Our People > Stephen M. Bland

Stephen M. Bland

Managing Editor and Head of Investigations

Stephen M. Bland is a journalist, author, editor, commentator, and researcher specializing in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Prior to joining The Times of Central Asia, he worked for NGOs, think tanks, as the Central Asia expert on a forthcoming documentary series, for the BBC, The Diplomat, EurasiaNet, and numerous other publications.

His award-winning book on Central Asia was published in 2016, and he is currently putting the finishing touches to a book about the Caucasus.

Articles

Cryptocurrency

Turkmenistan Opens Door to Crypto Mining, Keeps Firm Grip on Exchanges

Turkmenistan has taken a rare step toward opening a tightly controlled economy by legalizing cryptocurrency mining and the operation of crypto exchanges under a new “Law on Virtual Assets”. First reported by The Times of Central Asia in early December 2025, the law came into effect on January 1, 2026, creating a state-run licensing system overseen by the Central Bank of Turkmenistan, while keeping strict limits on how crypto can be used inside the country. The legal change, signed by President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, brings “virtual assets” under civil law, meaning that crypto is treated as property, rather than money. Under the framework, cryptocurrencies are not recognized as legal tender and cannot be treated as a currency or security for domestic payments. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the law covers the creation, storage, issuance, and circulation of virtual assets. It also states that the government is not responsible for losses incurred through crypto platforms or for drops in asset value. Mining rights are available to individual entrepreneurs and legal entities that register electronically with the central bank, and the law explicitly bans “hidden mining” that uses someone else’s computing resources without permission. For exchanges and related service providers, the licensing requirements are central. Licensed firms can offer exchange, transfer, storage, and management services, and conduct initial offerings, but they must follow customer identification rules aligned with anti-money-laundering controls. The law also places strict limits on who can operate crypto exchanges inside Turkmenistan. Individuals and legal entities registered in offshore jurisdictions are barred from establishing exchanges, and founders with offshore bank accounts are disqualified from obtaining licenses, reinforcing a framework designed to keep ownership and control within a tightly regulated domestic system. Advertising restrictions further underscore the government’s cautious approach. Crypto service providers are prohibited from making promises of profitability or offering inducements to attract customers. Promotional materials must include explicit warnings that virtual assets are not state-backed and may lose value, reflecting official concerns over speculation and consumer risk. The shift is widely seen as significant for one of the world’s most closed economies, though structural constraints remain. Turkmenistan’s heavily regulated internet environment poses a challenge for both trading platforms and large-scale exchange operations, particularly those requiring uninterrupted access to global networks. The move also fits within a broader effort to reduce reliance on gas exports by cautiously diversifying the economy. The commercial question now is whether legal clarity and access to low-cost electricity can outweigh these limitations. The model combines ultra-cheap energy with a license-driven regulatory system, a structure that may attract some miners while deterring firms that depend on flexible compliance regimes or unrestricted connectivity. Across Central Asia, governments have taken divergent approaches to regulating digital assets. Kazakhstan has experimented with special regulatory zones and later expanded oversight nationwide. Turkmenistan’s approach is more centralized, creating a narrow legal pathway that keeps regulatory authority concentrated with the state and the central bank. The government has signaled incremental openness in other areas, including the introduction of electronic...

2 months ago

Nuclear Energy

U.S. and Kazakhstan Expand Civil Nuclear Cooperation With Focus on Small Modular Reactors

