Our People > Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Senior Editor and Contributor

Robert M. Cutler has written and consulted on Central Asian affairs for over 30 years at all levels. He was a founding member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society’s executive board and founding editor of its Perspectives publication. He has written for Asia Times, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Euractiv, Radio Free Europe, National Post (Toronto), FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, and many other outlets.

He directs the NATO Association of Canada’s Energy Security Program, where he is also senior fellow, and is a practitioner member at the University of Waterloo’s Institute for Complexity and Innovation. Educated at MIT, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and the University of Michigan, he was for many years a senior researcher at Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, and is past chairman of the Montreal Press Club’s Board of Directors.

Articles

Aktau Plane Crash

How the Azerbaijan Airlines Crash Could Shake Relations with Russia

The crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) airplane in Aktau, Kazakhstan, has the potential to significantly effect Azerbaijan's relations with Russia if Moscow mishandles the situation. To date, there has been a lack of transparency and responsiveness on the part of the Kremlin. The implications could include accelerating the deterioration of Moscow's influence in the region. These implications, therefore, concern not only the local countries, but any international actor having strategic interests in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, or otherwise concerned with their future role and place in the evolving post–Cold War international system. The Facts of the Disaster Given the rapid dissemination of information in the 2020s by electronic means, whereby authentic real-time videos made by first responders to the fuselage on the ground were uploaded to social media and available worldwide within minutes, the overall outline and some details of the incident are by now generally well known. The airplane was en route from Baku to Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, when explosions in the air damaged the cabin. Very soon after, but not as a result of these explosions, the pilots completely lost all electronic orientation and navigation capabilities. According to one source close to Azerbaijan's investigation into the crash, preliminary results showed the plane was struck by a Russian Pantsir-S air defense system and its communications were then paralyzed by electronic warfare systems on the approach into Grozny. Ukrainian military drones have repeatedly targeted Russia’s southern regions, triggering Russian air defenses. “No one claims that it was done on purpose,” the source said; but “taking into account the established facts, Baku expects the Russian side to confess to the shooting down of the Azerbaijani aircraft.” After being hit, the plane was refused emergency landing permission at Grozny (2.5 kilometers from where the incident occurred) and at least two other Russian airports in the North Caucasus (Makhachkala, 155 kilometers away, and Mineral’nye Vody, 225 kilometers), before being directed by local air control out over the Caspian Sea. Once there, the pilots made the decision to try to land in Aktau (435 kilometers away). Against all odds, they succeeded in avoiding the need to ditch the aircraft into the sea, which would have undoubtedly killed all on board and also destroyed the craft, making any investigation into what had happened impossible. In the event, according to the Kazakhstani authorities, out of 62 passengers and five crew, 32 survivors were initially rescued. Captain Igor Kshnyakin, Co-pilot (First Officer) Alexander Kalyaninov, and Purser Hokuma Aliyeva died when the front wheel touched down ahead of the back wheels, as a result of which the cockpit was thrown violently away from the ongoing wreck. However, this is what created the conditions for at least some of the passengers to survive, as it split the fuselage in two. The event has garnered international attention, including for the professionalism of the crew. What Has Happened Since At first, Kazakhstan declared its own unilateral competence to investigate the crash, which occurred on...

1 year ago

Middle Powers

How Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Anchor a Strategic Middle-Power Hub in Central Asia

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are driving Central Asia’s global significance. Together, they are turning Central Asia into a strategic middle-power hub. The two countries increasingly act as central nodes in a region key to global supply chains and, inevitably, geopolitical competition. However, they are not merely reactive to changes around them, but are highly dynamic. What does it mean to say that the region is emerging as a strategic middle-power "hub"? The notion of a hub extends beyond the national profiles of the two principals, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, to include the aggregation of collective influence. Central Asia is recognized as a cohesive entity in global forums. Kazakhstan’s energy wealth combines with Uzbekistan’s demographic strength, creating an influential synergy beneficial to the entire region. The interplay between their respective strengths allows them to amplify Central Asia’s voice in international institutions and negotiations collectively. By integrating their regional strategies within global frameworks — such as the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) — Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan enhance the region’s geopolitical relevance. Kazakhstan, for example, has successfully advocated for the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, also called the "Middle Corridor"). This transcontinental trade route is emerging as a lynchpin in Eurasian logistics, connecting China to Europe via the Caspian Sea. Uzbekistan, for its part, has emphasized the integration of transport and energy infrastructure. These initiatives align with the broader vision of a unified Central Asia. The leadership of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has reinforced the region's collective identity as the "C5" group, also including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. This regional bloc has become a diplomatic focal point for major powers like the United States, China, Germany, and Japan. All of them engage with Central Asia through structured consultations within the C5 framework. These meetings have given the region traction in international diplomacy. The elevation of the C5 group reflects the region's new prominence. The United States engages with the C5 on issues ranging from regional security to sustainable development, emphasizing its commitment to a secure and prosperous Central Asia. China’s cooperation under the C5+1 mechanism complements its transcontinental infrastructure initiatives. Germany focuses on sustainable energy and governance, while Japan prioritizes infrastructure and technology transfers. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan together have over two-thirds of the region's gross domestic product and two-thirds of its population. Kazakhstan's vast natural resources undergird its economic influence, while its geographic expanse (as the ninth-largest country in the world) makes it central to major connectivity initiatives. Through President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's nuanced foreign policy, Kazakhstan has adeptly balanced relationships with major powers, ensuring that it remains a key partner for Russia, China, and the European Union. Uzbekistan has surged to prominence through its ambitious domestic reforms and proactive engagement for regional cooperation under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has implemented market liberalization measures attracting foreign investment and reinvigorating its economy. As the most populous country in Central Asia, Uzbekistan is an indispensable actor in regional affairs....

