Uzbekistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Power Outage

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Dispute Cause After Regional Power Failure Hits Almaty

A major power failure affected parts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan on August 14. In Almaty, electricity went out at 2:38 p.m. local time in four districts, disrupting transport and traffic in Kazakhstan’s largest city. Traffic lights stopped working and some businesses closed. The metro suspended service, and passengers still underground were evacuated. At several busy intersections, motorists and delivery couriers began directing traffic themselves. In Kyrgyzstan, outages affected parts of Bishkek and Issyk-Kul Region. “An accident in the power system of a neighboring country affected the Central Asian power grid. As a result, power supply disruptions were observed in the Surkhandarya region and several other regions,” Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry said. In Tajikistan, electricity went out in Dushanbe at about 3 p.m. and in numerous other cities and districts. Later that day, the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources said it had formed a working group to determine the cause. The ministry also denied reports of an accident at the Nurek Hydropower Plant. The Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC) later issued a preliminary account attributing the blackout to an emergency at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant. “Due to the emergency shutdown of two hydropower units with a combined capacity of 600 megawatts at the Toktogul HPP in the Kyrgyz Republic, there was a power surge on the North-South transit line, causing an overload and its disconnection by emergency protection systems. As a result, Kazakhstan’s southern zone was separated from the country’s unified power system,” KEGOC explained. Kyrgyz energy officials offered a different account. They said an external outage occurred at 3:34 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time on a high-voltage transmission line connecting northern and southern Kazakhstan. The disturbance split the Central Asian grid into isolated sections, leaving Kyrgyzstan temporarily operating autonomously while automatic protection safeguarded equipment. Both accounts illustrate the interdependence of the Central Asian Power System (CAPS). The Soviet-era network connected the region’s electricity systems across borders that were then internal. It was part of a regional water-and-energy arrangement in which hydropower releases from upstream republics supported irrigation downstream. Cross-border power exchanges declined after the Soviet Union collapsed. In 1999, the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed a parallel-operation agreement. Turkmenistan disconnected from CAPS in 2003, while Tajikistan was disconnected from Uzbekistan in December 2009. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an electricity-trade agreement in March 2018. The southwestern section of Tajikistan’s grid reconnected to CAPS in June 2024, but the northern connection was still under development in July 2026. Turkmenistan remains outside the system. In an assessment published on August 16, Zhakyp Khairushev, chairman of the Public Council under Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, called the incident a serious test of the country’s southern power system. He said emergency protection contained the disruption and allowed electricity to be restored in stages. Power restrictions in Kazakhstan were lifted by 5 p.m., but Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continued to disagree over where the failure began.

Power Grid

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Give Conflicting Accounts of Four-Country Blackout

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have given differing accounts of what triggered the August 14 blackout that cut electricity across swathes of Central Asia. Three days later, the initiating event remains unresolved, and the times released by the two sides do not fit neatly into the same sequence. Kazakhstan’s national grid operator KEGOC says two hydrogenerators at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant, with a combined capacity of 600 MW, disconnected at 2:37 p.m. Kazakhstan time. KEGOC said the sudden loss of generation overloaded the North-East-South transit corridor, separating southern Kazakhstan from the rest of the national grid and the interconnected systems of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. A special commission is investigating the causes. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan’s National Electric Grid has given a different chronology. It said that at 3:34 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time, an external disconnection occurred on a high-voltage line linking the northern and southern parts of Kazakhstan’s power system. The Central Asian network then split into an isolated section, and Kyrgyzstan temporarily operated separately while automatic protection systems worked to protect equipment. The one-hour difference between the countries’ clocks makes the discrepancy clearer. Kazakhstan has used UTC+5 nationwide since 2024, while Kyrgyzstan uses UTC+6. That puts Kyrgyzstan’s reported line disconnection at 2:34 p.m. Kazakhstan time, three minutes before KEGOC’s stated 2:37 p.m. Toktogul shutdown. The two times may describe different stages of a fast-moving cascade, but they do not establish the same starting point. A third timestamp complicates the sequence. Alatau Zharyq Company said three 500 kV KEGOC transmission lines shut down at 2:38 p.m., and that those lines triggered automatic load-shedding and frequency protection in Almaty and the surrounding region. Taken together, the public statements leave a sequence of 2:34 p.m., 2:37 p.m., and 2:38 p.m. that investigators will need to reconcile. TCA reporters in Almaty and Bishkek experienced power cuts, while local media reported outages in Dushanbe, Khujand, and southern parts of Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, the disturbance affected consumers in the Zhambyl, Turkistan, Kyzylorda, Zhetysu, and Almaty regions, with further restrictions in Karaganda, Ulytau, and Abai. KEGOC said supplies were restored across the affected regions later that afternoon. The four-country impact reflects how tightly the systems are connected. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan operate in parallel through the Central Asian power system. Cross-border links allow operators to share electricity and reserve capacity, but also mean that a sudden loss of generation or a major transmission line can be felt beyond one national grid before protection systems isolate the disturbance. Central Asia has been here before. In January 2022, a major blackout hit southern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The event also involved a sharp imbalance on the regional network and the separation of Kazakhstan’s northern and southern grids. Its precise starting point was disputed in the immediate aftermath. The regional grid dates to the Soviet period. Uzbekistan later withdrew from the old electricity ring, leaving Tajikistan largely isolated for years. Regional links have since been rebuilt; Tajikistan began reconnecting to the unified system in 2024. An Asian Development Bank project is adding...

