Uzbekistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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South Caucasus

As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches

The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the...

Bilateral Relations

Uzbekistan and Georgia Deepen Ties as Tashkent Eyes Black Sea Routes

Uzbekistan and Georgia have elevated their relations to a strategic partnership as Tashkent seeks wider access to Black Sea ports and new routes linking Central Asia with European markets. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, Mirziyoyev traveled to Georgia on a July 2-3 state visit aimed at expanding cooperation in trade, transport, investment, and regional connectivity. The visit concluded with the signing of a Strategic Partnership Declaration and a series of agreements designed to deepen political and economic ties. Uzbekistan and Georgia established diplomatic relations on August 19, 1994. Their cooperation was formalized a year later with the signing of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation. While political dialogue has continued over the years, bilateral engagement has accelerated since 2022 through regular presidential meetings, visits by prime ministers, sessions of the intergovernmental commission, and consultations between the two countries’ foreign ministries. Last year, on March 5, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze visited Tashkent, where the two sides discussed expanding cooperation. The latest visit built on those discussions. According to the Uzbek presidential press service, the two leaders agreed to strengthen cooperation in politics, trade, investment, transport, tourism, and humanitarian exchanges. Bilateral trade reached $270 million in 2025, and has already exceeded $100 million since the beginning of this year. Both governments adopted the goal of increasing annual trade to $1 billion through a dedicated roadmap, reducing trade imbalances, and expanding exports through reciprocal industrial exhibitions. Transport and logistics featured prominently in the talks. The leaders agreed to expand the use of Georgia’s Poti and Batumi ports for Uzbek cargo and supported plans to establish a logistics hub that would include an industrial zone and a permanent showroom for Uzbek products. Mirziyoyev also proposed linking the future China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway with the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, a move that could create a new transport corridor connecting Central Asia with European markets. The two countries also agreed to establish a joint investment fund and launch new industrial projects in agriculture, electrical engineering, pharmaceuticals, renewable energy, food processing, construction materials, digital technologies, digital banking, and tourism. Uzbekistan will also open an embassy in Georgia, while educational and tourism forums are scheduled to take place later this year. Political analyst Mukhtor Nazirov believes the visit represents more than a routine diplomatic exchange. Speaking to local media, he argued that Georgia is increasingly becoming Uzbekistan’s gateway to Europe as Tashkent seeks to diversify its foreign trade routes. “Today, a country’s economic opportunities are largely determined by its transport corridors and access to foreign markets,” Nazirov said. “The signing of the Strategic Partnership Declaration is therefore an important event in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy.” Nazirov noted that the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor, has become increasingly important for Uzbekistan. According to him, the route carried 12% of Uzbekistan’s foreign trade cargo in 2021, but that share has now risen to 28%. Official figures show that 1.2 million tons of cargo were transported along the corridor in 2025, while container train transit times to...

Iran

Central Asian Governments Join Mourning for Iran’s Late Supreme Leader

Central Asian delegations have traveled to Iran for the funeral of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed in an airstrike on Feb. 28, the first day of U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iran. The gesture reflects how Central Asia countries want to preserve and expand longstanding ties with Iran, even as they build trade and diplomatic relationships with the United States. President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan expressed condolences and hopes for peace during a meeting with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian inTehran on Friday, Tajikistan’s presidential office said. “It was noted that the volume of trade between the two countries has increased eightfold in the past five years, approaching almost five hundred million dollars in 2025,” the Tajik statement said. “At the same time, it was stated that there are all the necessary opportunities to bring this figure to one billion dollars in the near future.” Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, the former president of Turkmenistan who shares power with his son and successor, Serdar, was also in Tehran on Friday. In a meeting, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of Iran’s parliament, told him that Iran wanted to expand links with Turkmenistan, according to Iranian state news agency IRNA. Berdymukhamedov said trade between the two countries should increase and “expressed confidence that Iran would achieve favorable results in future negotiations with the United States,” IRNA said. Other Central Asian delegations attending funeral ceremonies in Tehran were led by Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev of Kazakhstan; Nuriddin Ismailov, speaker of Uzbekistan’s parliament; and Marlen Mamataliev, head of Kyrgyzstan's legislative assembly. A fragile ceasefire between Iran and the United States is in place and negotiations aimed at reaching a lasting settlement to a conflict that impacted the global economy are underway. Delegations from dozens of countries are in Iran for the funeral, which includes events over several days. The mourning is an opportunity for the Iranian leadership to demonstrate international stature after many of its key figures were killed in the U.S.-Israeli attacks. Khamenei was replaced by his son, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei. Some reports say the younger Khamenei was injured in the attack that killed his father and he has not been seen in public since the beginning of the conflict. The extent of his injuries has not been confirmed, though Iran has acknowledged that he was hurt. - For a complete chronology of the crisis and its implications for Central Asia, explore our continuously updated timeline and special coverage.

