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Natural gas

Turkmenistan Advances TAPI Pipeline and Infrastructure Projects in Herat

Turkmenistan has spent years seeking new gas export routes, and in western Afghanistan that effort is taking physical form. By mid-September, 122.3 kilometers of pipe had been welded and laid along the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) route in Herat Province. Ashgabat is also pursuing two other connections with Afghanistan along the same corridor. Energy officials are discussing a 500 kV transmission line, while plans call for a railway from the Turkmen border to reach Herat and eventually extend farther south. Herat is becoming the focal point for Turkmen gas, electricity, and freight. For Ashgabat, supplying Herat could give TAPI its first functioning Afghan market without waiting for the entire pipeline to reach Pakistan and India. Afghanistan would gain energy supplies and infrastructure, as well as a chance to connect its western region more closely to regional trade. As of September 15, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum reported that 150.3 kilometers of the 153-kilometer TAPI route in Herat Province had been prepared for pipe installation. Of the 122.3 kilometers of pipe welded and laid, 71.5 kilometers had been buried. Hydrostatic testing had been completed on 33 kilometers. The ministry’s estimate of nearly 80% completion applies only to pipe-laying along this section. In May, the ministry reported that 63 kilometers of pipe had been laid. Four months later, the figure had nearly doubled. The pipeline is designed to run roughly 1,814 kilometers from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas field through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian border. Its planned capacity is 33 billion cubic meters a year. At full capacity, the Asian Development Bank’s current project description allocates 5% of the gas to Afghanistan and 47.5% each to Pakistan and India. The pipeline has been under discussion for more than three decades. Conflict, financing shortages, security threats, and disputes over commercial terms have repeatedly delayed it. Work on Afghan territory resumed in September 2024. The latest figures from Herat make it possible, for the first time in years, to measure TAPI’s progress in kilometers of pipeline rather than diplomatic statements. For Turkmenistan, the stakes are high. The country holds the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves, but most of its gas exports go to China. Beijing receives around 30 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas annually and continues to work with Ashgabat on expanding production at Galkynysh. In February, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov said diversifying gas export routes was one of the country’s primary goals. Together, Pakistan and India would provide Turkmenistan with markets comparable in scale to its Chinese market. To reach them, however, the pipeline still has to cross most of Afghanistan and then Pakistan. Tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, along with the difficult relationship between Pakistan and India, continue to create political and transit risks for the full project. Herat offers a smaller market that could be reached sooner. A distribution network is planned in the city to supply gas to businesses, power plants, and households. In August, Turkmengaz and Afghan Gas signed a memorandum on the gasification of the province. The memorandum covers local...

2 hours ago

Oil Production

Karachaganak Maintenance to Cut Kazakhstan’s Oil Output by Up to 450,000 Tons

Karachaganak, one of Kazakhstan’s three largest oil and gas fields, entered planned maintenance on September 7, a shutdown expected to reduce the country’s oil and gas condensate output by 400,000–450,000 metric tons before work ends on October 1. The interruption comes in a year when the government has already lowered its national production forecast following repeated disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the main export route for Kazakhstan’s oil. In August, Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan had lowered its 2026 oil production target from 98 million to 96 million metric tons. He put production losses from attacks on CPC infrastructure in January, June, and July at about 3.5 million metric tons. CPC loadings rebounded by 22% in August after July’s disruptions, reaching around 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd). CPC exports are expected to fall to about 1.5 million bpd in September, partly because of the Karachaganak maintenance. More than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports move through CPC. The July shutdown at the Black Sea terminal showed how quickly an export disruption can force production cuts at fields far inland. On July 22, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate output fell by about 21%, while output at Tengiz dropped 56%, from roughly 925,000 to 406,000 bpd. Karachaganak also depends on Russian processing infrastructure. Raw gas from the field is sent to Russia’s Orenburg gas processing plant. In June, Karachaganak reduced production after an incident at the plant sharply curtailed its intake of gas from the field. Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (KPO), the field’s operator, is expanding its gas reinjection capacity. The process returns some of the produced gas to the reservoir, helping to maintain pressure and sustain oil and gas condensate output. A fifth gas reinjection compressor began operating in 2024. In June 2026, KPO announced that the KEP-1B project, which includes a sixth compressor, had begun reinjecting gas ahead of schedule. The Energy Ministry has said the two compressors would help maintain Karachaganak’s liquid hydrocarbon production at around 11–12 million metric tons a year. Following the expansion of Tengiz, Kazakhstan had expected national oil production to approach 100 million metric tons a year. Its production capacity has increased, but the events of 2026 have exposed the limits of the infrastructure used to move that oil to market. In May, Akkenzhenov said there was no full-scale alternative to CPC. Some oil can be rerouted across the Caspian into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline or east to China, but these routes cannot absorb CPC-scale volumes. CPC can carry up to 72.5 million metric tons a year from Kazakhstan. Whether or not the maintenance reduction was already incorporated into the revised forecast, Kazakhstan has little room for further disruption to the export and processing infrastructure on which its production depends.

