan had recorded strong economic growth for a fourth consecutive year, giving the authorities an opportunity to strengthen fiscal buffers and accelerate structural reforms. It also warned that the outlook remained exposed to significant downside risks. Kazakhstan: A Large External Debt, but a Different Risk Profile Kazakhstan accounts for the largest share of Central Asia’s external debt, but its headline figure can be misleading. Unlike several of its neighbors, the country’s external liabilities are dominated by corporate and intercompany borrowing rather...

Diplomacy

Tashkent and Kabul Rush to Deny Taliban Minister’s Criticism of Uzbekistan

A diplomatic row erupted between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan this week after a senior Taliban official was reported to have said that Islam in Uzbekistan exists only in name. After the remarks were widely covered by Uzbek and Afghan media, officials on both sides rejected the reports, although questions remain over whether excerpts of the speech were published and later deleted by the Taliban ministry itself. The dispute is sensitive because Uzbekistan has built close working relations with the Taliban administration on trade, transport, energy, and border security, while remaining wary of religious extremism and stopping short of formally recognizing its government. Public criticism of Uzbekistan’s religious policies by a senior Taliban figure could therefore strain a relationship both sides have worked carefully to preserve. The controversy centers on Sheikh Mohammad Khalid Hanafi, the Taliban’s acting minister for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Afghanistan International reported that Hanafi referred to Samarkand, Bukhara, and Termez, Uzbek cities associated with prominent Islamic scholars including Imam al-Bukhari and Imam al-Tirmidhi. He was quoted as saying that Islam in the cities remained “only on people’s lips,” and blaming religious scholars for leaving the enforcement of Islamic rules to the government. Some regional media paraphrased the remark as a claim that “only the name of Islam remains” in Uzbekistan. The comments were reportedly made during a speech in Afghanistan’s Paktia Province. Afghanistan International said Hanafi’s ministry published several excerpts from the address. Reports cited by Uzbek media said the passage concerning Uzbekistan also appeared on a ministry spokesman’s account on X before being removed. The reports attracted widespread attention in Uzbekistan, prompting the country’s embassy in Kabul to seek an explanation. On July 16, the embassy said it had received a letter from the Taliban’s Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice rejecting what it described as distorted reporting intended to damage relations between the neighboring countries. The letter praised Uzbekistan as the homeland of major Islamic scholars, including Imam al-Bukhari, and stressed the countries’ shared religious, historical, and cultural ties. It said statements presented as criticism of Uzbekistan “do not correspond to the truth” and described the reports as a distortion of the facts. However, the letter did not explicitly state that Hanafi had never made the remarks or explain why the passage was reportedly removed. Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a stronger denial. Speaking to Portal24.uz, ministry spokesperson Omonulla Fayziyev described the claims as “completely unfounded” and “disinformation.” Fayziyev said no such statement had been officially issued or published by Afghan state media. He added that Uzbekistan’s ambassador had discussed the controversy directly with the Taliban authorities. That explanation leaves the central question unresolved. The Uzbek and Taliban statements reject the reporting, yet neither directly addresses Afghanistan International’s account that the ministry itself released excerpts from Hanafi’s speech. Uzbekistan has emerged as one of the Central Asian countries most actively engaged with the Taliban since its return to power in 2021. The two sides are expanding trade...

Central Asia + Japan

Patient Capital, Fast Deals: Japan and South Korea Take Different Paths into Central Asia

Japan and South Korea have reached the same strategic conclusion: Central Asia matters to their economic security. Yet they are pursuing that goal through markedly different playbooks. In December 2025, Tokyo hosted the first leaders' summit of the "Central Asia plus Japan" Dialogue, 21 years after the format was launched. All five Central Asian presidents attended. Japan set a target of three trillion yen in business projects across the region over five years - roughly $19 billion at the time - while placing critical-mineral supply chains among the summit's priority areas. The bilateral announcements were equally significant. Uzbekistan presented a proposed project portfolio worth more than $12 billion and called for a joint investment platform to advance it. Kazakhstan and Japan announced a package of public- and private-sector agreements worth $3.7 billion. These included a long-term uranium contract and an offtake agreement under which Kazakhstan's Eurasian Resources Group would supply gallium to Mitsubishi Corporation RTM Japan. The timing was no accident. By May 2026, Chinese shipments to Japan of dysprosium and terbium remained close to zero, while exports of finished rare earth magnets to Japan fell 35% from the previous month. These materials are essential to high-performance magnets. For Tokyo, diversifying critical mineral supply is no longer a distant policy objective; it is an immediate industrial requirement. South Korea has been moving toward the same destination by a different route. During then-President Yoon Suk Yeol's state visit to Kazakhstan in 2024, the two countries signed a critical minerals memorandum allowing Korean companies to participate in the exploration and development of lithium, chromium, uranium, and rare earths. Seoul is now preparing to host the first Korea-Central Asia summit on September 16-17, 2026, elevating years of bilateral and multilateral engagement to the leaders' level. [caption id="attachment_52351" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: Japan Cabinet Public Affairs Office[/caption] Why Central Asia Counts Both Japan and South Korea are resource-poor manufacturing powers whose leading industries depend on secure supplies of imported minerals. South Korea imports more than 95% of the critical minerals it consumes. Japan received its own warning in 2010, when Chinese rare earth shipments were disrupted during a territorial dispute, and the pressure has returned in a sharper form in 2026. Central Asia cannot replace China in the short term, but it offers Tokyo and Seoul a credible route toward diversification. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan combine substantial mineral potential with governments eager to attract investment, technology, and new export markets. Kazakhstan is already a major producer of uranium and chromium, and has significant copper, titanium, and rare earth prospects. In April 2025, Kazakhstan announced the possible discovery of a rare earth deposit containing more than 20 million metric tons of resources. If further exploration confirms that estimate, the country could possess one of the world's largest rare earth resource bases. However, the distinction between a resource estimate and a usable supply chain is crucial. A discovery is not a producing mine, and a mine is not a processing industry. Exploration, environmental approvals, infrastructure, separation, refining, and...