The United States and Kazakhstan have expanded cooperation on civil nuclear energy, placing small modular reactors at the center of a new phase in bilateral engagement. In late December 2025, the U.S. Embassy in Kazakhstan announced two initiatives under the U.S. State Department’s Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology program, known as FIRST. The measures focus on workforce training and technical evaluation as Kazakhstan prepares to reintroduce nuclear power generation. Kazakhstan is the first country in Central Asia to participate in the FIRST program, which was launched by the U.S. State Department in 2021 to help partner countries prepare regulatory frameworks, workforce capacity, and infrastructure for advanced nuclear technologies. The first initiative provides for the installation of a classroom-based SMR (small modular reactor) simulator at the Kazakhstan Institute of Nuclear Physics in Almaty. The simulator is intended to train specialists in reactor operations, safety systems, and emergency response. On January 6, 2026, the American Nuclear Society reported that the simulator will be supplied by U.S. companies Holtec International and WSC Inc., a simulation technology company that operates as part of the Curtiss-Wright group. The project is designed to build domestic technical capacity prior to licensing or construction decisions. The International Science and Technology Center is supporting implementation in Kazakhstan. The second initiative is a feasibility study examining which U.S.-designed SMRs could be technically and economically suitable for Kazakhstan. According to the American Nuclear Society, the study is being conducted under FIRST, with U.S. engineering firm Sargent & Lundy. The assessment is expected to cover grid integration, siting considerations, cooling requirements, and indicative deployment timelines. The study does not authorize construction or commit Kazakhstan to a specific reactor technology; rather, the feasibility study is intended to produce a shortlist of U.S. SMR designs that could be compatible with Kazakhstan’s grid, geography, and projected electricity demand. These initiatives follow Kazakhstan’s decision to return to nuclear power. On October 6, 2024, voters approved the construction of nuclear power plants in a national referendum. Official results published by the Central Referendum Commission showed 71.12% voting in favor, with turnout at 63.66%. Kazakhstan has not generated nuclear electricity since the BN-350 fast reactor at Aktau was shut down in 1999. Government energy planners have warned that Kazakhstan faces growing electricity shortfalls as early as the mid-2020s, driven by aging coal plants and rising consumption. Kazakhstan’s interest in nuclear energy reflects structural pressures in the power sector. Coal-fired plants still supply most electricity, particularly in northern regions, but much of that capacity is aging. Electricity demand continues to rise alongside industrial output and urban growth, while the government has set targets to reduce emissions intensity. Nuclear power is being positioned as a source of stable, low-carbon baseload generation that can complement renewable energy. Kazakhstan also occupies a central position in the global nuclear fuel market. The country accounts for about 40% of global uranium mine production and holds roughly 14% of identified recoverable uranium resources. Despite that role, the country has relied...

2 months ago

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Kazakhstan Opens Criminal Probe Over Calls to Attack CPC Oil Pipeline

Kazakhstan has opened a criminal investigation into public statements that authorities say encouraged attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the main export route for the country’s crude oil, after months of disruption at the system’s Black Sea terminal turned a foreign security risk into a domestic legal and political issue. Prosecutor General Berik Asylov confirmed the case in a written reply to a parliamentary inquiry on January 6. "On December 17, 2025, the Astana City Police Department launched a pre-trial investigation under Part 1 of Article 174 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (incitement of social, national, tribal, racial, class, or religious discord) into negative public comments regarding damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium," the Prosecutor General stated. The authorities have yet to name suspects, publish the posts under review, or announce any arrests. The file remains at the evidence-gathering stage, and prosecutors have left open whether any charges will ultimately be filed under Article 174, or reclassified under other provisions once investigators assess the intent and impact. The probe follows a request by Mazhilis deputy, Aidos Sarym, who said that some social media commentary crossed from opinion into encouragement of harm to strategic infrastructure, endorsed attacks on the CPC, and urged further strikes on critical sites. The political sensitivity is rooted in the 1,500-kilometer pipeline’s central role in Kazakhstan’s economy. CPC carries crude from western Kazakhstan to a marine terminal near Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, where the oil is loaded onto tankers for delivery to global markets. The pipeline is owned by a consortium that includes Kazakhstan, Russia, and several international energy companies. The system dominates Kazakhstan’s oil export economy. More than 80% of the country’s crude oil exports move through the CPC route, which also carries more than 1% of global oil supplies, making it a pressure point for both markets and state revenue when operations are disrupted. The investigation follows a period of repeated disruption at the Novorossiysk terminal in late 2025, after a naval drone strike damaged one of the offshore loading points used to transfer oil from the pipeline to tankers. The damage forced operators to suspend loadings and move vessels away while inspections and repairs were carried out, sharply reducing export capacity. The CPC relies on single-point moorings positioned at sea to load crude onto tankers, a critical constraint on the entire system; when one goes offline, capacity drops quickly. The pipeline cannot store large volumes, forcing upstream producers to cut or slow output. By late December, the impact was visible in Kazakhstan’s production figures. Oil output fell by about 6% during the month after the late November strike constrained exports. Production at the Tengiz oilfield, the country’s largest, dropped by roughly 10%. Exports of CPC Blend crude fell to about 1.08 million barrels per day in December, the lowest level in more than a year, as the terminal operated with only one functioning mooring while others remained offline due to damage and maintenance. Operational pressures continued as...