3 hours ago

Central Asia-South Korea summit 2026

From Critical Minerals to Connectivity: South Korea’s Stakes in Central Asia

On September 16, Seoul hosted the first Korea–Central Asia Summit, bringing President Lee Jae Myung together with the heads of all five Central Asian states. The meeting elevated a dialogue that has run at a ministerial level since 2007 to the level of heads of state. The leaders adopted a Seoul Declaration setting the terms for future engagement and agreed to hold summits every two years. On September 14, trade and industry ministers from South Korea and the five Central Asian states met in Seoul for the first C5+Korea Industry Ministers’ Meeting. They signed a joint statement launching a standing platform for industrial cooperation. Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade used the occasion to push for a shift away from raw-material trade toward joint production and localization. Behind the diplomatic choreography sits a practical problem: the minerals both sides keep discussing cannot move without a route to carry them. A Minerals Agenda with Separate Tracks South Korea relies heavily on imported minerals for its manufacturing industries. Seoul has been developing separate plans with each country. With Tajikistan, discussions have focused on gold and silver, alongside antimony. With Kyrgyzstan, Seoul has been discussing antimony and tungsten. Cooperation with Uzbekistan covers minerals and digital manufacturing. With Kazakhstan, a central issue is moving beyond raw exports toward processing inside the country, as The Times of Central Asia reported ahead of the summit. South Korean firms are pursuing supply diversification independently. POSCO International and LX International have been expanding overseas mineral investments, including graphite and nickel projects, amid Chinese export restrictions. The Transport Connection Consider the Bolashak chrome mine in Kazakhstan, which Eurasian Resources Group launched in late 2024. The company plans to ramp it up to a design capacity of 7.5 million metric tons of chrome ore a year. Production on that scale makes reliable transport an essential part of the commercial equation. An Atlantic Council analysis identifies limited processing capacity and underdeveloped westward routes as obstacles to U.S. mineral partnerships with Central Asia. It presents the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor as a route to Western markets that avoids Russian and Iranian territory. That argument needs a distinction when applied to Korea. The corridor runs westward toward Europe; it is not a prerequisite for minerals to reach South Korea. Its relevance is the wider choice of buyers it could offer Central Asian producers, including potential Korean-backed processing ventures serving those markets. That corridor is being built out. The Aktau container hub has a planned capacity of 240,000 twenty-foot equivalent units. The World Bank-backed Mointy–Kyzylzhar railway is meant to remove a 149-kilometer detour and accommodate 30 train pairs a day, against roughly ten on the existing constrained route. Traffic is already rising: 125 container trains crossed Kazakhstan on the Trans-Caspian route in the first quarter of 2026, up 34.4% year-on-year. Japan has also become involved, pledging in August 2025 to help modernize customs operations at the port of Aktau. The Seoul Declaration also backs Korean participation in transport infrastructure, including modernization and digitalization. In...

