Uzbekistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Cultural Heritage

UNESCO Conference in Samarkand Highlights Uzbekistan’s Heritage

At the opening ceremony of the 43rd session of the UNESCO General Conference in Samarkand, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev highlighted Uzbekistan’s growing role in global cultural dialogue and its expanding cooperation with UNESCO. Held on October 30, the event marked the first time in four decades that the conference had convened outside UNESCO’s headquarters in Paris. The ceremony welcomed high-level participants, including UNESCO Director-General Audrey Azoulay, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Slovak President Peter Pellegrini, and representatives from UNESCO member states. In his address, Mirziyoyev said that hosting such a prominent international forum reflects global recognition of Uzbekistan’s reform efforts and its active role in cultural and educational cooperation. He commended UNESCO’s decades-long contributions to education, science, culture, and media, noting Samarkand’s symbolic importance as one of the world’s oldest cities. “Samarkand has always been a crossroads of civilizations, science, and tolerance,” Mirziyoyev said. The president highlighted the 2023–2027 cooperation program between Uzbekistan and UNESCO, which focuses on cultural heritage preservation, educational reform, and digital innovation. He also noted that Khiva, Bukhara, Shahrisabz, and Samarkand are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List, and that the Zarafshan-Karakum Corridor was recently added as part of the Silk Roads network. Uzbekistan’s rich intangible heritage, including Shashmaqom music, the Lazgi dance, Navruz celebrations, and traditional crafts such as embroidery and ceramics, has also earned UNESCO recognition, strengthening the country’s identity as a cultural hub in Central Asia. During the session, Mirziyoyev proposed several initiatives for UNESCO’s consideration: Establishing a UNESCO Platform for Inclusive Education with AI-integrated learning tools; Organizing a Global Summit on Vocational Education to prepare youth for future professions; Declaring November 19 as the International Day of Documentary Heritage; Creating an International Digital Heritage Institute under UNESCO auspices; Launching a UNESCO Academy for Women Leaders to advance women’s participation in science, culture, and education; and Hosting a World Forum of Women Researchers and Artists in Samarkand. Addressing global challenges, the president called for stronger international cooperation on climate issues and proposed designating a “UNESCO Ecological Capital” each year to recognize cities promoting sustainable environmental practices. Mirziyoyev also spoke about the dangers of misinformation, calling for improved media literacy among young people and greater support for responsible journalism and intercultural dialogue. Concluding his speech, the president reaffirmed Uzbekistan’s readiness to serve as a bridge between East and West and to actively support UNESCO’s mission to promote peace, sustainable development, and mutual understanding around the world.