Agricultural Export

Kazakhstan Agricultural Exports Face Growing Competition from Uzbekistan

Kazakhstan is rapidly increasing the value of its agricultural exports and trying to sell more processed products abroad rather than simply exporting raw commodities. In 2025, the country’s agricultural exports reached $7 billion, with processed products accounting for $3.6 billion. In the first four months of 2026, exports of agricultural and food products rose another 36% to $3 billion. But Kazakhstan’s relationship with Uzbekistan, one of the main buyers of its agricultural products, shows another side of this process. Uzbekistan is also beginning to challenge the established pattern. It buys Kazakh grain, vegetable oils, and oilseed products, but is expanding its own processing capacity. In some sectors, finished Uzbek products are now entering the same foreign markets where Kazakh producers have traditionally been strong. This is most clearly visible in the flour market. Kazakhstan has long been a dominant regional flour exporter and was until recently Afghanistan’s main supplier. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, imported both Kazakh wheat and flour. As Tashkent expanded its domestic milling capacity, it increasingly bought raw Kazakh wheat and turned it into flour at home. By 2025, the balance had shifted. Kazakhstan supplied Afghanistan with about 1.05 million metric tons of flour, while Uzbekistan shipped nearly 1.59 million tons. Almost all of Uzbekistan’s flour exports in 2025 went to the Afghan market. Kazakhstan has not disappeared from this production chain. Uzbekistan remains one of the largest buyers of Kazakh wheat. Those grain shipments help supply Uzbek flour mills, with the finished flour then exported, including to Afghanistan. Uzbekistan also continues to import Kazakh flour, so the substitution has not been complete. Kazakhstan is also developing its agricultural processing. Exports of processed agricultural products rose 35% to $3.6 billion in 2025. In the flour market, however, the value-adding step of milling grain and exporting the flour has increasingly shifted to its neighbor. There are signs of a similar shift in the vegetable oil and fat industry, although Kazakhstan’s position here remains considerably stronger. Between September 2025 and May 2026, Kazakhstan supplied Uzbekistan with 553,000 metric tons of vegetable oils and meal and oilcake, 31% more than during the same period of the previous season. Kazakhstan accounted for more than 90% of Uzbekistan’s vegetable oil imports in 2025. For Kazakhstan, this is an example of moving beyond the simple export of agricultural raw materials. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, is expanding its own oils and fats industry. Large enterprises produced 31,200 metric tons of margarine and spreads in 2025, up 21.4% from a year earlier. Sunflower oil production is also growing. In January-August 2025, large Uzbek enterprises produced 83,500 metric tons, compared with 28,000 metric tons during the same period in 2023. Domestic production is therefore rising rapidly even as Uzbekistan continues to import large volumes of sunflower oil. Uzbekistan is also beginning to export more sunflower oil. In the first half of 2025, Uzbekistan supplied Afghanistan with more than 17,700 metric tons of sunflower oil, becoming its largest supplier during that period, according to data from agricultural market analyst Marina Sidak and as reported by APK-Inform....

Central Asia’s C6 Takes Shape in Washington as Ambassadors Push for Practical Integration

Less than two weeks after regional leaders gathered in Cholpon Ata, diplomats from the emerging C6 grouping used a discussion in Washington to shift the focus from declarations of unity to the mechanics of integration: customs, railways, digitalized trade, access to European markets, and stronger links across the Caspian. The sharpest political message came from Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to the United States, Edil Baisalov, who said that Central Asian states were increasingly recognizing that they were “enough for each other,” and that resolving differences within the region had become a pragmatic national interest. His comments gave unusually direct language to a trend that has accelerated since the region’s consultative meetings began in 2018. The August 12 event at the Caspian Policy Center brought together the U.S.-based ambassadors of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan, the sixth country in the emerging C6 framework, was not listed among the participants. The event followed a late-July meeting in Cholpon Ata, where leaders concentrated on transport, energy security, investment, and foreign-policy coordination. The C6 label remains shorthand rather than the name of a formal organization. Its political basis, however, has become more concrete since Azerbaijan was admitted as a full participant in the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in November 2025. The shift extended a format once focused on relations among the five Central Asian republics across the Caspian Sea. From Regional Dialogue to Regional Agency Azerbaijan’s ambassador, Khazar Ibrahim, presented Cholpon Ata as evidence that the six states increasingly see themselves as part of one political and economic space. “We are finally holistic. We are all together,” he said. He argued that Azerbaijan’s presence changes the geography of the grouping by turning the Caspian from a dividing line into a connecting space between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. That idea has been developing for some time. TCA has previously examined how Azerbaijan’s entry could turn the C6 framework into a platform for common rules on transport, tariffs, customs systems, and digital data, rather than another layer of summit diplomacy. Kazakhstan’s ambassador, Magzhan Ilyassov, put the emphasis on building an “economically active neighborhood.” He pointed to the frequency of regional meetings and said the value of the current process lies partly in maintaining an inclusive conversation among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has also pushed for stronger coordination on transport planning as the consultative format develops. For Uzbekistan, the discussion was more explicitly about market access. Ambassador Furqat Sidiqov said cooperation with Azerbaijan could give Uzbekistan wider access to European and other export markets. He also called for further digitalization of the Middle Corridor. Sidiqov said Uzbekistan had close to 300 joint ventures with Central Asian countries in 2017, and now has about 1,500 with neighboring states. Corridors Become the Practical Core Digitalizing the Trans-Caspian route is not a new proposal. The countries of the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia, which already brings together the five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, endorsed a digitalization...