Central Asian Migrants

Russia Still Dominates Uzbek Remittances Despite Falling Share

Remittances to Uzbekistan continued to rise in the first quarter of 2026, even as Russia’s share of migrant transfers declined, according to a new labor market review by the Central Bank of Uzbekistan. Uzbek migrant workers sent home $3.8 billion in the first three months of the year, up 13% from the same period in 2025. Russia remained by far the largest source of those transfers, accounting for 72.4% of the total, but its share fell from 77.6% a year earlier. More than 1.63 million Uzbek citizens traveled abroad in the first quarter of 2026, an increase of 11.6% compared with the same period last year, according to the Central Bank. The figure covers outbound travel by Uzbek citizens, rather than labor migration alone, but it points to continued growth in population mobility. Air travel also expanded sharply during the first three months of the year, with 2.25 million passengers transported by air, up 32% year-on-year. Russia remained the main destination for Uzbek labor migrants, although the number of citizens working there under the country’s patent system declined. A work patent is the permit used by many visa-free foreign nationals, including Uzbeks, to work legally in Russia, with workers making regular tax-style payments to maintain the document. According to the Central Bank, 1.34 million Uzbek citizens were working in Russia under work patents in the first quarter, down 8.8% from the previous quarter and 1.8% compared with the same period in 2025. The bank said the decline reflected seasonal factors as well as changing conditions in external labor markets. Those "changing conditions" include a weaker ruble and tighter migration enforcement in Russia, where the price of a work patent has also risen. In Moscow, for example, the monthly payment required to maintain a migrant work patent increased from 8,900 rubles (about $120) to 10,000 rubles (about $135) from January 2026. There has also been a gradual opening of alternative destinations for Uzbek workers. Citing Turkey’s migration authority, the Central Bank said the number of Uzbek citizens in Turkey holding official residence or migration permits reached nearly 70,000 in the first quarter, up 14% year-on-year. The number of Uzbek nationals residing in South Korea also continued to grow, reaching 99,600. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s share of remittances rose from 3.1% to 4.1%, Europe’s increased from 2.3% to 3.3%, and South Korea’s rose from 3.5% to 4.1%. The combined share of other countries climbed from 13.6% to 16.2%. The figures suggest that Uzbek labor migration is becoming more geographically varied, but Russia remains dominant. Its 72.4% share of remittances is still more than 17 times the share of Kazakhstan or South Korea, and almost 22 times Europe’s share. The latest figures build on a broader trend identified by the Central Bank last year. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, Uzbek migrant workers sent home $4.8 billion in the second quarter of 2025, up 21.4% year-on-year. At the time, the Central Bank linked the increase to stable exchange rates in host countries, rising wages, and continued economic activity, while noting particularly strong growth...

Strategic Partnership

Uzbekistan and Georgia Sign Strategic Partnership Declaration

Uzbekistan and Georgia have signed a declaration establishing strategic partnership relations, adding a new dimension to a relationship led by trade and Eurasian transit routes. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze held talks on July 3 in Tbilisi during Mirziyoyev's state visit. The sides also exchanged agreements and memorandums on customs, digitalization, education, agriculture, tourism, environmental protection, labor migration, healthcare, and nuclear and radiation safety. The visit was the first by an Uzbek president to Georgia in 23 years. Mirziyoyev held talks with Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili on July 2 and with Kobakhidze the following day. Before the signing, Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili told 1TV that the visit was a "historic opportunity to elevate relations" and tied the agenda to the Middle Corridor. One concrete diplomatic step is Tashkent's decision to open an embassy in Georgia. Uzbekistan currently has no embassy in Georgia and covers the country through its diplomatic mission in Baku, despite diplomatic relations having been established in August 1994. The Uzbek president's office said bilateral trade reached $270 million in 2025 and has passed $100 million since the start of 2026. The governments plan a dedicated roadmap to raise trade to $1 billion in the coming years and reduce the trade imbalance. Following the talks, the Uzbek side said both governments had agreed on "concrete steps to significantly increase trade and deepen industrial cooperation in key sectors." The focus on Georgian ports gives the deal a clear regional dimension. Mirziyoyev and Kobakhidze discussed wider use of Poti and Batumi for Uzbek cargo and backed a logistics hub in Georgia, with an industrial zone and a showroom for Uzbek products. A business forum held before the signing drew about 300 participants, including Georgian businesses from logistics, pharmaceuticals, finance, IT, tourism, and agribusiness. Georgia already serves as a South Caucasus outlet for Central Asian freight moving toward the Black Sea and Turkey. Uzbekistan is seeking more western routes as it develops rail links toward China, Afghanistan, and the Caspian Sea. The Times of Central Asia recently reported that Kyrgyzstan and Georgia discussed linking the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway to Georgian port infrastructure. Mirziyoyev made the same connection in Tbilisi, proposing that the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway corridor be integrated with the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway now under development. That proposal would put Georgia firmly inside Uzbekistan's export planning. Uzbek foreign trade cargo moving along the Middle Corridor has doubled over the past five years to reach 1.2 million tons by the end of 2025. Industrial cooperation is also moving beyond general pledges. The sides signed a cooperation program through 2027 and discussed projects in agriculture, electrical engineering, energy, pharmaceuticals, food processing, construction materials, digital services, and tourism. The leaders also proposed a joint investment fund to support new projects. People-to-people links have grown with direct flights. Tashkent now has air links with both Tbilisi and Batumi, with direct flights operating 13 times per week. More than 21,500 Uzbek tourists visited Georgia in 2025, while Georgian tourist arrivals in Uzbekistan reached 6,800...