3 hours ago

C5+South Korea

What Could Come Next in Kazakhstan-South Korea Relations

The first Central Asia-Republic of Korea Summit in Seoul on September 16 will elevate South Korea’s multilateral cooperation with the five countries of the region to heads-of-state level. The Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum has existed since 2007 but until now has remained primarily a ministerial mechanism. Seoul is now seeking to establish a sustainable multilateral framework at the leaders’ level. The summit’s agenda is broad, with a focus on innovation, prosperity, and connectivity. One of its main outcomes is expected to be the Seoul Declaration, setting out a medium- and long-term vision for cooperation in supply chains, emerging industries, and people-to-people exchanges. The economic agenda is already taking more concrete shape. South Korea wants to connect Central Asia’s mineral resources with its technologies for geological exploration and processing, while expanding cooperation in artificial intelligence, digital technologies, and science. Seoul also sees infrastructure, water resources, climate, and industry as potential areas for new projects. On September 16, about 500 representatives of government and business will gather alongside the five leaders. The business summit should offer the first indication of how much of the broad political agenda can be translated into investment, contracts, and joint production. Don’t Copy the Korean Miracle South Korea’s experience inevitably comes up in discussions about Central Asia’s development. But the economy that enabled Korea’s industrial breakthrough in the second half of the 20th century was built in a very different international and historical environment. Professor German Kim, director of the Institute for Asian Studies at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and one of the founders of Korean studies in Central Asia, told The Times of Central Asia that South Korea’s development experience should not be treated as a model that can simply be copied. “South Korea’s accelerated modernization took place under completely different historical and international conditions. Kazakhstan should therefore study not so much the Korean model of the past as today’s mechanisms for supporting talented young people, startups, venture capital, and technological entrepreneurship,” Kim said. From this perspective, the value of the Korean experience lies more in individual mechanisms that work – from financing technology businesses to linking universities, research, and industry. Critical Minerals and Joint Production Critical minerals have become one of the central elements of South Korea’s agenda in Central Asia. South Korean industry needs reliable supplies of raw materials, while the region holds significant reserves of metals used in electronics, batteries, energy, and other high-tech industries. Seoul is already discussing projects individually with countries in the region. In August, South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources held talks with Tajikistan on industrial cooperation and possible critical-mineral projects. The Korean side also proposed making meetings between the industry ministers of South Korea and the five Central Asian countries a regular mechanism. That proposal has since moved forward. On September 14, the six countries held their first C5+1 Industry Ministers’ Meeting in Seoul, agreeing to strengthen cooperation across critical-mineral supply chains. The plan explicitly extends beyond extraction to local refining and smelting, materials processing, and...

1 day ago

Bonds Investments

Kazakhstan to Receive Maximum Weight in New JPMorgan Bond Index

Kazakhstan will receive the maximum 8% country weight in JPMorgan’s new index for frontier market government bonds, creating an opportunity to attract new foreign buyers of tenge-denominated debt. JPMorgan plans to launch the GBI-EM Edge by the end of September. The maximum weight for any single country is capped at 8%, and Kazakhstan will receive the full quota. Vietnam, Pakistan, and Bangladesh will have the same weight. Other major components will include Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka. The index will cover 26 countries, with nearly $330 billion in bonds eligible for inclusion. GBI-EM Edge is designed for frontier markets, relatively less accessible markets outside JPMorgan’s main emerging market benchmark. Inclusion is a separate development from Kazakhstan’s efforts to join that main index. The index will serve as a benchmark for international asset managers. Some funds seek to replicate its composition, while others use it to compare the performance of their own portfolios. A country’s weight can therefore influence how much money investors allocate to its bonds. However, the nearly $330 billion represents the value of bonds eligible for the GBI-EM Edge, not the amount of future investment. JPMorgan has not yet said how much capital will directly track the new index. That will largely determine how significant the additional demand for Kazakh debt may be. Foreign Investors Have Already Increased Their Holdings Foreign investors began actively buying Kazakhstan’s government debt even before JPMorgan’s decision. According to the Analytical Center of the Association of Financiers of Kazakhstan (AFK), non-resident holdings of government securities reached KZT 2.5 trillion, or about $5.4 billion, by the end of June. During the first half of the year, their portfolio grew by 28.3%, while the share of non-residents in the government securities market increased from 6.2% to 6.9%. In June alone, foreign investors added KZT 185.1 billion, or about $400 million. Just a year and a half earlier, non-resident holdings stood at around KZT 1.1 trillion, or about $2.4 billion. Kazakhstan has maintained a high base rate to combat inflation. This has also kept yields on government bonds high. According to AFK, real yields on government securities – meaning returns above inflation – ranged from 5.7% to 7.4% in the first half of the year. The association’s analysts also linked strong demand to expectations of a gradual reduction in the base rate. For a foreign fund, the trade can look attractive: raise money in a market with lower interest rates, buy tenge, and invest in Kazakh government bonds. If the tenge remains stable or strengthens, the investor benefits both from the high interest rate and from the currency movement. If the tenge falls, some of that return disappears when the investment is converted back into dollars. The tenge’s appreciation has already helped foreign bondholders. It strengthened by 2.6% during August, ending the month at KZT 461.57 per dollar, according to the National Bank. AFK points to another effect of foreign purchases. To buy the bonds, non-residents sell foreign currency and purchase tenge, increasing the supply...