U.S.-Central Asia Summit

Trump–Xi Meeting Reshapes Stakes Ahead of C5+1 Summit

The October 30, 2025, meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, marked their first in-person contact since 2019. While framed as a limited reset or tactical pause, the talks carry deeper strategic implications. They occurred just days before the forthcoming C5+1 Leaders’ Summit in Washington on November 6, a gathering with direct consequences for Central Asia’s role in the future of critical mineral supply chains. South Korea Talks: Reset or Recalibration? At the meeting in Busan, Trump and Xi discussed supply chains, tariffs, rare earth trade, and broader trade issues. The U.S. announced that China had agreed to pause certain rare-earth export curbs for a year, with Trump describing the talks as “amazing.” China currently processes roughly 90% of the world’s rare-earth elements and mines around 70%, which are indispensable in the production of electric vehicles, wind turbines, defense technologies, and high-tech manufacturing. Analysts characterized the Busan accord not as a strategic realignment but as a “tactical pause” or a “temporary lull to escalation” between the U.S. and China. For emerging potential U.S. partners in Central Asia, however, the optics matter, as any perceived U.S.–China trade thaw could diminish the urgency behind diversifying rare earth supply chains. Central Asia’s Rare Earth Opportunity As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the upcoming C5+1 summit is likely to focus on critical minerals, energy logistics, and investment infrastructure as the U.S. seeks to reduce its reliance on China. Kazakhstan has emerged as a major player in rare earths, with geological surveys in 2024 and 2025 identifying 38 promising solid mineral deposits, including the Kuyrektykol site in the Karaganda region, which contains substantial reserves. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, signed a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. on critical minerals cooperation in September 2024, which represented a major step toward deepening bilateral cooperation on this front. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has signaled its interest in co-financing midstream mining and processing infrastructure in Central Asia, though projects remain at formative stages. Logistics routes such as the Middle Corridor via Central Asia and the Caspian remain strategically attractive to Western-aligned supply chains seeking to bypass Russia. Trump–Xi Reset Could Blur U.S. Commitments, But the Case for Diversification Remains Strong Should the Trump-Xi meeting diminish the immediate urgency of supply chain diversification, this will be of concern to countries looking to balance their economies with geopolitical neutrality. Kazakhstan has long positioned itself as a multi-vector neutral broker between major powers, meaning fluctuating U.S. policy signals could cause complications. Despite the reset, however, most analysts contend that little has fundamentally changed, with the Busan meeting seen as a temporary rather than a genuine strategic pivot. While structural competition between Washington and Beijing endures, diversification of critical mineral supply chains remains as essential as ever. For Central Asia, this dynamic reinforces the need to continue developing regional value chains and its mid-stream processing capacity. What to Expect in Washington The November 6 C5+1 Leaders’ Summit in Washington will test whether the...

U.S.-Central Asia Summit

C5+1 at 10: Washington Seeks Concrete Outcomes With Central Asia

A leaders’ summit between Central Asia and the United States is scheduled for 6 November in Washington, D.C. Kazakhstan’s presidency has said the meeting will take place on that date, and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has confirmed his attendance. Others have confirmed as well. The meeting would bring the heads of state of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to Washington for only the second leaders’ level C5+1 meeting, after the first took place on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September 2023. The timing is notable as 2025 marks the C5+1’s tenth year. Since 2015, the C5+1 format, linking the five Central Asian states with the United States, has steadily become Washington’s primary channel for strategic diplomacy in the region. With Russia constrained by the war in Ukraine and China expanding Belt and Road finance and logistics, the U.S. is building a durable presence through programmatic work, published procedures, and predictable commitments. Public calls in the United States to mark the tenth year with a Washington meeting have focused on concrete results. Stakeholders such as U.S. and Central Asian ministries, regulators, banks, carriers, and investors now expect clear schedules for practical work on corridor performance, compliance guidance under evolving sanctions, critical minerals cooperation, grid reliability, aviation access, and investment risk-sharing. The success of the summit depends on more than words that have characterized prior summits. One metric of success could be the consummation of a final joint communiqué including 90-day and 180-day check-backs with a designated lead and co-lead for each item - identified by name, title, and agency - and a requirement to publish brief progress notes. The summit was preceded by a visit of U.S. officials to the region: on October 25, U.S. Special Representative for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau arrived in Tashkent, met senior officials and U.S. companies, continued to Samarkand, and then to Almaty. The trip was not publicly scheduled; initial confirmation came via embassy Telegram posts. Discussions reportedly covered rare-earth processing and other sensitive cooperation areas, signaling agenda-setting ahead of November 6. How Washington Can Regularize Intensified C5+1 Coordination This meeting would normalize leaders’ level C5+1 engagement after the first such gathering in September 2023. That shift matters. Since 2015, the format has moved from occasional ministerials to a steadier dialogue built around defined themes, even when leaders have met on the sidelines of larger events. With Washington now hosting, observers will compare outcomes to the 2023 joint-statement themes - security, economic resilience, sustainable development, climate, and sovereignty - and to readouts that set a precedent for presidential-level participation. In this sense, the Washington summit represents not only a procedural step but a test of whether the United States can institutionalize its Eurasia policy with a more proactive diplomacy. An annual leaders’ cycle, spring ministerials, and quarterly sherpa meetings pre-scheduled through Q4 2026 would signal a commitment to deepen the process. In Washington, there is bipartisan pressure to show continuity and delivery...

