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trans-Afghan railway

Icy Relations Between Pakistan and Afghanistan Threaten Central Asian Trade Plans

On November 25, the Afghan authorities accused Pakistan of a new round of airstrikes in eastern Afghanistan. The bombing killed nine children and a woman, injuring several others. The attacks are the latest escalation in rapidly worsening tensions between Islamabad and the Taliban-led government in Kabul, with key border crossings currently closed, and Afghan refugees being expelled from Pakistan. At the heart of the crisis is Pakistan’s claim that Kabul is providing support to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban, or TPP), a militant group seeking to topple Pakistan’s government and impose its strict interpretation of Islamic law. The fallout may ripple beyond bilateral relations, with significant consequences for Central Asian trade, particularly the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan plan for a Trans-Afghan railway. The planned 647-kilometer line is set to connect the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif with Peshawar in Pakistan. When combined with existing infrastructure, this will mean that trains can travel from southern Uzbekistan all the way to the Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi, granting landlocked Uzbekistan and Afghanistan a long-sought gateway to the Indian Ocean. But mounting instability, along with Islamabad’s willingness to shut borders as leverage, may now place the project in serious jeopardy. “The moment a state weaponizes geography, every financier in Tashkent, Moscow, or Beijing prices in risk, delays commitments, and quietly explores alternative alignments,” Anant Mishra, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales, told The Times of Central Asia. So, what are the prospects for salvaging the Trans-Afghan railway? How can Pakistan and Afghanistan de-escalate? And what does this turmoil mean for Central Asia’s wider economic ambitions? A sudden frost On July 17, Uzbekistan’s Transport Minister Ilkhom Makhkamov, Pakistan’s Railway Minister Muhammad Hanif Abbasi, and Afghanistan’s acting Public Works Minister Mohammad Esa Thani signed an agreement to conduct a feasibility study for the proposed railway. Many hoped the railway would presage a new era of fraternal relations between Central and South Asia. “Civil society, the intelligentsia, media, and business community of Pakistan have been loudly calling for intimate trade relations with the Central Asian Republics,” Khadim Hussain, Research Director at the Centre for Regional Policy and Dialogue (CRPD), Islamabad, told TCA. For Uzbekistan, which has aggressively pursued diversification of trade routes to reduce reliance on transit through Iran and Kazakhstan, the project promised a cheaper, faster corridor to global markets. According to Nargiza Umarova, Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, the trans-Afghan is one of two high-priority transport projects, along with the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway – work on which began in April 2025. But the ink had barely dried on the July accord when tensions between Afghanistan’s Taliban government and Islamabad began escalating, throwing the ambitious railway into doubt. [caption id="attachment_40211" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Uzbek passenger and freight trains parked in Andijan; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] In early October, Pakistan launched an airstrike in Kabul targeting the leader of the...

Afghanistan

Tajikistan: Three Chinese Workers Killed in Drone Attack from Afghanistan

Three Chinese workers in Tajikistan were killed in a drone attack that was carried out from across the border in Afghanistan, Tajikistan's government said on Thursday. The attack targeted a camp housing company employees in Tajikistan’s southwestern Khatlon region on Wednesday night, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “This attack was carried out using an unmanned aerial vehicle” carrying explosives, the ministry said. “Despite the constant efforts by Tajikistan to maintain security and create an atmosphere of peace and stability in the border areas between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, the disruptive actions by criminal groups located in the territory of Afghanistan still continue,” it said. The ministry condemned “these acts of terrorist groups” and urged Afghan authorities to stabilize and secure their side of the border. Chinese workers are involved in mining and construction projects in Tajikistan. Trouble along the border with Afghanistan has flared from time to time. Tajikistan said that it used a drone to kill two suspected drug smugglers from Afghanistan in the area a week ago. In August, Tajik guards and fighters from Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban movement exchanged fire. The drone attack that killed the Chinese workers came ahead of a meeting on Thursday of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a regional bloc. Leaders from the member countries of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan gathered for the summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan has periodically asked the group for more help in securing its long frontier with Afghanistan.