1 year ago

Putin

Russia’s Strategic Posturing and Putin’s November Visit to Kazakhstan

On November 27, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan underscored the complex geopolitical and security challenges facing the region. Hosted by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana, the visit took place amidst heightened tensions following Russia’s deployment of its Oreshnik hypersonic missile in Ukraine on November 21. This escalation has reshaped the regional security environment, compelling Kazakhstan to confront potential spillover effects of the Ukraine conflict. Energy remained a central focus during the visit. Kazakhstan remains heavily reliant on oil exports through the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which passes through southern Russia. This cooperation benefits Kazakhstan economically but, by tying Kazakhstan further into Russian energy networks, it further complicates Astana's efforts to balance relations with Moscow and Western powers. Following periodic closures of the CPC route on various pretexts, Kazakhstan has resolved to diversify its energy export strategy. It has increased shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to enter the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which terminates on Turkey's coast in the eastern Mediterranean. One should not be surprised if ideas about the old Trans-Caspian Oil Pipeline (TCOP) project are taken out of deep storage for reanimation. The TCOP is an undersea link first discussed in the late 2000s between then-Presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Nicolas Sarkozy of France. It was shelved at the time because it did not seem geoeconomically necessary. Since then, relations between Russia and Kazakhstan have been complicated by the periodic CPC closures that, although they are given technical justification, appear politically motivated by Moscow to squeeze Astana. Kazakhstan's short-term solution, to increase oil shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to Baku for insertion into the BTC pipeline, simply cannot attain the volumes necessary to provide a strategic alternative to the CPC. The BTC, at present, would be able to accommodate whatever volumes Kazakhstan would be able to transit to Azerbaijan including via a prospective TCOP, for export to world markets from Ceyhan. One would suppose that bilateral discussions also covered the possible participation of Rosatom in the construction and operation of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant (NPP). However, no mention of this topic was made in public statements. Kazakhstan would prefer to escape the vise-like pressure between Russia and China on this matter. That is why Tokayev has discussed participation by the French firms Orano and EDF with France's President Emmanuel Macron. It has recently been suggested that it would be technically feasible for Kazakhstan to find a group of Western companies capable of executing the project. A Western consortium would have no reason to hesitate to include Kazatomprom in an appropriate role, not excluding capacity-building. The Russia-only and China-only options for the NPP's construction would be less welcoming to such a possibility. Kazakhstan's leadership has become properly sensitive to how energy partnerships are not just economic decisions, but strategic calculations in Central Asia's volatile geopolitical landscape. Indeed, Russia’s use of the Oreshnik missile against Ukraine has created an entirely new security situation. It has raised concerns that...

1 year ago

Energy

Who Will Build Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Power Plant?