Geopolitics

Cyprus as a Mirror of Turkish Geopolitics: How Ankara Uses Northern Cyprus to Project Influence in Central Asia

Northern Cyprus has become a microcosm of Turkish foreign policy, a space where Ankara combines military presence, the ideology of “Turkic brotherhood,” and economic leverage. For Turkey, this territory is not merely a long-standing geopolitical dispute but a laboratory for a new diplomatic model centered on the vision of a “great Turkic world.” As noted by Stratfor, despite the decisive victory of Republican Turkish Party leader Tufan Erhürman in the October 19, 2025, presidential elections in the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), a candidate who supports renewed negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus and advocates for a federal model, Ankara has shown no intention of revising its entrenched two-state doctrine. Analysts suggest Turkey may apply economic pressure and diplomatic isolation, including suspension of subsidies and credit lines, should Erhürman attempt to implement a federal solution. Concurrently, Turkey is lobbying for the TRNC’s recognition within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), aiming to set a symbolic precedent: if Turkic-speaking nations will not support each other, who will? For Central Asia, this initiative reflects Ankara’s commitment to unifying the Turkic world under its political leadership, extending far beyond cultural solidarity. Political Implications for Central Asia Turkey’s push to incorporate the TRNC into the OTS shifts the organization from a cultural bloc to a geopolitical instrument. Should Northern Cyprus gain observer status, Ankara will likely expect symbolic support from its Turkic partners. This poses a significant dilemma for Central Asian states. Aligning with Turkey could be perceived by Western actors as a breach of international law, while maintaining neutrality might be viewed as a rejection of Turkic unity. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have so far emphasized adherence to international law and sovereignty. At the April 2025 EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, these states jointly reaffirmed UN Security Council resolutions from the early 1980s, which declared the TRNC’s independence and all related separatist actions legally invalid. Kyrgyzstan may face a more delicate challenge due to its deep humanitarian and educational ties with Turkey. Northern Cyprus thus serves as a litmus test for Turkic integration: how closely can nations align without compromising their political autonomy? Economic and Energy Dimensions Cyprus plays a strategic role in Turkey’s energy policy, linking the Caspian region, the Caucasus, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkish control over Northern Cyprus bolsters its influence over maritime logistics, offshore gas development, and export corridors. This holds direct relevance for Central Asia. A stronger Turkish position in the Mediterranean enhances its leverage over energy transit routes from the Caspian to Europe, particularly in relation to the Trans-Caspian pipeline and the Middle Corridor. Over time, Ankara is expected to use energy infrastructure as a tool for political engagement, promoting an “economy of Turkic solidarity”, offering mutual benefits, but often tied to strategic conditions. Security and Military Presence The TRNC functions as a prototype for Turkey’s military protectorate model, a way to retain control while presenting itself as a guarantor of stability. This model is echoed across the Turkic region through Turkey’s expanding military partnerships...