Central Asia-EU Relations

EU Deepens Central Asia Ties as Rights Record Varies Across Region

The European Union is rapidly deepening its trade, investment, and political ties with Central Asia, even as its latest assessment points to worsening human rights conditions across much of the region. The latest assessments are contained in the EU’s annual Human Rights and Democracy in the World country reports, which separately examine all five Central Asian states. In Kazakhstan, the EU notes judicial and political reforms, as well as continued implementation of measures aimed at strengthening protection against gender-based violence. Brussels also points to a shrinking space for civil society, growing pressure on journalists and independent media, increased oversight of NGOs, and continued restrictions on peaceful assembly. As part of the UN Universal Periodic Review, Kazakhstan accepted 259 of the 294 recommendations it received. The assessment of Kyrgyzstan is notably harsher. The EU says the human rights situation continued to deteriorate and highlights the new media law, mandatory registration for all media outlets, a 35% cap on foreign ownership, and prosecutions of media workers that it describes as seemingly politically motivated. Another source of concern was the closure of the National Center for the Prevention of Torture, whose functions were transferred to the Ombudsperson’s Office. In Tajikistan, the main concerns include pressure on independent media and human rights defenders, restrictions on freedom of expression and association, reports of torture and ill-treatment in detention, and the situation of Pamiri activists and journalists. Citing Human Rights Watch, the EU report says at least seven journalists were imprisoned on charges related to their reporting or coverage of protests. Turkmenistan remains subject to some of the region’s most extensive restrictions. Brussels points to continuing restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, the media, association, assembly, and religion, as well as reports of torture and ill-treatment in prisons. The EU also notes some improvements in detention conditions, gender equality and gender-based violence, and cooperation with the International Labour Organization on eliminating forced labor. The EU’s assessment of Uzbekistan is quite severe. According to the EU, the human rights and democracy situation continued to steadily deteriorate in 2025, with backsliding in nearly every area. Brussels points to legal action and imprisonment targeting journalists, bloggers, and human rights defenders, restrictions affecting NGOs, and worsening media freedom. The full report on the July 2022 protests in Karakalpakstan had still not been made public by the end of 2025. The EU nevertheless notes some positive developments, including new measures to protect children, changes to divorce law, and improved representation of women in parliament. The severity of these assessments contrasts with the pace at which Europe is expanding its relationship with the region. The first EU-Central Asia summit, held in Samarkand in April 2025, elevated relations to a strategic partnership. Brussels also announced a €12 billion Global Gateway investment package covering transport links, critical raw materials, digital connectivity, water, and energy. The Times of Central Asia has reported on efforts to move from political agreements toward specific projects. Human rights, however, remain part of the relationship with Brussels. This has been...

G20 Summit

Kazakhstan Confirms Tokayev Will Attend Miami G20 Summit

Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on August 12 that President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will attend the G20 Leaders’ Summit on December 14–15 at Trump National Doral Miami, President Donald Trump’s golf resort near Miami. Kazakhstan is not a member of the G20 and will attend as a guest of the United States, which holds the group’s presidency this year. Trump first said on December 23, 2025, that he would invite Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev following separate telephone calls with the two Central Asian leaders. In a Truth Social post, Trump said the relationship with both countries was “spectacular.” G20 hosts regularly invite countries outside the group to attend leaders’ summits. Two of Washington’s stated priorities for its G20 presidency are reducing regulatory burdens and expanding access to reliable, affordable energy. A third is developing new technologies, another area of recent U.S.-Kazakhstan cooperation. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer, while American companies have pursued mineral and technology investments in the country. Relations between Astana and the Trump administration have grown closer. At the C5+1 summit in Washington in November 2025, Tokayev said Trump’s “wise and bold policy” deserved strong support worldwide and praised his “Make America Great Again” agenda. During the same visit, Kazakhstan announced that it would join the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords, although it had maintained diplomatic relations with Israel since 1992. On January 22, Tokayev signed the charter establishing Trump’s Board of Peace. Uzbekistan has also been invited to the Miami summit, although as of August 13, Tashkent had not publicly confirmed that Mirziyoyev would attend. On June 25, Mirziyoyev met U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer to discuss trade and investment, including continued U.S. support for Uzbekistan’s accession to the World Trade Organization.