1 day ago

Film Festival

Women, Cinema and Changing Kazakhstan at QYZQARAS 2026

From August 20 to 30, Almaty hosted the third edition of QYZQARAS, an independent international film festival dedicated to women directors’ voices and the female gaze in cinema. Held this year at the Tselinny Center of Contemporary Culture, the festival presented 21 feature films, including five notable works from Central Asia, among them Kristina Mikhailova’s widely discussed River Dreams. River Dreams had its world premiere in the Berlinale Forum Special section in 2026 and received the Prize of the Ecumenical Jury in the Forum program. The screening marked an important milestone: the film became the first Kazakh documentary feature to premiere at the Berlinale. After a run of international festival appearances, the film returned home: on August 20, it opened QYZQARAS at the Tselinny Center of Contemporary Culture. River Dreams “This epic helped me believe in myself and feel at peace. I believe every frame,” Kristina said after the long applause that followed the final scene. Opening with a striking metaphysical orange river, River Dreams explores the inner lives of women in Kazakhstan. Constantly balancing between dream states and startlingly candid confession, the documentary immerses viewers in a wide range of themes – love, trauma, resistance, and survival – as women reflect on their pasts beside moving water. Grounded in a deeply humanist perspective, Mikhailova’s film presents tenderness as a sustained act of courage. Kristina’s presence behind the camera and the atmosphere of trust on set create an unpretentious portrait of contemporary Kazakhstan. It explores how the image of women is changing in this context, and how women directors themselves are shaping that change. Mikhailova begins with a simple question: “What kind of river are you?” From there, she builds the film around the personal stories of women of different ages and social backgrounds in Kazakhstan. This initial impulse encourages them to compare socially constructed ideals of femininity with what actually exists inside each of them. The most unexpected aspect of the film is the amount of humor. The protagonists’ wry, self-aware voices form an uncompromisingly honest agenda for contemporary Kazakh society: corruption, impunity, language, violence against women, and decolonization. “Decolonization is not only about one’s native language; it is about hierarchy. We look down on one another – it is a slave mentality: ‘I am better than you, so I will discriminate against you,’” says one of the young women featured in River Dreams. The director takes a transparent approach to the sensitive issue of language: in her view, what matters most is not which language we speak, but whether we are speaking about what truly matters. [caption id="attachment_56247" align="aligncenter" width="1024"] Image: Azhar Utezhan[/caption] “The girls did not resist or struggle with the concept of radical vulnerability; it is a very simple idea,” Mikhailova said. The Aksai River, where Kristina grew up and where her father taught her as a child to be stronger, becomes an embodiment of the socio-political whirlpool into which women in Kazakhstan have been drawn over the past 30 years. Unpredictable weather and shifting water levels carry...

1 day ago

Gold Mining

AzerGold Eyes Gold Mining Projects in Kyrgyzstan

Azerbaijan’s state-owned mining company AzerGold is exploring potential gold and other mineral projects in Kyrgyzstan as it looks to expand its operations in Central Asia. On September 14, AzerGold Chairman Zakir Ibrahimov met executives from Kyrgyzaltyn, Kyrgyzstan’s state-owned gold mining company, to discuss potential joint mining and exploration projects. The two companies formalized their initial agreement on July 31 in Cholpon-Ata, where AzerGold and Kyrgyzaltyn signed a memorandum of cooperation. A month and a half later, the Azerbaijani delegation traveled to see Kyrgyzstan’s gold mining operations firsthand. One of the stops was the Altynken gold mine in the Chuy Region. It is operated by a joint venture between Kyrgyzaltyn and a subsidiary of China’s Zijin Mining. Kyrgyzaltyn holds 40% of the venture, and Zijin 60%. The AzerGold delegation was shown the mine and its processing facilities. It then traveled to Kyrgyzaltyn’s refinery in Kara-Balta, giving the delegation a view of both extraction and refining operations. For AzerGold, Kyrgyzstan would mark another step in a recently launched international expansion. In June, the company signed an agreement in Tashkent on the joint development of a gold deposit in Uzbekistan, albeit with scant details. AzerGold nevertheless described the Uzbek project as the first major step in its international growth and has identified Central Asia as one of its priority regions for expansion. The talks in Bishkek suggest it is now looking for a second foothold in the region. For Kyrgyzaltyn, interest from a new partner comes after major changes in the country’s gold mining industry. The most significant was the long-running dispute over Kumtor, Kyrgyzstan’s largest gold mine. The government took control of the mine from Canada-based Centerra Gold in May 2021. Under a settlement reached the following year, Centerra transferred ownership of its Kyrgyz subsidiaries to Kyrgyzaltyn, while Kyrgyzaltyn gave up its roughly 26% stake in Centerra. That episode did not end Kyrgyzstan’s use of foreign mining capital. Kyrgyzaltyn remains partnered with Chinese investors at Altynken, while an Indian-backed project at the Altyn-Tor section of the Solton-Sary deposit reached the production stage this month. Kyrgyzaltyn holds 35% of that venture and Avelum Partner, controlled by India’s Deccan Gold Mines, holds 65%. AzerGold could now become another foreign partner in the state company’s portfolio.

