As China invests billions in Central Asian oilfields, railways, and cities, the region’s response is anything but passive. In Backlash: China’s Struggle for Influence in Central Asia, Bradley Jardine and Edward Lemon document how Central Asians – from government halls to village streets – are responding to Beijing’s expanding footprint. The book provides a nuanced look at China’s engagement in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan over the three decades since these nations gained independence. Drawing on more than a decade of fieldwork, Jardine and Lemon ask a timely question: can Beijing maintain its growing influence in an environment where local voices and interests are increasingly assertive? The Times of Central Asia spoke with the authors. TCA: Central Asia has become an increasingly strategic crossroads, rich in resources, young in demographics, and positioned between major powers. Yet China’s engagement appears far more ambitious than that of Western or regional players. In your view, what accounts for this asymmetry? Is it primarily a matter of geography and financial capacity, or has China been more politically and diplomatically attuned to Central Asia’s priorities than others? J/L: China’s dominance in Central Asia stems from both geography and political attunement. As we note in Backlash, Beijing views the region as an extension of its own security frontier, as both a buffer protecting Xinjiang and a potential source of terrorism. It has built deep ties through consistent, elite-level engagement since the 1990s. Its approach blends vast financial capacity with political instincts that resonate with local elites: prioritizing sovereignty, stability, and non-interference rather than the governance conditionalities that often accompany Western aid and investment. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, which was launched in the region in 2013, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was established in 2001 with four Central Asian republics as founding members, and newer platforms like the China-Central Asia (C+C5) summit, China offers infrastructure, energy investment, and regime security in ways tailored to the needs of authoritarian partners. Unlike the episodic or values-driven engagement of Western actors, and with Russia’s attention increasingly divided, China’s steady, pragmatic diplomacy, backed by proximity and resources, has allowed it to entrench itself as the region’s indispensable power. TCA: China’s expanding presence across trade, infrastructure, and finance has reshaped Central Asia’s economic landscape. To what extent do these investments remain primarily commercial, and when do they start to carry political or strategic implications? How do local governments manage the risks of dependency or debt while pursuing development gains? J/L: China’s expanding economic footprint in Central Asia may be driven by trade and infrastructure, but the lines between commerce and strategy have become increasingly blurred. As we note in Backlash, Beijing’s investments, roads, pipelines, railways, and energy grids are rarely purely commercial. They create structural dependencies that bind Central Asian economies to China’s markets, finance, and technology. By 2020, roughly 45% of Kyrgyzstan’s external debt and more than half of Tajikistan’s were owed to China, while around 75% of Turkmenistan’s exports flowed to Chinese buyers. These imbalances give Beijing...