Rare Earth Metals

Kazakhstan Enters the Global Rare Earth Metals Arena

Kazakhstan ranks among the global leaders in proven rare earth metals (REM) reserves. Until recently, this fact was often accompanied by the familiar phrase “underutilized potential.” Today, the country is rapidly shifting from being a raw material supplier to a strategic actor capable of influencing critical material supply chains. Amid intensifying global competition for resources, Kazakhstan is steadily establishing itself in the rare earth market. Central to this transformation is the state-owned mining company Tau-Ken Samruk, which is expanding aggressively both domestically and internationally. Rare Earth Potential Kazakhstan recently announced the discovery of a deposit containing strategically significant minerals, including cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, and yttrium, with total reserves estimated at multi-million tons. These materials are vital for modern industrial production and technological development. To date, over 100 deposits of rare and rare-earth elements have been identified in Kazakhstan, including Kurumsak, Bala-Sauskandyk, Akbulak, Kundybay, and Verkhnee-Espe. The country currently produces 19 of the 34 known rare earth elements. Kazakhstan possesses a unique combination of advantages: vast reserves, strategic geographic location, political stability, and a pivot toward processing and manufacturing high-value-added products. Where once the country focused primarily on extraction and minimal processing, the current strategy is fundamentally different. Kazakhstan is now aiming to build a full-scale industrial chain, positioning itself as an alternative hub in a market long dominated by China. This is particularly notable as diversification efforts by the U.S., European Union, Japan, and South Korea have progressed slowly. In short, Kazakhstan is quickly gaining strategic "rare earth" agency. A recent example is the case of the Severny Katpar and Verkhniy Kairakty tungsten deposits. In 2018, China’s Xiamen Tungsten expressed interest, but withdrew without signing legally binding agreements. In 2025, Tau-Ken Samruk signed an agreement with U.S.-based Cove Capital to develop the same assets. This development underscores a larger trend: Kazakhstan is no longer viewed as a peripheral resource supplier, but rather as a contested zone in the U.S.-China competition for critical materials. Global Expansion According to Nurlan Zhakupov, chairman of the board of the Samruk-Kazyna sovereign wealth fund, Kazakhstan intends to deepen its involvement in the global REM market by processing not only domestic materials but also raw inputs from third countries. Tau-Ken Samruk has launched geological exploration projects for rare earths in Rwanda and Afghanistan. “Tau-Ken Samruk is actively engaging with foreign partners,” Zhakupov noted. “We’ve signed an agreement with a Rwandan government agency and identified five target areas. Entry requires establishing a joint venture with a Rwandan state-owned company.” Africa is emerging as a significant REM source, with countries like Burundi already engaging in commercial mining. British firm Rainbow Rare Earths began operations at the Gakara mine in 2017. Kazakhstan’s exploration efforts in Rwanda aim to secure raw inputs for domestic processing. Collaboration with Rwanda’s Mines, Petroleum and Gas Board includes evaluating beryllium sales for Kazatomprom. During his official visit to Kazakhstan, Rwandan President Paul Kagame expressed interest in Kazakhstani technologies, particularly in energy, mining, and mineral processing. However, operations in Africa come with risks. Rwanda and...

Trade

Uzbekistan and Taliban Sign Trade Deals as Coal Shipments Pivot from Pakistan

Afghanistan International has reported that the Taliban administration in Afghanistan’s Balkh province has signed new trade agreements with Uzbekistan, signaling a shift in Kabul’s commercial strategy amid growing tensions with Pakistan. According to Haji Zaid, spokesperson for the Taliban-appointed governor in Balkh, Afghan coal will now be exported to Uzbekistan under the newly signed agreements, replacing previous shipments to Pakistan. In exchange, Uzbekistan will export cement and pharmaceuticals to Afghanistan. Zaid stated that the Taliban, in response to border closures and disrupted trade with Pakistan, is seeking to strengthen economic ties with neighboring countries, particularly Uzbekistan and Iran. Persian-language media also reported that Taliban officials are increasingly urging Afghan traders to seek alternative commercial and transit routes. The Taliban’s Ministry of Finance has claimed that the deterioration of trade with Pakistan has had “no negative impact” on Afghanistan’s overall trade volume, asserting that customs revenues have remained stable. The ministry added that it would fully support traders using new trade corridors. However, Afghan economic experts have challenged the Taliban’s claims. Economist Reza Farzam told local media that assertions about Pakistan’s trade freeze having no impact are misleading, arguing that Afghanistan currently lacks sufficient substitutes for its traditional transit infrastructure through Pakistan. Earlier, Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper reported that the month-long closure of the Torkham border crossing caused more than $4.5 billion in economic losses on both sides of the border. The latest agreements build on earlier announcements that Uzbekistan plans to import Afghan coal as part of broader efforts to balance bilateral trade. During a recent visit to Kabul, an Uzbek delegation expressed interest in purchasing coal, resulting in private-sector deals worth $4.5 million. Discussions also covered trade incentives, joint exhibitions, and a proposal from Uzbekistan to construct a cement plant in Afghanistan’s Samangan region. The Taliban administration has further stated that Afghan agricultural products will be exported to Central Asia, South Asia, and Europe via air corridors through Uzbekistan, as part of a wider strategy to diversify the country’s trade routes.