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Migration

Nearly 100,000 Uzbeks Return From Russia as Labor Migration Slows

Nearly 100,000 Uzbek citizens returned from Russia between August 25 and September 5, as broader figures point to a decline in labor migration from Uzbekistan to Russia amid rising costs and tighter migration controls. According to Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency, 96,415 people returned during the ten-day period. The agency has not published comparable figures for last year or explained why most of them came home, meaning the figure alone cannot be taken as evidence of a mass exodus. There is, however, evidence of a broader slowdown. Between January and June, Uzbek citizens made more than 1.1 million entries into Russia declaring “work” as the purpose of their trip, down 13.2% year-on-year. Across Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, work-related entries fell by about 15%, from more than 2.3 million to 1.9 million. The figures count border crossings rather than individual workers, meaning the same person may appear more than once. But unlike the ten-day return figure, they show a decline sustained over the first half of the year. Alexander Safonov, a professor at Russia’s Financial University, told Vedomosti that “tighter migration policy and the rising cost of work patents” were among the factors behind the decline. Uzbek and Tajik citizens need patents to work legally in Russia. Safonov also pointed to the cost of medical examinations, housing, and travel, which reduce the amount migrants can save or send home. At the same time, Russia has tightened migration controls. Since February 2025, foreign nationals who no longer have legal grounds to remain in the country have been placed on a register of controlled persons. Those listed face restrictions on certain banking transactions, registering property and vehicles, and other activities. Moscow and the Moscow Region have introduced additional controls. Some visa-free foreign workers are required to use the Amina mobile application for migration registration and to provide information about their location. From September 1, 2026, the system was expanded to other categories of adult foreign nationals from visa-free countries staying in the capital region for more than 90 days. The treatment of Uzbek migrants has also become an issue in relations between Tashkent and Moscow. In late August, Uzbek representatives discussed migration checks, the situation of citizens placed on the register of controlled persons, and the possibility of regularizing the status of some foreign nationals with Russia’s Interior Ministry, Prosecutor General’s Office, and Foreign Ministry. Some Uzbek workers who have already left Russia describe a similar calculation. In the spring, Azattyq Asia spoke with Uzbeks who had worked in Russia and returned home. They cited rising living costs, tougher migration rules, inspections, and concerns about their safety. Said, from Samarkand, had worked in Russia for several years before returning and finding a job at home. He said that Russian wages appeared less attractive once rent and the cost of a work patent were taken into account. Human rights advocate Valentina Chupik told the outlet that the return trend had begun before this year. She cited the ruble exchange rate, the war in Ukraine, and concerns...