There are three generally discussed possibilities for construction of Kazakhstan’s newly approved nuclear power plant (NPP). One is that Russia is sole contractor. Another is that China is sole contractor. Each of these choices has its own rationale yet also geo-economic and geopolitical drawbacks for Kazakhstan. Third, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has publicly stated that he favors an international consortium with participation by companies from China, France, Russia, and South Korea. This option, however, faces logistical challenges, particularly in dividing responsibilities among consortium members and determining the sourcing of critical components. Tokayev has already discussed with France’s President Emmanuel Macron the possible participation of the French companies Orano and EDF in particular. Orano focuses on various aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining, enrichment, and waste management. EDF specializes in design, construction, and operational management. This opens the door to a fourth possibility. Orano, EDF and the British-German firm Urenco together can provide all the NPP construction and management services necessary to realize the project. But Kazatomprom, which focuses on mainly on mining and processing, has not been mentioned in any of these schemes. Such an alternative approach, involving Western companies like Orano, EDF, and Urenco, could ensure comprehensive services with strong Western involvement, possibly including Kazatomprom, thus boosting local capacity and creating a "demonstration project" for broader natural resource collaboration within NATO frameworks. This kind of partnership could help Kazakhstan reduce its dependency on single external actors, thereby enhancing its strategic autonomy. Moreover, by involving Kazatomprom, the project could focus on knowledge transfer and capacity building, fostering local expertise and reducing external dependencies over time. It is reasonable that an offer to take Kazatomprom into a Western consortium and to make capacity building in Kazakhstan, at Kazatomprom and elsewhere, an explicit goal of the project, would be welcome in Astana. Cooperation via NATO platforms could likewise offer Kazakhstan access not only to technical specialists from NATO countries but also to more joint training exercises and workshops, to complement an exchange of knowledge on best practices in nuclear safety and energy resilience. And that would be only a “demonstration project” for the constructive expansion of the energy component of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) into broader natural-resource and rare-earth domains. Indeed, there is no reason even to wait for the NPP project. Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, is a periodic table of the elements, especially rare-earth elements, and their exploration and development has been under way for some time. Building upon the energy-security successes through NATO's PfP, this proposal suggests expanding cooperation with Caspian region Partner countries into the mining sector, specifically for rare-earth elements critical to defense. Extending PfP to include these resources aligns with NATO's and Partners' core security goals, offering broader opportunities to secure the supply chain and enhance collective defense capabilities. This extension also presents a strategic avenue to mitigate risks associated with supply disruptions and geopolitical tensions. Leveraging the extensive experience of partnership in energy security, NATO and its Partner countries could begin with...

1 year ago

COP29

Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan Stand Out at COP29

The 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), held in Baku from November 11–22, 2024, has underscored the critical role of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in advancing Caspian Sea regional energy transitions. Both countries leveraged their positions along the Middle Corridor to present ambitious renewable and nuclear energy strategies. Azerbaijan: Renewables and the Middle Corridor Azerbaijan, the host and chair of COP29, has positioned itself as a renewable energy connector between Central Asia and Europe. Its energy strategy reflects a pragmatic approach to transitioning from hydrocarbons, which accounted for 88% of government revenues in 2023, to a diversified portfolio incorporating solar, wind, and hydropower. Azerbaijan has prioritized key renewable energy projects to align with its goal of achieving a 30% renewable share in its electricity mix by 2030. Among these is the operational Garadagh Solar Power Plant, a 230-megawatt (MW) facility developed by the UAE's Masdar, which generates 500 million kilowatt-hours (kWh) annually. Complementing this is the planned Alat Solar Project, a 400-MW solar installation expected to be operational by 2027. These projects aim to bolster domestic electricity supply and expand Azerbaijan’s capacity to export renewable energy. The Caspian Offshore Wind Initiative, backed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), seeks to harness the Caspian Sea’s favorable wind conditions. A 1-gigawatt (GW) wind farm is under preliminary study, with construction anticipated to begin by 2026. This project could transform Azerbaijan into a renewable energy hub for the Middle Corridor, particularly as Europe reduces its dependency on Russian energy. Kazakhstan: Nuclear Ambitions and Renewable Diversification Kazakhstan’s energy strategy focuses on nuclear power and renewables, driven by the need to reduce coal dependency, which still accounts for two thirds of its electricity generation. The government’s approval of its first nuclear power plant, following a nationwide referendum in October 2024, is central to this strategy. The planned nuclear reactor, located near Lake Balkhash, will generate 1.2-GW of electricity, replacing approximately 20% of coal-fired generation. This initiative complements Kazakhstan’s status as the world’s largest uranium producer, supplying over 40% of global demand and generating $3.6 billion in export revenues in 2023. Potential consortium members for the project include South Korea’s KEPCO, France’s Orano and EDF, China’s CNNC, and Russia's Rosatom, although economic-sanctions issues complicate Russia’s involvement in the nuclear sector. Kazakhstan is simultaneously scaling up renewable energy projects, with several key initiatives underway. The Zhanatas Wind Farm, operational since 2022, produces 100-MW of power, and the Shelek Solar Park, a 200-MW solar facility near Almaty, is expected to come online in late 2025. Together, these projects aim to increase renewables to 15% of Kazakhstan’s electricity mix by 2030, quintupling the level from 2023. The Trans-Caspian Electricity Cable Project At the COP29 conference, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, along with Uzbekistan, announced an ambitious trans-Caspian electricity cable project through an underwater transmission system. This infrastructure initiative, estimated to cost $2.5 billion, seeks to establish an electricity corridor linking Central Asia with European markets, representing a significant step in regional energy integration. The project...

1 year ago