2 months ago

Reforms

Uzbekistan Has “Only Just Begun” Reforms, Says Saida Mirziyoyeva

Saida Mirziyoyeva has said that the country’s reform agenda remains at an early stage, arguing that the scale of change should be measured in years rather than months. In her first major interview since becoming Head of the Presidential Administration, Mirziyoyeva said Uzbekistan had “only just begun” large-scale reforms. Expectations of rapid results, she warned, often overlook structural limits, including weak infrastructure, uneven regional development, and tight public finances. Mirziyoyeva spoke about decision-making inside the presidential system and outlined what she described as the administration’s main policy priorities, including water management, education, healthcare, the business climate, and reform of the judicial and legal system. “Our goal is to improve people’s lives,” she stated, emphasizing that improvements in courts and law enforcement were essential for other reforms to succeed. Without legal guarantees, she argued, investment and social policy changes would fail to deliver lasting results. She said the reforms now underway are intended to address long-standing systemic problems rather than produce quick political gains, and rejected the idea that reform momentum has slowed, arguing that many of the most complex changes require time and careful implementation to succeed. Water management featured prominently in her remarks. Mirziyoyeva described it as one of Uzbekistan’s most urgent challenges, pointing to climate pressures, ageing infrastructure, and rising demand. Education and healthcare were also presented as priorities, with reforms focused on improving quality and access rather than simply expanding state programs. The judicial system, however, emerged as the central theme. Mirziyoyeva said that without independent and predictable courts, reforms in other areas would not deliver lasting results. Legal uncertainty, she said, discourages investment and undermines public trust, making the rule of law essential for both economic reform and the protection of citizens’ rights. Mirziyoyeva also addressed the business environment, arguing that excessive regulation and administrative pressure continue to constrain private enterprise. The state, she said, should act as a partner to entrepreneurs rather than an obstacle, and reforms should create conditions in which businesses can operate transparently and competitively. Mirziyoyeva described her role as focused on coordination and execution rather than public visibility. The task of the Presidential Administration, she said, is to ensure that decisions taken at the top translate into practical change on the ground. Public service, she added, should be judged by outcomes, not rhetoric. The interview comes more than nine years after President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in December 2016 and launched a reform agenda that marked a break with the isolationist policies of his predecessor. Early measures included the liberalisation of the foreign exchange market in September 2017, easing trade restrictions, and reducing state control over prices. International financial institutions have described Uzbekistan’s economic transition as ambitious, while noting that progress has been uneven. Political reform has proceeded more cautiously. In its 2024 Nations in Transit assessment, Freedom House classified Uzbekistan as a consolidated authoritarian system, citing restrictions on opposition activity and independent media. Against that backdrop, Mirziyoyeva said reforms should be judged by tangible outcomes rather than timelines. Reliable access...

2 months ago

Geopolitics

2025: The Year Central Asia Stepped Onto the Global Stage

For much of the post-Soviet era, Central Asia occupied a peripheral place in global affairs. It mattered to its immediate neighbors, but rarely shaped wider debates. In 2025, that changed in visible ways. The region became harder to ignore, largely not because of ideology or alignments, but because of assets that the world increasingly needs: energy, minerals, transit routes, and political access across Eurasia. One of the clearest signs came in April, when the European Union and the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in Samarkand for their first summit at the head-of-state level. The meeting concluded with a joint declaration upgrading relations to a strategic partnership, with a focus on transport connectivity, energy security, and critical raw materials. The document marked a shift in how Brussels views Central Asia, moving beyond development assistance toward geopolitical cooperation, as outlined in the official EU–Central Asia summit joint declaration. European interest is rooted in necessity. Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced EU governments to rethink energy imports, supply chains, and overland trade routes. Central Asia sits astride the most viable alternatives that bypass Russian territory. It also holds resources essential to Europe’s green transition, including uranium and a range of industrial metals. The region’s leaders spent much of the year framing their diplomacy around these tangible advantages, rather than abstract political alignments. The United States followed a similar track. Through the C5+1 format, Washington deepened engagement with all five Central Asian states, with particular emphasis on economic cooperation and supply-chain resilience. A key element has been the Critical Minerals Dialogue, launched to connect Central Asian producers with Western markets. This initiative formed part of a broader U.S. effort to diversify access to strategic materials and reduce dependence on Russia and China. Russia remained a central but changing presence in Central Asia throughout 2025. Economic ties, labor migration, and shared infrastructure ensured that Moscow continued to matter across the region. At the same time, however, Russia’s war in Ukraine constrained its ability to act as the dominant external power it once was. Central Asian governments maintained pragmatic relations with Moscow, but they increasingly treated Russia as one partner among several rather than the default reference point. Trade continued, security cooperation persisted, and political dialogue remained active, yet the balance shifted toward hedging rather than dependence. Uranium sits at the center of this shift, with the United States having banned imports of certain Russian uranium products under federal law, with waivers set to expire no earlier than January 1, 2028. As Washington restructures its nuclear fuel supply chain, Central Asia’s role has grown sharply. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2024 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Kazakhstan supplied 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. reactor operators, while Uzbekistan accounted for about 9%. Canada and Australia remain major suppliers, but the Central Asian share is now strategic rather than marginal. That economic weight translated into political visibility. In December, U.S. President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend...

3 months ago