2 days ago

Central Asia-South Korea summit 2026

South Korea and ADB Expand Central Asia Critical Minerals Push

Two days before South Korea hosts its first summit with all five Central Asian countries on September 16, Seoul held a series of talks with the Asian Development Bank over how Korean technology and financing could be used in critical-mineral projects in the region. On September 14, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung met ADB President Masato Kanda in Seoul, where they agreed to work more closely on critical-mineral supply chains, artificial intelligence, and energy. Kanda later held separate talks with South Korean Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol. More specifically, the two discussed combining ADB financing with the technology and expertise of South Korean companies for projects in Central Asia. The talks build on a financing mechanism that was already in place. ADB formally launched its Critical Minerals-to-Manufacturing Financing Partnership Facility at its annual meeting in Samarkand in May. It is designed to support critical-mineral supply chains across ADB’s developing member countries in Asia and the Pacific. The facility has two components. The first is a grant window that pays for early-stage work, including feasibility studies, environmental and social assessments, and technical assistance. At its launch, ADB announced a $20 million contribution from Japan and $1.6 million from the United Kingdom to this part of the facility. The second is designed to mobilize additional capital and share risk. This is where South Korea comes in. Korea Eximbank and Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K-SURE) each signed a memorandum covering up to $500 million in potential financing, giving the two South Korean institutions a combined potential cofinancing commitment of up to $1 billion. The facility is intended to support projects across the value chain, from mining and processing to manufacturing and recycling. ADB is already working on critical-minerals initiatives in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, the bank is supporting the development of a critical-minerals strategy, while in Uzbekistan it is working on AI-driven critical-metals production and circular approaches to raw materials. At an ADB seminar launching the facility during the bank’s annual meeting in Samarkand, Kanda said the aim was to ensure mineral-producing countries benefited from more than extraction. “Asia and the Pacific should be more than a source of raw materials. The region should also capture the jobs, technology, and value these minerals provide,” Kanda said. Central Asia's Critical Minerals Play Kazakhstan is already a major producer of uranium and chromite and also produces or processes titanium, beryllium, tantalum, zinc, and other strategic materials. In July, Kazakhstan and South Korea began establishing a joint research center for rare and rare-earth metals at Satbayev University in Almaty. The center is expected to work on processing technologies and specialist training. Ahead of the summit, Kazakhstan said it wanted to expand cooperation with South Korea beyond the already established automotive industry into AI, advanced technologies, and critical minerals. Astana is interested in deeper processing of raw materials and producing higher-value-added goods. Uzbekistan is moving in the same direction. The country has a $4.2 billion critical-minerals program for 2026–2030 comprising 120 projects. Tashkent plans to increase industry...

2 days ago

opinion

Opinion: How Europe Balances Conditions and Interests in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has enjoyed preferential access to the EU market under GSP+ since 2021. The program removes tariffs on thousands of products for countries that commit to implementing international conventions on human rights, labor standards, environmental protection, and governance. Uzbekistan is one of two Central Asian countries, alongside Kyrgyzstan, participating in GSP+. Tajikistan receives the less generous standard GSP preferences, while Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are outside the scheme because they are classified as upper-middle-income economies. Uzbekistan makes extensive use of the program. In 2024, its preference utilization rate, the share of eligible exports entering the EU duty-free, was 92.2%. EU imports from Uzbekistan nearly doubled between 2021 and 2024. Those benefits come with conditions. The European Commission assesses whether Uzbekistan is implementing the conventions required under GSP+. It must consider findings from the UN and International Labour Organization monitoring bodies, but it can also use evidence from governments, international organizations, civil society groups, and other sources. If the Commission has “reasonable doubt” that Uzbekistan is meeting its commitments, it can open a withdrawal procedure. Uzbekistan can respond and provide evidence of compliance. The Commission then decides whether to close the case or withdraw preferences from some or all products. The system gives Brussels a formal role in assessing whether Uzbekistan continues to meet the conditions attached to preferential market access. It also requires the Commission to decide how different evidence should be interpreted and when shortcomings are serious enough to justify action. There is no automatic formula that produces that decision. The EU–Uzbekistan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, or EPCA, creates a separate mechanism. It makes respect for human rights an essential part of the partnership, and a serious breach can lead to partial or full suspension of the agreement. The European Parliament’s May 2026 resolution called for implementation of the agreement’s human-rights and rule-of-law commitments and for those commitments to be assessed within three years. The EU’s own report records setbacks in media freedom, civil society, and judicial independence. It also recognizes progress on labor standards and protections for women and children. The Commission must assess compliance with each required convention; progress in one area does not remove obligations in another. That means the Commission must decide how much weight to give different evidence and when concerns are serious enough to affect trade preferences. Decisions on Uzbekistan’s domestic reforms, however, remain with the Uzbek government. Concurrently, cooperation between the EU and Uzbekistan has expanded. Brussels is pursuing closer ties with Uzbekistan on transport connectivity and critical raw materials. Uzbekistan’s position on regional transport routes, critical raw materials, and access to a growing Central Asian market also gives Tashkent leverage in its dealings with Europe. The new GSP rules apply from January 2027, raising the number of required conventions from 27 to 32. Existing beneficiaries retain their preferences during a transition period and must reapply by the end of 2028. The EPCA has applied provisionally since March 1, 2026, while full ratification remains pending. The next GSP+ review will show how...

2 days ago

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