U.S.-Central Asia Summit

Rare Earth Diplomacy: Critical Minerals Set to Top Agenda at C5+1 Summit

The announcement of an upcoming C5+1 summit in Washington between the United States and the Central Asian republics has taken much of the regional and U.S. political establishment by surprise. A swift visit by U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan was seemingly necessary to coordinate the summit’s agenda. Notably, Kazakhstan appears prepared to play a leading role on one of the summit’s most pressing issues. The summit, scheduled for November 6 in Washington, was first revealed through media channels before being confirmed through official correspondence between Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and U.S. President Donald Trump. Uzbek media later confirmed the meeting, citing sources within the administration of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and this was followed by Kyrgyzstan's President Sadyr Japarov. It is notable that shortly after Tokayev’s correspondence with Trump became public, the Kazakh president held a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Officially, the two discussed Tokayev’s upcoming visit to Moscow. This was their second such call in less than two weeks, the previous taking place on October 14. There is speculation that the Washington summit may have been a key topic of discussion. During meetings in Tashkent with Gor and Landau - Uzbekistan being the first stop on their tour - Mirziyoyev reportedly discussed a broad set of topics. However, the issue of “critical materials,” particularly rare earth metals, stood out. It is increasingly clear that rare earths will be a central focus of Trump’s engagement with Central Asian leaders. [caption id="attachment_38242" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Sergio Gor and Christopher Landau at the Shymbulak ski resort in Almaty; image: Akorda[/caption] Trump has previously drawn attention for high-stakes diplomacy involving rare earth metals, including a controversial deal with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and later discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Anchorage. Most recently, during the first leg of his Asia tour, Trump met with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and concluded a rare earth metals agreement, despite the challenges associated with extracting these materials, which are often found underwater. Against this backdrop, Kazakhstan appears well-positioned to take the lead in terms of rare earth elements. President Tokayev first proposed developing rare earth metal deposits in his September 2023 address, “The Economic Course of Fair Kazakhstan.” In 2024, Kazakh geologists identified 38 promising solid mineral deposits, including the Kuyrektykol site in the Karaganda region, which contains substantial reserves. Tokayev returned to the issue in January 2025, during an extended government meeting, criticizing the cabinet for delays and emphasizing Kazakhstan’s untapped potential in rare earth extraction and processing. In April, during the Central Asia-European Union summit, Tokayev met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who congratulated him on the discovery of a major deposit in Kazakhstan. The topic also featured at the Central Asia-Italy summit in May, where Tokayev proposed creating a regional research center to consolidate data on rare earth deposits across Central Asia. “The creation of joint ventures, technology transfer, and the localization...

China

China’s Visa Diplomacy: A Strategic Tool for Influence in Central Asia

As China’s international influence expands, it is refining its approach to global engagement by combining economic strength with crafted instruments of soft power. While in the past China primarily relied on Confucius Institutes and educational exchange programs to promote cultural understanding and strengthen people-to-people connections, its strategy has evolved into a more diverse and multidimensional framework. In recent years, Beijing has expanded its soft power tools to include Luban Workshops, which transfer technical skills and vocational expertise, and medical cooperation initiatives that enhance China’s reputation as a reliable development partner. These efforts have allowed China to project an image of a country that not only builds infrastructure and invests in markets, but also contributes to human capital and social welfare across the developing world. A newer element in this evolving strategy is visa diplomacy. In a global environment where mobility and connectivity shape international relationships, easing travel restrictions has become a subtle yet effective way to deepen engagement. As of mid-2025, China has signed or implemented visa-free or unilateral visa exemption agreements with 75 countries, covering tourism, business, family visits, and transit travel. This list includes key Central Asian partners such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, both of which maintain mutual visa exemption agreements with Beijing. The expansion of China’s visa diplomacy brings significant benefits for both China and its Central Asian partners, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. For Beijing, this initiative advances two major objectives, strengthening its economy and enhancing its soft power. On the economic side, visa-free agreements allow China to attract a larger and more diverse group of international visitors, expanding its tourism market beyond traditional regions. While travelers from Europe, Asia, and North America remain the most frequent visitors, there has been a noticeable increase in arrivals from Central Asia. This trend is already visible in official figures, as in 2024 China recorded 20.1 million foreign entries under visa-free arrangements, representing 74.6 percent of total arrivals and marking a growth of more than 112 percent compared with 2023. Visa-free diplomacy also supports China’s broader development goals by making tourism one of the essential drivers of economic growth and a reliable source of revenue. In 2025, China’s tourism sector, including both domestic and international travel, is expected to contribute a record 13.7 trillion yuan to the national economy. This figure exceeds pre-pandemic levels by more than ten percent and sustains approximately 83 million jobs. As China expands its visa agreements with Central Asian countries, it aims to attract more visitors from the region, increase tourism income, and deepen regional economic ties. Beyond its economic value, visa-free diplomacy enhances China’s soft power across Central Asia. By facilitating more frequent travel and cultural interaction, China has the opportunity to build a more positive image among Central Asian societies and to strengthen long-term people-to-people relations. These exchanges can create familiarity and trust, which are essential elements of sustainable diplomacy. When combined with other soft power tools such as educational programs, technical cooperation, and media outreach, visa diplomacy helps China build a balanced...