Humanitarian Aid

Twenty-Five Years Ago, Karimov and Powell Opened a Humanitarian Lifeline. Today, Global Support Wanes

During the first week of June 2026, World Food Programme Afghanistan Country Director John Aylieff, Supply Chain Officer Shukhratmirzo Khodzhaev, and TCA’s Javier M Piedra visited the Termez–Hairatan border crossing and the Termez Free Economic Zone (TFEZ), a logistics hub between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan on the Amu Darya River. The trip was organized by the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies (ISRS) in connection with Termez Dialogue 2026, a flagship Uzbekistan initiative designed to advance economic integration, trade, and cultural exchange across Central and South Asia. For 25 years, Uzbekistan has maintained the Termez crossing as a key humanitarian gateway, ensuring Afghanistan’s continued access to regional and global supply chains. [caption id="attachment_51321" align="aligncenter" width="850"] Geographical position of the Amu Darya; source: snipview.com/amudarya[/caption] A quarter-century on, the gateway that has saved millions of Afghans from famine remains open, but the funding that makes it so meaningful is on life support. While Central Asia has stepped up, its increased contributions only partially offset the huge shortfall left by wealthier countries. Termez, Uzbekistan Twenty-five years ago, with winter approaching, borders closed, logistics shattered, and five million Afghans in urgent need of food, WFP's Petar Bojilov and Tim Lavelle—on loan to USAID OFDA's DART from USUN Rome—took on an impossible mission: to open a lifeline and get emergency food aid across the Amu Darya River from Uzbekistan into Afghanistan. What began with one barge and a handful of hopelessly underequipped and understaffed personnel in 2001 has become one of the world's most consequential logistics hubs, through which WFP has delivered over 220,000 metric tons of food into Afghanistan in recent years. In 2026, the Bridge of Friendship Marks its 25th Anniversary Once a barely functional border crossing, Termez is now a Free Economic Zone (AIRITOM) with multimodal connectivity and extensive storage, providing WFP with what John Aylieff calls unmatched operational flexibility. “What makes the Termez hub today so strategically important is its reliability and versatility,” says Aylieff. “It offers dependable transshipment through multiple Afghan corridors—a vital lifeline where speed matters – as well as loading and storage. Given current geopolitical tensions, from the closure of the Pakistan–Afghanistan border to the spillover of the Middle East crisis, its role has become even more essential for humanitarian operations.” [caption id="attachment_51320" align="aligncenter" width="761"] John Aylieff and Javier Piedra, Termez (June 7th, 2026). Image: TCA[/caption] Since February 2026, violence along Afghanistan's 2,400-kilometre border with Pakistan has escalated sharply, triggering the displacement of approximately 20,000 families. With heightened instability along the Afghan-Pakistan border and in Iran, forced returns of Afghan refugees have increased sharply; the Termez transit corridor has become all the more critical as a channel for humanitarian food aid. Termez's value extends well beyond WFP's own operations. "The hub not only serves WFP in Afghanistan but also supports numerous humanitarian agencies in the country, including UNHCR, UNFPA, and UNICEF," says Aylieff. "It is the backbone of the northern corridor supply chain into Afghanistan, and more and more agencies are relying on WFP's logistics capabilities to bring their...