Geopolitics

Central Asia’s Road to the Southern Seas: A Search for Stability

India has confirmed that it received a six-month sanctions waiver from the United States for its involvement in developing Iran’s Chabahar port. According to The Times of India, the decision followed intensive diplomacy by New Delhi, which convinced Washington that Chabahar provides India’s only practical overland access to Central Asia that avoids Pakistan. Through Chabahar, India is building a land-based counterpart to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, creating an alternative axis linking the Indian Ocean with Eurasia while bypassing Islamabad and Beijing. The exemption, valid until April 2026, gives India room to negotiate with Washington. For Central Asia, the episode reflects a broader challenge: choosing viable routes to the southern seas. Current debates about “Afghan transit” focus largely on the Trans-Afghan Railway and the so-called Kabul corridor connecting northern Afghanistan with Pakistan’s ports. Yet Afghanistan’s transport network is forming along multiple lines. Alongside the eastern route, a western corridor from Herat to Kandahar and Spin Boldak is also developing, offering access both to Pakistan and to Chabahar. The integration of western Afghanistan’s infrastructure with Iran’s transport network makes this corridor more reliable under today’s political and security conditions. It aligns with projects pursued by Iran, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan and positions Herat as a major hub. It is also close to the North–South Transport Corridor, the Lapis Lazuli and Middle Corridors, and the Caspian and Persian Gulf regions. The planned Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat line fits the logic of the Five Nations Railway Corridor, potentially giving Tajikistan and Uzbekistan access to Chabahar and, if stability improves, to Pakistan’s ports as well. By contrast, the eastern route will remain constrained by the unstable Afghan–Pakistani border and the volatile relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Afghanistan’s own priorities also differ from outside assumptions: the Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak line primarily serves as an internal transport spine linking the west and south. For Kabul, the route to Gwadar is more a political gesture than a practical goal. Some analysts note that developing the western corridor also helps rebalance the country’s economic geography toward its more diverse western regions. These dynamics strengthen the western route’s appeal. The Taliban leadership has even urged Afghan businesses to reduce reliance on Pakistani ports, signaling a structural shift in trade orientation. Both Chabahar and Gwadar face political risks. Pakistan’s transit routes pass through areas affected by insurgency, including Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as the broader narcotics routes of the Golden Crescent. The greatest uncertainty remains the fluctuating relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Gwadar, while technologically superior, is undermined by chronic instability. Chabahar’s capacity is more modest, but its integration with Iran’s road and rail network provides reliability. The United States adds another layer of complexity. The waiver suggests Washington is balancing its Iran sanctions regime with its strategic partnership with India. The United States is not directly involved in regional infrastructure but retains enough influence to shift the balance between the western and eastern routes. Under certain conditions, Gwadar may appear less problematic for Washington than Chabahar. At the same time, selective sanctions exemptions...

Rivers

Central Asia Faces Growing Water Risks as Qosh Tepa Canal Nears Completion

Kazakh media, Inbusiness.kz, reports that discussions within the Russian Academy of Sciences have revived a decadesold idea to redirect Siberian rivers toward Central Asia. Researchers have proposed that Russia’s Ministry of Science and Higher Education include a study of the project in its state research plan, arguing that the region is entering a critical phase of water scarcity. This renewed debate comes as Afghanistan advances construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal, a massive irrigation project in the country’s north. The first 108 kilometer section began operating in 2023, and work on the second phase is nearing completion. Once fully operational, the 285 kilometer canal is expected to divert more than 15% of the Amu Darya river’s flow to irrigate around 550,000 hectares of farmland in Afghanistan’s drought-prone regions. Construction began in March 2022 and its impact is already being felt across Central Asia. Experts warn the canal could reduce Uzbekistan’s water supply by around 15% and Turkmenistan’s by up to 80%, which may lead to lower crop yields, job losses, rising poverty and even potential migration or tensions. Scholars in Kazakhstan note rising alarm. Ravshan Nazarov, an associate professor based in Tashkent, said that failure to address water shortages could trigger mass population movements. He argued that redirecting Siberian rivers, though technically complex and costly, may become unavoidable. He warned that if Russia does not share its water resources, it might eventually face “an influx of 100 million refugees.” Data from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) show that Turkmenistan is the region’s largest water consumer, using 53 cubic kilometres annually despite a population of just about 7 million. Experts attribute this to ageing infrastructure, high evaporation losses and a lack of concrete-lined canals. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan has faced water shortages since 2020.